M building of the Vienna International Center,
Location of the NPT PrepCom.
CNS has compiled a set of frequently asked questions (FAQ) relating to the PrepCom meeting to be held in Vienna starting April 30, 2012.
The Ninth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is scheduled to be held in 2015, and the first Preparatory Committee meeting of the ninth review cycle will be held in Vienna from April 30 to May 11, 2012. CNS has compiled a set of frequently asked questions (FAQ) related to the up-coming meeting.
1. What is the NPT Review process? What is the purpose of a Preparatory Committee?
2. Who is chairing the 2012 PrepCom meeting?
3. What is the first PrepCom meeting expected to do? What is the relevance of past Review Conferences to the current Review Cycle?
4. What is the 2010 Action Plan?
5. What is the status of implementation of the 2010 Action Plan?
6. What is the status of implementing the recommendations on the Middle East?
7. What issues are likely to arise at the 2012 PrepCom meeting?
1. What is the NPT Review process? What is the purpose of a Preparatory Committee?
In accordance with Article VIII.3 of the NPT, every five years States parties convene to review the implementation of the treaty and, since 1995, to set a forward-looking agenda for its further operation. At the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, States parties decided to “strengthen” the review process and to convene 10-day Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings in each of the three years preceding the Review Conferences (RevCon). If necessary, a fourth PrepCom may be held in the year of the Conference.
The purpose of the PrepCom meetings is to address both substantive and procedural matters ahead of the Review Conferences. At the 1995 and 2000 Conferences, States parties decided that subsequently the first two PrepCom sessions would consider “principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty as well as its universality.” Each of the PrepCom meetings is therefore supposed to allocate specific time for the discussion of substantive issues regarding implementation of the treaty and past review conferences’ decisions and resolutions. The chairs of the first two PrepComs are expected to prepare factual summaries of the meetings, while the third (or fourth) preparatory committee meeting should produce a consensus report with recommendations to the Review Conference. In practice, it has proven difficult — if not impossible — for States parties to adopt such recommendations or even factual summaries at past PrepCom meetings. The Preparatory Committee meetings should also make the necessary procedural preparations for the next Review Conference, such as developing the draft agenda and rules of procedure.
2. Who is chairing the 2012 PrepCom meeting?
The Chair-designate of the 2012 PrepCom meeting is Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia, while the Secretary-General-designate is Thomas Markram, senior political officer at the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs. Customarily, the State parties confirm the appointments of the Chair and Secretary-General at the beginning of the PrepCom. The meeting on April 30 is expected to be opened by the President of the 2010 RevCon, Ambassador Libran Cabactulan of the Philippines.
The Office of Disarmament Affairs of the UN Secretariat (UNODA) functions as the Secretariat of the entire NPT Review Process, as the treaty has no designated implementing organization or permanent secretariat. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established under a separate statute, only implements safeguards under Article III of the NPT.
3. What is the first PrepCom meeting expected to do? What is the relevance of past Review Conferences to the current Review Cycle?
The first — and main — goal of the upcoming PrepCom meeting is to adopt an agenda that would guide the current review cycle. The draft provisional agenda prepared by the Chair-designate is based on the one that guided the 2007-2010 review cycle, although different states might propose adding new items and issues.
One of the most important points on the PrepCom agenda is the substantive preparatory work that should consider ways to promote implementation of the NPT as well as decisions of past review conferences. Of particular relevance in this regard are the outcomes of the 1995, 2000, and 2010 conferences.
In 1995, the Review and Extension Conference indefinitely extended the NPT as part of a “package” agreement consisting of three Decisions and a Resolution on the Middle East:
- Decision I on Strengthening the Review Process;
- Decision II on Principles and Objectives on Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation;
- Decision III on Extension of the NPT, and
- 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, calling for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region.
The 2000 Review Conference produced a consensus Final Document which, among other things, contained 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament. The 2010 Review Conference was successful in adopting a 64 item Action Plan 64 item Action Plan on disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy as well as a set of recommendations on the implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution. The 2012 PrepCom meeting is widely expected to begin the discussion of progress in implementing the 2010 Action Plan, and particular attention will likely be paid to the disarmament section and recommendations on the Middle East. The Chair will then have to reflect the discussions at the PrepCom meeting in his factual summary, which is subject to approval by the PrepCom participants.
4. What is the 2010 Action Plan?
The Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions adopted by consensus at the 2010 RevCon contain 64 action items across the “three pillars” of the NPT: nuclear disarmament (actions 1-22), nonproliferation (action 23-46), and peaceful uses of nuclear energy (action 47-64). The action plan includes commitments by nuclear-weapon states (NWS) to accelerate the reductions in their nuclear arsenals, declare and dispose of the fissile material taken out of weapons programs, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines, and engage among themselves on these and other issues. States that have not yet done so commit to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and NWS should also adopt a standard form to report on their implementation of the disarmament action plan.
The formulation of actions on nonproliferation and peaceful uses is broader, and they pertain, for the most part, to all States parties. The nonproliferation section calls, among other things, for further support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and wider adoption of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreements. The protocol gives the Agency additional tools to verify not only non-diversion of declared nuclear material to weapons programs but also the absence of undeclared nuclear material. This section of the Action Plan underscores the importance of compliance with nonproliferation obligations, and urges states “to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons.” The section on peaceful uses calls on NPT members to cooperate in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, strengthen the IAEA technical assistance program, give preferential treatment to non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) in exports and cooperation, share best practices on nuclear safety and security, and implement other relevant measures.
Decisions on the Middle East include a request that the UN Secretary-General, together with the three NPT depositaries (Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all states of the region, on the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. The Secretary-General and the three depositary states should also, in consultation with the states of the region, designate a host country for the conference and appoint a facilitator to assist with organizing the conference and implementing follow-on steps. (For more on Middle East recommendations, see FAQ 6 below.)
5. What is the status of implementation of the 2010 Action Plan?
While the adoption of the action plan at the 2010 RevCon was widely regarded as a success, its long-term impact will depend on the implementation by the NPT member states. So far, however, it is unclear how the States parties are planning to review and assess progress in implementing the action plan. Broad formulations, the lack of specific targets and deadlines on most of the action items, and possible differences in interpretation pose challenges for the review and assessment.
It is noteworthy that the disarmament section of the action plan is significantly more “actionable” than others. Indeed, the disarmament section was the only one initially conceived as an action plan, beginning from the 2009 PrepCom meeting. Citing the need for a balance between the pillars of the treaty, several states then successfully argued that there should be action plans for nonproliferation and peaceful uses as well, but the resulting language for these two sections was less committal and specific.
In advance of the new review cycle, nongovernmental organizations, including Reaching Critical Will and CNS, have begun to conduct their own monitoring and assessment of the action plan implementation. CNS findings on the disarmament section indicate that progress has been limited, and most of the measures implemented since the 2010 RevCon were, in fact, initiated or planned before the adoption of the Action Plan. On the other hand, actions that required states to undertake significant change in behavior or revision of policies, for the most part, saw little or no progress in implementation. For example, states that had not previously declared fissile material in excess of defense needs did not do so during the reporting period; additionally, states that had not provided information on their arsenal numbers or warheads dismantlement have not revised these policies since the 2010 RevCon.
The most significant progress was observed on Action 4 related to New START: the bilateral strategic arms control treaty entered into force, and Russia and the United States successfully began its implementation. At the same time, the two countries have not been successful in making much headway on follow-on measures. Another welcome development is the engagement of the five NWS on verification issues, which appears to be one of the most promising areas for progress in the near future.
A particularly important area that saw virtually no progress during the reporting period is the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, which should provide the overall context for the implementation of other concrete steps. Consultations among the NWS, as called for in Action 5, are falling short of the expectations of the NNWS. So far, the NWS were able to report only the establishment of a working group on terminology, and due to the confidentiality of consultations, it is unclear to what extent other issues listed in Action 5 have been addressed.
6. What is the status of implementing the recommendations on the Middle East?
In October 2011, Finland was designated as the host country for the 2012 Conference, and the Finnish Undersecretary of State Ambassador Jaakko Laajava named as the Facilitator. Since his appointment, Amb. Laajava has conducted intensive consultations with states in the Middle East, as well as with the NPT depositaries and co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution (Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States). He is expected to report on the progress of his efforts at the 2012 PrepCom.
Issues that need to be addressed for the conference to take place include the conference agenda, desired outcome, timing, and participation. States so far have had divergent views about the possible agenda and what the conference should accomplish. The Arab states are anxious to see the 2012 Conference take place as a first step towards negotiations on WMDFZ in the region and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution. Therefore, they would like the conference to establish a formal process. Israel, however, is concerned that such a conference might lead to a “slippery slope” of negotiations on a zone, while the regional conditions Israel deems as necessary for its success (peaceful relations and reconciliation among all states in the region) are not present. Some officials from the NPT depositary states have mentioned a preference for a short high-level meeting, cautiously setting the expectations low.
Participation in the conference by all relevant states is particularly important, and there are still doubts about the attendance by Israel, Iran, and Syria. After the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Israel stated that the consensus document ignores the realities of the Middle East and that, as a non-signatory to the NPT, Israel is not obligated to follow the decisions of the review conference. Subsequently, however, Israel has signaled some flexibility and engaged in consultations on the appointment of the facilitator, and later with the facilitator himself. Somewhat paradoxically, Iran also expressed a view that Israel should not be present at an NPT RevCon-mandated conference. Furthermore, Iran did not participate in the IAEA forum on a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the Middle East in November 2011, raising questions about the implications for the 2012 Conference. A wave of uprisings and revolutions in the Arab states that began in late 2010 also has many observers questioning the implications and prospects for the 2012 Middle East conference. So far, however, none of the relevant states has definitely refused to attend the Conference.
7. What issues are likely to arise at the 2012 PrepCom meeting?
Some States parties view the first PrepCom meeting as largely procedural and focused on organizational matters, bearing in mind that the review cycle is still at an early stage. Other states emphasize the need to address substantive issues, particularly the implementation of the 2010 Action Plan. In this regard, the focus is likely to be on the progress — or lack thereof — on the nuclear disarmament section. Non-nuclear-weapon states, from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Western Europe, are concerned about the slow pace of implementation and will seek assurances that NWS are committed to the Action Plan, with NAM likely to ask for more ambitious, time-bound steps.
For the most part, states appear to be eager to avoid confrontations and not “spoil the mood” at this stage. At the same time, a number of developments since the 2010 RevCon will inform and affect the discussions at the PrepCom:
- Iran’s nuclear program: The November 2011 IAEA Director General’s report concluded that Iran had conducted activities “relevant to a nuclear weapons program,” and discussion of a possible Israeli or U.S. strike against Iranian nuclear facilities has increased sharply in recent months. The lack of resolution of the crisis will certainly feature in the debates at the meeting. At the same time, the resumption of talks between P5+1 (or E3+3: China, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) and Iran and the decision to continue the negotiations on May 23, 2012, somewhat relieve the pressure ahead of the PrepCom. The draft PrepCom agenda proposed so far does not include a reference to “full compliance” with the Treaty, and the United States and other countries might insist on having such a reference, as they did in 2007.
- North Korea’s nuclear weapons program: DPRK attempted a rocket launch on April 12, 2012, and subsequently announced that it will not abide by the terms of the “Leap Day” deal with the United States on the suspension of its nuclear weapons program and the return of IAEA inspectors. While these developments are of serious concern, they are not likely to significantly alter the tone of the PrepCom meeting. However, States parties such as Japan, the United States and other Western countries might bring up the North Korean case to restart the debate on tightening the withdrawal clause under Article X of the NPT to make it more costly for states to leave the treaty. Article X stipulates that a state can withdraw from the NPT if it jeopardizes its “supreme national interest” and has to notify other States parties and the UN Security Council three months in advance of withdrawal. Many NAM states remain wary of reinterpreting Article X, and there is little appetite for revisiting the issue after the debates at the 2010 RevCon.
- Nuclear safety and security: Nuclear safety has received a lot of attention at international fora since the earthquake and tsunami in Japan in March 2011 caused a meltdown at the Fukushima Daichi nuclear power plant. At the High Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security in September 2011, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon specifically encouraged the NPT PrepCom to allocate time to discuss nuclear safety and security. The nuclear security discussion will be boosted by the March 2012 Seoul Summit, and most parties are likely to welcome developments in this regard.
Reference Documents
- Patricia Lewis and William C. Potter, “The Long Journey Toward A WMD-Free Middle East,” Arms Control Today, September 2011, www.armscontrol.org.
- Chen Kane, “The Role of Civil Society in Promoting a WMDFZ in the Middle East,” Disarmament Forum: Nuclear-weapon-free zones, Volume 2 (2011).
- Nabil Fahmy and Patricia Lewis, “Possible Elements of an NWFZ in the Middle East,” Disarmament Forum: Nuclear-weapon-free zones, Volume 2 (2011).
