

# **DPRK nuclear status**

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**Track II China – U.S. Meeting**  
**Beijing**  
**November 4, 2015**

# Update of DPRK nuclear progress

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- **Reactors**

- 5 MWe reactor operating, ELWR close to operation

- **Reprocessing facility**

- Remained in stand-by, possible reactivation in 9/15

- **Fuel fabrication facility**

- Much expansion since 2009

- **Uranium enrichment**

- Apparent expansion, possibly large capacity

- **Nuclear test site** (Activity, but no signs of new test)

- **Missile program** (Lots of activity at Sohae)

# Update of DPRK nuclear progress

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- **1965 – 1985**      **Laying the foundation**
- **1986 – 1994**      **Nuclear weapon option developed**
- **1995 – 2003**      **Plutonium freeze, HEU hedge**
- **2003 – 2006**      **Build and test the bomb**
- **2007 – 2008**      **Disable Pu, continue HEU**
- **2009 – 2010**      **Test #2, preparing HEU option**
- **2010 – 2015**      **Test #3 Build up of nuclear arsenal**

# Estimates of DPRK nuclear program

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Nuclear Capability	December 2015 Estimates	December 2016 Estimates
Plutonium	34 – 42 kg	34 – 52 kg
HEU (Highly enriched U)	Possibly 300 kg	Possibly 450 kg
Nuclear tests	3 (possible 4 <sup>th</sup> )	3 or 4
Nuclear weapons	<b>~ 6 Pu + 12 HEU = 18</b>	<b>Possibly 8 Pu + 18 HEU</b>
Long-range rockets	Successful Unha-3 launch (Dec. 2012)	Unha-3 Possibly more tests

# Estimates of DPRK nuclear program by 2020

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Nuclear Capability	December 2016 Estimates	2020
Plutonium	34 – 52 kg	Possibly 70 kg
HEU (Highly enriched U)	Possibly 450 kg	~150 kg/yr
Nuclear tests	3 or 4	Possibly 4
Nuclear weapons	<b>Possibly 8 Pu + 18 HEU</b>	<b>~10 Pu + 42 HEU</b>
Long-range rockets	Unha-3 Possibly more tests	Musudan or KN-08 tests

# Three no's are still a good option

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- **Essentially no hope of giving up nukes in the near term**
- **Should we still push for 3 No's in return for 3 Yes's**
  - No more bombs
    - Important to stop buildup and diversification
  - No better bombs (no nuclear or missile testing)
    - Important to constrict miniaturization
  - No export
    - New concerns – ISIS or others

In return

- Address the North's security concerns
- Provide energy assistance
- Provide economic assistance

**Backup**

# DPRK nuclear program: Rate of growth

Nuclear Capability	January 2003	December 2014
Plutonium	0 to 10 kg	24 to 42 kg
HEU (Highly enriched U)	Likely zero	Possibly 150 kg
Nuclear tests	Zero	3 (possible 4 <sup>th</sup> )
Nuclear weapons	Likely zero Pu Zero HEU	~ 6 Pu + 6 HEU = 12
Long-range rockets	One failed Taepodong-1 launch (1998)	Successful Unha-3 launch (Dec. 2012)



26 SEP 2010

# Overhead imagery



Source: DigitalGlobe

4 NOV 2010



Source: DigitalGlobe

28 MAY 2011



Source: GeoEye

4 NOV 2011



Source: DigitalGlobe, 38 North

26 JAN 2012



Source: DigitalGlobe

20 MAR 2012



Source: DigitalGlobe

24 JUN 2012



Source: GeoEye

6 AUG 2012



Source: GeoEye

12 DEC 2013



Source: DigitalGlobe/ Google Earth





Feb. 3, 2014



Turbine/generator building

Turbine waste water outlet

5 MWe reactor

Pump house

Spent fuel rod building

Water intake

Experimental light water reactor

Turbine/generator building

New piping

Experimental light water reactor pump house

The new Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) sits on the site of the original 5 MWe reactor's cooling tower. The ELWR's pump house will now serve a secondary cooling system for each reactor.





Reprocessing building

Spent fuel rod receiving building

Unidentified material

Support building

Vehicles

Vehicles

Chemical storage building

A 38 North exclusive with analysis by William Mugford and Jack Liu, 9/8/15





Feb. 3, 2014ç

Fuel fabrication facility

Settling ponds

New centrifuge buildings

Former fuel rod final assembly

Rail spur

Uranium trioxide to uranium dioxide conversion


New steam plant

Uranium dioxide to uranium tetrafluoride to uranium metal conversion

Uranium metallurgy

Hydrogen fluoride production

The fuel fabrication facility is the largest of the functional areas in the southern half of the Centre. Visible is a new centrifuge building with an expected capacity of 2,000 centrifuges.




Bistline, et al. (2015)  
Stanford University

35,000 SWU ~ 175 kg HEU/year





# Better bombs? North Korea would require another test



Testing is still an area of restraint

# DPRK delivery systems

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- SCUD (mobile, liquid fueled) 300 – 600 km
- KN-02 Toksa SRBM (solid fueled, like SS-21)
- Nodong IRBM (mobile, liquid fueled) 1200 – 1500 km
- 60 Il-28 light bombers
- **Future:** Long-range Taepodong ICBM (based on Unha SLV)
- Road mobile Musudan IRBM
- KN-08 ICBM (~ 9000 km)
- Short-range, sea-based land-attack missiles

Pyongyang's inventory of older liquid-fueled missiles is impressive, but its history shows a striking lack of progress compared to Pakistan and Iran.

John Schilling and Henry Kan, US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015