February 5, 2026
Hanna Notte
The following is an excerpt from Foreign Affairs.
n the eve of invading Ukraine in 2022, Russia enjoyed a decent global position. It had a strong partnership with China; extensive economic ties with Europe; a working relationship, however fraught, with the United States; and an informal network of partners with which to do business. Russia dominated few countries (other than Belarus) but also had few real enemies and could exercise influence beyond its neighborhood. More than a rising or declining power, Russia was a protean power.
Then Russia invaded Ukraine. In response, Europe and the United States immediately became Moscow’s adversaries. The Kremlin, having lost much of its diplomatic influence in Europe, became much more reliant on China. The war, meanwhile, has absorbed Russia’s attention and virtually all of its military capacity, making it hard for Moscow to steer events farther afield. As a result, the Kremlin could do little as some of its allies, including Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, fell. The war itself has not gone particularly well, either. After four years of fighting, Ukraine remains in control of roughly 80 percent of its territory.
But Moscow is hardly prepared to cut its losses. Unless U.S. President Donald Trump can persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the fighting—an unlikely scenario—Russia will probably try harder to subjugate Ukraine, not because the battlefield decisively favors Moscow but because Putin needs to hold the line somewhere. He is poised to respond to Russia’s geopolitical limits by recommitting to its war. The humanitarian catastrophe he has already inflicted on Ukraine, depriving it of heating and electricity amid freezing conditions, may soon get even worse.
Continue reading at Foreign Affairs.
