Analysis

Magical Thinking and the Real Power of Hiroshima

The 70th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing is a big moment to take stock of where we are, how we’ve gotten here, and where we’re headed.

Removing Risk: Replacing High-Risk Radiological Sources with Alternatives

By examining the potential for replacing high-risk radiological material, a road map can be drawn and used to increase nuclear security and prevent nuclear terrorism.

Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel (Src: Wikimedia Commons)

Israel can live with the Iranian nuclear deal, can Netanyahu?

Israel can live with — and even benefit from– the Iranian nuclear deal. Can Netanyahu?

Understanding the Fuel Cycle in the Iran Agreement

CNS’s scientist-in-residence discusses the ways the Iran deal closes all possible routes to the bomb.

US and Iran Flags (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Iran Deal: Resources and Analysis

Articles, multimedia, and list of experts available for comment on the Iran deal and its implications.

Replacing High-Risk Radioactive Sources

OP#23: Replacing High-Risk Radiological Materials

Occasional Paper #23: CNS researchers offer governments a roadmap to replace high-risk radioactive sources with non-isotopic alternatives.

Nuclear Fuel Bank of Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Fuel Bank: A New Nonproliferation Tool

A former Soviet facility that once produced fuel for nuclear submarines now has the chance to play a key role in reducing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Could low-enriched uranium be used in naval reactors

Could low-enriched uranium be used in naval reactors? Don’t ask the Navy

Congress should commission qualified experts to conduct an impartial review, at classified & unclassified levels, of naval LEU use.

Saudi Arabia Can Build a Bomb

Sorry, Fareed: Saudi Arabia Can Build a Bomb Any Damn Time It Wants To

Fareed Zakaria’s assertion that Saudi Arabia can’t build a nuke is simply wrong– and its not all that hard to demonstrate why.

How can we push for tighter security for nuclear weapons?

Despite progress toward improving security for civilian nuclear materials, there is little appetite to open a discussion on developing security guidelines for these dangerous materials and weapons in military programs.