Nikolai Sokov
February 24, 2004
Igla Trajectory
Military Exercises in Russia: Naval Deterrence Failures Compensated by Strategic Rocket Success
The recent Russian Armed Forces exercises, code-named “Security-2004,” were advertised as the biggest for over 20 years. They lasted about a month – from late January to February 17 with some elements continuing beyond that point – and involved all branches of the armed forces as well as all six military districts.
From the very beginning there was much speculation about the nature of these exercises. It is now obvious that media reports, which had claimed that up to 40 percent of the armed forces and a third of reservists would participate, were incorrect. Officially they were classified as “command and staff training” (komandno-shtabnaya trenirovka) as opposed to maneuvers. Deputy Chief of the General Staff Col.-Gen. Yuri Baluevski described the difference in the following way: exercises (training) primarily involve the command and staff level while troops play a subsidiary role while maneuvers emphasize operations of troops. (1) Still, there seems much more to them than the official line suggests.
“Security-2004” had many interesting features. Three aspects attract particular attention. First, these exercises tested key elements of the Russian military doctrine, disclosing much about the way the Russian military elite sees likely future conflicts and its plans for fighting them. Second, the failed launches of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) will likely have a significant impact on the future of the nuclear triad. Third, the successful launch of the land-based strategic missile (ICBM – intercontinental ballistic missile) Topol tested a brand-new warhead capable of penetrating missile defenses.
Doctrine for Limited and Regional Conflicts
The key elements of Russia’s defense policy were determined by the 2000 Military Doctrine, which was expanded and updated in the 2003 Ministry of Defense document “Immediate Tasks for Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” (see CNS report “Russian Ministry of Defense’s New Policy Paper: The Nuclear Angle”). The 2004 exercises, like similar events in previous years, were apparently intended to test the ability of the Russian Armed Forces to fight the most likely conflicts of the future – limited and regional wars.
According to the 2003 document, these conflicts will have the following distinguishing features:
- Even limited conflicts will be fought over large territories unlike traditional, Cold-War and earlier limited wars
- The ability to strike targets at large distances will play a central role as will the defense against such strikes
- Secure and survivable command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities will be more important than ever before
- Ready reserves that can be called up and deployed after the war begins will play a vital role in all types of conflicts
- Nuclear weapons can be an effective deterrence tool only if supported by modern and effective conventional forces
The military doctrine also allows – although in an indirect and oblique way – for limited use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict if Russian Armed Forces are unable to repel it.
The scenario of the 2004 exercises incorporated all of these features. As explained by Baluevski, they assumed attacks “by terrorists” from four directions – east, south, west, and north-west. Accordingly, defense was simulated on all four fronts (with the emphasis on the south and the north-west), plus against air and space attacks. (2)
Exercises were primarily concentrated at the command and staff levels and involved 250 generals and more than 2,000 senior officers. (3) The “active phase” began about two weeks into the exercises. At that stage, the Siberian Military District (MD) mobilized 10,000 reservists, which were then transported to three training centers for live-fire exercises – two of these centers located in the Volga-Urals MD (both beyond the Urals) and one (4,000 reservists) in the Moscow MD (4) (the figures were clearly chosen so that exercises were not subject to notification and invitation of observers under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which established the level of 9,000 participants for notification). After these exercises, troops from the Moscow MD were transferred further to the north-west (the Leningrad MD) to simulate reinforcement of border guards. (5) Airborne troops were also involved in various activities. The country-wide movement of armed forces was supposed to test the ability of Russia’s railroads to support concentration of troops in case of a conflict that escalated beyond the capabilities of the standing army. (6) Reportedly, new systems of command, control and communications were tested during the exercises. (7)
The naval phase involved 10 surface ships and seven submarines and included, among other elements, live-fire exercises of anti-missile defenses: the heavy cruiser Petr Veliki intercepted cruise missiles launched from Russian heavy bombers, a sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) launched from a submarine (at least, this was the plan, but it has remained unclear whether this part was implemented), and an intermediate range ballistic missile (there is no information about where it was launched from and reports indicated that these were simulators of ballistic missiles). (8) According to some reports, these exercises tested the naval version of the tactical missile defense system S-300, which is called “Fort-M.” (9)
Simultaneously, 14 heavy bombers (Tu-160 and Tu-95MS) conducted flights in three directions: to the North Atlantic, to the north of Russia (over the Barents Sea), and to the south (the Ashuluk test range in Astrakhan Oblast). (10) During exercises in previous years launches of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) apparently simulated the limited use of nuclear weapons. This time Tu-160s that flew over the North Atlantic did not conduct launches of ALCMs. However, three Tu-95MS bombers launched ALCMs over the Barents Sea. Two were launched at the Novaya Zemlya test range and at least one was intercepted by surface ships as part of the anti-missile defense practice. (11)
Finally, Security-2004 also included launches of strategic missiles. The original plan provided for one launch of an SLBM, two launches of ICBMs (one of them the remotely controlled launch from the Baikonur space center in Kazakhstan), and a launch of a new satellite.
Russian officials flatly rejected numerous allegations by the media that these exercises were directed against the United States. Col.-Gen. Baluevski specifically pointed out during a press conference midway through the exercises: “There is no hint that this is the United States of America. There is no hint that this is any other state, whether European or Asian: the opponent is notional.” (12) Many observers remarked, however, that from a military point of view there is no such thing as an abstract opponent. Specific states are always kept in mind. (13) A prominent expert, former director of the research institute of Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) Vladimir Dvorkin pointed out: “In spite of what seems to be a partnership with the United States and the ongoing dialogue in the area of strategic cooperation, the state of mutual nuclear deterrence continues.” He recalled that the October 2003 “White Paper” listed, among other missions of the Russian Armed Forces, defense against an attack from space and asked, who else except the United States could launch such an attack. (14)
Indeed, Baluevski, speaking at the same press conference, noted Russian concerns that the United States apparently contemplated making nuclear weapons “an instrument of achieving military missions and lowering the nuclear threshold. Must we react to that as we train our staffs and troops? I am sure we must and we do.” His references to the October 2003 document were also telling: that document did list the enlargement of NATO and a string of US military campaigns in the 1990s and the early 2000s as security challenges. He also admitted that, although the official scenario of the exercises mentioned defense against terrorists, “one does not fight Bin Laden with strategic missiles.”
Failed Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles Launches
The events that attracted the most attention in the Russian media were the failed launches of SLBMs, which happened at the most inopportune moment – as President Vladimir Putin observed them from a strategic submarine. Launches of strategic delivery vehicles were part of the so-called “active phase” of the exercises.
Putin observed launches from a strategic submarine Archangelsk belonging to the type known in the West as Typhoon and in Russia as Project 941. A Delta-IV (Project 667BDRM) submarine Novomoskovsk was supposed to launch an SLBM SS-N-23 (RSM-54 or RM-29RMU) toward the usual target – the test range Kura in Kamchatka. All launches failed for one reason or another.
Immediately following the first failure, a flurry of reports made contradictory claims: there was an explosion, the missile fell into the water, the launch was blocked by a satellite, etc. The Chief of the Navy Adm. Vladimir Kuroedov quickly declared that no “physical” launch should have taken place at all: the launch was supposed to be a simulation. (15) Not a single commentator believed that announcement, however. In the end, it became clear – although, at the date of this writing, not officially admitted by the navy – that between the third and the fourth minutes of the launch sequence the targeting system of the submarine failed and the electronic system immediately blocked the launch. (16) Apparently Capt. Sergei Radchuk, the commanding officer of Novomoskovsk, attempted to launch the second SLBM, but also without success. The sequence of events is somewhat murky as originally only one SLBM launch had been announced, but subsequently all news media reported the failure of two SLBM launches from that submarine. Some reports suggested that the second missile failed to completely exit the tube and became stuck. (17)
Newspapers immediately recalled that in 1991 the same Novomoskovsk, having just entered service, conducted a unique experiment – it successfully launched all of its 16 SLBMs one after another. In 1993 Novomoskovsk was again in the headlines after a collision with the US submarine, Grayling. In 1998 it successfully launched a converted SLBM carrying two German-made satellites – the first such launch in history. In 2001 it successfully launched an SLBM from beneath the surface. In the first half of 2003, the submarine underwent periodic repairs. (18)
The day after the Novomoskovsk’s failed launches, another submarine of the same class, Karelia, made a fresh attempt to launch an SLBM of the same type. At first, the flight was normal, but after 98 seconds (at the time of the separation of the first stage) the missile began to deviate from its trajectory, which immediately activated the self-destruction mechanism. (19) This launch was attempted after Putin had already left the Northern Fleet and flew to the Plesetsk test range to watch the launch of land-based missiles.
Four commissions were immediately established to investigate the accidents – one for each submarine, one at the Makeev design bureau where the SS-N-23 SLBM was developed, and one at the Krasnoyarsk Machine-Building Plant where the missiles were produced. (20) Sources in the navy immediately blamed faulty missiles while representatives of the production plant declared that it was too early to speculate. (21) Baluevski, at a press conference at the end of the exercises, announced that there had been no decision to withdraw the SS-N-23s from service and said that these missiles are considered among “the most reliable.” Out of 36 launches in the 1990s this was only the second failure. (22)
The exact circumstances of the failure are still unclear in spite of dozens of reports. Only the second failed launch, from Karelia, can be confidently attributed to the missile. According to one report, that missile was still under warranty. (23) The failure of the Novomoskovsk launches, judging from conflicting descriptions, could be attributed to the submarine, the missiles, or both. One unconfirmed report attributed the failed launch to a mistake by the crew (the majority of reports, however, emphasized that the crew made no mistakes) and to inadequate repairs at the shipyard in 2003. (24) It is even unclear which missiles were launched – the general assumption was that these were SS-N-23s, a.k.a. RS-54s, which entered service in the mid-1980s. Their warranty periods have already expired, but were extended, as is the standard practice now in Russia. There is at least one report, however, that the failed missiles were the 1999 modification of SS-N-23 called Sineva. (25) The new version carries 10 warheads instead of four and has a new navigational system.
The lack of evidence makes a confident assessment of the implications difficult. If these were indeed the old SS-N-23s, then the incidents cast doubt on the Russian military’s policy of relying on weapons with extended warranties. Thus, the reliability of strategic deterrence is questionable, at least as far as the sea-leg of the triad is concerned. So far, the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), which controls land-based strategic missiles, and the Russian Air Force have had no accidents with old equipment.
Certainly, there will be a thorough investigation of the SS-N-23 SLBMs. It is likely that new tests will be conducted perhaps within six months, this time without pomp, to confirm that the old missiles are still reliable. If irreparable faults are found, then Russia might increase funding to produce the new version, Sineva. It is also possible that work on the new, solid-fuel SLBM, Bulava, will be accelerated (it passed the first throw-tests in January 2004), and funding will increase for the construction of the new class of strategic submarines, Borey. The first submarine of that class, Yuri Dolgoruki, was launched in the late 1990s, but is still awaiting the new missile, Bulava. In the next few months, government decisions will clarify the weapons situation.
The political and bureaucratic impacts of the failed launches are clearer. After several years in disfavor, the SRF are likely to return to their place as the centerpiece of Russia’s strategic deterrence. The SRF fell out of favor in 2000, when Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin and the Chief of the Navy Vladimir Kuroedov joined efforts to unseat the Minister of Defense Igor Sergeev. This effort led to the demotion of the SRF from a branch of the armed forces equal to the army, the navy, and the air force to a lower status. ICBMs were slated for a very fast reduction while funds for deployment of a new ICBM, Topol-M, were reduced from 10 to six missiles per year (for an analysis of the debates and decisions of 2000 see the CNS reports “‘Denuclearization’ of Russia’s Defense Policy?” and “The Fate of Russian Nuclear Weapons: An Anticlimax on August 11”). The navy was supposed to become the mainstay of strategic forces and ambitious plans to deploy new SLBMs and new submarines were drawn up.
The SRF regained part of their former standing in early 2002 after the United States announced its intention to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The subsequent Russian withdrawal from the START II Treaty (the day after the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty became official) meant that old, Soviet-era MIRVed (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) ICBMs would remain in service. In 2003, Russia acquired about 30 six-warhead SS-19 ICBMs from Ukraine and announced that missiles of that type would remain in service until the 2030s.
In the meantime, the situation in the navy has improved only marginally. The failures during “Security-2004” demonstrated that serious improvement will require a long time and, even more importantly, much more money. In the meantime, the SRF have continued to demonstrate their reliability: even very old missiles have been launched without serious glitches, deployment of the new ICBM, Topol-M, continues, and it has acquired an impressive new capability to penetrate missile defenses (more about that in the next section). At a press conference after the end of the exercises, Yuri Baluevski declared that “the SRF have confirmed the high degree of reliability of their control systems and missile complexes.” (26)
Furthermore, the two figures that played the key role in the demotion of the SRF are falling from favor. Adm. Kuroedov has been roundly criticized for his inability to redress the many past woes of the navy other than by drafting ambitious plans for a blue-water navy. The General Staff was recently criticized by Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov for micromanagement of the armed forces at the expense of its main tasks, strategic planning and forecasts. Perhaps even more telling, Ivanov declared that independent access of the chief of the general staff to the president was inappropriate and damaging for the Ministry of Defense. It is instructive to recall that such access and a seat on the Security Council, which Kvashnin acquired in 1999, played a critical role in the toppling of Igor Sergeev in 2000.
It seems only logical to expect that the political clout and especially the funding of the SRF will improve even further, although it is not likely that it will regain its formal status as a branch of the Russian Armed Forces.
New Capability for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Having left the Northern Fleet, which was hastily arranging for the second attempt to launch an SLBM, Vladimir Putin traveled to the Plesetsk test range to observe launches conducted by the SRF. The SRF and the Space Troops planned three launches: a Molniya (R-7) space-launch vehicle with a military satellite, a Topol ICBM, and an SS-19 (a.k.a. RS-18, a.k.a. UR-100UTTKh), which was remotely launched from Baikonur in Kazakhstan. All launches were successful.
The SS-19 launch was quite interesting as it demonstrated the ability to control ICBMs directly anywhere in Russia without passing through the full command chain.
The central piece of the exercise, however, was the launch of Topol (an earlier version of Topol-M), which was conducted almost in secrecy (“almost” because it was announced in advance, but journalists were not allowed to see it and, it seems, the launch of the Molniya was consciously used to draw attention away from the ICBM). That launch was conducted from a mobile launcher about 50 kilometers from Plesetstk. (27) In an interesting twist, the Topol ICBM is the same age as the SS-N-23; yet another successful launch of Topol clearly puts the SRF ahead of the navy in terms of reliability of weapons.
The launch of the Topol became the most important event because the missile carried a new warhead, which is, according to numerous official and unofficial reports, capable of penetrating any missile defense system that could conceivably be developed in the next several decades. According to newspaper reports, the new warhead is equipped with hypersonic engines that allow the warhead to reach speeds of 6 Mach and change its trajectory to evade interceptors. The diagram showing the trajectory of the Topol warhead can be seen above. (28) It is difficult to intercept any target that deviates from a predictable ballistic trajectory, and the interceptor should be much faster than the target. A combination of very complicated trajectory and high speed makes the new warhead very difficult to intercept. Some sources reported that the new Topol warhead was based on a new hypersonic cruise missile X-90 (AS-19 Koala), which eventually is supposed to replace the old Soviet X-55 ALCM.
The Topol launch was a cause for celebration. President Vladimir Putin, at a press conference at Plesetsk announced that “an experiment” conducted during the “Security-2004” exercises demonstrated that “in the near future the Russian Army, the Strategic Rocket Forces, will have new weapons systems, which will be able to destroy targets at intercontinental ranges at hypersonic speed and with high precision, as well as with the ability to perform maneuvers in both altitude and the trajectory.” This new weapon, said Putin, should “ensure Russia’s strategic security for a long historical perspective.” (29)
For all the pomp, the new warhead should not be a complete surprise to an attentive observer. Rumors that Russia was developing a maneuvering front section (warhead) for Topol-M had been circulating for quite some time. They first appeared in expert reports outside Russia in 1998, (30) and in 1999 the seventh test of the Topol-M included, by official admission of Russian military representatives “a side antimissile maneuver,” i.e., the ability to avoid interceptors. (31) In hindsight, this was an earlier, incomplete version of what has been officially and unofficially characterized as a stellar performance by the new warhead in 2004. The fact that it took five years to progress from what appears to be the first successful test of a prototype to a demonstration of full capacity suggests that funding was insufficient and probably the program was not considered high-priority, at least outside the SRF (perhaps another consequence of the 2000 decision to demote that service).
It remains an unanswered question why the warhead, which was originally tested as part of Topol-M, had its first full-scale successful test with an older missile, Topol.
In fact, some reports suggested that the program was originally launched back in the 1980s in the Soviet Union as part of the Soviet response to Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), commonly known as “Star Wars.” In other words, it was originally conceived as a means to penetrate far more sophisticated missile defense systems than those the United States is expected to deploy in the coming years.
Russian commentators immediately dubbed the recent Topol test “a response” to the US missile defense system, which is scheduled to begin deployment this year in Alaska. This suggestion seems an exaggeration. Programs that take much time and money can rarely be timed perfectly to a specific event. Thus, it is doubtful that the scheduled fall 2004 deployment of US missile defenses had triggered a Russian counter-program, which was in full swing at least five years ago.
Rather, since at least 1983 – the year Ronald Reagan announced SDI – Soviet and Russian military planners have used their concerns about missile defenses to define the broad contours of strategic modernization policy. All programs launched after that time incorporated a defense penetration capability. With adequate funding, the new maneuvering warhead would have perhaps emerged several years earlier. It seems likely that the new system will not be deployed for years due to the lack of funding, and at most we will see only one or two new tests in the coming years. In a sense this is still a theoretical capability, a suggestion what Russia might do, but probably not in the foreseeable future.
This new capability probably should not be of concern to the United States. US missile defense is intended for deployment against rogue states and is likely to have some capability vis-à-vis China. The United States can hardly build a reliable defense against the Russian strategic arsenal for many years, if ever – simply put, the Russian arsenal is far too large for a conceivable defense system and too sophisticated. The technical characteristics and capabilities of target acquisition and tracking, as well of interceptors must be enhanced quite considerably before there would be a defense against Russia.
A more fundamental fact is that practically no one in the United States, especially in the military, expects a serious conflict with Russia that is fraught with a nuclear exchange. Consequently, there is simply no need to defend against Russia in the foreseeable future. The situation is different in Moscow – a large-scale conflict with the United States is considered highly unlikely, practically impossible, but there is a concern that the United States might use force against Russia on a limited scale. This concern is the foundation of scenarios that provide for limited use of nuclear weapons in primarily conventional conflicts. As in the United States, strategic capability is a reinsurance against an improbable event. The low probability of a large-scale conflict, as well as the relatively low priority of weapons programs designed for such a conflict is the primary reason why the theoretical capability the SRF have demonstrated last week will not be deployed any time soon.
“Security-2004” turned out to be an interesting exercise. It gives a reasonably clear picture not only of what the Russian Armed Forces are now, but, more importantly, what they are likely to become in the future. Unexpected weaknesses were displayed (problems with the sea-based leg of the strategic triad), as well as unexpected strengths (hypersonic warheads and cruise missiles). There is much to watch in the coming years as the Russian army evolves further.
Notes
(1) Press conference of the first deputy Chief of the General Staff Col.-Gen. Yuri Baluevski, February 11, 2004, www.mil.ru.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Dmitri Litovkin, “Putin Rukovodit Strategicheskimi Ucheniyami,” Izvestiya, February 17, 2004.
(4) Nikolai Polyakov, “Prezident Otdal Kontsy,” Gazeta.Ru, February 16, 2004, www.gazeta.ru; Yuri Avdeev, Alexander Bogatyrev, Vladimir Gundarev, and Alexander Danilkin, “Garantiya Neuyazvimosti,” Krasnaya Zvezda, February 19, 2004.
(5) Vladislav Kulikov, Sergei Ptichkin, and Boris Talov, “Ucheniya Yadernogo Chemodanchika,” Rossiskaya Gazeta, February 11, 2004.
(6) “Rossiya Vstupaet v Yadernuyu voinu,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, February 10, 2004.
(7) Sergei Vasiliev, “‘Skiff’ Startuet iz Glubiny,” Krasnaya Zvezda, February 17, 2004; “V Barentsevom More Nachalis Ucheniya Severnogo Flota,” MurmanNews.Ru, February 17, 2004, www.murmannews.ru.
(8) “Uchimsya Voevat Po-Sovremennomu,” Krasnaya Zvezda, February 11, 2004; Vladimir Mukhin, “Neudachnye Puski Raket Rassleduet Komissiya,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 20, 2004.
(9) Dmitri Litovkin, “Giperzvukovaya ‘Koala’,” Izvestiya, February 20, 2004.
(10) Nikita Petrov, “NPRO-2004 Soedinennykh Shtatov – Nenadezhnyi Shchit Protiv Rossiiskikh Raket,” Strana.Ru on-line information service, February 3, 2004, www.strana.ru.
(11) “‘Petr Veliki’ Otrazil Vizdushnye Ataki,” Strana.Ru on-line information service, February 17, 2004, www.strana.ru; Vladimir Mukhin, “Dalnyaya Avitsiya Porabotala v Barentsevom More,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 20, 2004; “Putin Nabluydaet za Ucheniyami Severnogo Flota,” Strana.Ru on-line information service, February 17, 2004.
(12) Press conference of the first deputy Chief of the General Staff Col.-Gen. Yuri Baluevski, February 11, 2004, www.mil.ru.
(13) Alexander Babakin, Oleg Yelenski, Vladimir Mukhin, “Yadernye Zuby Sergeya Ivanova,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 13, 2004.
(14) Alexander Babakin, Oleg Yelenski, Vladimir Mukhin, “Bessrochnye Ucheniya do Pobednogo Kontsa,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 13, 2004.
(15) “Glavkom VMF: Stsenarii Uchenii Predusmatrival Tolko Uslovnyi Pusk Raket,” Strana.Ru on-line information service, February 17, 2004 ,www.strana.ru.
(16) Dmitri Litovkin, “Ballisticheskie Rakety Putina ne Porazili,” Izvestiya, February 18, 2004; Vadim Solovyov, Vladimir Ivanov, Viktor Myasnikov, “Ne v Raketakh Delo, a v Umnoi Nachinke,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 20, 2004.
(17) “Vladimiru Putinu Pustili ‘Sinevu’ v Glaza,” Kommersant-Daily, February 18, 2004.
(18) Vadim Solovyov, Vladimir Ivanov, Viktor Myasnikov, “Ne v Raketakh Delo, a v Umnoi Nachinke,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 20, 2004; Ivan Yegorov, Andrei Reutov, “Zapustili,” Gazeta, Febraury 19, 2004; “Istoriya K-407,” Kommersant-Daily, February 19, 2004.
(19) Vladimir Mukhin, Andrei Riskin, “Morskoi Shchit Rossii Vzorvalsya nad Severnym Morem,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 19, 2004; “Rossiiskii Yadernyi Shchit Dal Treshchinu,” Kommersant-Daily, February 19, 2004.
(20) “Rossiiskii Yadernyi Shchit Dal Treshchinu,” Kommersant-Daily, February 19, 2004.
(21) Ibid.
(22) “Prikazov o Priostanovke Ekspluatatsii Samolikvidirovavsheisya Rakety RS-54 Ne Bylo,” Strana.Ru on-line information service, February 19, 2004; Nail Gafutulin, Segei Severinov, Alexander Bogatyrev, “Proryv k Oruzhiyu Novogo Pokoleniya,” Krasnaya Zvezda, February 20, 2004.
(23) Yulia Kalinina, Olga Bozhieva, “Sho to Bylo?” Moskovski Komsomolets, February 20, 2004.
(24) Ibid.
(25) Vadim Solovyov, Vladimir Ivanov, Viktor Myasnikov, “Ne v Raketakh Delo, a v Umnoi Nachinke,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 20, 2004.
(26) Press conference of the first deputy chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluevski, February 19, 2004, www.mil.ru.
(27) Andrei Borisov, Vadim Solobyov, “Putin za Tri Chasa Zapustil v Nebo Tri Rakety,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 19, 2004; Dmitri Litovkin, “U Rossii – Novoe Oruzhie,” Izvestiya, February 19, 2004; “Chto i Kuda Zapustili Kosmicheskie Voiska,” Kommersant-Daily, February 19, 2004; Yuri Avdeev, Alexander Bogatyrev, Vladimir Gundarov, Alexander Dolinin, “Garantiya Neuyazvimosti,” Krasnaya Zvezda, February 19, 2004.
(28) Dmitri Litovkin, “Giperzvukovaya ‘Koala’,” Izvestiya, February 20, 2004; Nail Gafutulin, Segei Severinov, Alexander Bogatyrev, “Proryv k Oruzhiyu Novogo Pokoleniya,” Krasnaya Zvezda, February 20, 2004; Fyodor Rumyantsev, Yelena Shishkunova, “Rossiiskaya Raketa Probila Amerikansuyu PRO,” Gazeta.Ru, February 20, 2004, www.gazeta.ru.
(29) Press Conference of Vladimir Putin at Plesetsk, February 18, 2004, www.president.kremlin.ru.
(30) David Fulghum, “Russian Missile Tests Yield Mixed Results,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 19, 1998, p. 30.
(31) Yuri Golotuyk, “Zato My Delaem Rakety” Izvestiya, June 5, 1999.
