May 22, 2019
Cyrus Jabbari, Philipp C. Bleek
This is the abstract of a study published by the National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Emerging microfluidics technology has significant extant and potential implications for chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons threats. Picture a computer chip, but instead of wires, tiny channels through which liquids flow and mix. Such “lab on a chip” devices enable far greater control over chemical reactions than traditional bulk, batch chemistry. Flow chemistry, including both microfluidics and nanofluidics, is already being used in the chemical, medical, and pharmaceutical industries. The security policy implications have received only modest attention. Potential implications are various, to include the development of novel chemical agents via microfluidic-enable combinatorial chemistry, on-demand production of extremely pure chemical agents in facilities whose small footprints make them easier to hide, more portable chemical and biological agent detectors, and sensors that might better enable International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on nuclear reprocessing. Emerging microfluidics technology may also interact with other emerging technologies. For example, microfluidics chips can be additively manufactured (3D printed). Or microfluidics-enabled chemical and biological detectors might be small and light enough to be mounted on swarming drones that could characterize a chemically or biologically-contaminated battlefield. Policymakers concerned about CBRN threats have an opportunity to get ahead of, or at least less behind, some of these developments.
This paper is dedicated in memory of Raymond A. Zilinskas, who was one of the world’s leading chemical and biological weapons experts and a devoted teacher and mentor. Ray served as Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, where both authors had the privilege of interacting with him. Ray offered his usual tough but constructive feedback on earlier drafts of this project, passing away as the paper was being finalized for publication. He will be deeply missed.
Read the full study at NDU’s Center for the Study of WMD.
Cyrus Jabbari is a Masters Candidate in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Program, and a Graduate Research Assistant at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, both at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
Philipp C. Bleek is an Associate Professor and Program Chair (Acting) in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Program, and Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, both at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
