CNS Resources on South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program

Michael Barletta
Christina Ellington
March 1999

View the Nuclear Facilities List

An Annotated Chronology, 1969-1994 [1]

1969

The Atomic Energy Board [AEB] forms an internal committee to research the technical and economic aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions [PNEs] for the mining industry.[2]

1971

Uranium Enrichment Corporation [UCOR] is assigned responsibility for overseeing the uranium enrichment program, and construction of a pilot-scale uranium enrichment plant– the Y-plant – is initiated.[3]

March 1971

South Africa initiates an effort to construct a PNE, according to Armaments Corporation [Armscor] officials. South African Minister of Mining Carl de Wet authorizes the AEB to conduct research on constructing the first device.[4]

1972

Lacking adequate facilities at Pelindaba, a small team of AEB staff begins working on mechanical and pyrotechnic subsystems for a gun-type nuclear explosive device at a propulsion laboratory at Somchem, in Cape Province.[5]

1973

According to a 1983 US intelligence report, “[deleted passage] indicates that South Africa formally launch[es] a weapons program in 1973,” and scientists are instructed to develop gun-assembly, implosion, and thermonuclear weapons designs.[6]

South African and other international sources provide different estimates on the initiation of the nuclear weapons program. According to F.W. de Klerk, president of South Africa from 1989-1994, the decision to “develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability” is made “as early as 1974.”[7] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards officials charged with verifying South Africa’s past nuclear activities likewise report that the prime minister approves a “limited program for development of nuclear weapons as a deterrent” in 1974.[8]

But according to Waldo Stumpf, head of the Atomic Energy Corporation [AEC[9]], the government officially does not change the objective of its nuclear explosive program from peaceful purposes to developing a nuclear deterrent capability until 1977.[10] Armaments Corporation [Armscor] officials maintain that in October 1978, Prime Minister P.W. Botha decides “to shift the emphasis” of the nuclear program from peaceful nuclear explosives to developing nuclear weapons, just one month after taking office.[11]

1974

In a report to Prime Minister John Vorster, the AEB concludes that it can build a nuclear explosive device. Vorster approves the development of PNEs and construction of an underground nuclear test site.[12]

May 1974

The AEB team at Somchem tests a scale model of a gun-type device using non-nuclear material as a projectile.[13]

Late 1974

According to AEC head Waldo Stumpf, the first stages at the lower end of the cascade at the Y-plant uranium enrichment facility are commissioned. The full cascade is not operational until March 1977.[14]

1976

One nuclear explosive test shaft is completed at the Vastrap testing range in the Kalahari Desert.[15]

The AEB team at Somchem tests a full-scale model of a gun-type device, using natural uranium as the projectile.[16] Natural and depleted uranium have the same physical and chemical properties as HEU, and can be used to test the design and function of an HEU-based nuclear explosive assembly.

1977

A second test shaft is completed at the Vastrap testing range.[17]

The AEB completes manufacture of South Africa’s first full-scale nuclear explosive device based on a gun-type design. The device does not contain a highly enriched uranium [HEU] core, however, because the Y-plant has not yet produced a sufficient quantity of HEU. The device is loaded with a depleted uranium core in preparation for a “cold” test planned for August 1977 at the Kalahari test site. The AEB plans to conduct a “true” test using a HEU pit in 1978. The device with the depleted uranium pit is later “dismantled and scrapped.”[18]

Mid-1977

The AEB transfers the nuclear weapons program from Somchem to the weapons research-and-development facilities that it built at Pelindaba.[19]

July 30, 1977

A Soviet surveillance satellite discovers the nuclear test site in the Kalahari desert.[20]

August 6, 1977

A second Soviet satellite completes four more passes over the test site. The Soviet Union immediately informs the United States that South Africa is making preparations for a nuclear test. Under international pressure, South Africa subsequently covers the test shafts with concrete slabs and abandons the site.[21]

January 30, 1978

The first small quantity of HEU is withdrawn from the Y-plant.[22]

1978

The AEB constructs a “second, smaller” nuclear device.[23]

April 1978

Prime Minister Vorster formally approves a draft document prepared by senior officials outlining South Africa’s future nuclear course.[24]

As defense minister, P.W. Botha approves adoption of a three-phase nuclear deterrent strategy. In phase one, the government will neither acknowledge nor deny its nuclear capability. If South African territory were threatened, the government would move to phase two and consider privately revealing its nuclear capability to certain international powers, such as the United States, to catalyze international intervention. If aid were not forthcoming, the government would move to phase three and consider demonstrating its nuclear capability in public, perhaps by conducting an underground nuclear test.[25]

1979

The government decides to assign Armscor with the task of designing and building additional gun-type devices. The AEB is to provide HEU and expertise in theoretical and neutron physics. The principal components of the Armscor nuclear weapons program include: development and production of deliverable gun-type devices; studies of implosion and thermonuclear technology; research and development on production and recovery of plutonium and tritium; and separation of lithium-6 for tritium production, for possible use in boosted nuclear weapons.[26]

July 1979

An “Action Committee” created by Botha to develop plans for the production of nuclear devices recommends production of a total of seven nuclear weapons.[27]

August 1979

The Y-plant is abruptly shut down “due to a massive catalytic in-process gas reaction between the UF6 [uranium hexafluoride] and the hydrogen carrier.”[28]

September 22, 1979

A US Vela surveillance satellite detects a “brief, intense, double flash of light near the southern tip of Africa.” Due to its characteristics, the US officials estimate that the flash could have resulted from the test of a nuclear device with a yield of 2-4 kilotons. South Africa emerges “as the prime suspect,” but the South African government denies that it has conducted a nuclear test. There are also rumors that Israel conducted a nuclear test, either alone or in conjunction with South Africa. US President Jimmy Carter assembles a panel of non-governmental scientists to determine whether the flash registered by the Vela was the result of a nuclear explosion.[29]

November 1979

The Y-Plant produces sufficient HEU to provide 55kg of 80-percent enriched U235 for use with the AEB’s second nuclear device, which was built in 1978. The AEB assembles the device to ensure that “everything fits properly.” The AEB device is a “non-deliverable demonstration device,” designed for use in an underground nuclear test that would prove South Africa’s nuclear weapons capability.[30] The device is eventually transferred from temporary storage in an abandoned coal mine at Witbank to a special vault at the Kentron Circle facility. Armscor later note that this AEB device is not a “qualified” design, indicating there is “not an adequate degree of assurance that it would detonate as intended or that it would not detonate accidentally.”[31]

Late 1970s

South Africa conducts a test of a gun-type device at Building 5000 at Pelindaba. “For a brief moment, the HEU [goes] critical, providing confidence that the device would work as predicted by theoretical calculations,” according to Institute for Science and International Security analyst David Albright.[32]

Mid-1980

The US panel of scientists assembled by President Carter releases its public report on the double flash detected by the Vela satellite in 1979. The panel concludes that the “signal was probably not from a nuclear explosion,” but it does not “rule out the possibility.” The Central Intelligence Agency, the Naval Research Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Defense Intelligence Agency contest the panel’s conclusions, saying they believe that the data indicates a nuclear explosion.[33]

May 1981

Armscor’s Kentron Circle facility is commissioned. It “essentially duplicate(s), under one roof, most of the development and manufacturing capabilities at Pelindaba.”[34]

July 1981

The first HEU is withdrawn from the Y-plant since its 1979 shutdown.[35]

April 1982

Armscor produces its first nuclear explosive device. The South African nuclear weapons arsenal increases at the rate of one device approximately every 18 months, until it includes six weapons by the late 1980s. During this period, the older devices are upgraded.[36] However, according to Stumpf and IAEA specialists, the “first prototype deliverable device” built at the Armscor facility is not completed until December 1982.[37] All sources concur, however, that until 1982 South Africa did not possess a deliverable nuclear weapon.

September 1985

After reviewing the nuclear weapons program, President P.W. Botha confirms that the program will be limited to seven fission devices. The government halts all work related to development of plutonium devices, ceases efforts to produce plutonium and tritium for nuclear weapons, and limits production of lithium-6. The Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation [AVLIS] program is reoriented from production of lithium-6 to production of lithium-7 for water chemistry control in power reactors. However, Advena personnel continue work on implosion designs and theoretical research on advanced weapons.[38] A mid-1980s organizational chart of the weapons program depicts eight divisions: Program Management and Systems Engineering, Operations Support, Engineering, Technology Development and Explosives, Personnel, Security, Health Care, and Finance.[39]

August 1987

Armscor completes its “first qualified production model” nuclear device, which can be delivered by a modified Buccaneer bomber aircraft. By the program’s termination, Armscor manufactures four additional deliverable devices as well as the HEU core and some non-nuclear components for a seventh device.[40]

June-October 1988

Armscor constructs a concrete floor and hangar around the surface of one of the test shafts in the Kalahari Desert, in order to assess the shaft’s condition. The test site is examined in order to guarantee that a nuclear test can be conducted if needed, to fulfill phase three of the nuclear deterrent strategy.[41]

Late-1980s

Armscor prepares to upgrade the seven gun-type devices. Armscor plans to “replace the seven cannon-type devices with seven upgraded devices, when they reach the end of their estimated life by the year 2000.”[42]

September 1989

At a meeting of his senior political aides and advisors, President F.W. de Klerk declares that in order to end South Africa’s isolation from the international community, both the political system of apartheid and the nuclear weapons program must be dismantled.[43]

November 1989

An “Experts Committee” formed by de Klerk and composed of senior AEC, Armscor, and South African Defense Force [SADF] officials formally recommends the dismantlement of South Africa’s nuclear weapons, and outlines dismantlement procedures. De Klerk and the South African cabinet approve the plan.[44] The Y-plant stops producing HEU.[45]

Late-1989

The nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert is completely abandoned.[46]

February 1, 1990

The Y-plant officially ceases operations.[47]

February 26, 1990

According to Stumpf, this date “should stand as the official date of implementation of the termination of South Africa’s weapons program.”[48]

July 1990

A dismantlement study commissioned by de Klerk is completed. De Klerk opts to order the dismantlement of one complete nuclear device at a time. An alternative, more rapid disarmament option would have been to destroy one-half of each device before destroying the second half. The slower option allows South Africa to maintain a nuclear deterrent until the last weapon is dismantled. Furthermore, Wynand Mouton, a retired nuclear physicist and university professor who de Klerk appoints as independent auditor of the dismantlement project, believes the slower option will “help acclimate the dismantlement team to the reality” of de Klerk’s decision to eliminate South Africa’s nuclear arsenal.[49]

June 1991

According to Stumpf, the dismantling of South Africa’s nuclear weapons program is “essentially complete.”[50]

July 10, 1991

South Africa accedes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state.[51]

September 5-6, 1991

The HEU from the last dismantled nuclear weapon is returned to the AEC.[52]

September 16, 1991

South Africa signs a full-scope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].[53]

October 10, 1991

South Africa presents its initial inventory of nuclear materials and facilities to the IAEA.[54]

September 3, 1992

The IAEA reports that the high-enrichment separation units of the Y-plant have been dismantled and removed, and that the remainder of the plant has been decommissioned and partially dismantled. Using accounting data provided by the AEC, the IAEA estimates the U-235 balance of the Y-plant. The calculations indicate “an apparent discrepancy in this balance,” which could be the result of imperfections in the material accounting system. According to the AEC, blending operations to convert some HEU to LEU will begin this month.[55]

October 8, 1992

IAEA inspectors discover “evidence of critical assemblies, testing gear, and equipment for metallurgical research and processing” at Building 5000, an abandoned site southwest of the enrichment complex at Pelindaba. Unnamed sources say that South African technicians used the equipment to work on “the shape of spherical fissile cores for a [more sophisticated] nuclear explosive device.”[56]

March 24, 1993

In a speech before the South African parliament, President F.W. de Klerk announces that South Africa had a nuclear weapons program from “as early as 1974” to 1990, during which time it constructed six of seven planned nuclear devices. According to de Klerk, the devices constituted a deterrent and South Africa never intended to use them offensively. South Africa’s strategy was that “if the situation in southern Africa were to deteriorate seriously,” the government would confidentially indicate its deterrent capability to one or more of the major powers – such as the United States – in order to persuade them to intervene. De Klerk states that all of South Africa’s fissile nuclear material has been accounted for, and all hardware and design information has been destroyed. De Klerk declares that South Africa has never conducted “a clandestine nuclear test,” nor has it obtained nuclear weapons materials or technology from another country.[57] On this same date, officials destroy the last documents on policy making in the South African nuclear weapons program.[58]

Approximately 1,000 personnel participated during the life span of the weapons program, with about 400 involved at the height of the project. Officials at Armscor estimate that each gun-type nuclear device would have had a yield of 10-18 kilotons. South African officials state that they had never sought to develop more advanced devices, or to increase the precision of the yield.[59]

July 1993

In the presence of IAEA inspectors, Armscor renders useless the nuclear test shafts at the Vastrap site in the Kalahari Desert by filling them with concrete.[60]

August 16, 1993

South Africa proclaims the Act on the Control of Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The legislation creates the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation [NPC] of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which is charged with export control authority for all nuclear dual-use items.[61] The Act makes any involvement by South African citizens in the development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, and ballistic missile systems to deliver such weapons, a criminal offence.[62]

September 1993

The IAEA finds it “reasonable to conclude” that the quantity of HEU that could have been produced by the pilot enrichment plant [the Y-Plant] in South Africa are consistent with South Africa’s initial report to the IAEA. The IAEA General Conference accepts “the completeness of South Africa’s inventory of materials and facilities.” The General Conference also accepts South Africa’s declarations on the dismantlement and destruction of equipment for its nuclear weapons, on transfer of dual-use equipment and facilities to non-nuclear or civilian nuclear uses, and on destruction of the two Vastrap test shafts under IAEA supervision.[63]

With these determinations, most international experts conclude that South Africa has completed its nuclear disarmament. South Africa is the first and to date only country to build nuclear weapons and then entirely dismantle its nuclear weapons program.

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Sources and Notes:
[1] This chronology includes presents selected entries from Michael Barletta, Christina Ellington, and Zondi Masiza, “South Africa’s Nuclear History: An Annotated Chronology, 1944-1999,” unpublished manuscript, March 1999, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA.
[2] International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Director General, “The Denuclearization of Africa,” GC[XXXVII]/1075, September 9, 1993; cited by David Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” ISIS Report, May 1994, p. 6.
[3] Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement,” Arms Control Today, 25, December 1995/January 1996, p. 3.
[4] Mark Hibbs, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent,” NuclearFuel, May 10, 1993, p. 3.
[5] Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” p. 6.
[6] Directorate of Intelligence, New Information on South Africa’s Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation, March 30, 1983, p. 1, www.foia.ucia.gov. [Secret document, partially declassified and released on April 27, 1997].
[7] “De Klerk Tells World South Africa Built and Dismantled Six Nuclear Weapons,” NuclearFuel, March 29, 1993, p. 7.
[8] Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, “Nuclear Verification in South Africa,” IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, p. 45.
[9] The AEB and UCOR were incorporated into the AEC in 1982. Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 8.
[10] Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 5.
[11] Hibbs, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Program: From PNE to a Deterrent,” p. 4; David Albright, “A Curious Conversion,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1993, http://bullatomsci.org.
[12] Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 4; Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” p. 6.
[13] Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” p. 6.
[14] However, on April 7, 1975, Prime Minister Vorster announces in the South African House of Assembly that the pilot enrichment plant, or Y-plant, had commenced operations on April 5, 1975. US Department of State, “South African Uranium Enrichment,” Telegram from the US Embassy in Cape Town to the US Secretary of State, April 1975. [Released August 19, 1987]; Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa: Nuclear Technology and Non-Proliferation,” Security Dialogue, 24 (1993), p. 458.
[15] Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” p. 7.
[16] Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” p. 6.
[17] Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” p. 7.
[18] Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 5; Mark Hibbs, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Program: The Dismantling,” NuclearFuel, May 24, 1993, p. 9; Mitchell Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), p. 10; Hibbs, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent,” p. 4.
[19] Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” p. 7.
[20] Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” p. 10.
[21] Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” p. 10.
[22] Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 4; Stumpf, “South Africa: Nuclear Technology and Non-Proliferation,” p. 458. David Albright and Mark Hibbs, “South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1993, p. 34; Mark Hibbs, “Pretoria Replicated Hiroshima Bomb in Seven Years, then Froze Design,” Nucleonics Week, May 6, 1993, p. 16.
[23] Hibbs, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent,” p. 4.
[24] Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” p. 9.
[25] Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 5.
[26] Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 5; Von Baeckmann, Dillon, and Perricos, “Nuclear Verification in South Africa”.
[27] Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” p. 9.
[28] Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 4; Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” p. 11.
[29] Noting that South Africa did not supply a complete nuclear device with HEU until November 1979, AEC head Waldo Stumpf said that “this should put to rest speculations as to whether South Africa was responsible for the ‘double flash’ over the South Atlantic Ocean on 22 September 1979.” Stumpf, “South Africa: Nuclear Technology and Nonproliferation,” p. 458. David Albright and Corey Gay, “A Flash from the Past,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1997, www.bullatomsci.org.
[30] Hibbs, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent,” p. 4-5; Stumpf, ” South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 5; Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” pp. 11-12; Von Baeckmann, Dillon, and Perricos, “Nuclear Verification in South Africa”.
[31] Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” pp. 9-10; Albright, “A Curious Conversion”.
[32] Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” pp. 7-8.
[33] Albright and Gay, “A Flash from the Past”.
[34] Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” pp. 9-10; Albright, “A Curious Conversion”.
[35] Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 4; Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” p. 11.
[36] Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” p. 10; Hibbs, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Program: From PNE to a Deterrent,” p. 5; Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” p. 11.
[37] Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 5; Von Baeckmann, Dillon, and Perricos, “Nuclear Verification in South Africa”.
[38] Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 6; Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” p. 13; Von Baeckman, Dillon, and Perricos, “Nuclear Verification,” p. 45. However, Reiss indicates that South Africa terminated preliminary studies on thermonuclear weapons in 9/85. Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” p. 16.
[39] Hibbs, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons Program: From PNE to a Deterrent,” p. 4.
[40] Von Baeckmann, Dillon, and Perricos, “Nuclear Verification in South Africa;” Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” p. 11.
[41] Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” pp. 13, 16.
[42] Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” p. 14.
[43] Adrian Hadland, Sunday Independent; in “SA’s Nuclear Delusions Lie in Ruins, But They Still Cost a Fortune,” Independent Online, January 26, 1998, www.inc.co.za.
[44] Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” p. 17.
[45] Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” p. 11; David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 380; International Atomic Energy Agency, Report on the Completeness of the Inventory of South Africa’s Nuclear Installations and Material, attachment to Gov/2609, September 3, 1992, pp. 4-5.
[46] Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” p. 14.
[47] Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 6; Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” p. 11; David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker,Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 380; International Atomic Energy Agency, Report on the Completeness of the Inventory of South Africa’s Nuclear Installations and Material, attachment to Gov/2609, September 3, 1992, pp. 4-5.
[48] Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 6; Von Baeckmann, Dillon, and Perricos, “Nuclear Verification in South Africa;” Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” p. 16.
[49] Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” p. 18.
[50] Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 6.
[51] Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Signatories and Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” December 3, 1998, www.acda.gov.
[52] Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 6.
[53] “De Klerk Tells World South Africa Built and Dismantled Six Nuclear Weapons,” p. 8.
[54] Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” pp. 6-7.
[55] IAEA, Report on the Completeness, pp. 4-7.
[56] Mark Hibbs, “IAEA Found Evidence of Nuclear Weapons Work in South Africa,” Nucleonics Week, October 8, 1992, p. 2.
[57] “De Klerk Tells World South Africa Built and Dismantled Six Nuclear Weapons,” pp. 6-8.
[58] Mitchell Reiss, “South Africa: Castles in the Air,” in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 23.
[59] Hibbs, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Program: From PNE to a Deterrent,” pp. 3-4; Hibbs, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Program: the Dismantling,” p. 10.
[60] Von Baeckmann, Dillon, and Perricos, “Nuclear Verification in South Africa.” Photographs online at “Rendering Harmless the Kalahari Test Shafts in South Africa,” IAEA, www.iaea.org.
[61] Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement,” Arms Control Today, 25, December 1995/January 1996, p. 8; “Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act,” Government Gazette, Act No. 87, 1993. The authors are indebted to Rianne Van Vuuren for providing the text of this legislation.
[62] Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa: Nuclear Technology and Non-Proliferation,” Security Dialogue, 1993, 24[4]: 458.
[63] Hans Blix, “Director General’s Statement on the Occasion of the Presentation by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa,” April 7, 1994, www.iaea.or.at; Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 7.

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South Africa’s Nuclear-Related Facilities [1]

Michael Barletta and Christina Ellington
March 1999

Notes and Sources:

• This facility list is based on the following sources: Rob Adam, et al., “Country Programme Framework,” Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, November 23, 1998, www.dacst.gov.za. David Albright, “A Curious Conversion,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 1993, www.bullatomsci.org; David Albright, “Slow But Steady,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July-August 1993, www.bullatomsci.org. David Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” ISIS Report, May 1994. David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies, (Oxford University Press, 1997). Atomic Energy Corporation, “Sale of Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Equipment on Tender,” August 17, 1998, www.aec.co.za. Atomic Energy Corporation, “Background on Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility,” PR Wire Service, April 8, 1998, www.anc.org.za. K. Bharath-Ram, et al., “Review of the Atomic Energy Corporation,” Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, January 1997 (updated July 15, 1998), www.dacst.gov.za. Gail J. Fox, “Africa: Uranium Production and Nuclear Power Overview,” Nuclear Review, April 1997, pp. 24-31. “Home Affairs Apologizes to Chinese Technicians,” Business Day, December 1997, www.bday.co.za. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Facilities Under Agency Safeguards or Containing Safeguarded Material on 31 December 1997,” in The Annual Report for 1997, (Vienna: Division of Public Information, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1998), pp. 89-104. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Report on the Completeness of the Inventory of South Africa’s Nuclear Installations and Material,” Attachment to Gov/2609, September 3, 1992. Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough, with Toby F. Dalton, and Gregory D. Koblentz, “South Africa,” in Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998), pp. 243-250. Ann MacLachlan and Michael Knapik, “South Africa to End MIS SWU Project,” NuclearFuel, December 29, 1997, p. 4. J.D.L. Moore, “The Development of South Africa’s Nuclear Capability,” in South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987). Nuclear Engineering International, 1998 World Nuclear Industry Handbook, (United Kingdom: Wilmington Business Publishing, 1998). Reuters; in “South Africa to Close Uranium Enrichment Plant,” Executive News Service, January 25, 1995. Stuart Rutherford, “Old Nukes Thriving Sector: Nuclear Fuels also Battered by Market Fall-Out,” Uranium, September 26, 1997, www.fm.co.za. The Star, December 13, 1997; in “Nuclear Equipment Sold to China Had Been Redundant for Years, Says AEC,” Independent Online, www.inc.co.za. SAPA, (Johannesburg), April 7, 1998; in FBIS-TEN-98-097, (7 April 1998). Leonard S. Spector, “South Africa,” The Undeclared Bomb, (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988), pp. 286-305. Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa, Annual Report 1998, www.aec.co.za. Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon and Demetrius Perricos, “Nuclear Verification in South Africa,” IAEA Bulletin, 1(1995), www.iaea.org. Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa: Nuclear Technology and Non-Proliferation,” Security Dialogue, 1993, 24(4): 455-58.

• Published reports conflict on the location of the pilot-scale Y-plant and semi-commercial Z-plant. According to David R. Kyd, Director of the Division of Public Information at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the IAEA considers the decommissioned pilot plant to be located at Pelindaba East (formerly Valindaba), and the semi-commercial plant to be located at Pelindaba West. Kyd noted, however, that “Valindaba is very close by and could almost be considered part of the same overall site.” David R. Kyd, Director of the Division of Public Information, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria, electronic mail communication with Christina Ellington, December 4, 1998.

• The AEC has invited international buyers to submit bids for the purchase of fuel fabrication equipment used in fabricating pellets and fuel assembly. Atomic Energy Corporation, “Sale of Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Equipment on Tender,” August 17, 1998, www.aec.co.za.

• In 1997-98, the Johannesburg newspaper Mail & Guardian reported that it possessed internal AEC documents noting that Vaalputs stores high-level radioactive waste, although the facility is not licensed to do so. Swapna Prabhakaran, “Pelindaba Bomb Fuel Plant Sold as Scrap,” Mail & Guardian, July 11, 1997, www.mg.co.za. “‘Leaky’ Vaalputs to Store Uranium Rods,” Mail and Guardian, April 13, 1998, www.mg.co.za.

• Equipment used for uranium metallurgy at Kentron Circle was returned to the AEC with the termination of the nuclear weapons program, and the entire uranium metallurgy process area at the facility was dismantled and decontaminated. Machine tools used in the manufacture of HEU and high explosives components were also decontaminated and made available for use in non-nuclear applications. Gary Dillon and Demetrius Perricos, “Experience Gained in the Verification of the Completeness and Correctness of the Inventory of South Africa’s Declaration,” presentation at the International Atomic Energy Agency Symposium on Safeguards, held in Vienna, Austria, March 14-18, 1994.

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