August 17, 2008
| Chronology of North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Program | |
|---|---|
| 1960-1979 | 1994-1995 |
| 1980-1989 | 1996-1998 |
| 1990-1991 | 1999 |
| 1992-1993 | |
Early 1960s
North Korea begins producing a version of the Chinese Type 63 107mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL).
Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 1991-92, (Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey: 1991), p.719.
1968-69
North Korea takes delivery from the USSR of S-2 Sopka (SS-C-2b Samlet) coastal-defense missiles sufficient to outfit five batteries. The missiles are deployed on the east coast of North Korea where they replace coastal artillery.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp.203-207.
1969-70
China assists North Korea in the re-organization and expansion of the Soviet-built Samlet maintenance and assembly facilities. North Korea acquires and fields the Chinese-built HY-1 (a reverse-engineered Soviet SS-N-2 Styx surface-to-surface missile). Some HY-1 deliveries are made directly from Chinese naval stocks, and some are shipped as “knock-down” kits for assembly.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp.203-207.
Late 1960s
North Korea takes delivery of Soviet BM-21 122mm-caliber MRLs.
Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 1991-92, (Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey: 1991), p.719.
Early 1970s
Soviet deliveries of SS-C-2b missiles continue. The missiles are supplied in “knock-down” kits, which the North Korean military has been trained to assemble and test. However, the USSR refuses to supply more modern missiles due to political differences. This leads North Korea to approach China for assistance, which it receives in the form of transfers of reverse-engineered Soviet-designed missile systems and Chinese missile research and development technology.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp.203-207.
1972
North Korea establishes an indigenous SY-1/HY-1 production facility. However, many major components are still provided by Chinese factories.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp.203-207.
1973
It is reported that North Korea possesses 24 unguided FROG-5 and -7 rockets, as well as six SS-C-2b sites. The North Korean navy possesses 10 Komar-class and eight Osa-class missile boats armed with Styx anti-ship missiles.
The Military Balance: 1973-74, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973), p.53.
1974-75
North Korea’s HY-1 production facility is converted to produce HY-2 missiles.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp.203-207.
April 1975
North Korean leader Kim Il-sung travels to Beijing where Kim’s defense minister, Oh Jin-u, expresses a desire to purchase tactical ballistic missiles from China. China does not have that class of missile at the time, but the North Korean query coincides with growing Chinese interest in developing such a missile.
Hua Di, Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, September 1991, pp.14-15. John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, International Security, Fall 1992, pp.5-40.
Mid-1970s
North Korea begins producing Soviet model BM-21 122mm-caliber MRLs.
Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 1991-92, (Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey: 1991), p.719.
Mid-1970s
North Korea begins a program to reverse-engineer FROG-7A rockets. The program is eventually cancelled when North Korea begins its Scud-B surface-to-surface missile (SSM) reverse-engineering program.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp.203-207.
1976
North Korea purchases two Scud-B missiles from Egypt.
Yonhap (Seoul), 24 June 1993; in JPRS-TND-93-020, p.1.
(Note: There is conflicting information on whether North Korea received its first Scud-Bs from Egypt in 1976 or 1981. The 1981 date is more likely given the lack of reported missile development in North Korea until the 1980s.)
1976
It is believed that full-scale production of the HY-2 missile begins.
Christopher F. Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 1991-92, (Jane’s Information Group, Coulsdon, Surrey: 1991), p.749.
Late 1976
China agrees to an April 1975 North Korean proposal for joint development of the DF-61 single-stage mobile tactical missile, which may carry cluster munitions or fuel-air explosive warhead. The maximum range of the missile is estimated at 600km with a 1,000kg payload, with guidance to be supplied by a new Chinese-developed gyro.
Hua Di, Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, September 1991, pp.14-15. John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, International Security, Fall 1992, pp.5-40.
March 1977
Korean Worker’s Party Secretary Kang Song-san attends a reception hosted by the Seventh Machine Industry Ministry, which develops China’s ballistic missiles.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, September 1991, pp.404-411.
1978
The joint Chinese-North Korean DF-61 missile project collapses when its primary Chinese supporter Chen Xilian is ousted from office.
John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, International Security, Fall 1992, pp.5-40.
(Note: While the program was never completed, North Korean technicians and scientists who worked on the project may have brought back valuable knowledge on missile design. Given that the Chinese acquired restricted missile information during training with the Soviets in the 1960s, it is plausible that North Korea might have duplicated this feat while working with the Chinese. The knowledge and expertise acquired may have proven valuable in the Scud-C program, a missile not unlike the DF-61, and in subsequent missile programs as well.)
1979
Negotiations begin between North Korea and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for the construction of a digital bi-polar integrated circuit factory in North Korea.
Terminal Report on Project DP/DRK/79/003; Establishment of Digital Bi-Polar Integrated Circuit Plant in DPR of Korea, (ET&T Development Corporation Ltd.: New Delhi).
(Note: Acquisition of this technology constitutes first step towards an indigenous integrated circuit capability, which might find application in missile guidance, control, and navigation.)
