Nonproliferation Review • 8.1 • Spring 2001

Volume 8 • Number 1

SPECIAL SECTION — New Approaches to Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements

by Michael Moodie & Amy Sands

Revisiting Fred Iklé’s 1961 Question, “After Detection–What?”
by Brad Roberts

The “Yellow Rain” Controversy: Lessons for Arms Control Compliance
by Jonathan B. Tucker

Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance
by Javed Ali

The Soviet Union, Russia, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
by Michael Moodie


South Korea’s Shifting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel Reprocessing
by Jungmin Kang & H.A. Feiveson

Making “No First Use” Work: Bring All WMD Inside the Tent
by Alan Dowty

Ending the Production of Highly Enriched Uranium for Naval Reactors
by Chunyan Ma & Frank von Hippel

Tamper Detection for Safeguards and Treaty Monitoring: Fantasies, Realities, and Potentials
by Roger G. Johnston


Downsizing Russia’s Nuclear Warhead Production Infrastructure
by Oleg Bukharin

Rebuilding Bilateral Consensus: Assessing U.S.-China Arms Control and Nonproliferation Achievements
by Evan S. Medeiros

Prospects for a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
by Scott Parrish


Statements of fact and opinion expressed in The Nonproliferation Review are the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, or the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
The Nonproliferation Review ISSN 1073-6700
Copyright © 2001 by Monterey Institute of International Studies