June 18, 2024
Hanna Notte
The following is an excerpt from The Atlantic.
Iran is suffering blow after blow, and Russia, its most powerful supporter, is apparently not prepared to do much of anything about it.
Not long ago, backing the West’s least-favorite power in the Middle East had its uses. In prosecuting his war of attrition in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has made confrontation with the West the organizing principle of his foreign policy. In that context, edging closer to Iran and its partners in the “Axis of Resistance” made sense.
Tehran was also an important supplier: It delivered Shahed drones for Russian use in Ukraine at a moment when these were particularly crucial to Moscow’s war-fighting capacity. Then came the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, followed by Israel’s brutal war in Gaza. Leaning into pro-Palestinian and anti-Western sentiment allowed Russia to score points with global public opinion.
But dynamics that initially seemed to benefit Russia quickly became a strategic headache. First, Israel devastated Iran’s partners Hamas and Hezbollah; then, in April and October 2024, Iran attacked Israel directly with strikes that yielded only minimal damage, suggesting that Iran’s missile capabilities were not all that formidable. Israel retaliated, impairing Iran’s missile production and air defenses, including its Russian-made S-300 missile systems. Suddenly, Iran looked weak, and Russia had a choice: It could shore up its Middle Eastern ally, or it could cut its losses in a troubled region.
Continue reading at The Atlantic.
