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Occasional Paper #63 cover.

OP63: Generative AI and WMD Nonproliferation: Why Diplomats and Policymakers Need to Pay Attention Now and Develop AI Literacy

Policymakers and diplomats must urgently develop AI literacy to harness its benefits while safeguarding against potential misuse.

CNS/MIIS presents a Certificate of Appreciation to Ms. Nobuko Saito Cleary for her long-standing commitment to intercultural understanding.

Paper Lanterns Film Screening and Panel Discussion

Experts Call for Ending Wars and Conflicts

Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons: Examining the Connection

The presentation delves into the complex relationship between nuclear power and nuclear proliferation.

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)

Author Interview: AI, Chemistry, and the Threat of Chemical Weapons

An exclusive interview with Dr. Ryan Stendall, a chemist and AI safety researcher.

Shira Cohen

Why Do States Use Religious Signals? The Case of Nuclear Weapons

Religious signaling is a growing global phenomenon, particularly in the nuclear realm.

Jeffrey Knopf interviewed on InFocus With Ejaz Haider EP 49: Should We Take Deterrence for Granted?

Should We Take Deterrence for Granted?

Dr. Knopf discusses how to estimate future risks associated with nuclear deterrence.

collage with university towers, chess pieces, a tank on a beach, smoke

Machiavelli in the Ivory Tower: A CNS videocast series

Ep.12: China’s Nuclear Modernization with Dr. Fiona Cunningham

Carnegie Politika

Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Future Depends on More Than a Referendum

Officials in Astana need to focus on meaningful localization if they want Kazakhstan to build a successful civil nuclear industry.

Cover for Russia's "War against Ukraine".

Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Transform, but Do Not Lift, the Fog of War: Evidence from Russia’s War on Ukraine

New technologies add more complexity than clarity on battlefields.

OP#62: The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Posture and Arms Control in Today’s More Dangerous World

At the present moment, it is hard to see grounds for optimism when it comes to nuclear arms control or risk reduction.