Non-Resident Scholar, Expert in Biosecurity and Artificial Intelligence
[email protected]
Monterey, CA
Background
Allison previously served as the Director of Advanced Technology for Stanford’s Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), and as Executive Director of Stanford University’s Cyber Initiative and Cyber Policy Center, which entailed directing research, outreach, and educational activities focused on the development of new technologies and policy. She has taught courses on technology and science policy, computer science and ethics, and protein engineering at Stanford and Duke Universities, has worked on biosecurity research at Lawrence Livermore National Lab and with the Centre for Effective Altruism, and previously worked in technology- and policy-focused consulting with McKinsey & Co.
Education
She received her PhD in Bioengineering from UC Berkeley, and BS degrees from MIT in Biology and Mathematics.
CNS Work
- The Asilomar Principles for Governing AI Applications in Nuclear and Biological Security
CNS releases principles for its landmark Asilomar Process, aiming for sustained cross-sector dialogue on early AI governance. - AI Is Changing Biological and Nuclear Risks; Governance Must Change Accordingly
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists publishes “Asilomar Principles for Governing AI Applications in Nuclear and Biological Security.” - Defense-Forward Biosecurity
With the kind of early warning that a defense-forward biosecurity network would enable, we can respond more effectively and urgently to future threats. - CNS Seminar on the Intersection of Artificial Intelligence and WMD Nonproliferation
The seminar showcased the wide range of CNS expertise and its collaborative relationships with industry. - Charting a roadmap for multiparty confidence and security building measures, risk reduction, and arms control in the Indo-Pacific
This work contains contributions by CNS’s Miles Pomper, Allison Berke, Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, and George M. Moore. - Congressional staffers created antibiotic-resistant bacteria. And that’s a good thing.
Staffers learn how easy it might be to genetically engineer a pathogen and how synthetic biology can speed up the manufacturing of medicinal compounds. - The Danger of ‘Invisible’ Biolabs Across the US
Proper federal oversight could make invisible labs more visible and prevent unsafe labs from working with dangerous pathogens. - Dr. Allison Berke joins CNS as Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program Director
CNS Founding Director William Potter expressed great enthusiasm about the appointment, which he characterized as “adding significantly to the scientific expertise of CNS related to both bioengineering and cybersecurity.” - WMD Terrorism Threats: Assessing and Prosecuting
Eighteen senior and mid-level government employees from Malaysia and the Philippines traveled to CNS for a two-week in-person workshop.
