February 27, 2025
Hanna Notte
The following is an excerpt from Foreign Affairs.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s embrace of Russia would seem to heighten a threat that has raised alarms in Western capitals for the past year: the alignment of a formidable set of adversaries, including China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, in a Russian-led “axis of upheaval.” All four countries are revisionist, intent on overturning a global order that they see as stacked against them. The West has feared that, in addition to lending each other economic, military, and political support, these countries may stir conflict whose destabilizing effects the West would struggle to contain. As it breaks from its Western allies and engages Moscow in negotiations over the war in Ukraine, Washington has suggested that one of its goals is to drive wedges between Russia and its partners. That outcome is unrealistic. Russia expects to win in Ukraine sooner or later, with or without a U.S. deal. It will therefore see little reason to cut ties with valued partners just to please Trump—and will be especially reluctant to upset a reliable relationship with Beijing for the sake of one with Washington that may last only until the next U.S. election. If the Trump administration lifts U.S. pressure on Moscow anyway, Russia could end up having both stronger ties with fellow revisionist states and a previously unimaginable degree of tolerance from Washington for its disruptive foreign policies.
But even in a relatively permissive environment, Russia’s appetite for global upheaval has limits. New bursts of conflict will not necessarily work in its favor. Given its finite resources and its preoccupation with Ukraine, Moscow’s ability to shape outcomes to its advantage in other parts of the world is highly constrained. As violence has recently spread across the Middle East, for instance, Russia at first was optimistic that the hostilities would harm its adversaries, but that conflict ended up weakening Moscow’s position because it exposed the vulnerability of one Russian partner, Iran, and culminated in the downfall of another, the regime in Syria. Russia’s reliance on partners other than China, Iran, and North Korea has also restricted its troublemaking. Its need to keep stable relations with India and Saudi Arabia in particular has softened its aggressive impulses, and Moscow’s desire to avoid upsetting countries in the global South has compelled it to navigate multilateral diplomatic forums, such as BRICS and the United Nations, with some caution.
These constraints will be strongest while Russia continues to wage war in Ukraine, but they will persist in some form after a potential settlement, too. Where it can control the consequences of its meddling, Moscow will likely determine that the benefits outweigh the risks. But where its interference could escalate into a full-blown conflict that demands Russia’s military engagement, Moscow may exercise more restraint. In practice, this means that Russia will almost certainly step up its disinformation campaigns and acts of sabotage (such as cyberattacks and vandalism of infrastructure) in Europe, sensing in the United States’ apparent desire to retreat from the continent an opportunity to further erode NATO cohesion. But Russia’s aversion to military entanglement should inhibit it from causing upheaval on the Korean Peninsula, in the Middle East, and even in the African countries where it maintains a security presence. After facing some opposition to its revisionist agenda in multilateral forums, Moscow may also reassess its diplomatic strategy, based in part on how much havoc the United States itself will wreak in those institutions.
Russia is playing a long game, and it knows it needs to pick its battles, especially if the unexpected tailwind from the White House turns out to be temporary or tempestuous. If the countries still committed to countering Russian disruption are to do so effectively in this new, uncertain era, they, too, will need to assess carefully where and when to enter the fray—starting with the increasingly imperiled European front.
Continue reading at Foreign Affairs.
