The Asilomar Principles for Governing AI Applications in Nuclear and Biological Security

June 18, 2026
Allison Berke, Stephen Herzog, Yanliang Pan, William Potter, Douglas Shaw

We, the Secretariat, adopt the following principles on the basis of deliberations among more than 100 experts from academia, research institutions, government, civil society, and the artificial intelligence (AI) industry. These principles are intended to guide responsible governance of AI applications affecting nuclear and biological security. They recognize AI’s potential contributions to human safety, as well as its capacity to create or amplify global catastrophic risks. As the first statement of an ongoing Asilomar Process, the principles aim to set an agenda for further research and implementation work, while remaining open to refinement as experience and capabilities evolve.

1. AI must protect human survival.

AI systems must reinforce—and never erode—barriers against the use of nuclear and biological weapons. These armaments pose extinction risks to humanity that predate the development of AI. Such risks must not be accelerated or exacerbated by AI systems. The protection of human survival should therefore be the first priority in the deployment of AI tools affecting these domains.

2. Nuclear weapons use decisions must remain under meaningful human control.

AI systems must not initiate, authorize, or otherwise cause the use of nuclear weapons. Human decision-makers must retain the ability to review and override AI outputs, even under severe time pressure and in circumstances where automation bias may distort judgment. Any AI system involved in nuclear decision support must accordingly be auditable in both data and logic—by civilian and military authorities—in peacetime and in crises. New intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architectures should be deployed only when they are shown to decrease the risk of nuclear weapons use.

3. AI governance must strengthen nonproliferation and strategic stability.

Nuclear and biological research activities must be made safer, more secure, and more proliferation-resistant in light of AI’s disruptive potential. Existing practices of restraint must evolve to address new risks introduced by AI, including through commitments that reduce the dangers of AI-enabled escalation, miscalculation, or proliferation. Behavioral arms control and confidence-building measures should be pursued alongside the responsible use of AI tools to improve crisis communication.

4. AI developers must contribute to anticipatory risk governance.

Frontier AI developers bear a special responsibility for helping anticipate and govern the nuclear and biological risks that may arise from rapid commercial innovation. Advances in AI may introduce technological shocks into these domains before governments or international institutions are prepared to manage them. Developers should therefore assess emerging capabilities before their release, recognize how they may alter incentives or lower practical barriers to weapons use or proliferation, and support stronger oversight as risks increase. AI companies are geopolitical actors whose choices can affect global security. Their legal, financial, and institutional obligations should reflect the overriding priority of preventing extinction risks.

5. AI-enhanced monitoring and verification must be responsible and ethical.

AI systems may significantly improve the monitoring and verification of peaceful nuclear and biological activities, as well as efforts to detect diversion in support of weapons of mass destruction programs. Because these judgments carry high stakes, the use of AI must not weaken established standards for explainability, objectivity, validity, data provenance, and ultimate human accountability. AI should be used in ways that protect privacy and personal safety, while also guarding against the disclosure of sensitive nuclear or biological information that could aid malicious actors or undermine strategic stability. AI models used for monitoring and verification must themselves be protected, so that they do not become tools for helping proliferators evade detection.

6. AI governance must be globally inclusive.

International collaboration—aligned with frameworks such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)—should ensure that the benefits of AI accrue to all humanity without deepening security or development divides. This work should cultivate shared strategic understanding, reducing rather than compounding the risks of nuclear proliferation, nuclear escalation, war, and catastrophic biological events. Measures that restrict access to dangerous capabilities should therefore be paired with efforts to reduce the incentives that drive states or other actors to acquire them.

7. AI must not enable disinformation or attacks on nuclear and biological facilities.

False or manipulated information concerning the use or development of nuclear and biological weapons can be highly damaging. Safeguards should be established to prevent actors from using AI to create or disseminate highly realistic falsehoods in these domains. Active resilience must also be developed against AI-enhanced physical and cyberattacks on nuclear and biological facilities, including attacks intended to enable material theft or sabotage. These measures should address both crisis decision-making and public perceptions of nuclear and biological threats. The societal, economic, and psychological effects of information warfare may be difficult to reverse.