October 20, 2015
- View the full UNSCR 1540 Resource Collection
Region Overview
The sub-Saharan Africa region includes a diverse set of forty-nine states at varying levels of economic and political development. The region faces numerous non-state actor threats and is home to some of the world’s most porous and unregulated borders, through which large volumes of drugs, small arms, and other contraband flow with relative impunity. Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540″ in the region is well below that of other world regions. The slow implementation rate is largely due to sub-Saharan states’ poor capacity to fulfill 1540 provisions, as well as the low priority these states give to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC) nonproliferation. However, very few sub-Saharan states, with the exception of South Africa, possess the capability to produce NBC weapons or related materials.
Many states in sub-Saharan Africa continue to face security threats from extremists, armed militias, and international terrorist organizations. In East Africa, the most acute threat emanates from the Somali-based terrorist organization al-Shabaab, which has demonstrated a capacity to strike beyond Somalia into Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, and has threatened attacks in Djibouti and Burundi. [1] According to the Terrorism Risk Index developed by the global risk advisory firm Maplecroft, Somalia is now the most at-risk state from terrorist attacks. [2] In 2012, this threat compelled neighboring states to take action, delivering major blows to al-Shabaab by securing the organization’s strongholds in Mogadishu and Kismayo. [3] Other extremist groups in East Africa include the Janjaweed, Sudan Liberation Army (SLA); the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Sudan’s Darfur region; the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda, and others in Ethiopia. [4]
Since the 1990s, al-Qaeda has operated in the region, engaging in activities in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. Kenya has been the most frequent target of Al-Qaeda attacks, and the organization “almost certainly continues to maintain cells in Kenya.” [5] In the Sahara region itself, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to pose a significant threat, having been forced from its traditional base of operations along Algeria’s Mediterranean coast to the Sahel region that spans Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger, Senegal, and Burkina Faso. Notably, the AQIM has made significant gains in Mali, capturing, along with other Islamist groups, the sparsely populated northern region of the state in early 2012. [6] Following the government’s request for military assistance in January 2013, a French-led intervention has thwarted further Islamist territorial gains and recaptured key Islamist strongholds in Mali. France is still engaging in military operations, in tandem with Malian forces and United Nations peacekeepers. [7] Some experts contend AQIM is the “primary transnational terror threat in North Africa,” as it is believed to have played a role in the September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Libya, as well as in a number of attempted attacks in Western Europe. [8]
In West Africa, Nigeria also faces a growing number of terrorist threats, experiencing “a tremendous rise in insurgent-related incidents in the country.” [9] The Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram, which seeks to establish an Islamic Nigerian state, claimed responsibility for many of these attacks. [10] The group fractured into Boko Haram and Ansaru in 2012; both are designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the U.S. Department of State. [11]
The terrorist threat in Southern Africa appears less severe than in others parts of the continent. While South Africa possesses many advantages over other African states in its capacity to combat terrorism, the state is nonetheless “attractive to terrorists because of its superior transportation links, its infrastructure, its international linkages, and its relative freedom of movement,” as well as the “value and apparent availability of South African passports.” [12] In a reported biological terrorism threat in 2011, South African citizen Brian Patrick Roach threatened to release hoof and mouth disease among livestock in the United States and the United Kingdom. [13]
For detailed information on this region’s NBC and delivery system capabilities, see the relevant country profiles.
WMD-Related Illicit Trafficking
Sub-Saharan states are source, destination, and transshipment points for illicit trafficking, including arms smuggling, drugs, and human trafficking. Many African states argue the spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW) presents a much more serious threat on the continent than does the proliferation of NBC weapons or related materials. By some accounts, 100 million out of the estimated 640 million SALW in circulation worldwide are believed to be in Africa, the majority of which are in the hands of non-state actors. [14] A plethora of actors contribute to SALW trafficking, “including corrupt government and law-enforcement officials, illicit brokers, banks, military, and transportation companies.” [15]
The drug trade is another ubiquitous form of illicit trafficking in the region. Drug trafficking in West Africa in particular has received significant attention in recent years. According to the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), between 2004 and 2007 “at least two distinct transshipment hubs emerged in West Africa: one centered on Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, and one centered on the Bight of Benin, spanning the coastline from Ghana to Nigeria.” [16]
Most East African states are used as transshipment points for heroin from Southwest and Southeast Asia destined for South African, European, and U.S. markets. [17] Moreover, the UNODC notes, “an intra-regional drug trafficking pattern has also emerged recently, involving Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, and the Comoros.” [18]
The same factors facilitating these illicit activities, including weak border controls and enforcement capacities, remote and inhospitable terrain, and corruption, could conceivably facilitate the proliferation of NBC weapons and related materials. Open source information suggests that there is some NBC trafficking in sub-Saharan Africa. Incidents of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials in the region largely involve smuggling of natural uranium from unsecured mines; the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources (DTSO) recorded 12 such incidents between 1994 and 2005 in Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, Namibia, and South Africa. [19] Uranium ore does not present a significant proliferation concern due to the need for further processing and enrichment; however, the concentrations of U-235 in some deposits, particularly in the DRC, are amongst the richest worldwide, having “the potential to make Congolese uranium attractive to threshold states as a starting point for their nuclear weapons programs.” [20] The unofficial mining of copper deposits near uranium sources has contributed to these fears. [21]
One of the most high-profile incidents of nuclear smuggling occurred in the DRC in 1997, when eight fuel rods of 19.9% enriched uranium were stolen from a research reactor in Kinshasa. This incident constitutes the only known case of theft of nuclear fuel from a research reactor, and the whereabouts of seven of the eight fuel rods remain unknown. [22]
South African companies and individuals were important suppliers in the A.Q. Khan network. In 2004, investigations revealed three South African individuals, Gerhard Wisser, Daniel Greigs, and Johan A.M. Meyer, “created a crucial link in the Khan network, becoming a secret supplier of centrifuge equipment to Pakistan, Libya, India, and possibly Iran and North Korea.” [23] Wisser and Greigs were subsequently charged with ten violations of export controls involving Libya and Pakistan, while Meyer agreed to testify against them in exchange for clemency. [24]
Maritime piracy also presents a substantial security issue in the region. Between 2008 and 2009 global incidents of piracy began to skyrocket, principally occurring off the Coast of Somalia. [25] Over the past decade, Somali pirates have extended their activities as far as 1000 nautical miles from the eastern coast of Somalia. [26] While the breadth of their activities has expanded, Somali pirates mainly operate in the Gulf of Aden and the adjacent Red and Arabian Seas. The Gulf of Aden is a strategic naval zone which sees the passage of thousands of ships per year en route to and from the Suez Canal. [27] It is near a major chokepoint for oil naval transit; the U.S. Department of Energy estimated that 3.4 million barrels of oil per day passed through the Bab el-Mandab strait connecting the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea in 2011. [28] Recognizing the severity of this growing problem, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1816 in 2008, “creating conditions for third-party governments to conduct anti-piracy operations in Somali territorial waters, as well as engaging in on-shore operations with the authorization of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG).” [29] In addition, the EU-led Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) established the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor in 2009, where military assets are strategically deployed to provide protection and support of merchant ships. [30] These efforts appear to have had a positive impact, as there were fewer incidents of successful hijackings in the Gulf between 2008 and 2011 despite an overall increase in the number of attempted hijackings over this period. [31] By 2013, piracy off the Somali coast was at a seven-year low. [32] However, the Gulf of Guinea, particularly off of the coast of Nigeria, has seen a rise in attacks. [33]
1540 Implementation
Submission of 1540 National Implementation Reports has progressed slowly in sub-Saharan Africa, especially when compared with reporting behavior in other parts of the world. Only twenty-nine of forty-nine states in the region have submitted reports to the 1540 Committee. [34] Many of the submitted reports, with the exception of South Africa’s, are lacking in terms of their quality and comprehensiveness. Most states merely noted the absence of NBC weapons within their territories, their participation in relevant treaties and conventions, and their existing export and border control-related legislation and enforcement activities. Most of this legislation is likely aimed at restricting illicit small arms and drug trafficking, and as one study highlighted, “much of the legislation is broad, outdated and insufficient to effectively deal with more recent [NBC weapons] threats.” [35]
Export Controls and Related Measures
South Africa has by far the most advanced export control laws and systems in the region. It is a member of all of the nonproliferation export control regimes except the Australia Group, and notably requires industry to apply for import, export, and transport permits to transfer conventional arms as well as dual-use chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile-related controlled goods. [36] Since dismantling its nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s, South Africa’s weapons-grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) “is well secured and under continual surveillance by the [International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)],” having been placed, along with other nuclear materials and activities, under strengthened safeguards after Pretoria’s signing of the Additional Protocol in September 2002. [37] Given South Africa’s extensive experience drafting and enforcing its export control system, the country could be a good candidate to provide some capacity-building assistance to other countries in its region. However, its report still states that it “is considering possible ways in which assistance could be provided.” [38]
While the four additional high priority states that either possess or once possessed NBC-related materials have submitted reports to the 1540 Committee (the DRC, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sudan), substantial work remains with respect to their implementation of the resolution. Of these four, only the DRC has requested implementation assistance, appealing for aid drafting its national report and relevant legislation and regulations, and building the capacity of its customs officials and border police. [39] Toward these ends, the DRC and the United States signed a Joint Action Plan on Combating Smuggling of Nuclear and Radioactive Material in December 2010, “specifying 45 priority actions to be taken to improve anti-smuggling capabilities of the DRC.” [40]
Within the remaining forty-four sub-Saharan states, many of whom present a transit or terrorist concern, 1540 implementation has not been afforded significant attention. The lack of attention paid to reporting and implementation of Resolution 1540 in the region is largely due to a combination of conflicting priorities, lack of capacity, and reporting fatigue. Given the immense task of comprehensively implementing the resolution, sub-Saharan states are reluctant to devote already limited resources to a problem that many do not consider a pressing regional threat. Governments in the region afford much greater priority to dealing with the issues of poverty, poor public health, SALW proliferation, and persistent regional and internal conflicts. [41]
Regional Cooperation and Outreach
A number of outreach activities have contributed to the process of achieving 1540 objectives within sub-Saharan Africa. From 2005 to 2013, a total of eight 1540-related seminars and workshops with a sub-Saharan regional theme took place, bringing together a host of African representatives, regional organizations, and experts from states and organizations located outside the region. [42] An October 2013 seminar in Nairobi, Kenya addressed the physical protection of nuclear materials. [43] Seminars have endeavored to raise awareness about 1540, share implementation experiences, identify potential gaps in legislation, and provide guidance on reporting and implementation requirements. Moreover, these seminars give international organizations and states outside the region formal opportunities to offer implementation assistance.
A number of sub-Saharan states have taken advantage of the various assistance programs offered by Western states and international organizations. Ghana and Tanzania cooperated with the IAEA in establishing Nuclear Security Support Centers that aim to “foster nuclear security culture and enhance coordination and collaboration among the nuclear security competent authorities,” along with developing a network of nuclear security experts. [44] Furthermore, the IAEA has provided nuclear safety and security assistance to a number of states via the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development, and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA), launched in 1990. [45] The AFRA project provided initial and continued support for the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA), established in 2009. With 33 participating states, the FNRBA “provides a mechanism for exchanging experiences and practices among nuclear regulatory bodies in Africa,” and has the potential to support its members in compiling 1540 reports and in the implementation of the resolution’s provisions. [46]
The United States has been particularly active in outreach efforts, providing both material assistance and border security training to a number of sub-Saharan states via regional workshops organized by the U.S. Defense Department’s African Command (AFRICOM), the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and the State Department’s Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP). [47] In addition, the United States has developed partnerships with Kenya, Tanzania, and South Africa via the State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program. The EXBS program has worked to provide these states with support in meeting their 1540 obligations through the development of legal and regulatory frameworks, as well as providing export licensing and enforcement training. [48]
The EU has also provided 1540 assistance in the region. Following the adoption in 2006 and 2008 of European Council Joint Actions, the EU has provided financial assistance in support of UNODA-implemented regional 1540 seminars and workshops aimed at awareness raising, experience sharing, report drafting, and capacity-building of export control officials in four regions including Africa. [49] In 2010, the EU launched the CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence (CoE) project with a budget of over €100 million. [50] Specific CoE initiatives in the region include “establishing a National Response Plan in Ghana and Kenya for responding to unauthorized events involving [CBRN] materials,” as well as “capacity building and raising awareness for identifying and responding to threats from [CBRN] materials in sub-Saharan African countries.” [51]
However, only ten sub-Saharan states have requested assistance via the 1540 Committee. [52] Moreover, of the states that have requested assistance, “few have been specific or have provided the necessary details of the type of support they require.” [53] This is largely due to the fact that the majority of sub-Saharan states have limited experience with strategic trade controls, making it difficult for them “to assess and outline the kind of assistance they require to implement the resolution.” [54]
Regional Organizations and 1540
The major regional and sub-regional organizations on the continent “play almost no role in promoting Resolution 1540.” [55] The African Union (AU) is the largest regional organization on the continent with fifty-four member states, and its institutional mandate states that the AU shall “promote and encourage the implementation of…UN and other relevant international Conventions and Treaties on arms control and disarmament.” [56] The AU’s predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), frequently passed nonproliferation and disarmament-related resolutions pertaining to French nuclear testing on Algerian soil in the 1960s, African support of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963, condemnation of South Africa’s clandestine nuclear program, and support of the Pelindaba Treaty. [57]
Some AU member states have promoted nonproliferation and 1540 implementation through the AU. During an opening meeting of the UN Security Council in 2007, the Ghanaian ambassador stressed the capacities of regional organizations including the AU “to pool resources for the implementation of such 1540 obligations as border controls and [countering] illicit financial networks within the regional context.” [58] In addition, former Nigerian foreign affairs minister Oluyemi Adeniji proposed in 2002 that the AU secretariat “establish a dedicated unit to promote African states’ ratification of and adherence to international nonproliferation and disarmament agreements.” [59] The establishment of such a unit would help to overcome key weaknesses of the AU, such as “the lack of follow-up mechanisms to negotiate treaties and implementation of multilateral agreements.” [60] Such statements and proposals, however, have not been met with commensurate political will from other member states. The AU continues to focus mainly on peacekeeping and crisis management activities in response to more pressing priorities, such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic, extreme poverty, and regional conflicts. [61]
However, pursuant to Article 12 of the Treaty of Pelindaba, the AU established the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) in November 2010 as a mechanism for ensuring compliance with the treaty. Having finalized key structures and procedures in July 2012, AFCONE is set to become operational, and will focus on “monitoring of compliance by State Parties with their nonproliferation obligations; nuclear and radiation safety and security; nuclear sciences and applications; and, partnerships and technical cooperation, including outreach and promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” [62] While the commission is still in its infancy, AFCONE could complement 1540 implementation at the continental level, given the significant overlap between its mission and the resolution’s provisions. [63]
A number of sub-regional organizations also operate in sub-Saharan Africa. [64] Like the AU, however, sub-regional organizations have not yet comprehensively engaged on nonproliferation issues. Nonetheless, some experts argue African sub-regional organizations have the potential to play a more effective role than larger regional organizations such as the AU in facilitating 1540 implementation, pointing to their engagement with the 2001 UN Program to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA). Johan Bergenas argues that given their more limited membership and relative homogeneity, sub-regional organizations “to a greater extent than regional organizations have been able to agree on and promote ratification of treaties, accords, and protocols.” [65] In addition, Bergenas found the coordinating organs within these organizations exhibited notable strengths in the areas of sharing information, harmonizing legislation, and lobbying governments to implement commitments. However, it remains to be seen if sufficient political will can be garnered within sub-regional organizations to address Resolution 1540 specifically.
1540 Implementation Challenges
Adopting a risk-based approach to analyzing 1540 implementation, one study contends that the highest priority states include those that possess or have possessed NBC weapons or related dual-use materials, notably the DRC, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and Sudan. [66] Most sub-Saharan states present a substantially lower proliferation risk, falling into a second category defined by their potential to be targeted by non-state and terrorist actors as transit states for weapons and components.
While conflicting priorities and lack of capacity hamper the achievement of 1540 objectives in sub-Saharan Africa, many experts argue 1540 implementation and the security priorities of developing states are mutually reinforcing objectives, capable of being accomplished in tandem. A study performed by the Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation argued that Resolution 1540 offers “opportunities to leverage international security assistance to also benefit development needs and regional security priorities, such as public health, trafficking in small arms and light weapons, and broader economic development concerns of the Global South.” [67] Wider recognition among sub-Saharan states of the spillover benefits of meeting 1540 objectives would likely facilitate greater attention to the resolution’s implementation.
Sources:
[1] Ken Menkhaus and Christopher Boucek, “Terrorism Out of Somalia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 23 September 2010, www.carnegieendowment.org; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2011: Africa Overview,” State Department, 31 July 2012, www.state.gov; Brian Finlay et al., “Beyond Boundaries in Eastern Africa: Bridging the Security/Development Divide with International Security Assistance,” the Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, 10 March 2011, p. 19-21.
[2] “Somalia overtakes Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Colombia to become world’s terror capital,” Maplecroft, 15 November 2010, www.maplecroft.com; “Newly formed South Sudan joins Somalia, Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan at the top of Maplecroft terrorism ranking,” Maplecroft, 3 August 2011, www.maplecroft.com.
[3] Katherine Zimmerman, “Al Shabaab after Kismayo,” American Enterprise Institute Critical Threats Project, 3 October 2012, www.aei.org.
[4] David H. Shinn, “Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn,” Journal of Conflict Studies, Summer 2007, p. 47.
[5] David H. Shinn, “Al-Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn,” Journal of Conflict Studies, Summer 2007, p. 66.
[6] Jonathan Masters, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),” Council on Foreign Relations, 27 January 2013, www.cfr.org.
[7] Alissa J. Rubin, “France Begins New Anti-Islamist Sweep in Mali,” The New York Times, 24 October 2013, www.nytimes.com.
[8] Jonathan Masters, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),” Council on Foreign Relations, 24 January 2013, www.cfr.org.
[9] Brenda Brown Schoonover, “A Glimpse at Nigeria’s Ongoing Islamic Terrorist Challenges,” American Diplomacy, Foreign Service Dispatches and Periodic Reports on U.S. Foreign Policy, October 2013, www.unc.edu; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2011: Africa Overview,” State Department, 31 July 2012, www.state.gov.
[10] Andrew Walker, “What Is Boko Haram?” United States Institute of Peace Special Report, May 2012, www.usip.org; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2011: Africa Overview,” State Department, 31 July 2012, www.state.gov.
[11] Study for Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “FTO Designation: Boko Haram and Ansaru,” November 2013, p. 1, www.start.umd.edu.
[12] Princeton N. Lyman, “The War on Terrorism in Africa,” in Africa in World Politics: Reforming Political Order, eds. John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (New York: Westview Press, 2009).
[13] Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2011: Africa Overview,” State Department, 31 July 2012, www.state.gov.
[14] “Organised Crime and Trafficking in Eastern Africa,” UN Office on Drugs and Crime, November 2009, p. 23, www.unodc.org.
[15] Brian Finlay et al., “Beyond Boundaries in Eastern Africa: Bridging the Security/Development Divide with International Security Assistance,” the Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, 10 March 2011, p. 16.
[16] “The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment,” UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010, p. 6, www.unodc.org.
[17] “Organized Crime and Trafficking in Eastern Africa,” UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Discussion Paper, 2009, p. 28-9, www.unodc.org.
[18] “Organized Crime and Trafficking in Eastern Africa,” UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Discussion Paper, 2009, p. 28, www.unodc.org.
[19] “Illicit Trafficking in Radioactive Materials,” in IISS Strategic Dossier,” Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks – A net assessment, 2 May 2007, p. 129.
[20] “Illicit Trafficking in Radioactive Materials,” in IISS Strategic Dossier,” Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks – A net assessment, 2 May 2007, p. 130.
[21] World Nuclear Association, “Uranium in Africa,” July 2013, https://world-nuclear.org.
[22] Scott Firsing, “Africa, Nuclear Security and the 2012 Summit,” Foreign Policy Association, 29 February 2012, https://foreignpolicyblogs.com; “Illicit Trafficking in Radioactive Materials,” in IISS Strategic Dossier,” Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks – A net assessment, 2 May 2007, p. 130.
[23] David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies, (New York: Free Press, 2010), p. 100.
[24] David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies, (New York: Free Press, 2010), p. 217.
[25] “The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010, p. 193, www.unodc.org.
[26] “The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010, p. 196.
[27] “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 22 August 2012, www.eia.gov.
[28] “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 22 August 2012, www.eia.gov.
[29] “The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010, p. 200.
[30] “Piracy & Armed Robbery Prone Areas and Warnings,” ICC Commercial Crime Services, December 2009, www.icc-ccs.org.
[31] “Somali pirates widen their net,” IISS Strategic Comment, Vol. 17, Comment 40, November 2011; “Somalia: Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly Report,” Office of Naval Intelligence, 12 July 2012, p. 2; “The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2010, p. 200.
[32] “Somali Piracy Sinks to Seven-Year Low,” Journal of Commerce, 15 July 2013, www.joc.com.
[33] “Somali Piracy Sinks to Seven-Year Low,” Journal of Commerce, 15 July 2013, www.joc.com.
[34] 1540 Committee, “National Reports,” www.un.org.
[35] Jean du Preez and Dominique Dye, “Implementing Resolution 1540 in Africa; Balancing Competing Priorities,” in Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organization, UNIDIR, 2008, p. 101.
[36] Gerhard Rousseau, “Relevant Lesson: South Africa,” in UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, “United Nations Seminar on Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in Africa,” ODA Occasional Papers, No. 12, May 2007, p. 37, www.un.org.
[37] Jean du Preez and Dominique Dye, “Implementing Resolution 1540 in Africa; Balancing Competing Priorities,” in Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations, UNIDIR, 2008, p. 107; Gerhard Rousseau, “Relevant Lesson: South Africa,” in UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, “United Nations Seminar on Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in Africa,” ODA Occasional Papers, No. 12, May 2007, p. 35, www.un.org.
[38] Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Africa to the UN, “Note verbale dated 31 January 2005 from the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee,” Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), S/AC.44/2004/(02)/102, 31 January 2005, p. 9.
[39] “Summary of Requests for Assistance from Member States,” 1540 Committee, www.un.org.
[40] “U.S. Government to Sponsor Anti-Nuclear Smuggling Workshop in the DRC,” U.S. Department of State, www.kinshasa.usembassy.gov.
[41] UN Security Council, “Security Council Affirms Determination to Strengthen Cooperation Aimed at Countering Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Weapons Proliferation,” UN document SC/8964, 23 February 2007, www.un.org.
[42] 1540 Committee, United Nations, “Event List and Related Documents,” accessed November 2013, www.un.org.
[43] 1540 Committee, United Nations, “Event List and Related Documents,” accessed November 2013, www.un.org.
[44] Both the Ghana and the Tanzania centers are now open. Alan Heyes, “An Assessment of the Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence,” The Stanley Foundation, May 2012, pp.2-3, 11, www.nsgeg.org; IAEA Director General, “Nuclear Security Report 2010: Measures to Protect against Nuclear Terrorism,” IAEA Board of Governors General Conference, 12 August 2010, www.iaea.org.
[45] Mickel Edwerd, “Development of a Continent,” IAEA Bulletin, September 2009, p. 53-56.
[46] Amelia Broodryk and Noël Stott, “Challenges and Solutions for 1540 Implementation in the African Region,” 1540 Compass, Winter 2012, p. 12, www.cits.uga.edu.
[47] Jane Purcell, “Opportunities for assistance: United States,” in UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, “United Nations Seminar on Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in Africa,” ODA Occasional Papers, No. 12, May 2007, p. 116 www.un.org; “NNSA, AFRICOM Conduct Inaugural East African Border Security Workshop,” U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, 16 September 2011, www.nnsa.energy.org; “U.S. Government to Sponsor Anti-Nuclear Smuggling Workshop in the DRC,” U.S. Department of State, www.kinshasa.usembassy.gov.
[48] Pamela Mburu, “EXBS Expands Engagement with Kenya,” EXBS Quarterly Newsletter, August 2012, p. 4, www.state.gov.
[49] Lina Grip, “The Role of the European Union in Delivering Resolution 1540 Implementation Assistance,” EU Non-Proliferation Papers, No. 22, October 2012, p. 11.
[50] Lina Grip, “The Role of the European Union in Delivering Resolution 1540 Implementation Assistance,” EU Non-Proliferation Papers, No. 22, October 2012, p. 10.
[51] Namely Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Madagascar. 1540 Committee, “Summary Requests for Assistance from Member States,” www.un.org.
[52] CBRN Centres of Excellence, “CoE projects in the world,” European Commission, www.cbrn-coe.eu.
[53] Jean du Preez and Dominique Dye, “Implementing Resolution 1540 in Africa; Balancing Competing Priorities,” in Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations, UNIDIR, 2008, p. 125.
[54] Jean du Preez and Dominique Dye, “Implementing Resolution 1540 in Africa; Balancing Competing Priorities,” in Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations, UNIDIR, 2008, p. 123.
[55] Jean du Preez and Dominique Dye, “Implementing Resolution 1540 in Africa; Balancing Competing Priorities,” in Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations, UNIDIR, 2008, p. 119.
[56] “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,” the African Union, 9 July 2002, p. 10, www.africa-union.org.
[57] Johan Bergenas, “The Role of African Regional and Subregional Organizations in Implementing Resolution 1540,” in Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations, UNIDIR, 2008, p. 144.
[58] UN Security Council, “Security Council Affirms Determination to Strengthen Cooperation Aimed at Countering Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Weapons Proliferation,” UN document SC/8964, 23 February 2007, www.un.org.
[59] Jean du Preez and Dominique Dye, “Implementing Resolution 1540 in Africa; Balancing Competing Priorities,” in Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations, UNIDIR, 2008, p. 119.
[60] Brian Finlay et. al, “Beyond Boundaries in Eastern Africa: Bridging the Security/Development Divide with International Security Assistance,” the Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, 10 March 2011, p. 36.
[61] Johan Bergenas, “The Role of African Regional and Subregional Organizations in Implementing Resolution 1540,” in Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations, UNIDIR, 2008, p. 145.
[62] “African nuclear commission takes shape,” World Nuclear News, 13 August 2012, www.world-nuclear-news.org.
[63] “Conference Non-Paper to AU Commission: International Expert Workshop Establishing the Treaty of Pelindaba African Commission on Nuclear Energy,” Institute for Security Studies and James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, March 2010, p. 19, www.nonproliferation.org.
[64] These sub-regional organizations include: The Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African Development Community; and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization; Intergovernmental Authority on Development; East African Community; Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).
[65] Johan Bergenas, “The Role of African Regional and Subregional Organizations in Implementing Resolution 1540,” in Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations, UNIDIR, 2008, p. 148.
[66] Jean du Preez and Dominique Dye, “Implementing Resolution 1540 in Africa; Balancing Competing Priorities,” in Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations, UNIDIR, 2008, p. 117-8.
[67] Brian Finlay et al., “Beyond Boundaries in Eastern Africa: Bridging the Security/Development Divide with International Security Assistance,” The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, 10 March 2011, p. 24, Tate.gov.
