June 19, 2025
Advocates for U.S. nuclear primacy suggest that highly accurate modern strategic missiles may usher in a “new era of counterforce dominance” in which the United States can eliminate an adversary’s nuclear forces in a disarming first strike. Yet, counterforce enthusiasts overlook an important technological headwind: the complexity of advanced weapon systems can confound nuclear planners’ ability to predict their performance in a real nuclear exchange. This challenge is particularly acute for counterforce systems that cannot be tested in operational settings, and whose failure would bring catastrophic consequences on their user. I analyze the uncertainty of counterforce operations by constructing a Monte Carlo simulation of a counterforce strike with modern U.S. strategic missiles on China’s silo-based missile force. I show that small variations in parameters that cannot be known to the attacker with certainty correspond to wide variation in strike outcomes. The resulting uncertainty in costs to the attacker complicates popular strategic theories of damage limitation.
This talk is a crucial intervention in the debate over U.S. nuclear strategy, the escalating arms race with China, and the profound complexities of modern warfare.
Speaker: Dr. Christopher Lawrence, Assistant Professor of Science, Technology, and Nuclear Security, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.
Moderator: Dr. Stephen Herzog, Professor of the Practice, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
This seminar was held at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) in Monterey, California, on June 4, 2025.
Chapters
(00:00:11) Introduction
Moderator Dr. Stephen Herzog introduces the seminar and guest speaker, Dr. Christopher Lawrence from Georgetown University.
(00:02:14) The Theory of Nuclear Humility
Dr. Lawrence introduces the concept of “The Balance of Nuclear Humility,” critiquing the techno-optimism of standard models and applying complexity theory to nuclear systems.
(00:15:00) The Simulation: Trident vs. Chinese Silos
An overview of the systems being modeled: the advanced U.S. Trident II D5 SLBM and China’s silo-based ICBMs, and an introduction to the Monte Carlo simulation method.
(00:23:01) Problems with the Standard Model: Fratricide & Dust
Dr. Lawrence details why standard counterforce calculations are flawed, focusing on the overlooked physical effects of fratricide and the massive dust clouds from multiple detonations.
(00:32:19) Baseline Simulation Results
The initial results of the simulation are presented, showing a significant number of Chinese silos surviving even under optimistic assumptions for the attacker.
(00:33:16) Exploring Uncertainty: Perturbing the Variables
Dr. Lawrence demonstrates how small, realistic changes to variables—like missile accuracy, reliability, and silo hardness—lead to a wide and unpredictable range of outcomes.
(00:44:13) The Combined Scenario: A More Realistic Outcome
A final simulation scenario combining multiple realistic uncertainties shows that the U.S. attacker would likely fail to achieve any meaningful damage limitation.
(00:45:31) Q&A: The Balance of Vulnerability & Missile Defense
The Q&A session begins with a question on how missile defense and a “balance of vulnerability” fit into the model.
(00:51:50) Q&A: The Limits of Counterforce & The “Easy Case”
Dr. Lawrence discusses why he chose to model an “easy case” for the attacker and what the vast uncertainties imply for counterforce and targeting policy.
(01:01:54) Q&A: Low-Tech Countermeasures & The Arms Race
A discussion on potential low-tech defenses China could employ (like the Soviet “Mozyr” program) and the nature of the U.S.-China technological arms race.
(01:09:32) Q&A: Policy Implications for No First Use & Conventional Options
The seminar concludes with a discussion on the implications of the research for No First Use policies and whether it makes a case for conventional counterforce alternatives.
