October 20, 2017
- View the full UNSCR 1540 Resource Collection
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is the nodal point of three continents-Europe, Africa and Asia. It is critical to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, as nearly one-third of the countries in the region either possess some type of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (NBC) capability, or are suspected of having related research programs. The region also served as an operational hub in A.Q. Khan’s illicit nuclear trafficking network and is still serving as an operational route for non-state actors because of the ongoing unrest in the Middle East and the rise of terrorist groups like the Islamic State (IS). Several states continue to provide financial and logistical support to non-state actors engaged in illicit trafficking and terrorist activities.
States across the Middle East and North Africa face significant internal security and terrorist threats. More than thirty percent of the foreign terrorist organizations recognized by the U.S. State Department operate in the Middle East. [1] Of these groups, IS is the most recently cited organization attempting to obtain and use Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons (CBRN). [2][3] Additionally, IS is turning to drug trafficking to maintain its source of income.
Furthermore, since the onset of the 2011 Arab Spring, the civil war in Libya, and the ongoing sectarian conflict in Iraq and Yemen, there has been widespread instability in the region, with political protests, revolutions and, in several cases, escalation of violence taking place in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Syria, and other states. Both surviving and newly formed governments continue to struggle to maintain political control and civil order, with negative implications for internal security, border control, and enforcement of export controls and anti-terrorism measures. Terrorist and militant groups might attempt to use the ongoing political instability to expand their activities.
For more detailed information on this region’s NBC and delivery system capabilities, see the relevant country profiles.
WMD-Related Illicit Trafficking
Illicit trafficking remains a significant problem in the MENA region. It is exceptionally border-dense, and home to seven of the world’s top fifty maritime container ports; moreover, most states have underdeveloped judicial and law enforcement institutions and thus lack robust export control and border security systems. [4] Terrorist organizations and other transnational criminal networks take advantage of porous borders and poorly regulated financial institutions across the Middle East to engage in activities such as illicit financing, drug trafficking, and transport of dual-use items. [5]
Dubai has served as a key transshipment point for nuclear materials, as well as dual-use goods and technologies in the region. [6] The A.Q. Khan Network, and subsequently Iran, both utilized Dubai for the transshipment of dual-use goods and technologies, and the former also shipped large quantities of uranium hexafluoride to Libya via Dubai from 2000 to 2001. [7] Nuclear trafficking notwithstanding, terrorist and transnational criminal organizations have engaged in the transport of other forms of contraband across key transit points in Morocco, Libya, Lebanon, the Iran-Afghanistan border, the Iran-Iraq border, and the Suez Canal in Egypt. [8] In addition to illicit trafficking, maritime piracy also presents a substantial security concern in the region. Pirates mainly operate in the Gulf of Aden. One of the most vital maritime trade routes in the world, it provided passage for upwards of seventeen thousand ships in 2011 en route to and from the Suez Canal. [9] Although the majority of pirates operate out of Somalia, chaos in Yemen, on the opposite side of the Gulf of Aden, makes that country another potential base for piracy and for terrorist groups seizing coastal land and ports like Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen. [10]
1540 Implementation
All Middle Eastern states submitted an initial report to the 1540 Committee within a year of the resolution’s passage, satisfying their initial reporting requirements. Although 41 reports, including first and additional reports, have been submitted to date, they vary dramatically in terms of quality and comprehensiveness. Some States submitted only one report since the resolution 1540 was adopted. This suggests that these countries are either unable or unwilling to meet their obligations under 1540. For instance, in Yemen, the implementation of 1540 does not seem as a priority at the moment given the ongoing civil war. However, there are other states that have been regularly submitting national reports such as Egypt and Morocco. Other states submitted reports that are dated in 2012, 2013, and 2014, but only few reports were submitted as of 2015 and 2016. Many of these reports included diplomatic statements supporting the spirit of the resolution, and highlighted concrete actions taken by the states in implementing and enforcing 1540. Indeed, some of the reports included previous efforts made by the states submitting the reports and do not include concrete strategies on implementing resolution 1540. Lars Olberg of Sandia Laboratories assessed that “Middle Eastern countries have had a poor start when it comes to the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540. Their general reporting behavior is significantly behind that of countries in other regions.” [11] Furthermore, while a number of states submitted fairly comprehensive reports, states’ engagement with the reporting process is not necessarily reflective of their commitment to timely and effective implementation of the resolution. Some states, such as the UAE and Jordan, have sought to institute concrete legislation geared towards 1540 objectives; however, when compared with other states in the region, these states are more the exception than the norm.
Export Controls and Related Measures
Both the UAE and Jordan have demonstrated positive engagement with 1540 objectives. The UAE has passed a number of laws since the adoption of Resolution 1540 aiming to secure and account for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-related materials and technologies, as well as to control and penalize their export, re-export, transit, and transshipment. The United Arab Emirates, for example, has taken steps to improve monitoring export/import activities in its Dubai port. One of the measures taken involves collaborating with the United States. The Department of Homeland Security permanently stations U.S. Border Patrol personnel in Dubai to screen any shipments destined to the U.S. In its most recent 1540 report in 2014, the UAE reaffirmed its efforts in implementing UNSC 1540. In the report, the UAE highlighted the establishment of a committee in 2009 for goods and materials that can have dual-use and subject to import and export control to limit the proliferation of WMD. [12] Similarly, the Jordanian government has instituted an anti-terrorism law, a new law on nuclear safety and security, and a national product control list, and taken efforts to strengthen customs controls along its borders to regulate WMD-sensitive trade. [13] However, both countries are relatively new to the concept of strategic trade controls and lack the necessary expertise, and possibly the financial resources, to institute an effective system. The UAE has closed numerous domestic and international companies involved in illicit finance and illegal dual-use exports, and interdicted several vessels suspected of carrying illicit goods to Iran. [14] Despite these successes, however, the country lacks the capacity to comprehensively implement its ambitious export-control system. [15] Indeed, two years after the passage of key laws relating to countering illicit trafficking and brokering controlled items, its enforcement body had not been staffed, and key regulations had not been implemented. [16] This variation in enforcement and implementation, as one expert argued, is “as much a result of limited capacity as limited political will.” [17] In Jordan, the strategic trade control system does not explicitly regulate transshipment, brokering, and financing of proliferation-sensitive materials and activities. In addition, while Jordanian law prescribes criminal penalties for the transport of WMD-related materials “in the execution of terrorist acts,” the penal code does not impose such penalties for more general offenses involving dual-use items. [18]
In contrast to the UAE and Jordan, Saudi Arabia possesses only a crude legal framework with respect to key trade controls such as control lists, transfer and re-transfer regulations, and “catch-all” mechanisms. One notable improvement includes the adoption of the 2007 Arms and Ammunitions Regulations stipulating the establishment of a national licensing authority to regulate proliferation-sensitive imports. [19] Despite a poor implementation record at the national level so far, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated an increased willingness to improve its compliance with 1540 objectives in recent years, primarily in a regional context. Through participation in regional workshops and activities within the League of Arab States (LAS) and the GCC, Saudi Arabia has begun to assume an active leadership role with respect to 1540 implementation. Notably, the Kingdom hosted and organized, in cooperation with the 1540 Committee and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), a December 2010 “Regional Workshop on UNSC Resolution 1540” in Riyadh. [20] The event was attended by delegates from Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE, and by the Secretary General of the GCC, as well as the 1540 Committee Chairman, two 1540 Committee members, and two 1540 experts. In 2012, the Kingdom offered half a million dollars to “support activities that promote the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).” [21]
Egypt was initially critical of the Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1540, raising concerns that the Council’s role was moving closer to that of a legislator. [22] Despite these initial concerns, Egypt has begun to positively contribute to 1540 objectives. Like Saudi Arabia, Egypt has tended to view implementation of 1540 in a regional context, stating its commitment to regional promotion of 1540 implementation through the LAS, as well as hosting an October 2009 seminar organized by the Arab League and attended by representatives of the 1540 Committee and various ministerial officials from 17 Arab states. [23] Despite these positive developments, Egypt’s implementation of 1540 at the national level is progressing. Of all the countries in the Middle Eastern and North Africa, Egypt is the only country that submitted a recent report for 2016. In 2015, Egypt passed a counter-terrorism law that also referenced punishing any entity seeking to acquire, produce, design or transfer non-conventional weapons or materials. In addition, Egypt implemented new regulations seeking to improve monitoring and inspection of its ports. Yet many critical aspects remain unaddressed, as Egypt has yet to institute a strategic trade control system.
Algeria’s engagement with 1540 implementation is among the most comprehensive in the region. This is significant given the confluence in Algeria of well-developed nuclear and chemical industries with the presence of known trafficking and terrorist activities on Algerian soil. As noted in Lars Olberg’s 2008 study of 1540 implementation in the Middle East, Algeria’s first report to the 1540 Committee featured the most measures taken when compared with reports from other states in the region. [24] Olberg further observes that, “this high number of measures shows that Algeria’s legal system contained major gaps in regard to non-state actor proliferation, and that Algeria had a very good understanding of how these gaps had to be closed.” [25] This understanding can likely be traced to Algeria’s experience serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council during the resolution’s negotiation, and as an initial member of the 1540 Committee. Algeria submitted another national report in April 2008, which was even more comprehensive than its previous reports. For instance, since July 2007 Algeria participated in the program concerning IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database to strengthen nuclear security. In particular, this report details additional measures related to improving the physical security of sensitive materials via strengthened electronic surveillance systems; amending the customs code to better combat smuggling, money laundering, and financing of terrorism; and establishing effective border controls via the creation of several new border surveillance posts, and the employment of air assets to combat illicit trafficking of all weapon types along Algeria’s vast southern borders. [26] While these are significant developments, key gaps remain with respect to adopting export legislation related to end-user and transshipment controls. [27] This is a common deficit within the region, and thus should not detract from the comparatively good reporting and implementation behavior exhibited by Algeria.
Reports submitted by Iran and Syria to the 1540 Committee surprised some observers with their level of detail and apparent support for the resolution. [28] Both reports submitted by Iran addressed each of the 1540 operational paragraphs, and included details on CWC implementation. [29] Syria’s reports, while not as comprehensive as Iran’s, referenced several measures already taken or planned. [30] However, these reports were submitted prior to the ongoing civil war, which has undoubtedly negatively affected 1540 compliance.
The current Iraqi government has also demonstrated a higher level of positive engagement, despite the ongoing unrest in several parts of its territory with implementing Resolution 1540, though its efforts are greatly hampered by the fact the central government controls only some of the country’s territory, with large swathes contested or controlled by IS. Its most recent report in 2014 highlighted that Iraq implemented the National Monitoring Authority Non-Proliferation Act No. 48 (2012). This act is designed to “prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regulate the transfer, import and export of dual-use items.” [31] Iraq created the Iraqi National Monitoring Authority (INMA) in 2012 to make sure that the country’s non-proliferation actions were “in accordance with non-proliferation conventions, treaties and resolutions.” [32] In addition, Iraq developed a National Control List, which aligns with the dual-use technology lists of international organizations such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Australia Group. Finally, Iraq is in the process of creating an action-plan to expand its implementation of Resolution 1540, and INMA is developing awareness programs for Iraqi citizens, especially those working in industries with dual-use technology. [33]
As noted in Olberg’s study, Israel differs from other states in the region by virtue of its relatively high levels of economic development, larger trade volumes both within and outside the region, and unique security situation. [34] These factors “contribute to the fact Israel had a comprehensive legal regulatory body in force long before the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1540.” [35] Therefore, Israel has not felt the need to adopt many new measures in response to Resolution 1540. Israel’s second report in 2012 detailed the adoption of one new measure, “the development of a computerized system to build profiles for identifying cargo/shipments suspected of violating customs laws and regulations, including those concerning WMD.” [36] Israel has taken additional measures since its initial 2004 report, which include the establishment of the Defense Export Control Directorate within the Ministry of Defense in July 2006 responsible for, inter alia, granting export licenses and industry outreach; the formation of the U.S.-Israel Defense Export Control Working Group in April 2007; and the entrance into force of both new dual-use export control legislation in January 2007 and the Defense Export Control Law in December 2007. [37] Figuring prominently across Israel’s 1540 Matrix, the 2007 Defense Export Control Law includes provisions establishing Wassenaar Arrangement- and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)-based control lists; licensing requirements for transit, transshipment, re-transfer, and brokering activities; and enhanced criminal penalties. [38]
Regional Cooperation
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the League of Arab States (LAS) are two regional organizations that have taken steps to promote 1540 implementation among their member states. Both organizations have demonstrated an increased capacity and willingness to address nonproliferation challenges, and specifically 1540-related issues, in recent years. However, with the recent tension between Qatar and other Gulf countries, the Gulf Cooperation Council is facing a push back in regards to collaborating regionally to implement resolution 1540.
Institutionally, the GCC’s three main bodies, the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council, and the Secretariat General, have the capacity to actively engage with 1540 implementation, as the Charter stipulates they may establish sub-agencies as necessary. [39] To date, however, the GCC has not nominated a 1540 coordinator, identified a focal point to lead on 1540-related issues, or established a specialized committee devoted to addressing nonproliferation issues. [40] Nonetheless, in recent years the GCC has demonstrated an interest in 1540 objectives, although often indirectly. In an effort to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts, GCC member states signed the Counter-Terrorism Agreement in May 2005 aimed at “boosting coordination among security agencies and better exchange of intelligence information.” [41] Moreover, the GCC established a Permanent Anti-Terrorism Committee in 2006 and called for the establishment of a “World Counter Terrorism Center” in 2009 to better coordinate regional and global counter-terrorism efforts. [42] Over the past several years, the GCC has shown increased interest in developing a joint civil nuclear program, as well as promoting the establishment of a Gulf WMD Free Zone. [43] With these goals in mind, the organization has fostered partnerships with the EU and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to facilitate the improvement of nuclear safety and security. [44] While its interest in 1540 has increased, the GCC has capacity limitations specific to facilitating 1540 implementation among its member states, particularly with regard to the more technical dimensions of a comprehensive export control system.
The Arab League’s interest in 1540 implementation seems primarily geared towards issues relating to counter-terrorism and combatting (via field enforcement) illicit trade, while 1540 objectives such as legal/regulatory development of strategic trade controls, national control lists, and nuclear security generally receive less attention. The LAS began to address 1540 in the summer of 2007, when its Group of Experts on Counterterrorism requested that LAS member states report on 1540 implementation and other UN counter-terrorism instruments. [45] On 23 December 2013, the LAS submitted to the UN 1540 Committee a report detailing “relevant experience, lessons learned, and effective practices,” and measures taken by the LAS to prevent the proliferation of CBRN materials to non-state actors. [46] A number of infrastructural deficits hamper the Arab League’s capacity to effectively allocate limited funding, and to comprehensively address 1540 objectives. [47] Few member states have experience with strategic trade controls, and thus the LAS lacks the knowledge base from which to provide members with 1540-related assistance absent extra-regional assistance.
Regional Implementation Challenges
Given the ongoing political instability and conflict throughout the MENA region, 1540’s current and near-term implementation is likely to be low on the lists of many countries’ priorities. However, 1540-related assistance in the last few years suggests that at least some states in the region continue to devote attention to the resolution. In 2012 alone, the U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program sponsored strategic trade control development training for multiple states in the region, including Jordan, Oman, and Yemen. [48] The German government also engaged with Yemen in spring 2012 to discuss possible counterterrorism assistance, and the UAE has shared its advancements in comprehensive strategic trade control development through participation in conferences sponsored by EXBS, the EU, and Japan‘s Center for Information on Security Trade Controls (CISTEC). [49] For example, Iraq in 2014 set up bilateral CBRN cooperation programs with the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway, the Netherlands, and the European Union. [50] The degree to which such capacity-building efforts will translate into actual implementation remains to be seen, but the willingness of regional actors to engage with these programs highlights continued support for the resolution.
Sources:
[1] Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, 22, 2015, www.state.gov.
[2] Brendan Nicholson, “Islamic State Bid for Chemical Weapons,” The Australian, 6 June 2015, www.theaustralian.com.au.
[3] Alexander Frank, “ISIS and Failed States in the Middle East-an Emerging CBRN Threat,” CBRNe.Portal, 31 March 2015, www.cbrneportal.com.
[4] “Top 50 World Container Ports,” World Shipping Council, www.worldshipping.org; Brian Finlay, Johan Bergenas and Veronica Tessler, “Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs with Resolution 1540,” The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, p. 17.
[5] Mark Fitzpatrick, Export Control and Combating Terror Financing, Embassy of The United Arab Emirates, January/February 2009, www.uae-embassy.org.
[5] Brian Finlay et al., “Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With Resolution 1540,” The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, pp. 16-17.
[6] Brian Finlay et al., “Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With Resolution 1540,” The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, p. 19; “A.Q. Khan and Onward Proliferation from Pakistan,” in IISS Strategic Dossier, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks – A net assessment, 2 May 2007, p. 78.
[7] Brian Finlay et al., “Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs with Resolution 1540,” The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, pp. 16-20; Jean du Preez and Dominique Dye, “Implementing Resolution 1540 in Africa: balancing competing priorities,” in Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations, UNIDIR, 2008.
[8] “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 22 August 2012, www.eia.gov.
[9] Peter Shaw-Smith, “Yemen’s Descent into Chaos Fuels Piracy Fears,” The Financial Times, 26 September 2011, www.ft.com; Kelly McEvers, “In Anti-Piracy Fight, Yemen May Be Part of Problem,” NPR, 8 May 2009, www.npr.org.
[10] Lars Olberg, “The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East,” Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 28.
[11] Aaron Dunne, “Strategic Trade Controls in the United Arab Emirates: Key Considerations for the European Union,” EU Non-Proliferation Consortium Papers, No. 12, March 2012, www.nonproliferation.eu; “Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy,” Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, 20 April 2008, https://enec.gov.ae; “Committee for Goods and Materials Subject to Import and Export Control,” Presentation for the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.exportcontrol.org; Kareem Shaheen, “UAE begins review of anti-terrorism law,” The National, 28 November 2010, www.thenational.ae.
[12] “Jordan ratifies anti-terrorism law,” China Daily, 27 August 2006, www.chinadaily.com.cn; “Nulcear Safety and Security and Radiation Protection Law No. 43 of 2007,” Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission, www.jnrc.gov.jo; Emmad Nosaeir, “Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance in Jordan Customs,” 8th International Export Control Conference, 2007, p.4, www.exportcontrol.org.
[13] Johan Bergenas, “A Piece of the Global Puzzle,” The Stimson Center, December 2010, p. 24.
[14] Brian Finlay et al., “Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With Resolution 1540,” The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, p. 19.
[15] Brian Finlay et al., “Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With Resolution 1540,” The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, p. 19.
[16] Brian Finlay et al., “Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With Resolution 1540,” The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, p. 19.
[17] “Summary of Legislation of Jordan Related to Terrorism,” United Nations Treaty Collection, 28 January 2002, p. 305-6, www.untreaty.un.org.
[18] “Saudi Arabia,” Matrix as Approved by the 1540 Committee on 24 November 2010, www.un.org.
[19] “Even List and Related Documents,” United Nations Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540, www.un.org.
[20] Nicolas Kasprzyk, “The Role of International, Regional, and Sub-regional Organizations,” presentation given at the Workshop on UN Security Council Resolution 1540, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 14-15 January 2013, www.un.org.
[21] Johan Bergenas, “A Piece of the Global Puzzle,” The Stimson Center, December 2010, p. 14.
[22] UN Security Council, “Risks to Non-Proliferation Regime Challenge Resolution 1540 to Ensure States Enact Domestic Controls Over Weapons of Mass Destruction Spread to Non-State Actors,” UN document SC/9757, 1 October 2009, www.un.org; Johan Bergenas, “A Piece of the Global Puzzle,” The Stimson Center, December 2010, p. 25; “Even List and Related Documents,” United Nations Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540, www.un.org.
[23] Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the UN, “Note Verbale Dated 28 February 2008 from the Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations Addressed to the Chairman of the Committee,” Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), S/AC.44/2007/7, 28 February 2008, p. 2; Michelle Cann, Kelsey Davenport and Margaret Blaza, “The Nuclear Security Summit: Assessment of National Commitments,” Arms Control Association, 20 March 2012, p. 18, www.armscontrol.org.
[24] Lars Olberg, “The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East,” Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 12.
[25] Lars Olberg, “The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East,” Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 12.
[26] Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN, “Note Verbale Dated 30 April 2008 from the Permanent Mission of Algeria to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee,” Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), S/AC.44/2007/1, 30 April 2008, p. 12-15.
[27] Lars Olberg, “The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East,” Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 31.
[28] Lars Olberg, “The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East,” Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 13.
[29] Lars Olberg, “The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East,” Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 18; Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN, “Note Verbale Dated 28 February 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee,” Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), S/AC.44/2004/(02)/105, 28 February 2005.
[30] Lars Olberg, “The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East,” Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 12; “National Reports,” Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), www.un.org.
[31] Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations, “Sharing of Experiences, Lessons Learnt and Effective Practices, in the Areas Covered by Resolution 1540 (2004),” Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), 4 February 2014, www.un.org.
[32] Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations, “Sharing of Experiences, Lessons Learnt and Effective Practices, in the Areas Covered by Resolution 1540 (2004),” Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), 4 February 2014, www.un.org.
[33] Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations, “Sharing of Experiences, Lessons Learnt and Effective Practices, in the Areas Covered by Resolution 1540 (2004),” Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), 4 February 2014, www.un.org.
[34] Lars Olberg, “The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East,” Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 17.
[35] Lars Olberg, “The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East,” Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 17.
[36] Permanent Representative of Israel to the UN, “Note Verbale Dated 22 November 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations Addressed to the Chairman of the Committee,” Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), S/AC.44/2004/(02)/84, 22 November 2004, p. 5; Lars Olberg, “The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East,” Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 17.
[37] Eli Pincu, “Israeli Defense Export Control,” presentation for US-Israel High Technology Forum, 9 September 2008, www.ndia.org.
[38] Eli Pincu, “Israeli Defense Export Control,” presentation for US-Israel High Technology Forum, 9 September 2008, www.ndia.org; Office of the General Counsel, “Defense Export Control Law, 5766-2007,” Israeli Ministry of Defense, October 2007, www.exportctrl.mod.gov.il.
[39] “The Charter,” Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 25 May 1981, www.gcc-sg.org.
[40] “Gulf Links,” Gulf Cooperation Council, accessed 23 June 2015, www.gcc-sg.org.
[41] Johan Bergenas, “A Piece of the Global Puzzle: The Role of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab States in Implementing Resolution 1540,” Stimson Center Report (Washington: Henry L. Stimson Center, December 2010), p. 27, www.stimson.org.
[42] Secretariat General, “The GCC Process and Achievement,” Gulf Cooperation Council, 4th Ed., 2009, p. 35; Secretariat General, “The Final Communiqué of the 30th Session of the Supreme Council of the GCC,” Gulf Cooperation Council, December 2009, www.gcc-sg.org.
[43] Ghazanfar Ali Khan, “Upheaval in Regions Tops Agenda of GCC Summit,” Arab News, 9 May 2011, www.arabnews.com; Nicole Stracke, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation from a Gulf Perspective,” FES Briefing Paper 3, April 2008, p. 4, www.library.fes.de.
[44] “Joint Communiqué: 20th EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting,” Council of the European Union, 14 June 2010, p. 2, www.consilium.europa.eu.
SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 27.
[45] Lars Olberg, “The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East,” Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 27.
[46] Office of the Permanent Observer to the United Nations, The League of Arab States, “Efforts Made by the League of Arab States to Implement Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), 24 December 2013, www.un.org.
[47] In 2008, the LAS faced a $22 million deficit, or about 60% of its annual budget and most of its member states have not paid annual contributions; “Arab League summit to Discuss Dire Financial Straits,” The Jerusalem Post, 17 March 2008, www.jpost.com.
[48] CNS experts’ discussions throughout 2012 with government officials and NGO practitioners directly involved in these or similar training programs in the Middle East.
[49] “Yemen, Germany discuss counterterrorism cooperation,” Yemen News Agency (SABA), 21 April 2012, www.sabanews.net; the UAE had representation at the 13th International Export Control Conference, 7-9 May 2012 in Portoroz, Slovenia, and UAE officials presented on the strategic trade control implementation in the Emirates at CISTEC’s 18th Asian Export Control Seminar, 15-17 February 2011 in Tokyo, Japan.
[50] Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations, “Sharing of Experiences, Lessons Learnt and Effective Practices, in the Areas Covered by Resolution 1540 (2004),” Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), 4 February 2014, www.un.org.
