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New Details of “The Gyroscope Deal” Investigation: More Than 800 Missile Components Were Transferred from Sergiev Posad, Moscow Region, to the Middle East
Vladimir Orlov, Editor, Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control)
PIR Center for Policy Studies
April 1998
The PIR – Center for Policy Studies in Russia was the first, and is still the only Russian non-governmental organization to begin studying the gyroscope scandal, involving gyroscopes which were illegally exported from Russia to Iraq. In September 1997 we issued a respective report followed by a number of articles on the subject, we received responses from a broad array of sources, including the representatives of Russian governmental authorities, experts on missile technology, Western journalists, and the employees of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). In the initial report and the subsequent follow-ups we drew conclusions about the imperfection of Russian export controls over missile components as well as the imperfections of the Russian Criminal Code which prevented punishment of those guilty of smuggling. However, we repeatedly emphasized that our investigation turned up more questions than answers, with the primary question shifting from the undoubtedly interesting aspect where from and where to, to the question why. In other words, question qui prodest? – who profits? – stayed open.
We endeavored to complete the investigation we had begun. It required additional interviews (which we succeeded in obtaining, on the condition that we maintain the anonymity of the sources), an independent expert review of the material received earlier, and also additional information from official sources or private experts as well as foreign journalists, in particular, from the USA and Jordan; and a considerable amount of information was supplied from the Iraqi and Palestinian circles. Like all the other sources, these have been thoroughly and, where possible, cross-checked multiple times.
Though we had collected the materials referred to below as early as January, at that time we refrained from their disclosure: while the Iraqi crisis was in full swing (which was the case in January-February) the risk of a biased interpretation and use of the data for an investigation, similar to our own, was too great.
Today, when the crisis around Iraq has subsided (probably, temporarily), we are ready to suggest our version of the reasons and details of the story started in 1994 and resulted in the export of eight hundred ten-missile gyroscopes from Russia.
The Story
On December 9, 1995, a group of scuba divers hired by the UNSCOM surfaced six missile instruments from the bottom of the river Tigris, near Baghdad: L24-560-4 two-stage gyro units, serial numbers A17373 and Z17530; L20-17G integrating gyros, serial numbers E17248 and T17215; an LVR-014 air pressure regulator, decimal number LD2.573.014, and a micromotor, serial number A093. Immediately after the finding of the gyroscopes the Russia’s Ambassador to the United States Yuli Vorontsov declared that they were not of the Russian origin, regardless of the revealing numbers. At first, it was assumed that the gyroscopes had been stolen from the manufacturer in Ukraine.
In early February 1996 the Chairman of the UNSCOM, Rolf Ekeus, came to Moscow for negotiations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the course of almost four-hour of talks in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs he swamped the experts with questions, showing knowledge of a large amount of information on the issue. The Russian diplomats were not prepared for this meeting. After the meeting their statements became more cautious – they were already not denying the Russian origin of the Iraqi gyroscopes, however they insisted that governmental authorities had nothing to do with the deal.
On April 9, 1996, on the basis of the materials supplied by the Department for Counterintelligence Support of the Strategic Facilities of the Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia, the Investigation Department of the FSB of the Russian Federation opened criminal case on the charge of the illegal export of the equipment applicable in the construction of missile delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, i.e. regarding evidence of the type of crime covered by the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Part 2, Article 78-1.
The Buyer
Viam Garbie. A subject of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, but ethnically a Palestinian. He was born 1963 in Lebanon, which he left with his parents for Qatar where he grew up. From Qatar he went to the United States, where he studied at the University of Chicago. He maintained a close relations with General Union of Palestinian Students and was an active member. He worked in collaboration with the Democratic Youth Organization, the League for Support of Palestine, and other student, youth, and public organizations registered and formally working in the USA.
Garbie took an active part in the events during intifada. He participated in the demonstrations, manifestations and other public actions “directed at the attraction of attention of the American public to the problem of the Palestinian people”. However, in connection with my activities in this field he had no problems in terms of a breach of the law, and he had no criminal charges. Though he knew that his name was mentioned in the so-called black list. Many of his friends had to face similar problems both in the USA and Canada. In the USA Garbie opened his own business, trading in second-hand computers. Then he left for Canada. He spent more than ten living in North America.
Garbie decided to leave the USA since he received an opportunity to get a job as well as becoming a permanent residence. Considering that the Jordanian authorities denied him the extension of his passport at the time, he was afraid that the American authorities could make use of this condition against him or he would have problems because he had not made timely arrangements for his passport, and it would thus turn out that he was breaking the Immigration Law. However, he learnt that in Canada they had more favorable conditions for naturalization of the people of his status (Palestinians without passports) as well as for getting a suitable job. Besides, he believed that in Canada he would face a different political situation, more favorable compared with that pursued within the US borders. He did not have a valid passport to extend it.
In Canada, Garbie lived in Toronto and Montreal. He rented an apartment himself or shared it with a friend. Later, he could not remember the addresses of the companies with whom he cooperated. In Canada Garbie was associated primarily with Arabs who had received Canadian citizenship, and later he could not exactly recall their names or occupations.
The Seller
The Research and Testing Institute of Chemical and Building Machines (NIIKhSM). Situated in Serghyev Posad, the Moscow Region. From 1990 to 1995, in compliance with the START-1 Treaty, more than 100 submarine launched intercontinental ballistic missiles were disposed of here.
The disposal of missiles is the responsibility of the company which designed them. The same company issues the documentation describing the purpose and method for their disposal. The principal task here is cost effectiveness, i.e. the possibility of reasonable reuse after the disposal (for instance, missiles are cut into blocks and the metal is recycled). A secondary task is declassification (i.e. pieces sent to the dumping site should not contain classified components). Theoretically, SLBM disposal should be the responsibility of the Makeyev GRTs Design Bureau (the Myass Machine Building Design Bureau, in the Chelyabinsk Region). However, they actually only take responsibility for the general coordination of the work and use a large number of subcontractors, which are responsible for specific aspects, such as engines, steering systems, etc. In particular, the steering systems are the domain of the Sverdlovsk Design Bureau, and this bureau, also, uses subcontractors for power supplies, gyroscopes, etc. This branching is infinite, and it is unknown who determines the limit of declassification.
Usually there are no problems in the process of transportation of SLBM from the Ministry of Defense location to a disposal site. And in this case the SLBM, from which the warhead was removed, came to dismantling and disposal to Serghyev Posad under strong security and marked “classified”. The direct dismantling of the missiles was also conducted in a guarded and secret location. After the missile dismantling (crushing or cutting) the scrap (including intact instrument parts, with gyroscopes among them) is delivered to the storage facility (copper separately, tin separately, gyroscopes separately, etc.).
The Buyer
After more then ten years in North America Garbie returned to the Middle East, and specifically Jordan However, he faced serious passport problems in the Amman’s Al-Malica Alya international airport. The old Jordanian passport used for travelling around the world had expired. On arrival to Amman Garbie was detained and the expired passport seized from him. Garbie had to stay in the transit passenger room about six days before he received, due to the mediation of, as he would call him later, an intimate friend, the permission to enter Jordan, with his passport returned.
Upon arrival to Jordan, Garbie stayed in the Amman International Hotel. Then, for a while he stayed with his relatives. Later, when his relatives bought their own apartment for the family, he settled with them at Umm Uweina, on the corner of the Mecca Street and Medina Street, near a small Chinese restaurant.
After the seizure of Kuwait in 1990 Garbie suddenly found himself in the occupied territory. Here he continued his computer business, removing computers from the plundered Kuwait offices, including the Ministry of the Interior. According to some sources, he discovered confidential and classified information in some of the Ministry computers, which he profited from by selling it to Iraq. After this, the Iraqi special services established direct, friendly contact with Garbie. He also met Hussein Camil (Kamal) Khasan, the Minister of Industry, Trade and Oil of Iraq, and most important, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law.
It was from him that Garbie received his first really serious order.
The Seller
Garbie first came to Russia in December 1993, also on computer business. He began with small things, buying electronic components at markets and selling them to Iraq via Jordan. He found his way around, and as early as 1994 he established important relations with a number of Moscow businesses, including some in the military industrial complex.
Thus, in early 1994, Garbie contacted the managers of NIIKhSM, including Deputy Director of Economic Affairs V., Chief Accountant S., First Deputy Director L., and Deputy Director of General Affairs O. (we know all the names). Soon they began detailed negotiations on selling him various kind of equipment, including that from disposed of missiles.
By July 1995 they came to a final agreement with Garbie on selling him a large amount of non-liquid equipment as well as gyroscope instruments from the command modules of decommissioned ballistic missiles. V. and S. were directly involved in the execution of the deal with Garbie (including the execution of the contract, financial and other documents, and shipping the equipment).
Simultaneously, a obscure company, the closed joint-stock company SPM-Systema emerged in Serghyev Posad. We can now only guess who was behind the creation of this company, however it was all done neatly: the closed joint-stock company was registered by a front, though with the use of forged documents and seal. The trail of SPM-Systema owners faded, though the contract which was soon signed – the only one for the company – lifted the shroud surrounding the mystery.
The Gyroscope Samples
Garbie requested samples of the gyroscopes, and received approximately ten. Together with these samples he quietly went to Jordan in June 1995 (Russian customs officers would hardly have reason to search a modest consignment of electrical equipment without being prompted, or additional occupational training), and then to Iraq. He showed the samples to Camil. And then strange things began to happen.
According to one of the versions, Camil reprimanded Garbie for lack of wit: the gyroscopes offered by the Russians were much more advanced than those Iraq was looking for. Camil was interested in the gyroscopes for short range missiles, for SCUDs. The use of the gyroscopes for longer range missiles required a gyroplatform (housing three gyroscopes in three directions), additional documentation, and service support. Finally, long rang missiles themselves would also be necessary. According to another version Camil appreciated the efforts of the Palestinian in Russia more than favorably, and gave him a free hand to implement the whole deal. That would certainly imply its generous financing.
In any case, upon Garbie’s return to Moscow lines of credit had been opened in the Moscow commercial bank Yapy Toko Bank, to be distributed to NIIKhSM, for US$100,000 and $20,000.
It was these samples that were quite accidentally recovered from the turbid Tigris by the UN Special Commission six month later. By that time Camil Hussein was already far away from Baghdad: Saddam’s son-in-law had dissented and told his new (or perhaps not so new) patrons many curious things about the life of the Baghdad court, including, probably, the gyroscope story.
The Deal
In August 1995 V. and S. signed an agreement, on behalf of NIIKhSM, with their closed joint-stock company SPM-Systema “to conduct experimental work”, under which a large number of various instruments were delivered, including those from the command modules of the disposed 3M-40 ballistic missiles: L24-560-4 two-stage gyro units and L20-17G integrating gyros, which are listed in the “list of equipment, materials and technologies, used for creation of missile weapons, the export of which are controlled and licensed”, as approved by the Executive Order No. 193-rp of the President of the Russian Federation, dated April 25, 1995.
A total of eight hundred gyroscopes were sold to the Iraqis, not including the first ten.
The Deputy Director and the Chief Accountant were actually quite familiar with the Russian export control legislation. They preferred not to the break laws. Because under those laws there is nothing criminal in selling gyroscopes by a Russian institute to a company which is also Russian. How SPM-Systema would sell the gyroscopes to a foreign company, should it be Jordanian or any other, was a different question. But that did not confuse the investigators from the Defense Ministry, either.
What confused them was the money issue. First, the amount of the contract. One hundred twenty thousand was next to nothing for the goods offered, considering their size, actual world prices, and strategic importance. However, an amount with a larger number of trailing zeros could attract the attention of the customs authorities or the Federal Security Service. The second confusing, and more important, point was the conditions, established by Garbie, on the line of credit at the Yapy Toko Bank. Their fulfillment was clearly too difficult. We can say, jumping ahead, that neither NIIKhSM, nor SPM-Systema ever received the money for the goods. Not a cent.
Customs
In the assessment of the risk of breaking the export controls laws of Russia, one of the greatest risks is pinned to the possibility of carrying goods without license, or specifying false data. Customs officers themselves admit that even in case of radioactive materials their capabilities to identify and stop the transfer of contraband materials are extremely limited . As for stopping non-nuclear strategic contraband, in particular, missile equipment, no governmental resolution would enable customs officers to reveal and prevent such illegal exports. There certainly is no prompting from special services or, even more reliable, competing companies .
In this connection, the actions of V., S. and Garbie stir a special interest, because they still preferred to play it safe. In addition to the Qatar-Canadian Palestinian, Muscovite Nigerians also came onto the scene.
When the equipment purchased by Garbie in NIIKhSM in August 1995 was carried from Serghyev Posad to Moscow in two lots, the execution of the customs formalities for the consignment was taken by a representative of the Russian-Nigerian closed joint stock company Nison Investment Plc Gerald Iwusezi, to whom Garbie described the consignment to be exported as television (electronic) equipment or as precision supersensitive instruments.
As Garbie later stated in Amman: “No organization or person asked me to rename the goods, as I adhered to the conventional classification, namely, the term micromotor, i.e. a precision supersensitive motor. This is a general classification for electric instruments. All instruments of this kind has its own number stamped on it; they have no signs except the numbers. This name is used in documents, however, the term gyroscope implies a whole group of instruments, that is why it would be illogical to apply a single term to them.
“The execution of the shipping documents in the framework of the deal signed was charged to a Russian company owned by Nigerians. That company was occasionally involved in the organization of shipping goods. We informed the company about having a lot of precision equipment, with the basis being electric motors. We needed an experienced specialist in goods export from Russia since we did not have such experience. We needed a lawyer or accountant with necessary experience and authority to [prepare the required documents]. One of the company office workers assumed this responsibility. The control was exercised by the company providing the loading of the consignment. Throughout all the necessary steps there was neither renaming of the goods nor change of its classification fixed in respective documents. The man [in charge] did all those things personally. Before the loading he came to the airport to be sure of the correctness of the execution of the consignment, its compliance with the specified name, classification and numbers specified. All of that data was contained in the shipping documents. All of this was done to pass the customs examination. … In this way we carried the last lot of equipment from Russia in a few steps.
“[The problems] were connected primarily with the financial aspects concerning prices and customs taxes, and did not cover technical classification. Though we used the term highly sensitive equipment to describe those components there could be no problem here since we also formally imported precision equipment, in the framework of the same consignment, having received it from the same source. As for the use of the term gyroscopes or accelerometers, there is no such classification in the customs catalogue. Besides, nobody would deny that they are based on precision motors”.
Indeed, there can hardly be any claims against the Russian-Nigerian company. They only assisted in the execution of the documents. However, Garbie was well aware what was in the load he was carrying and why the neutral word micromotor should be used in the documents. He really feared a charge of breaking export controls laws, that is why he tried to demonstrate in every way that his contraband is not so dangerous: “[The deal] does not run counter to either the laws of the exporter country or those of the importer country. Such a deal could be compared, for instance, with a purchase of electronic equipment with a purpose to use the internal parts containing gold”
Garbie insisted in talking with his Jordanian lawyers, that he did not simply know that export of gyroscopes from Russia is criminal under the law effective in this country. According to my information, he said to one of his lawyers, export of such gyroscopes has not been banned. They were not in the international classification list of gyroscopes prohibited for sale – that was my impression when I received them and opened a line of credit for that purpose. The group of such high-sensitivity electronic instruments could better be refereed to as potentiometers, tachometers, etc. Besides, these are multipurpose instruments; they may be used in various systems, for instance, to be installed at civil aircraft, drilling equipment, etc. Those instruments were designed only for the determination of deviation and acceleration. In many Western states, and not Western states only, trading in these instruments is allowed [This is true but only within those states, while their export is controlled according to MTCR – Ed.]. Specialized newspapers and journals publish articles describing similar technical arrangements. The deal was legitimate. Otherwise, with the existing prohibition on the sale of these instruments the deal could not have been formally executed, however, all the documents were generated and signed by the selling party, not to mention the formal nature of the contacts. I did not distort the classification characteristics of the instruments, Garbie believed, for I brought them to the territory of Jordan on the basis of a formal document with the respective reference number. In the Moscow Sheremetyevo Airport those samples passed through the necessary examination without any problem. Besides, Garbie continued, we had not made any modifications in the rates or name of the goods to hide contraband. We knew that in case of any problems in the Moscow Airport we had an opportunity to invite a representative of the selling party to confirm the legitimacy of the deal regarding the sale of those instruments, specifying the payment account with the authorized bank. The goods were sent to my address and my name. I did not try to avoid the customs examination or mislead the customs officers.
When we attempted to receive the technology and ready components from the gyroscope manufacturers, Garbie explained to his lawyers, the selling party in compliance with the formal documents offered us separate components, technologies and materials not covered by the agreement on prohibition to transfer technologies related to some specific pieces of missile equipment. In case of gyroscopes and accelerometers, one has to be extremely accurate in their classification. We did not go beyond this classification in receiving the instruments from the missile equipment dismantling plant. One knows that the agreement covers only production process transfer, but it does not include ready manufactured pieces. We know that India imported manufactured instruments in the framework of its projects for development of missile technologies, however, it was denied the transfer of the production process going beyond the framework of the agreement. It is a fact that we have not imported the whole guidance and steering system – the gyroplatform. We imported separate parts of that system: some electronic instruments which, when desired, could be separately obtained both from Western and Eastern sources at well-known prices and in the framework of the same classification to which we adhered importing the instruments, with their subsequent installation, after certain improvements and revamping, in a system where they could be used, for instance, at ground-to-ground missiles or ground-to-air missiles, or other similar systems.
In the same way one could buy a missile airframe or other missile part, and use individual components as metal scrap, with the electric and electronic systems retrieved to be used separately, explained Garbie. We gave opportunity of solving all the questions concerning the purchase, transportation, handling and delivery of the goods to the persons interested in the deal. As we knew, it was not an attempt to smuggle the instruments not included in classification lists of electric or other equipment. We had an opportunity to obtain a whole guidance system [Editor’s emphasis], however, we did not do it so as not to breach the law regarding all items of the system as a whole. We could have used various forms of pressure to conclude such a deal in this or that way, however, we left the opportunity to resolve the issue to the persons interested in the deal, who assured us that they acted within the framework of the international agreements and Russian laws.
We did not quote the above ample reasoning to assure the reader of Garbie’s naivete. It is obvious that he had prepared such an excuse in advance and it is intended for the people who have little knowledge of the constraints in the framework of MTCR. It seemed noteworthy to us that the same reasoning is also used, almost verbatim, by some domestic potential sellers who would like to put the Russian military industrial complex on a commercial track.
However, the Palestinian had one more stand-by explanation, and it was this explanation that could really confuse the investigation.
Scrap
Nevertheless, Garbie did not resort to it. Only once, in Amman, did he let out that he carried to Iraq the instruments designated as scrap. Our interlocutors in Moscow spoke about it much more frequently and persistently. Really, the gyroscopes were dismantled from the SLBM without any further intentions for their sale; it was expected that they would stay in storage until final and irreversible disposal. Several domestic specialists in missile technology and guidance systems tried to persuade us, concertedly, that most gyroscopes dismantled from missiles undergo rough mechanical manipulation (for instance, using hammer to separate pieces) and, hence, they cannot in any way be used for military purpose because they would not provide the necessary guidance accuracy. At the same time, according to these specialists, the dismantled gyroscopes may be of interest both in terms of exercise and experiments, and in terms of studying the design. Though, on the other hand, it is clear that a few hundreds of instruments are obviously too numerous for the purpose.
The instruments found in Iraq in November 1996 were made available for expertise in Russia by the UNSCOM, and their technical review was prescribed and fulfilled. The expert opinion was that those instruments had been manufactured in the Russian Federation and were the components of a command instrument of a ballistic missile steering system; at that time the instruments were inoperative and could not be used for the designed purpose; the reason of the impossibility to use them for the design purpose was their nonprofessional dismantling from missiles not pursuing the purpose to retain operability of the instruments, and two of the instruments had been damaged by water.
So, two instruments, before they got to the Tigris, had been operable and could be used for their designed purpose. That was one third of the instruments which underwent review by experts. If this proportion is extended to all the gyroscopes purchased by Garbie, it would turn out that two hundred seventy items might have been used by Iraq for their originally intended purpose.
However, Garbie did not seem to know completely why he was carrying the gyroscopes to Baghdad. As he said to one of his Jordanian friends, “according to the purchase conditions for the gyroscopes, we could use either separate items of their structure (to be precise, high sensitivity electric motors or precision internal systems) or the whole system.”
Incongruity
What was it that Garbie carried to Iraq: broken instruments unfit for any missiles? Then why was it necessary to receive the order from Camil himself? Why was it necessary to request hundreds of thousands of dollars to pay for the deal? Was it just to bring from Serghyev Posad to Baghdad the scrap only good for studying its chips? Would not it have been simpler to be confined with the previously delivered, and, as it is becoming clear, not quite unfit samples? Or was it a concrete military order for the implementation of specific purposes?
The Destiny of the Gyroscopes
The gyroscopes successfully passed through the freight customs of the Sheremetyevo airport and were delivered to Jordan by Royal Jordanian Airlines. In Amman, the goods were examined at customs through a few steps upon arrival and at their dispatch from Al-Malike Alya airport to the customs warehouse where they were to stay till shipment to Baghdad, while Garbie was executing the permission to trans-ship the consignment to the end-user in Baghdad.
But there turned out to be no consignee. Camil had disappeared from Baghdad. The money promised for the deal had disappeared with him. As Garbie found out, nobody else expected him and his goods in Baghdad. Soon it became clear that Camil had sold out his father-in-law and, probably, he had long been working for the Americans.
Garbie was anxious to go to Baghdad, even without the gyroscopes. He had problems with a financial matter as he had no free money because Camil Hussein’s had disappeared. He was trying to solve his problems in a few ways: either selling the electronic equipment, electric motors and instruments, or returning them, or making arrangements with the Iraqi Government. Simultaneously he began devising other options, so as not to sustain a complete loss. He did not rule out that he might supply the gyroscopes or their components to Egypt or Algeria.
Scrap
Nevertheless, Garbie did not resort to it. Only once, in Amman, did he let out that he carried to Iraq the instruments designated as scrap. Our interlocutors in Moscow spoke about it much more frequently and persistently. Really, the gyroscopes were dismantled from the SLBM without any further intentions for their sale; it was expected that they would stay in storage until final and irreversible disposal. Several domestic specialists in missile technology and guidance systems tried to persuade us, concertedly, that most gyroscopes dismantled from missiles undergo rough mechanical manipulation (for instance, using hammer to separate pieces) and, hence, they cannot in any way be used for military purpose because they would not provide the necessary guidance accuracy. At the same time, according to these specialists, the dismantled gyroscopes may be of interest both in terms of exercise and experiments, and in terms of studying the design. Though, on the other hand, it is clear that a few hundreds of instruments are obviously too numerous for the purpose.
The instruments found in Iraq in November 1996 were made available for expertise in Russia by the UNSCOM, and their technical review was prescribed and fulfilled. The expert opinion was that those instruments had been manufactured in the Russian Federation and were the components of a command instrument of a ballistic missile steering system; at that time the instruments were inoperative and could not be used for the designed purpose; the reason of the impossibility to use them for the design purpose was their nonprofessional dismantling from missiles not pursuing the purpose to retain operability of the instruments, and two of the instruments had been damaged by water.
So, two instruments, before they got to the Tigris, had been operable and could be used for their designed purpose. That was one third of the instruments which underwent review by experts. If this proportion is extended to all the gyroscopes purchased by Garbie, it would turn out that two hundred seventy items might have been used by Iraq for their originally intended purpose.
However, Garbie did not seem to know completely why he was carrying the gyroscopes to Baghdad. As he said to one of his Jordanian friends, “according to the purchase conditions for the gyroscopes, we could use either separate items of their structure (to be precise, high sensitivity electric motors or precision internal systems) or the whole system.”
Incongruity
What was it that Garbie carried to Iraq: broken instruments unfit for any missiles? Then why was it necessary to receive the order from Camil himself? Why was it necessary to request hundreds of thousands of dollars to pay for the deal? Was it just to bring from Serghyev Posad to Baghdad the scrap only good for studying its chips? Would not it have been simpler to be confined with the previously delivered, and, as it is becoming clear, not quite unfit samples? Or was it a concrete military order for the implementation of specific purposes?
The Destiny of the Gyroscopes
The gyroscopes successfully passed through the freight customs of the Sheremetyevo airport and were delivered to Jordan by Royal Jordanian Airlines. In Amman, the goods were examined at customs through a few steps upon arrival and at their dispatch from Al-Malike Alya airport to the customs warehouse where they were to stay till shipment to Baghdad, while Garbie was executing the permission to trans-ship the consignment to the end-user in Baghdad.
But there turned out to be no consignee. Camil had disappeared from Baghdad. The money promised for the deal had disappeared with him. As Garbie found out, nobody else expected him and his goods in Baghdad. Soon it became clear that Camil had sold out his father-in-law and, probably, he had long been working for the Americans.
Garbie was anxious to go to Baghdad, even without the gyroscopes. He had problems with a financial matter as he had no free money because Camil Hussein’s had disappeared. He was trying to solve his problems in a few ways: either selling the electronic equipment, electric motors and instruments, or returning them, or making arrangements with the Iraqi Government. Simultaneously he began devising other options, so as not to sustain a complete loss. He did not rule out that he might supply the gyroscopes or their components to Egypt or Algeria.
But on Garbie’s way from Amman to Baghdad, which is within an easy distance, he was suddenly confronted by the Jordanian special services – probably, those whom he previously numbered among his intimate friends. Again they used the best pretext – the expired passport of the Palestinian, and agreed to extend it once more (and let Garbie go to Baghdad) provided that he agrees to tell them about his political activities in the USA and he suggested that they return his passport in exchange for agreeing to leave Jordan, promising not to return to that country. Garbie had to accept such an outcome as he needed to return to Iraq — on urgent business.
Instead of receiving the money Garbie was arrested in December 1995 by the law enforcement agencies of Iraq “on suspicion of involvement in the illegal supply of missile components to Iraq”. At the same time, the majority of the missile and other equipment exported by Garbie from Russia was detained by the law enforcement agencies of the Kingdom of Jordan.
Incongruity
While the Russian customs officers easily let Garbie pass with his freight, their Jordanian counterparts appeared to be capable of revealing the actual content of the consignment. They could hardly be as knowledgeable in missile technology details (unless they were graduates of the Bauman Technical University in Moscow). Maybe somebody suggested the true details to them?
Perhaps the Jordanian partners he had both in Amman and Moscow? At least Garbie, himself was sure it was not them.
Iraqis? Most unlikely, taking into account the difficult relations between the Baghdad and Amman (although this cannot be completely ruled out).
Camil Hussein?
The Outcome
On January 5, 1997, in connection with the entry into force of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation on January 1,1997, and amendment of the language of Art.78-1 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR , the case against the NIIKhSM was requalified to Art. 189 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the disposition of which does not provide for criminal liability for illegal export of equipment used in creation of delivery vehicles of weapons of mass destruction. Criminal case has been closed. The only charges that could be presented against S., V. and other employees of the institute would be setting up a front company with the purpose to Well, the purpose is not important any more because no investigator would undertake to prove their connection with SPM-Systema.
Viam Garbie is in Iraq with his case under investigation. The criminal prosecution against him was undertaken according to Article 159 of The Law on Criminal Offense of the Republic of Iraq, “work for an enemy foreign state”. One can easily guess that the state in question is by no means Jordan.
The gyroscopes and other equipment seized at the Amman customs warehouse have been expropriated by the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.
It is a fact that the Russian judicial and legal system is incapable of adding at least some element of vitality in the sections of the Criminal Code covering breaches of export control legislation . While such states as Germany and the USA demonstrate a most serious attitude towards the breaches of national legislation and international obligations by the illegal export of goods and technologies included in the control lists, Russia appears to consider any criminal prosecution here unnecessary.
We can only guess how it happened that Criminal Case fell to pieces and never came to court here, in Russia. We may assume that in the power structures and law enforcement agencies there are many people acutely suffering from the conniving of those who have created serious blows to the national interests and prestige of the state.
Upon reading the Resolution of the Government No.57 On the Improvement of Controls over Export of Dual-Use Goods and Services Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Delivery Vehicles Thereof, many federal officials were seriously concerned about whether their agencies were prepared to meet the stringent requirements of the document. However, many people away from Moscow, at manufacturing plants only smiled ironically, not believing in the seriousness of the intentions of the government which is capable of writing formidable resolutions but incapable of bringing even an obvious case of missile contraband to court.
Is there a lacuna in the Criminal Code where WMD delivery systems have been forgotten? Possibly so. However, did any of the present law-makers do anything to demand that the legislator fill in these lacunas? Was that forgetfulness unintentional? Probably so. Though this absence of attention betrays how poorly the government thinks its constraints on strategic export will work; one can even notice a poorly hidden trace of pity for the managers of the collapsing enterprises of the defense industry who try, in circumvention of the law, to feed themselves and maybe the enterprise, too… their thoughts are far from criminal prosecution.
