

# Ideas, Beliefs, and Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine

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A focus on international anarchy and technology diffusion led many scholars of international relations to initially predict the emergence of 25 to 30 nuclear weapon states by the 1990s.<sup>1</sup> When that situation did not materialize, some analysts temporized, arguing that the unique constraints imposed by the superpowers during the Cold War era had slowed proliferation, and they forecasted rapid nuclear proliferation in the post-Cold War era.<sup>2</sup> Early evidence confounds this prediction, offering instead some important anomalies: since the demise of the Soviet Union, several countries have dismantled their nuclear arsenals or renounced their nuclear programs.<sup>3</sup>

South Africa and Ukraine present particularly dramatic cases of denuclearization. On March 24, 1993, President F.W. DeKlerk acknowledged that South Africa had built six nuclear weapons and was working on a seventh before it acceded to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1991. In 1989,

DeKlerk instructed the relevant agencies to terminate the program, and by July 1991, South Africa had become the first nation in history to “roll back” its possession of nuclear weapons.

In December 1991, Ukraine gained its independence from the Soviet Union and immediately inherited a substantial share of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Specifically, 15 percent of the former Soviet nuclear stockpile remained inside the territory of Ukraine—approximately 2,500 tactical and 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons. Despite such an inheritance, Ukraine declared non-nuclear weapon status, became a party to the NPT, and began the process of denuclearization—becoming, along with South Africa, one of four states to relinquish nuclear weapons capability.

The neorealist approach to state behavior expects that in the post-Cold War era, states such as Ukraine and South Africa would seek to acquire and maintain a nuclear deterrent, and therefore, we argue, does little to

help us understand and explain their decisions to denuclearize. Accordingly, there is a need to consider alternative models. This article presents a careful examination of the South African and Ukrainian nuclear cases to illustrate the value of a model incorporating ideas and beliefs into explanations of political outcomes. It demonstrates that an understanding of these countries' nuclear decisions (first to build the bombs, then dismantle them in the case of South Africa; and to relinquish an inherited nuclear arsenal in the case of Ukraine) requires a model of policymaking that appreciates the role of ideas and beliefs both in the formulation of state preferences and in the selection of state strategies.

Explaining policy change by reference to beliefs, however, requires a rebuttal of neorealist claims that deeper objective conditions force states in a given direction or that any limitation in this approach can be rectified by incorporating domestic politics into the equation. Before presenting a model incorporating beliefs and ideas and considering their relevance to the cases, therefore, this article discusses two alternative approaches to explaining nuclear policy: (1) structural-realism or neorealism; and (2) domestic-level theories of foreign policy. Following a presentation of our model incorporating ideas, the South African and Ukrainian cases of nuclear decisionmaking are presented. The article concludes with a discussion of the findings and their implications for understanding the role of ideas in nuclear policy choice. It suggests that there may be opportunities to promote nonproliferation by appealing to states' senses of their identity and seeking to reassure them, not just on their physical security, but on the security of their identity as well.

### **THE LIMITATIONS OF THE NEOREALIST EXPLANATION**

Neorealism maintains that states pursue power capabilities in an anarchic international system as a means to their survival and security.<sup>4</sup> The anarchic structure of the international system compels states to create a balance of power against potentially hostile actors. States balance internally by relying on their own capabilities or externally by relying on allies' capabilities.<sup>5</sup> States generally prefer internal balancing for reasons of autonomy and self-sufficiency.

The acquisition of military capability is central to states' power pursuits. "States secure their survival by

accumulating military force they can use singly or in combination with other states.... [A] state with access to greater amounts of force has more control over its security than a state with access to lesser amounts of force."<sup>6</sup> Nuclear weapons contribute to national power, or perceptions of power, in at least two ways: the obvious, military dimension and psychologically as prestige and evidence of national technological achievement.<sup>7</sup> Nuclear weapons also reinforce states' preference for balancing through acquiring internal capabilities: "While allies were crucial in the pre-nuclear era to resist foreign aggression, the advent of nuclear force has made internal balancing both more feasible and more urgent."<sup>8</sup>

As noted, despite the popularity of structural realism, nuclear proliferation predictions drawn from it have twice proven themselves inadequate: first, during the Cold War and second in its immediate aftermath.<sup>9</sup> Paradoxically, we have seen the unprecedented phenomena of several states choosing to denuclearize at the end of the Cold War despite systemic factors that allegedly encourage all states to retain their nuclear weapons or pursue new weapons capabilities.

### **AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION: THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS**

#### **A Domestic Political Economy Explanation**

As an alternative to an explanation that holds that the international distribution of power is the most important variable shaping foreign policy, some scholars point to the primacy of domestic politics in determining foreign policy outcomes.<sup>10</sup> This "domestic-dominant" perspective argues that different state strategies result from different national political environments and different national preferences.<sup>11</sup>

Two variations on the domestic-dominant approach could account for the nuclear policies of South Africa and Ukraine: (1) the domestic political economy; or (2) democratic institutions and norms. The first explanation, offered by Etel Solingen, focuses on societal *economic* coalitions and nuclear policy choice. She argues that states' nuclear postures are the result of a struggle between two domestic coalitions: one advocating economic liberalization, the other opposing it. Each coalition develops contrasting perspectives on the domestic and international consequences of nuclear weapons acquisition.<sup>12</sup> The first group, a "liberalizing coalition,"

she hypothesizes, is internationalist in its outlook. The key supporters of liberalization are liquid asset holders and export-oriented firms. She maintains that economic interests and opportunities open to such a liberalizing coalition make it “more likely to be receptive to compromise nuclear postures that do not endanger their interests,” including interest in debt relief, export markets, technology transfer, and investments available from powerful international actors and institutions. Domestic considerations reinforce the liberalizing coalition’s opposition to large-scale, state-supported nuclear programs that are often inefficient, inflationary, unproductive, and involve an expansion of state power.

Opposition to the liberalizing coalition comes from an, “inward-looking” coalition generally composed of unskilled blue-collar workers, state employees, small businesses, import-competing firms or those tied to the state or local markets, under-employed intelligentsia, and politicians that fear an erosion of the local bases of their support. The military establishment adversely affected by liberalization is also likely to oppose denuclearization, as are extremist religious groups.<sup>13</sup> Hence, there are both material and ideological bases for this inward-looking coalition.

Notably, Solingen’s analysis offers a domestic-level, coalition-based explanation for a state’s nuclear weapons decision. Phrased as a hypothesis for this study, her approach would assert that South African and Ukrainian decisions to denuclearize were the result of domestic coalition politics in which an economic liberalizing coalition’s support for denuclearization triumphed over nationalistic, inward-looking groups that favored the retention of nuclear weapons. As discussed below, however, this approach has very little relevance to the South African and Ukrainian cases.

### **The Role of Democratic Institutions and Norms**

A second domestic-dominant approach merits consideration. Perhaps the most popular variant of the notion that certain kinds of domestic political systems predispose countries toward particular policy preferences is the so-called “democratic peace” argument. Democratic peace theorists offer two causal scenarios. One strain of thinking focuses on democracies’ *institutional structures and dynamics*—checks and balances, division of political power, the need for public debate to enlist widespread support for policies—to explain the reluc-

tance of democracies to resort to military measures. A second strand of domestic peace theory argues that the adoption of democratic *norms*<sup>14</sup> of peaceful resolution of disputes could affect a state’s decisionmaking calculus and restrain states from resorting to force.<sup>15</sup>

Extrapolating from questions of war or peace to the issue of denuclearization, one could hypothesize that nascent democratic institutions reduced enthusiasm for sustaining the means to engage in large-scale violence and reduced the likelihood that weapons intended for such an end would be retained.<sup>16</sup> Alternatively, decisions to denuclearize could be the result of internal democratic norms affecting external behavior. The internalization<sup>17</sup> of democratic norms could constrain a state’s nuclear ambition, or cause a state to relinquish a nuclear arsenal it already possesses, because democratic norms make it unacceptable for democracies to deter other states with one of the most dangerous and violent forms of weapons.<sup>18</sup>

Applying the democratic peace theory to these cases requires two assumptions—one empirical, and the other theoretical. Empirically, it assumes that the South African and Ukrainian regimes were democratic or becoming democratic, institutionally or normatively, during the decisionmaking process that led to non-nuclear status. Even if South Africa and Ukraine were or were becoming democratic during the time of their denuclearization, this explanation remains problematic because there are numerous non-democracies that are and remain non-nuclear weapon states; and today most nuclear powers are democracies. Theoretically, this approach assumes that the alleged monadic effect of democracy,<sup>19</sup> i.e., democracies are more peaceful in their relations with all countries (itself controversial), can be extrapolated from the question of war or peace to the issue of nuclear policy.<sup>20</sup> This is particularly problematic in explaining the nuclear relations between two democracies in South Asia—Pakistan and India—at least prior to the 1999 military coup in Pakistan.

### **AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: THE ROLE OF CAUSAL BELIEFS**

This article offers an alternative explanation for South African and Ukrainian nuclear policies. It accepts the dominant assumption that states act rationally, i.e., they choose strategies to maximize their utility subject to environmental constraints.<sup>21</sup> Further it accepts the propo-

sition that to understand political outcomes, such as a state’s decision to build, dismantle, or relinquish nuclear weapons, we need knowledge of both actor preferences and the strategic environment in which it operates. Unlike the approaches discussed above, however, this study does not derive preferences solely from structure (inter-state competition) or from domestic politics. Instead, it demonstrates how causal beliefs shape policy outcomes through their impact on both state preference formation and state selection of strategy in a changing environment.

Before applying this approach to South Africa and Ukraine, a general exposition of the model and a definition of terms are required. As used here, *preferences* are predilections for particular policy outcomes. They are a product of both basic *interests* and *causal beliefs*. Basic interests are antecedents to preference formation. We maintain they are what Jeffrey Frieden calls “tastes,” basic desires that motivate behavior in a wide variety of situations.<sup>22</sup> Causal beliefs are “beliefs about the cause-effect relationships which derive authority from the shared consensus of recognized elites.”<sup>23</sup> In short, preferences combine basic interests and ideas or beliefs.<sup>24</sup>


Following preference formation, states (or individuals or groups within states) pursue *strategies*—instruments used to get as close as possible to achieving one’s preferences.<sup>25</sup> Strategies differ from preferences in that the relevant actor has no independent predilection for one set of strategies or another; the actor’s inclination is based on the best anticipated means to achieve the underlying goal or preference.

Thus the decisionmaking chain begins with an actor’s basic interests. In pursuit of these interests, the actor forms preferences. Given these preferences, the actor searches for the best available strategies to achieve them.<sup>26</sup> We argue that strategy selection—like preference formation—includes an ideational component. Actors choose strategies based on beliefs about expected returns under environmental constraints. As the environment changes, it may induce a change in beliefs about the efficacy of a strategy in achieving long-standing preferences. A change in beliefs can thus lead to a change in state/actor strategy. A visual model of the policy process is represented in Figure 1.

**Ideational Model Applied: South Africa**

As applied to South Africa’s nuclear policy, we maintain that South Africa’s *basic interest*, its desire for its physical security in a decentralized international system, was mediated by its *belief* about itself as a Western nation—what some would call its identity.<sup>27</sup> Together, structure and belief created South Africa’s *preference* for pursuing its security through attempted affiliation with the West. This preference, solidly in place by the late 1940s, led South Africa to pursue two distinctive *strategies* in response to its changing beliefs about its environment. First, during the Cold War era, South Africa’s increasing international isolation and insecurity led it to build nuclear bombs as part of its strategy to “blackmail” the West (especially the United States) into tacitly supporting its security, or at least not abandoning it wholly to its fate.<sup>28</sup> South African elites *believed* the

*Figure 1: Ideas and Outcomes*



West was less likely to abandon it if it possessed a credible nuclear weapons potential. During this period, weapons possession became part of South Africa's strategy.

How then to account for South Africa's decision to dismantle its weapons? We argue that South Africa's preference (a prior melding of interest and beliefs)—to pursue its security as a part of the Western system of states—did not change. What changed was its environmental setting *and* its belief about the anticipated response of the West to its possession of nuclear weapons in the new, emerging post-Cold War world. South Africa came to believe that to remain part of the West, it must change its strategy by ending apartheid policies and dismantling its nuclear arsenal.

### Ideational Model Applied: Ukraine

Similar to South Africa's position after the Cold War, Ukraine's desire for physical security in an uncertain environment was mediated by its belief about its place in the Western community of liberal, democratic states. Ukraine believed that being a part of the Western community would guarantee its survival. Because the West would be more likely to include Ukraine as a peer if it relinquished its inherited nuclear arsenal, Ukraine eventually chose to denuclearize and accepted non-nuclear weapon status.

### THE LIMITS OF A STRUCTURAL EXPLANATION FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S DECISION TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

There are several problems with relying exclusively on a structurally derived, security interest-based explanation for South Africa's decision to build nuclear weapons. First, South Africa had few, if any, targets for nuclear weapons. The only conceivable targets for a South African bomb would have been hostage cities or staging areas in neighboring states, embattled areas within South Africa, or possible Soviet naval forces.<sup>29</sup> Long distances and lack of suitable delivery systems precluded use outside the region.<sup>30</sup>

Second, actual use of nuclear weapons against such targets carried more disadvantages than advantages. Threatened use of nuclear weapons against a regional adversary would have precipitated South Africa's total isolation from international contacts and, thus, devastated the regime's economic and technological well-being. An overt nuclear policy would have crystallized

opposition to the regime in southern Africa and the West—precisely the outcome South Africa hoped to avoid. Moreover, development of an overt nuclear threat would have invited greater Soviet involvement in the region through offers of treaties of friendship and closer ties with South Africa's neighbors, including protection under its nuclear umbrella.<sup>31</sup> The use of nuclear weapons against Soviet forces would have provoked overwhelming and devastating retaliation. Former Foreign Minister Pik Botha recently acknowledged that South Africa's leaders knew nuclear weapons could not be used as a local deterrent for fear of repercussions from the international community, particularly the United States.<sup>32</sup>

Third, South Africa faced no nuclear threat and any conventional threat could be handled by its superior conventional capabilities. No African state could successfully project forces against South Africa in a way that could not be met with a conventional response; South Africa's capabilities far exceeded that of her neighbors. South Africa had responded to the partial Western arms embargo by developing substantial indigenous conventional weapons capabilities and securing new, nontraditional sources of supply. Moreover, black African countries never seriously threatened South Africa with military attack.<sup>33</sup>

Finally, the real threat to the Republic came not from an antagonistic superpower or another African state but from within its borders in the form of revolt in the black community aided by sabotage conducted by guerrilla fighters harbored in neighboring states. In J.D.L. Moore's words, "the only realistic threat to the South African regime, and one far more difficult to meet, comes from the people of South Africa themselves."<sup>34</sup> Whatever domestic political advantage the white regime gained from describing the threat to the Republic as an external conspiracy, the regime was not blind to its true antagonist—the majority of its population it had disenfranchised.

After a detailed account of the history of the South African bomb that focused on the country's structural security situation, Mitchell Reiss concludes "that nuclear bombs were developed without a strategic rationale."<sup>35</sup> Others reach the same conclusion: a structure-based explanation alone does not lead to an adequate explanation for South Africa's nuclear weapons. As Moore observed in the 1980s, "it is difficult to see any need for their development."<sup>36</sup>

## **SOUTH AFRICA'S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE LIMITS OF A DOMESTIC-DOMINANT EXPLANATION**

Although South Africa's sense of threat and its isolation were directly linked to its domestic racial policies, shifting domestic economic coalitions or increasing democratic institutions or norms played virtually no direct role in nuclear weapons policy. During South Africa's nuclear age, all elements of white society shared a general consensus over foreign and defense policy. Indeed, there was little discussion of foreign affairs in general, and nuclear weapons proliferation in particular, by white South Africans. The remarkable feature in South Africa's domestic coalitions, institutions, and norms was continuity, not change. Throughout South Africa's nuclear period, the South African public regarded nuclear matters as state secrets to be left to the government.<sup>37</sup> Opposition parties did not challenge the ruling Nationalists on nuclear policy.<sup>38</sup> Press comments were minimal, and only a handful of South African academics wrote on the subject of nuclear weapons.<sup>39</sup> The business community was absent on the nuclear question,<sup>40</sup> and academic and public interest groups were largely silent on nuclear matters.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, there is little evidence that South Africa's domestic institutions or norms changed to become more democratic and influential during this time period (as opposed to the later transition to majority rule).

## **THE ROLE OF BELIEFS IN SHAPING STATE PREFERENCES: SOUTH AFRICA'S WESTERN IDENTITY AND ITS BLACKMAIL STRATEGY**

South Africa's nuclear aspirations originated from its abundant uranium reserves, which led it to establish an indigenous civilian nuclear research and development program by the late 1950s. In the 1960s and 1970s, South Africa was the world's third largest producer of uranium and a partner with the United States and Britain on many nuclear energy matters. In 1969, South Africa demonstrated its independent nuclear expertise with the construction of a pilot uranium enrichment plant, the Y Plant, at Valindaba near Pretoria. The Y Plant made possible the manufacture of weapons-grade uranium outside international inspection and control.

In 1971, South Africa embarked on research for "peaceful nuclear explosives." By 1974, its program had begun to acquire greater military potential. That year,

South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) reported to Prime Minister John Vorster that it could build a nuclear explosive device.<sup>42</sup> Vorster then authorized the development of a nuclear explosive capability and approved funding for the testing site. Waldo Stumpf, head of South Africa's AEC, identifies 1977 as the point when South Africa's strategy shifted from a predominantly "peaceful" nuclear explosive program, i.e., one devoted to explosives used for mining or construction, to a program based primarily on the manufacture of weapons for military purposes, i.e., war-fighting or deterrence.<sup>43</sup> The AEC and the Armaments Corporation (ARMSCOR), the state-owned arms manufacturer, compiled the first bomb in 1979, and over the next decade five more weapons were added to the stockpile.

These developments in nuclear technology and strategy occurred within an environment of growing internal and external threats. The ultimate source of South Africa's insecurity and international estrangement was its racial policies. South Africa was one of the few countries in the world where a racial minority controlled the government, which sought to preserve the privileged position of whites with a policy of apartheid ("separateness"). When the Nationalist Party came to power after the 1948 elections, it passed laws that segregated the racial groups and gave the government extensive police powers.

Although largely unchallenged in the 1950s, a number of events in the 1960s threatened the Nationalist regime. In particular, the March 21, 1960, Sharpeville massacre of 69 unarmed protesters strengthened internal resistance. It led the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the African National Congress (ANC) to adopt sabotage as an explicit strategy to further the aim of overthrowing apartheid. External opposition to apartheid from many countries grew following Sharpeville. In the 1970s, the end of Portuguese rule and the installment of national left-leaning governments in Mozambique and Angola brought insecurity closer to South Africa's borders. Internally, threats also were on the rise, culminating in the 1976 Soweto riots and another round of international condemnation and ostracism.

Although the chronology of South Africa's nuclear weapons development and the domestic and international sources of South Africa's insecurity are reasonably clear, the explanation for its acquisition, and later its destruction, of nuclear weapons, is more opaque. The goal of

the next section is to illustrate how South Africa's insecurities and beliefs shaped South Africa's preference to be part of the West, and how that preference led to two distinct nuclear strategies under different environmental constraints.

### South Africa's Beliefs and Its Policy Preference

It is within the context of South Africa's search for a Western guarantee of its security that the acquisition and dismantlement of nuclear weapons can be best explained. Why did South Africa seek, or expect, a Western guarantee of its security?

To answer that question, one must appreciate that fundamental to South Africa's preference formation was its *belief* that it was part of the West. White South Africa's Western orientation is the unshakable core of its worldview.<sup>44</sup> The consequence of this belief for South Africa's international alignments and foreign policy has been an enduring invitation to Western nations to include South Africa in their collective security arrangements and to accept it as an ideological, security, and economic partner. Over time, South Africa pursued ever more desperate efforts to link itself to the West as Western antipathy toward the regime increased. Nuclear weapons acquisition became part of a long-term strategy to attain its policy preference of security through Western alignment. This preference was derived in substantial part not only from the structural environment—the Cold War and regional/domestic insecurity—but from South Africa's beliefs about itself.

The origins of South Africa's beliefs stemmed in part from an earlier period, 1919 to 1945, when it was a respected member of the predominantly white international system—what one author calls the “golden age” highlighted by Jan Smuts' contribution to the genesis of the League of Nations.<sup>45</sup> Prime Minister Smuts firmly believed that Great Britain and the other Commonwealth nations would stand by South Africa and provide external support in the event of regional conflict. In 1947, Smuts proclaimed, “We have friends, and if it comes to the worst, we shall find that we are not standing alone.”<sup>46</sup> Smuts' opinion was undoubtedly based on the fact that South Africa had provided substantial support to the allies during World War II, and a quid pro quo could be expected.

After World War II, South Africa's elites repeatedly stressed their role as a Western nation and assiduously

courted security ties with the West. During the 1950s and 1960s, Pretoria remained determined to enter into a defense alliance and to draw the Western powers into a commitment to ensure South Africa's security.<sup>47</sup> South Africa's initial efforts to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were rejected, however, and, although Pretoria was invited by Britain to join the Middle East Defense Organization, it failed to become actively involved because of opposition from developing nations. After strenuous efforts, South Africa's courtship of Great Britain was rewarded in the 1955 Simonstown Agreement. While not an alliance or a promise of protection of any sort, under the terms of the agreement, a base near Cape Town would be used by the British Royal Navy in exchange for the sale of arms and munitions to South Africa. In signing the agreement, South Africa emphasized that it confirmed the strategic importance of the country to the West and conferred “legitimacy on its aspirations to enjoy the benefits of association with the Western alliance system.”<sup>48</sup>

Events in the early 1960s weakened South Africa's faith in its role as a secure and protected member of the West and prompted the Republic to modernize and expand its defense forces to better attend to its own security. Withdrawal from the Commonwealth and UN sanctions convinced South Africa of the need for greater self-reliance. South Africa did not give up on its efforts to be invited to join a Western security alliance, however. During the defense build-up of the early 1960s, Defense Minister Fouché explained that the modernization program was designed to make South Africa a more attractive alliance partner. Even if the West failed to come to South Africa's aid, South Africa would remain steadfast in its loyalty to the West. Prime Minister Vorster declared that the Republic would defend the free world even if the West refused to provide the arms necessary for it to do so.<sup>49</sup>

Nonetheless, South Africa was progressively cut off from nuclear cooperation and conventional arms. Great Britain terminated the Simonstown agreement in 1975, and the United Nations and United States imposed a strategic and munitions embargo against the Republic by the late 1970s. However, the United States continued to share some intelligence with South Africa, and the United States, Great Britain, and France blocked the 1974 move to oust South Africa from the United Nations. Furthermore, some Western arms continued to find indirect routes to South Africa.

South Africa's partial international isolation and worsening internal and external security during the 1970s coupled with its abiding belief about itself as part of the West best explain its decision to move ahead with its nuclear weapons program as part of a blackmail strategy to prevent Western abandonment.

### The Three-Part "Blackmail" Strategy for the Bomb

In April 1978, Prime Minister Vorster approved a three-phase deterrent strategy for the use of nuclear weapons. Director of the program, Waldo Stumpf, explained the plan:

**Phase 1:** Strategic uncertainty in which the nuclear deterrent capability will not be acknowledged or denied.

**Phase 2:** Should South African territory be threatened, for example, by the Warsaw Pact countries through the surrogate Cuban forces [then] in Angola, covert acknowledgment to certain international powers, e.g., the USA, would be contemplated.

**Phase 3:** Should this potential disclosure of Africa's capability not bring about international intervention to remove the threat, public acknowledgment or demonstration by an underground test of South Africa's capability, would be considered.<sup>50</sup>

In short, South Africa's "bombs in the basement" strategy was primarily for political use. Nuclear weapons would be used in case of emergency to extract military, strategic, or economic concessions from the West. David Fischer explains South Africa's strategy: "The card it keeps in play is political, not military. A country believed to be able to make nuclear weapons is treated with greater circumspection. South Africa is courted by the West, especially the U.S...."<sup>51</sup> David Albright similarly concludes, "In essence the weapons were the last card in a political bluff intended to blackmail the United States or other Western powers. Whether it would have worked is impossible to determine."<sup>52</sup>

South Africa's political strategy for the bomb remains the most plausible explanation. All those associated with the program claimed that no offensive use of a nuclear explosive was ever foreseen or intended because it was recognized that such use would not serve South Africa's interests and could bring about massive counter-retaliation. In practice, Stumpf claims, "the strategy never advanced beyond Phase 1."<sup>53</sup> The weapons were never

deployed militarily or integrated into the country's military doctrine.

Although South Africa had few, if any, military uses for nuclear weapons, its likely possession of nuclear weapons was a useful political device to extract security concessions from, and to maintain the country's tenuous links with, the West. The specter of nuclear weapons and the possibility of revealing their actual presence were designed to avoid military or economic abandonment by the West. The pursuit of nuclear weapons only makes sense if one understands it as a strategy meant to best serve South Africa's preference of remaining part of the West to ensure its survival.

### Why Dismantle the Bomb?

How best to explain South Africa's decision to dismantle its weapons? Most approaches emphasize South Africa's improving external security situation by the mid- to late 1980s as the most important reason. This interpretation is consistent with a structural explanation for South Africa's acquisition of the bomb in the first place. Analyses by Reiss, Albright, Stumpf, and others chronicle the changing circumstances in southern Africa and internationally:

- in August 1988, a cease fire was negotiated for the northern border of Namibia;
- in December of that year, South Africa, Angola, and Cuba agreed on the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from the region consistent with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's call for a "political settlement" and an end to the conflict;<sup>54</sup>
- on April 1, 1989, Namibia was granted independence; and
- by year-end 1989, the Berlin wall had fallen and many recognized the Cold War as over.<sup>55</sup>

Several authors conclude that the end of the Cold War and greater regional stability made possession of nuclear weapons "superfluous" as a defense against a "total onslaught."

True, but as discussed, nuclear weapons were of marginal value or counterproductive in meeting a conventional or Soviet nuclear threat in the first place. Moreover, South Africa's relative security from these threats was established by the mid-1980s. Meanwhile, the broader strategic environment was changing in other important ways. Pretoria's economic and political isolation was worsening. Between 1985 and 1988, over 100 compa-



nies pulled out of South Africa and all Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries imposed sanctions against the regime.<sup>56</sup> The regime also felt the costs of apartheid in the form of an oversized bureaucracy and military to maintain the system and the rigidities and distortions it created in the economy and society. Apartheid was becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile with the needs of a modern economy.<sup>57</sup>

Further, the end of the Cold War and all credible claims of a Soviet threat in southern Africa removed any leverage South Africa's blackmail strategy might have held over the West. South Africa could no longer make a meaningful claim of its strategic importance to the West because of its mineral supplies, Cape route, or anti-Communist ideology. Growing economic problems, continuing domestic unrest, and continuing international ostracism meant white South Africa faced a stark choice if it were to achieve its preference of security through Western affiliation: remove the barrier between itself and the West by directly addressing apartheid and other barriers like nuclear weapons possession, or forego its Western ties. Nuclear weapons had become a burden to South Africa rather than a benefit in the political/economic sense; nuclear weapons never had any direct military purpose.

Unable to blackmail the West but wishing to remain a part of it, a change in strategy was imperative. The only remaining question for South Africa was when and how to cash in its nuclear bargaining chip for whatever advantage it might bring.<sup>58</sup> Pretoria looked to alleviate its international isolation by signing the NPT and using the concession for maximum advantage with the West and to counter conservative Afrikaner opposition to such a move. The government also wanted to provide the National Party with distinction for the dismantlement decision and thus prevent any future government from taking the credit.<sup>59</sup> Foregoing its nuclear weapons and joining the NPT was a way "to reenter the international community in compliance with international norms."<sup>60</sup> But, these actions alone would not be sufficient to earn the West's support.<sup>61</sup> The basis for Pretoria's isolation was its apartheid policy, not its nuclear policy. Internal reform in dismantling apartheid and denuclearization would have to be addressed together.

The change in South Africa's strategy was precipitated by the election of F.W. DeKlerk in September 1989. He assumed office ready to make fundamental political

reforms, including ending apartheid, dismantling the country's nuclear weapons program, and signing the NPT. This regime change was a critical factor leading to a fundamental shift in South African nuclear strategy. On February 2, 1990, President DeKlerk delivered a speech in which he announced the unbanning of the ANC, PAC, and other dissident groups and the release from prison of ANC leader Nelson Mandela. He justified his actions with the end of the Cold War and the desire to eliminate South Africa's international isolation and economic estrangement.

The same month, DeKlerk terminated the nuclear weapons program. South Africa's nuclear policy would become part of this strategy to normalize its relations with the West. Removal of its nuclear weapons and accession to the NPT assumed some distinct advantages for South Africa both in the West and in the region.<sup>62</sup>

In sum, the dismantlement decision, like the decision to acquire and maintain an implicit nuclear threat, was motivated by South Africa's beliefs about the likely Western response to its nuclear strategy. As its strategic environment changed, its beliefs and, eventually, its strategy changed as well. Its interest and preference remained constant, however. The end of a Communist insurgency in the region eliminated South Africa's belief that it was able to coerce the West through the threatened possession or use of nuclear weapons, rendering them superfluous in a strategic sense and a barrier to its reaching its preference of remaining linked to the West. The regime's apartheid policy remained the unavoidable source of South Africa's isolation, and with the end of the Cold War, there was no longer a countervailing geostrategic motive for the West to tolerate South Africa's domestic policies. South African elites believed that to maintain its Western ties, South Africa must sooner or later dismantle apartheid and rid itself of nuclear weapons for whatever political or commercial benefits that action could bring. The changed security picture in the region and internationally also reduced South Africa's near-term threat and helped to create an opportunity for a new strategy. Structural conditions remain important, but must be understood in conjunction with state preferences and causal beliefs to understand policy outcomes.

#### **UKRAINE AND ITS NUCLEAR DECISION<sup>63</sup>**

Even before its independence, Ukraine declared its intention to become "a permanently neutral

state...holding to three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, produce or acquire nuclear weapons.”<sup>64</sup> In fact, two months before Ukraine became an independent country, its Parliament (Rada) adopted the statement “On the Non-Nuclear Status of Ukraine.” On December 21, 1991, members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) signed the “Agreement on Joint Measures on Nuclear Arms,” which provided for the removal of tactical weapons from Ukraine by July 1, 1992, and strategic weapons by the end of 1994. All tactical nuclear weapons were removed from the country ahead of schedule, by May 1992, despite Ukrainian fears that the Russians would not destroy the weapons and concerns that Ukrainians were being denied their share of disarmament assistance.

Nonetheless, Ukraine proceeded down the path of denuclearization. Its leaders signed the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992, which required Ukraine to return its strategic weapons to Russia and join the NPT “in the shortest time possible.” Obstacles emerged, however, as the Rada began to emphasize conditions for START I and NPT ratification. In September 1993, the Russians and Ukrainians met at Massandra to work through some of the issues that stood in the way of Ukrainian non-nuclear status. The agreement reached at this meeting, however, was quickly thrown aside as both the Russians and the Ukrainians argued that neither side intended to keep its bargain.<sup>65</sup>

On November 18, 1993, the Ukrainian Rada ratified START I, but attached 13 conditions before it would be implemented. This led to a trilateral meeting in Washington, DC in January 1994 where Russia, Ukraine, and the United States agreed on appropriate Ukrainian compensation for fissile materials, dismantlement assistance, and security assurances. One month later the Rada removed the conditions it had attached to START, but again delayed its consideration of the NPT. In the summer of 1994, Ukraine’s President Leonid Kravchuk was defeated in elections by Leonid Kuchma, who ran on a platform of market-based economic reform and closer relations with Moscow. Kuchma also supported, as had Kravchuk, NPT membership. In November 1994, after Kuchma’s speech to the Rada appealing for NPT ratification, it voted to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. On December 5, 1994, Ukraine submitted its NPT ratification to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and START then entered into force.<sup>66</sup>

## UKRAINE AND THE LIMITS OF A NEOREALIST EXPLANATION

Shortly after its independence, Ukrainian leaders began to express concern regarding Russia’s apparent unwillingness to respect Ukrainian independence or its present borders.<sup>67</sup> Russian officials reportedly described Ukraine’s independence as “transitional” and went so far as to warn European governments not to open embassies in Kiev.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, Ukrainian leaders complained that the Russians were attempting to reassert authority in the former Soviet region through their manipulation of the CIS agreements.<sup>69</sup>

Problems also arose between Russia and Ukraine over the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet. Disagreement over the fleet began when the CIS agreed on January 16, 1992, that troops in the strategic forces would swear allegiance to the CIS. There was no agreement, however, on which forces were “strategic.” The battle over the fleet heightened when Russian leaders declared Sevastopol a “Russian city.”<sup>70</sup>

Other territorial disputes with Russia and Romania increased Ukraine’s security concerns as well. The Russian dispute, however, was more threatening because of the 11 million Russians living in Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine have also debated the ownership of territory in eastern Ukraine (Donbas), southern Ukraine (so-called Novorossiia), and the Crimea.<sup>71</sup>

Tension between Ukraine and Russia also increased concerning the considerable debt owed to Russia for fuel, oil, and gas shipped to Ukraine.<sup>72</sup> By late 1994, Ukraine owed Russia \$4.2 billion for imports of oil and natural gas; an amount that increased \$100 million every three months.<sup>73</sup> Because of Ukraine’s inability to pay for such services, and because Ukrainian exports to Russia collapsed, Russia threatened to halt the much needed energy supply.

Given Ukraine’s security concerns, the neorealist approach would expect that it would seek to balance against the power of Russia either by developing and maintaining a credible military capability or by allying with others who share its concerns about Russia. To balance internally, Ukraine could rely on its conventional military capability. It is widely accepted, however, that Ukraine could not defend itself if it were to enter a conventional war with Russia. Russia outpaces Ukraine three-to-one in population, gross domestic product, and military capability. Moreover, Ukraine cannot make its

defenses viable geographically. It has long, open borders (a 1,600-kilometer border with Russia and a 900-kilometer border with Belarus) that lack natural boundaries. In fact, some analysts have suggested that, at best, Ukraine's 20 armored divisions could defend approximately 600 kilometers of its border.<sup>74</sup>

Regarding external balancing, neorealists would expect Ukraine to ally with other powers to counter Russian power capability. Of course, an alliance with the CIS would not have been feasible given Russia's prominent role in this loose organization of former Soviet states. Allying with other powers (joining NATO for example) would be provocative to Russia, possibly placing Ukraine in a less secure situation between Russia and the Western alliance. Nonetheless, Ukraine has sought closer military ties with Western powers.<sup>75</sup> The West, however, demonstrated relatively little interest in Ukraine, instead focusing its foreign policy almost exclusively on Russia.<sup>76</sup>

In addition, neorealists suggest that states are overwhelmingly concerned with relative gains. Because the international system is anarchic in nature, states are inherently fearful and distrustful of other states. In an environment where states seek to survive and maintain sovereignty, they can never be sure of another state's intentions. They must be suspicious of other states' actions and must always anticipate danger.<sup>77</sup> States are, therefore, very sensitive to the capabilities of others.

Because Ukraine regularly expressed concerns about the relative position and capability of Russia, neorealists would expect that Ukraine would find it rather difficult to give up its nuclear weapons—especially to a state it did not trust. The neorealist approach, in other words, would not expect Ukraine to relinquish the arsenal that would “level the playing field” and reduce the gap in relative capabilities between Russia and Ukraine. Moreover, Ukraine's position in the international system as a middle-range power should have made its leaders even more sensitive to any possible change in relative power. Indeed, some Ukrainian leaders expressed concern that it was their nuclear inheritance that created such interest in Ukraine, and that renunciation of their nuclear arsenal would only lead the other powers of the world to turn a blind eye to Ukraine.<sup>78</sup>

## UKRAINE'S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE LIMITS OF DOMESTIC-LEVEL APPROACHES

Like the South African case, domestic political pressures and democratic institutional or normative factors played virtually no role in Ukraine's nuclear decisionmaking. Domestic coalitions, either “inward looking” or “liberalizing,” that pressured the government to select a particular nuclear path were largely non-existent. Although public opinion polls on the nuclear issue were conducted, such opinions were rarely if ever considered during the decisionmaking process in Ukraine. Other forces, such as the media and independent researchers or groups, were of little significance as well. During the early years of Ukraine's independence, at which time the nuclear question was being considered, coalitions, groups, and public opinion remained outside the relevant decisionmaking circles.<sup>79</sup> Moreover, Ukrainian domestic institutions and norms were hardly democratic during this period. Although Ukraine was attempting to make strides in that direction, it was having difficulty adjusting to the pains of democratization.<sup>80</sup> Ultimately, the domestic upheavals with which the Ukrainian population had to deal during the nuclear decision process meant that there was little to no involvement by the Ukrainian citizenry in the nuclear issue.<sup>81</sup> Ukraine's *ideas* about democracy were, however, of considerable significance regarding the country's decision to denuclearize.

## UKRAINE'S WESTERN IDENTITY AND ITS DECISION TO DENUCLEARIZE

When Ukraine achieved its independence in December 1991, the new country began a difficult political, economic, and social transition. The Ukrainian people had to decide what kind of government they would create and maintain, as well as who were their friends and foes. The Ukrainian state, in other words, had to establish its new identity as a new independent country.<sup>82</sup>

Very soon after Ukraine became an independent country, its leaders began asserting its status as a European state. Moreover, Ukraine's conception of its position in Europe provided the country's leaders with a guide for action. President Kravchuk stated in February 1992 that “Ukraine, as a European state, has an intention to participate in all European structures.”<sup>83</sup> President Kravchuk also stated Ukraine's intention of fully integrating into the European community.<sup>84</sup> In July 1992, Ukraine ap-

plied to become a member of the Council of Europe, and by July 1993 was regularly attending Council of Europe meetings.

These activities are the result of Ukraine's conception of itself as a "100% European state."<sup>85</sup> Foreign Minister Zlenko reiterated this conception when he said, "Ukraine is in Europe. Furthermore, the geographical center of Europe is situated on Ukrainian territory."<sup>86</sup> Ukrainian decisionmakers consistently referred to Ukraine's Western orientation and its "place" in the community of West European states.<sup>87</sup> Ukraine, they believed, would serve as "a stabilizing force in Europe" and intended to develop itself according to a "Western model."<sup>88</sup> President Kravchuk asserted that Ukraine "would like as soon as possible to endow [itself]...with components that proceed from tried-and-tested European experiences."<sup>89</sup>

On July 5, 1993, the Ukrainian Rada endorsed Ukraine's Western orientation when it adopted the "Basic Principles of Ukraine's Foreign Policy." This document highlighted the importance of the West in Ukraine's foreign policy, and urged Ukrainian participation in Western organizations such as the European Union (EU), West European Union (WEU), NATO, and North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).<sup>90</sup> Ukraine's Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko discussed the country's foreign policy priorities stating that "Ukraine should be directly and fully involved in the creation of an all-European system on the basis of NATO, the CSCE, and other international structures."<sup>91</sup> Moreover, Ukraine's military doctrine, adopted in 1993, further asserted Ukraine's self-conception as a Western, European state. The document, for example, stated that "Ukraine can and must become an influential state, capable of playing a significant role in ensuring political, economic, and military stability in Europe."<sup>92</sup> By 1994, Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko boasted of Ukraine's strong and active "economic, political and psychological ties with the Western world."<sup>93</sup>

In addition to asserting its own position as a European state, Ukraine fully recognized the existence and importance of the "community" of Western states. This community is the result of "intensive integration" on the part of many Western nations.<sup>94</sup> The Ukrainians acknowledged, for example, that the "political marks and geographical affiliation of countries [are] disappear[ing] step-by-step."<sup>95</sup> Moreover, Ukrainian leaders understood

that this community of nations was created by those who "share common principles" for the purpose of "working together."<sup>96</sup> Ukraine and the United States signed a "friendship" agreement in May 1992 in which both parties promised to "strive to protect and promote the values that bind us together in the democratic community of nations."<sup>97</sup> Ukrainians often asserted their "mutual understanding" of Western ideals, and their commitment to become a "full-fledged member" of the Western community.<sup>98</sup> Most importantly, however, Ukrainian leaders linked their Western orientation and membership in a Western community with their nuclear decision. President Kravchuk, for example, suggested that "Ukraine's international standing and membership in the community of European nations depends on its denuclearization and abiding by its commitments."<sup>99</sup>

Ukraine, therefore, believed that it was part of the Western community it so admired. To be accepted as a part of that community, Ukraine necessarily had to renounce its nuclear inheritance and accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. In other words, the country's belief in the importance of the West and its role in the European region was inconsistent with nuclear weapons status.<sup>100</sup>

In addition to Ukraine's belief that it belongs to a Western community of nations, Ukraine's ideas concerning democracy and the peaceful resolution of conflict greatly influenced the country's decision to denuclearize. Ukrainians often linked liberal democracy and the notion of peaceful change. In an agreement with the United States, for example, Ukraine agreed "to promote democratic peace across Europe."<sup>101</sup> Moreover, Ukraine agreed that "security must be based on a multilateral commitment to uphold shared principles, especially democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes."<sup>102</sup> In 1993, President Kravchuk stated that "democracy is the ultimate protector," and that "democratic transformations in the countries of the [former Soviet] region are necessary for the peaceful settlement of conflict."<sup>103</sup>

Ukraine's notion of democracy and peace was particularly focused on Russia's domestic political situation. Ukrainian leaders often spoke of the necessity of a democratic Russia for there to be peace and stability in the region. President Kravchuk, for example, stated that: stabilization and peace in Russia are an important factor of stabilization and peace in Ukraine respectively. This is why we should

in every way possible support democratic processes in Russia, democratic as to their essence, as to their nature, and abstain from the moves which would stand in the way of Russia's progress along the road of democracy because this is an important factor of our security and our possibilities exactly on way toward democratic market transformations.<sup>104</sup>

Kravchuk further suggested that "Russian democracy and reform" would mean "calm, peace and harmony."<sup>105</sup> Ukrainian parliamentarians also linked Ukrainian democratic development with that of Russia's, stating that the two were "dependent" on each other.<sup>106</sup> More importantly, a democratic Russia appears to have been a significant factor for Ukraine in its decision to relinquish its inherited nuclear arsenal. "Democracy in Russia," according to Kravchuk, "is important to Ukraine's nuclear position."<sup>107</sup>

In sum, Ukraine's decision to relinquish its inherited nuclear arsenal was largely motivated by its beliefs and ideas about itself as a member of the Western, liberal community of states and about democracy and the peaceful resolution of conflict. Ukrainian leaders consistently and often suggested that their country belonged with the other democratic nations of Europe. Accordingly, they understood that Ukraine's acceptance by and participation in the Western club required denuclearization.

### CONCLUSION: IDEAS, BELIEFS, AND NUCLEAR POLICIES

In a recent work, Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane offer a straightforward hypothesis asserting that ideas and beliefs are often important determinants of government policy. Ideas, they claim, provide road maps and clarify goals or means-ends relationships.<sup>108</sup> This assertion is not offered to the exclusion of the rational/neorealist emphasis on the pursuit of interest as a guide to state action, but as a complement: "ideas *as well as* interests have causal weight in explanations of human action."<sup>109</sup> An explanation based on the force of ideas, however, must overcome the null hypothesis that the actions described can be understood on the basis of egoistic interests in the context of power realities.<sup>110</sup>

This study lends support to the position that beliefs and ideas are critical to explaining foreign policy outcomes. It illustrates the limits of attempts to understand

policy and policy change solely by reference to power, insecurity, or, for that matter, domestic political machinations. Deriving South African or Ukrainian strategies from their security environment or domestic politics alone inadequately explains why these countries made the nuclear decisions they did. In the case of South Africa, the beliefs and ideas of the country's leaders regarding the West's potential abandonment of it clearly affected their decisions first to develop a nuclear weapons capability and then to dismantle it. Similarly, Ukraine's belief in the Western, democratic community, and understanding that its inclusion in that community required non-nuclear status, greatly affected its decision to denuclearize.

Beyond simply supporting the proposition that "ideas matter," this study sheds some light on *how* beliefs and ideas matter to nuclear policy outcomes, exposes the limitations of both strict rationalist and strict reflectivist positions on beliefs and ideas, and suggests how both approaches might find common ground in operationalizing ideational variables. The South African and Ukrainian cases show that causal beliefs play a significant role *both in preference formation and strategic choice* regarding nuclear policymaking. This conclusion challenges a strict rationalist perspective that treats beliefs and ideas as either unimportant or as "hooks" used by elites to justify their pursuit of interests.<sup>111</sup> Further, this study encourages rational theorists to consider ideational variables in their analysis, first by using adjustments in beliefs in explaining strategy, and second by deriving a contextual, ideationally based state preference as an earlier endogenous choice in the pursuit of a basic interest, rather than treating preference formation as fully exogenous.

The study also challenges a strict reflectivist position that asserts the indeterminate nature of ideas and their intersubjective, rhetorically determined qualities.<sup>112</sup> Although this position offers a useful epistemological insight, this article demonstrates that some ideas and beliefs may be sufficiently enduring as to make them operational in policy analysis. Specifically, causal beliefs about oneself—that is, beliefs related to one's identity—are enduring beliefs that help shape basic interests into preferences. Identity is designed to resist change and must be subjected to large amounts of inconsistent information before it is replaced or altered.<sup>113</sup> Because identity is a stable and openly expressed idea, it is possible to

operationalize beliefs about how to preserve or gain outside acceptance of one's identity as causal variables in the policymaking process.

In sum, this study argues that causal beliefs were important in two distinct phases of policymaking: in the formation of actor preferences and in the choice of strategy. The cases support Goldstein and Keohane's point that "causal ideas help determine which of many means will be used to reach desired goals and therefore help to provide actors with strategies with which to further their objectives."<sup>114</sup> Further, it suggests that ideas matter with regard to political outcomes not only in the selection of strategies, but in the formation of state preferences as well. Certain causal beliefs become imbedded in long-term calculations to such an extent that they are no longer merely guides to strategies, but become part of the state's goals or preferences themselves.<sup>115</sup>

From a practical policy perspective, the South African and Ukrainian nuclear decisions caution against sweeping generalizations regarding inevitable pressures for nuclear weapons proliferation or denuclearization in a post-Cold War world. State ideas and beliefs are likely to mediate underlying interests in security when states are forming preferences and choosing nuclear weapons strategies. The range of state choice, therefore, may be more varied than a narrow focus on structurally determined interest alone would allow. Likewise, the range of policy options available to address the problem of nuclear proliferation, and the underlying insecurity that engenders it, may be broader than is generally recognized. Confidence-building measures essential to cooperation can and should include those directed to a state's "ideational" security, as well as its physical and economic security. Recognition of a state's identity and validation of the legitimacy of its beliefs (not the accuracy of them) could help facilitate cooperation even on matters of nuclear weapons strategy. This point forces us to question the wisdom of a nonproliferation policy that begins by branding potential proliferants "rogue nations," for example. We do not, however, want to overstate the general policy prescriptions that can be derived from two case studies. Rather, in concluding, we hope only to suggest that policymakers, like theoreticians, have much to gain from incorporating ideational variables into their analyses.

<sup>1</sup> See Herbert S. Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 450-51.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds., *The Proliferation Puzzle* (London: Frank Cass and Company, Ltd., 1993), pp. 42-3; and John J. Mearsheimer, "Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56.

<sup>3</sup> Specifically, four countries (out of a universe of 11 known nuclear states) recently chose to dismantle their nuclear arsenals: South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. See Leonard S. Spector and Mark G. McDonough with Evan S. Medeiros, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Company, 1979); Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

<sup>5</sup> States also "bandwagon," that is, accede to the directives of a clearly more powerful state. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 117-123; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985), pp. 3-43.

<sup>6</sup> Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," pp. 42-43; Stephen M. Walt, "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia," *International Organization* 43 (Spring 1988), pp. 275-316; and Walt, "Alliance, Threats, and US Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs," *Security Studies* 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 448-82.

<sup>7</sup> Zachary S. Davis, "The Realist Nuclear Regime," in *The Proliferation Puzzle*, p. 80. See also George Quester, "Conceptions of Nuclear Threshold Status," in Regina Cowen Karp, ed., *Security With Nuclear Weapons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 217.

<sup>8</sup> Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," in *The Proliferation Puzzle*, p. 196.

<sup>9</sup> See Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation."

<sup>10</sup> See generally, Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

<sup>11</sup> Jeffrey Frieden, "Actors and Preferences in International Relations," paper prepared for the IGCC project on Strategic Choice in International Relations, Preliminary Draft, June 1996, p. 12.

<sup>12</sup> Etel Solingen, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint," *International Security* 19 (Fall 1994), pp. 136-139.

<sup>13</sup> On the role of vested interest groups in nuclear weapons acquisition, see Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," pp. 192-212.

<sup>14</sup> On norms and political behavior see Friedrich Kratochwill, *Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 31-32; and William Dixon, "Democracy and Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 88 (March 1994), p. 16.

<sup>15</sup> Admittedly, the study of norms and their effect on behavior is not without methodological problems. Compare Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Politics and Peace," *International Security* 20 (Fall 1995), pp. 123-146 with G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44 (Summer 1990), p. 294.

<sup>16</sup> For a less benign view of the impact of democratization, see Edward S. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (May/June 1995), pp. 79-97; "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38.

- <sup>17</sup> On the process of internationalization, see John Finley Scott, *The Internalization of Norms: A Sociological Theory of Moral Commitment* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971); Herbert C. Kelman, "Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Opinion Change," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2 (1958), p. 132.
- <sup>18</sup> See Solingen, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint," p. 132.
- <sup>19</sup> The monadic effect is in contrast to the dyadic effect, which maintains more narrowly that democracies are not prone to conflict with other democracies, but are as prone to conflict with nondemocracies as nondemocracies are with one another. David L. Rousseau, *inter alia*, "Assessing the Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88," *American Political Science Review* 90 (September 1996), pp. 512-533.
- <sup>20</sup> Michael Doyle, Joseph Nye, Jr., Bruce Russett, and others working on the democratic peace question recommend testing the thesis on a wider range of dependent variables than merely war or its absence. See, for example, Michael Doyle, "Correspondence: The Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19 (Spring 1995), pp. 181-183.
- <sup>21</sup> We employ the term "rationality," just as most rational choice scholars do, to mean that a person acts on his or her preferences in ways that he or she expects to maximize his or her welfare, given those preferences. This is an instrumental definition of rationality. It asserts that people do what they believe is in their best interests, however they may define them. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *Principles of International Politics* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), p. 242.
- <sup>22</sup> Freiden, "Actors and Preferences in International Relations," p. 14.
- <sup>23</sup> Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 10.
- <sup>24</sup> For more on how ideas affect political outcomes, see Jeffrey Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
- <sup>25</sup> Frieden, "Actors and Preferences in International Relations," p. 14.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>27</sup> We use the term "identity" to mean a very important and particular set of beliefs that provides a group with a sense of self and a means for understanding its relationship to the external environment. Critical for one's survival, these beliefs or identity are relatively long-standing and slow to change. See Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International System," *American Political Science Review* 88 (June 1994), p. 385; William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 23; and Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
- <sup>28</sup> On South Africa's growing international ostracism, see Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
- <sup>29</sup> Warren H. Donnelly, "South Africa and Nuclear Weapons," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, June 27, 1991, p. 7.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* See also Edouard Bustin, "South Africa's Foreign Policy Alternatives and Deterrence Needs," in Onkar Marwah and Ann Schultz, eds., *Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1975), p. 223.
- <sup>31</sup> Donnelly, "South Africa and Nuclear Weapons," p. 7.
- <sup>32</sup> Pik Botha, interview by author, Pretoria, South Africa, December 20, 1995.
- <sup>33</sup> J.D.L. Moore, *South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation* (London: MacMillan Press, 1987), p. 126.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131.
- <sup>35</sup> Mitchell Reiss, *Bridled Ambition* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 29.
- <sup>36</sup> Moore, *South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation*, p. 126.
- <sup>37</sup> Renfrew Christie, "South Africa's Nuclear History," paper presented at the Nuclear History Program Fourth International Conference, Sofia-Antipolis, Nice, France, June 23-27, 1993, p. 12.
- <sup>38</sup> George Barrie, "South Africa," in Joseph Goldblat, ed., *Nonproliferation: The Why and the Wherefore* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), p. 156.
- <sup>39</sup> David Fischer, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Western Europe's Influence on South Africa," Occasional Paper, Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels, February 1985, p. 18.
- <sup>40</sup> Interviews by author, Johannesburg, South Africa, December 14, 1995, and Pretoria, South Africa, December 20, 1995.
- <sup>41</sup> Moore, *South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation*, pp. 66-67.
- <sup>42</sup> Barrie, "South Africa," p. 156.
- <sup>43</sup> Waldo Stumpf, "Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons Programme," presentation given at the conference, "50 Year After Hiroshima," organized by the USPID (Unione Scientiati per il Diarmo), Castiglione, Italy, September 28-October 2, 1995, pp. 7-8.
- <sup>44</sup> Fischer, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons," p. 16.
- <sup>45</sup> Bustin, "South Africa's Foreign Policy Alternatives and Deterrence Needs," pp. 217-218.
- <sup>46</sup> Garth Lawrence Shelton, "Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Nonproliferation: The Case of South Africa," Ph.D. diss., University of Witwatersrand, South Africa, 1992, p. 119.
- <sup>47</sup> G. Cawthra, *Brutal Force* (London: International Defense Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1986) p. 11; Moore, *South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation*, p. 63.
- <sup>48</sup> Shelton, "Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Nonproliferation: The Case of South Africa," p. 122.
- <sup>49</sup> Gwendolen Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds., *Southern Africa in Crisis* (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1977), chapter one.
- <sup>50</sup> Stumpf, "Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons Programme," pp. 7-8.
- <sup>51</sup> Fischer, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons," p. i.
- <sup>52</sup> David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS (Institute for Science and International Security) Report, May 1994, pp. 8-9.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>54</sup> Shelton, "Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Nonproliferation: The Case of South Africa," p. 213.
- <sup>55</sup> See for example, Reiss, *Bridled Ambition*, p. 17; Stumpf, "Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons Programme," p. 11; Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," p. 16; J.W. Villiers, Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Nov/Dec 1993), pp. 98-109, p. 102.
- <sup>56</sup> Michele A. Flournoy and Kurt M. Campbell, "South Africa's Bomb: A Military Option?" *Orbis* (Summer 1988), p. 394.
- <sup>57</sup> Fisher, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons," p. 19.
- <sup>58</sup> Former Foreign Minister Pik Botha, interview by author, Pretoria, South Africa, December 20, 1995.
- <sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>60</sup> Mr. Derek Keys, former Minister of Finance, interview by author, Johannesburg, South Africa, December 14, 1995.
- <sup>61</sup> For example, the European Community tied future nuclear cooperation with South Africa to changes in its social policies. Donnelly, "South Africa and Nuclear Weapons," p. 9.
- <sup>62</sup> Mr. Harry Schwartz, former South African ambassador to the United States, interview by author, Johannesburg, South Africa, December 14, 1995.
- <sup>63</sup> For a more full and complete analysis of Ukraine's nuclear decisionmaking, see Suzette R. Grillo, "Explaining Ukrainian Denuclearization: Material Interests or Liberal Identity?" *International Politics* (forthcoming, June 2000).
- <sup>64</sup> Quote from Annex 1 in Victor Batiouk, "Ukraine's Non-Nuclear Option," UNIDIR Research Paper 14 (1992), p. 17.
- <sup>65</sup> Reiss, *Bridled Ambition*, p. 109.
- <sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121; Dunbar Lockwood, "Ukraine Accedes (Finally) to NPT; Opens Way to START Reductions," *Arms Control Today* 24 (December 1994), p. 17; and Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., "Wisdom Prevails in Kiev: Global Security Wins," *Arms Control Today* 24 (December 1994), p. 2.
- <sup>67</sup> "Kravchuk Interviewed on Russian, German Ties," *Der Spiegel*, February 3, 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-023 (February 4, 1992), p. 58; and "Kravchuk Said to Call Russia 'Main Enemy'," *Pravda*, September 15, 1993, pp. 1-2, in FBIS-SOV-93-178 (September 16, 1993), pp. 36-7.
- <sup>68</sup> See Chriystia Freeland, "Russia 'Trying' to Isolate Ukraine," *Financial Times*, March 17, 1993, p. 2.
- <sup>69</sup> Roman Solchanyk, "Russia, Ukraine, and the Imperial Legacy," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 9 (October-December 1993), pp. 337-374; "Russia's Monroe

Doctrine," *Izvestia*, August 7, 1992; and "Russia Wants Special Role in the Former Soviet Union," Reuters, February 28, 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>>.

Also of concern to Ukrainian officials were public opinion polls that showed the Russian public in favor of Ukrainian and Russian integration. One poll, for example, showed that 34 percent of Russians preferred that Ukraine unite with Russia in a single state. See *OMRI Daily Digest*, June 9, 1994.

For these reasons and more, some neorealist scholars suggested that Ukraine not only would, but should keep its inherited nuclear arsenal. See John Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Summer 1993), pp. 50-66.

<sup>70</sup> "An Interview with Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 49 (Fall 1993), p. 245.

<sup>71</sup> Taras Kuzio, *Ukrainian Security Policy* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), pp. 17-18.

<sup>72</sup> Ustna Markus, "Debt and Desperation," *Transition* 5 (April 14, 1995), pp. 14-19.

<sup>73</sup> See *RFE/RL Daily Report*, November 23, 1994.

<sup>74</sup> See Peter Rutland, "Search for Stability," *Transition* 1 (June 1995), pp. 20-21.

<sup>75</sup> For example, Ukraine and the United States have conducted joint military operations on Ukrainian territory as part of the Partnership for Peace program.

<sup>76</sup> Rutland, "Search for Stability," p. 23.

<sup>77</sup> See John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 7-11; and Robert Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 304-5.

<sup>78</sup> Anatoly Zlenko, "Speech to Ukrainian Deputies," *Izvestia*, July 2, 1993, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>>; "Statement of Anatoly Zlenko," BBC, January 28, 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>>.

<sup>79</sup> Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes Toward Nuclear Arms," *Ukrainian Weekly*, May 6, 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>>; and author's interviews with Ukrainian officials in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Economic Relations and Defense, Ukrainian Parliamentarians, and Ukrainian experts and analysts in various institutes, Kiev, Ukraine, May 1996. For an account of the absence of domestic involvement in another foreign and security policy matter in Ukraine, see Scott Jones, "The Evolution of the Ukrainian Export Control System: State Building and International Cooperation," in Gary K. Bertsch and Suzette R. Grillot, eds., *Arms on the Market: Reducing the Risk of Proliferation in the Former Soviet Union* (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 71-3.

<sup>80</sup> Author's interviews with numerous Ukrainian officials, experts, analysts and citizens, Kiev, Ukraine, May 1996.

<sup>81</sup> See Kuzio, *Ukrainian Security Policy*, especially p. 54.

<sup>82</sup> Concerning the perils of transition in Ukraine, see Sergei Kiselyov, "Not So Western After All?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 50 (January/February 1994), pp. 32-35; and Kuzio, *Ukrainian Security Policy*. Regarding the establishment of a Ukrainian identity, see Roman Szporluk, "Independent Ukraine," in Dick Clark, ed., *Russia, Ukraine and the US Response* (Queenstown, MD: The Aspen Institute, 1993), pp. 23-29; Andrew Cowley, "Unruly Child: A Survey of Ukraine," *The Economist*, May 7-13, 1994, pp. 3-18; and Serhiy Holowaty, "Ukraine: One Year of Independence," in Clark, ed., *Russia, Ukraine and the US Response*, pp. 53-63.

<sup>83</sup> "President Kravchuk Briefs Ukrainian and Foreign Journalists," Radio Ukraine, February 17, 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-033 (February 19, 1992), p. 68.

<sup>84</sup> "Kravchuk's Final Press Conference in Paris," *Izvestia*, June 19, 1992, pp. 1; 5, in FBIS-SOV-92-119 (June 19, 1992), p. 58.

<sup>85</sup> "Interview with Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko," *Izvestia*, June 17, 1993, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>>.

<sup>86</sup> Pol Mathil, "Anatoly Zlenko on Issues of Foreign Policy," *Le Soir*, September 16, 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-179, (September 17, 1993), p. 44.

<sup>87</sup> "Kravchuk Addresses Parliament on National Security Issues," Radio

Ukraine, October 21, 1993, from BBC, October 23, 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>>.

<sup>88</sup> "Foreign Minister Zlenko Speak to the Press," *Kievskiy Novosti*, September 17, 1993, p. 4, in FBIS-SOV-93-186 (September 28, 1993), p. 33; and "Interview with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk," *Magyar Nemzet*, February 26, 1993, p. 7, in FBIS-SOV-93-040 (March 3, 1993), pp. 54-55. Also author's interviews with Ukrainian officials and experts, Kiev, Ukraine, May 1996.

<sup>89</sup> Josef Vesely, "Interview with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk," *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, October 25, 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-208 (October 29, 1993), pp. 61-62.

<sup>90</sup> Kuzio, *Ukrainian Security Policy*, pp. 55-58.

<sup>91</sup> "Zlenko Article on Foreign Policy Priorities Viewed," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, August 18, 1994, p. 3, in FBIS-SOV-94-160 (August 18, 1994), p. 23.

<sup>92</sup> "Text of Military Doctrine," *Holos Ukrayiny*, October 29, 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>>.

<sup>93</sup> Oleh Oliynyk, "Udovenko Discusses Foreign Ministry Activities," *Uryadovyy Kuryer*, August 22, 1994, p. 4, in FBIS-SOV-95-166 (August 28, 1994), p. 54.

<sup>94</sup> "President Kuchma's Stance on Security System," Interfax (August 17, 1994), in FBIS-SOV-94-160 (August 18, 1994), p. 22.

<sup>95</sup> Udovenko, "Statement Before the UN General Assembly," p. 2. Also see "Speech by Zlenko on Foreign Policy Guidelines," Radio Ukraine, July 2, 1993, from BBC, July 6, 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>>.

<sup>96</sup> "Declaration on U.S.-Ukrainian Relations: Building a Democratic Partnership," Department of State Dispatch, May 11, 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>>.

<sup>97</sup> "U.S.-Ukrainian Presidents' Statement on Relations," *Uryadovyy Kuryer*, May 9, 1992, from BBC, May 30, 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>>.

<sup>98</sup> "Zlenko Briefs Correspondents at the Foreign Ministry," Radio Ukraine, October 12, 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-196 (October 13, 1993), p. 86; and Maria Graczyk, "President Kravchuk Interviewed," *Uprost*, March 8, 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-055 (March 20, 1992), p. 67. Also see "Interview with Ukrainian Defense Minister," BBC, December 16, 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>>; and "Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko on Foreign Policy," *Holos Ukrayiny*, July 6, 1994, p. 3, in FBIS-SOV-94-131 (July 8, 1994), p. 42.

<sup>99</sup> "Kravchuk Proposed Defusing Ukraine's Nuclear Arsenal," Reuters, November 29, 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>>. Also see "President Kravchuk Wants Nuclear-Free State," ITAR-TASS, November 20, 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-223 (November 22, 1993), p. 51.

<sup>100</sup> For more on Ukraine's self-conception and role in the region and the world, see Glenn Chafetz, Hillel Abramson, and Suzette Grillot, "Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," *Political Psychology* 17 (December 1996), pp. 727-757.

<sup>101</sup> "Declaration on U.S.-Ukrainian Relations: Building a Democratic Partnership," in Lexis-Nexis, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>>.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> "Ukraine's Kravchuk on Moscow Developments," Radio Ukraine, October 4, 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-192-S (October 6, 1993), p. 51; and "Slovakian Defense Minister Meets with Kravchuk," Ukrainian Television, October 28, 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-208 (October 29, 1993), p. 63.

<sup>104</sup> "Kravchuk Addresses Parliament on National Security Issues," in Lexis-Nexis, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>>.

<sup>105</sup> "Ukraine's Kravchuk on Moscow Developments," p. 52. Also see "President Kravchuk Discusses Political Trends," Ostankino Television, November 5, 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-214 (November 8, 1993), p. 75.

<sup>106</sup> Holowaty, "Ukraine: One Year After Independence," p. 53.

<sup>107</sup> Kravchuk quoted in Steven Erlanger, "Ukraine and Arms Accords: Kiev Reluctant to Say 'I Do'," *New York Times*, March 31, 1993, p. A6. Also see Reiss, *Bridled Ambition*, p. 108.

<sup>108</sup> Goldstein and Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, p. 3.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., pp. 26-27.



<sup>111</sup> Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models," *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (1979), pp. 27-60.

<sup>112</sup> Alexander Wendt, for example, argues that beliefs such as social identities "are always in process during interaction." Thus identities should "be treated as dependent variables endogenous to interaction. This would allow us to treat collective action...as a process of creating a new definition of self." Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International System," pp. 386-387.

<sup>113</sup> Alexander Wendt states that identities are "relatively stable, role specific understanding and expectations about self." Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992), pp 397-398.

<sup>114</sup> Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, pp. 13-14.

<sup>115</sup> For a similar approach, see Charles A. Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).