

## T – Miscellaneous Documents

### Section 1 Iran

#### Security Council Resolution 2231

[S/RES/2231, 20 July 2015]

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, and its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010),

*Reaffirming* its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with their obligations, and *recalling* the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

*Emphasizing* the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and *noting* that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation,

*Welcoming* diplomatic efforts by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Iran to reach a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, culminating in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concluded on 14 July 2015, (S/2015/544, as attached as Annex A to this resolution) and the establishment of the Joint Commission,

*Welcoming* Iran's reaffirmation in the JCPOA that it will under no circumstances ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons,

*Noting* the statement of 14 July 2015, from China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union aimed at promoting transparency and creating an atmosphere conducive to the full implementation of the JCPOA (S/2015/545, as attached as Annex B to this resolution),

*Affirming* that conclusion of the JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue, and *expressing* its desire to build a new relationship with Iran strengthened by the implementation of the JCPOA and to bring to a satisfactory conclusion its consideration of this matter,

*Affirming* that full implementation of the JCPOA will contribute to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme,

*Strongly supporting* the essential and independent role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of declared nuclear material to undeclared purposes and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and undeclared nuclear activities, and, in this context, in ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, including through the implementation of the "Framework for Cooperation" agreed between Iran and the IAEA on 11 November 2013 and the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues", and *recognizing* the IAEA's important role in supporting full implementation of the JCPOA,

*Affirming* that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of nuclear non-proliferation, promote greater confidence among States, *inter alia*, by providing assurance that States are complying with their obligations under relevant safeguards agreements, contribute to strengthening their collective security and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation, and further *recognizing* that effective and efficient safeguards implementation requires a cooperative effort between the IAEA and States, that the IAEA Secretariat will continue to engage in open dialogue on safeguards matters with States to increase transparency and build confidence and to interact with them on the implementation of safeguards, and in this case, avoid hampering the economic and technological development of Iran or international cooperation in the

field of peaceful nuclear activities; respect health, safety, physical protection and other security provisions in force and the rights of individuals; and take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge,

*Encouraging* Member States to cooperate, including through IAEA involvement, with Iran in the framework of the JCPOA in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects, in accordance with Annex III of the JCPOA,

*Noting* the termination of provisions of previous resolutions and other measures foreseen in this resolution, and *inviting* Member States to give due regard to these changes,

*Emphasizing* that the JCPOA is conducive to promoting and facilitating the development of normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with Iran, and *having* regard to States' rights and obligations relating to international trade,

*Underscoring* that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions,

1. *Endorses* the JCPOA, and urges its full implementation on the timetable established in the JCPOA;

2. *Calls upon* all Members States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and this resolution and by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA;

3. *Requests* the Director General of the IAEA to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA, and reaffirms that Iran shall cooperate fully as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports;

4. *Requests* the Director General of the IAEA to provide regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors and, as appropriate, in parallel to the Security Council on Iran's implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA and also to report to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of concern directly affecting fulfilment of JCPOA commitments;

#### Terminations

5. *Requests* that, as soon as the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraphs 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA, the Director General of the IAEA submit a report confirming this fact to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council;

6. *Requests* further that, as soon as the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, the Director General of the IAEA submit a report confirming this conclusion to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council;

7. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, upon receipt by the Security Council of the report from the IAEA described in paragraph 5:

(a) The provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) shall be terminated;

(b) All States shall comply with paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 5 and the provisions in subparagraphs (a)-(f) of paragraph 6 of Annex B for the duration specified in each paragraph or subparagraph, and are called upon to comply with paragraphs 3 and 7 of Annex B;

8. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that on the date ten years after the JCPOA Adoption Day, as defined in the JCPOA, all the provisions of this resolution shall be terminated, and none of the previous resolutions described in

paragraph 7 (a) shall be applied, the Security Council will have concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue, and the item “Non-proliferation” will be removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized;

9. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that the terminations described in Annex B and paragraph 8 of this resolution shall not occur if the provisions of previous resolutions have been applied pursuant to paragraph 12;

#### Application of Provisions of Previous Resolutions

10. *Encourages* China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union (EU), and Iran (the “JCPOA participants”) to resolve any issues arising with respect to implementation of JCPOA commitments through the procedures specified in the JCPOA, and *expresses* its intention to address possible complaints by JCPOA participants about significant non-performance by another JCPOA participant;

11. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, within 30 days of receiving a notification by a JCPOA participant State of an issue that the JCPOA participant State believes constitutes significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA, it shall vote on a draft resolution to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a) of this resolution, *decides* further that if, within 10 days of the notification referred to above, no Member of the Security Council has submitted such a draft resolution for a vote, then the President of the Security Council shall submit such a draft resolution and put it to a vote within 30 days of the notification referred to above, and *expresses* its intention to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue by the Advisory Board established in the JCPOA;

12. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, if the Security Council does not adopt a resolution under paragraph 11 to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a), then effective midnight Greenwich Mean Time after the thirtieth day after the notification to the Security Council described in paragraph 11, all of the provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) that have been terminated pursuant to paragraph 7 (a) shall apply in the same manner as they applied before the adoption of this resolution, and the measures contained in paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20 of this resolution shall be terminated, unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

13. *Underscores* that, in the event of a notification to the Security Council described in paragraph 11, Iran and the other JCPOA participants should strive to resolve the issue giving rise to the notification, *expresses* its intention to prevent the reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved, *decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that if the notifying JCPOA participant State informs the Security Council that such an issue has been resolved before the end of the 30-day period specified in paragraph 12 above, then the provisions of this resolution, including the terminations in paragraph 7 (a), shall remain in effect notwithstanding paragraph 12 above, and *notes* Iran’s statement that if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12 in whole or in part, Iran will treat this as grounds to cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA;

14. *Affirms* that the application of the provisions of previous resolutions pursuant to paragraph 12 do not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with the JCPOA, this resolution and the previous resolutions;

15. *Affirms* that any application of the provisions of previous resolutions pursuant to paragraph 12 is not intended to harm individuals and entities that, prior to that application of those provisions, engaged in business with Iran or Iranian individuals and entities that is consistent with the JCPOA and this resolution, *encourages* Member States to consult with each other with regard to such harm, and to take action to mitigate such unintended harm for these individuals and entities, and *decides* if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12 not to impose measures with retroactive effect on individuals and entities

for business activities with Iran that were consistent with the JCPOA, this resolution and the previous resolutions prior to the application of these provisions;

#### JCPOA Implementation

16. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to review recommendations of the Joint Commission regarding proposals by States to participate in or permit nuclear-related activities set forth in paragraph 2 of Annex B, and that such recommendations shall be deemed to be approved unless the Security Council adopts a resolution to reject a Joint Commission recommendation within five working days of receiving it;

17. *Requests* Member States seeking to participate in or permit activities set forth in paragraph 2 of Annex B to submit proposals to the Security Council, *expresses* its intention to share such proposals with the Joint Commission established in the JCPOA for its review, *invites* any Member of the Security Council to provide relevant information and opinions about these proposals, *encourages* the Joint Commission to give due consideration to any such information and opinions, and *requests* the Joint Commission to provide its recommendations on these proposals to the Security Council within twenty working days (or, if extended, within thirty working days);

18. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in order to support JCPOA implementation, to take the necessary administrative measures to facilitate communications with Member States and between the Security Council and the Joint Commission through agreed practical arrangements;

19. *Requests* the IAEA and the Joint Commission to consult and exchange information, where appropriate, as specified in the JCPOA, and *requests* further that the exporting states cooperate with the Joint Commission in accordance with Annex IV of the JCPOA;

20. *Requests* the Joint Commission to review proposals for transfers and activities described in paragraph 2 of Annex B with a view to recommending approval where consistent with this resolution and the provisions and objectives of the JCPOA so as to provide for the transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for Iran’s nuclear activities under the JCPOA, and *encourages* the Joint Commission to establish procedures to ensure detailed and thorough review of all such proposals;

#### Exemptions

21. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that the measures imposed in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) shall not apply to the supply, sale, or transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, and the provision of any related technical assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, by JCPOA participant States or Member States acting in coordination with them, that is directly related to: (a) the modification of two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production; (b) the export of Iran’s enriched uranium in excess of 300 kilograms in return for natural uranium; and (c) the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design and, subsequently, on the agreed final design of such reactor;

22. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that Member States engaging in the activities permitted in paragraph 21 shall ensure that: (a) all such activities are undertaken strictly in accordance with the JCPOA; (b) they notify the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and, when constituted, the Joint Commission ten days in advance of such activities; (c) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in the relevant INFIRC referenced in resolution 1737 (2006), as updated, have been met; (d) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and (e) in case of supplied items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in the INFIRCS referenced in resolution 1737 (2006), as updated, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfers;

23. *Decides*, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, also that the measures imposed in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) shall not apply to the extent necessary to carry out transfers and activities, as approved on a case-by-case basis in advance by

the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), that are:

- (a) directly related to implementation of the nuclear-related actions specified in paragraphs 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA;
- (b) required for preparation for the implementation of the JCPOA; or,
- (c) determined by the Committee to be consistent with the objectives of this resolution;

24. *Notes* that the provisions of paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 27 continue in effect if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12;

#### Other Matters

25. *Decides* to make the necessary practical arrangements to undertake directly tasks related to the implementation of this resolution, including those tasks specified in Annex B and the release of guidance;

26. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Security Council in its exercise of the tasks related to this resolution, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures in this resolution;

27. *Decides* that all provisions contained in the JCPOA are only for the purposes of its implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as setting precedents for any other State or for principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognized principles and practices;

28. *Recalls* that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the conditions specified in paragraph 15 of that resolution are met, and *underscores*, that if the provisions of previous resolutions are reapplied pursuant to paragraph 12 of this resolution, then this provision will apply;

29. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the application of the provisions of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1929 (2010) and this resolution;

30. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until the termination of the provisions of this resolution in accordance with paragraph 8.

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### IAEA Board of Governors Resolution. NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran

GOV/2025/38  
[12 June 2025]

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The Board of Governors,

(a) Commending the continued professional, independent and impartial efforts of the IAEA Director General and the Secretariat, including its inspectors, to implement Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve the long outstanding Safeguards issues in Iran,

(b) Emphasizing the essential and independent role of the IAEA in verifying Iran's compliance with its NPT Safeguards obligations,

(c) Stressing the imperative nature of Iran's compliance with its Safeguards obligations and the importance of Iran cooperating fully and in a timely manner with the Agency with a view to clarifying and resolving the long outstanding Safeguards issues detailed in the Director General's report GOV/2025/25 and in several prior reports

(d) Recalling the Board of Governors' resolutions of 19 June 2020 contained in GOV/2020/34, of 8 June 2022 contained in

GOV/2022/34, of 17 November 2022 contained in GOV/2022/70, of 5 June 2024 contained in GOV/2024/39, and of 21 November 2024 contained in GOV/2024/68, which called upon Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency and decided that it is essential and urgent, in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material, that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and, with a view to clarifying all outstanding issues, take all specified actions without delay,

(e) Regretting that despite the above resolutions by the Board and numerous opportunities provided by the Director General since 2019, Iran has failed to provide the co-operation required under its Safeguards Agreement, impeding Agency verification activities, sanitizing locations, and repeatedly failing to provide the Agency with technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at several undeclared locations in Iran or information on the current location(s) of nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment, instead stating, inconsistent with the Agency's findings, that it has declared all nuclear material and activities required under its Safeguards Agreement,

(f) Noting the Director General's conclusion contained in GOV/2025/25 that Iran did not declare nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at three undeclared locations in Iran, specifically, Lavisan-Shian, Varamin, and Turqzabad, and that, because of the lack of technically credible answers by Iran, the Agency is not in a position to determine whether the nuclear material at these undeclared locations in Iran has been consumed, mixed with other declared material, or is still outside of Safeguards,

(g) Noting with concern the Agency's conclusion that these undeclared locations were part of an undeclared, structured programme carried out by Iran until the early 2000s, and that some of these activities used undeclared nuclear material,

(h) Noting with concern the Agency's conclusion that Iran retained unknown nuclear material and/or heavily contaminated equipment, and other assets, arising from the former undeclared structured nuclear programme, at Turqzabad in the period 2009 until 2018, after which items were removed from the location, the whereabouts of which remain unknown,

(i) Noting the Director General's conclusion in GOV/2025/25 that the material balance of the uranium involved in undeclared uranium metal production experiments conducted at Jabr Ibn Hayan Laboratories (JHL) in 1995–2000 includes an amount of nuclear material still unaccounted for, and that the Agency is not in a position to determine whether this material has been consumed, mixed with other declared material, or is still outside of Safeguards,

(j) Recalling Iran's continued refusal to implement modified Code 3.1, contrary to the legal obligations that it had accepted in 2003 and which it cannot modify or suspend unilaterally in accordance with Article 39 of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and Iran's failure to provide the Agency with design and preliminary design information regarding new and planned nuclear facilities, as required under modified Code 3.1, which obstructs the Agency's visibility of Safeguards relevant activities and thereby undermines the effective implementation of Safeguard,

(k) Noting that Iran's failure on numerous occasions to co-operate to facilitate the implementation of Safeguards, while pursuing activities consistent with concealment efforts, including extensive sanitization and the provision of inaccurate explanations, represents a significant impediment to the Agency's ability to clarify and verify Iran's declarations and the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme,

(l) Noting with concern the Director General's conclusion, most recently in GOV/2025/25, that these issues stem from Iran's obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement and unless and until Iran assists the Agency in resolving the outstanding issues, the Agency will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful

(m) Noting, in this context, the Director General's serious concern regarding the rapid accumulation of highly enriched uranium by Iran, the only State without nuclear weapons that is producing such material, which the Director General notes the Agency cannot ignore given the potential proliferation implications,

(n) Regretting Iran's failure to provide the Agency with technically credible explanations regarding undeclared nuclear material, despite the Director General's ongoing efforts to obtain progress from Iran on resolving outstanding Safeguards issues and improving cooperation with the Agency, including through the high-level meetings between the Agency and Iran in Tehran in April 2025 and the full implementation of the Joint Statement between the IAEA and Iran of 4 March 2023, recalling that both sides have recognized that such engagements could pave the way for wider agreements among parties,

(o) Reiterating its concern that Iran has still not provided necessary, full and unambiguous cooperation with the Agency and has not taken the essential and urgent actions as decided by the Board in its June and November 2024 resolutions, with the consequence that Safeguards issues remain outstanding despite numerous interactions with the Agency since 2019, with serious implications for the Agency's ability to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and

(p) Concerned that the Agency is at an impasse with regards to resolving these issues,

1. Deeply regrets that, despite repeated calls from the Board and many opportunities offered, Iran has failed to co-operate fully with the Agency, as required by its Safeguards Agreement;
2. Strongly supports the Agency and requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement fully the Agency's Safeguards Agreement with Iran as well as this and previous resolutions and to report any significant developments to the Board, as appropriate;
3. Finds that Iran's many failures to uphold its obligations since 2019 to provide the Agency with full and timely cooperation regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations in Iran, as detailed in GOV/2025/25 constitutes non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute;
4. Finds also consistent with Article 19 of Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/214, that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
5. Finds also that the Director General's inability, as indicated in GOV/2025/25, to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful gives rise to questions that are within the competence of the United Nations Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, consistent with Article III.B.4 of the Agency's Statute, and expresses its grave concern in this regard;
6. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement this and previous resolutions and to report again, including any further developments on the issues raised in his GOV/2025/25. The Board will address the timing and content of the report required under Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute and also provided for in Article 19 of Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and the notification required under Article III.B.4 of the Agency's Statute;
7. Reaffirms its decision that it is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and, with a view to clarifying all outstanding Safeguards issues, take the following actions without delay:
  - i. Provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin in two undeclared locations in Iran,
  - ii. Inform the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of the contaminated equipment,
  - iii. Provide all information, documentation and answers

the Agency requires for that purpose, and

- iv. Provide access to locations and material the Agency requires for that purpose, as well as for the taking of samples as deemed appropriate by the Agency;
8. Underscores Iran's legal obligation to implement modified Code 3.1, and provide all necessary design and preliminary design information to the Agency;
9. Underlines that the provision by Iran of this information and access and the subsequent verification by the IAEA pursuant to Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement is essential for the Secretariat to be in position to report the issues as no longer outstanding and thereby remove the need for the Board's consideration and action on these issues;
10. Calls upon Iran to urgently remedy its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement by taking all steps deemed necessary by the Agency and the Board, so that the Director General can provide the necessary assurances regarding the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement;
11. Stresses its support for a diplomatic solution to the problems posed by the Iranian nuclear programme, including the talks between the United States and Iran, leading to an agreement that addresses all international concerns related to Iran's nuclear activities, encouraging all parties to constructively engage in diplomacy;
12. Decides to make the text of this resolution as well as the Director General's reports on this issue available to the public; and
13. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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### **Letter from China, Iran and Russia on Snapback Mechanism & Iran**

[20 October 2025]

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1. We have the honour to refer to the joint letter dated 28 August 2025 from the Foreign Ministers of the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation (A/79/1004-S/2025/546, annex), in which they set out the common position of our States regarding the recent actions by the United Kingdom, France and Germany (the E3) allegedly undertaken in the context of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).
2. We reaffirm that the attempt by the E3 to trigger the so-called "snapback" is, by default, legally and procedurally flawed. The E3, having themselves ceased to perform their commitments under both the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015) and also failing to exhaust the procedures of the dispute resolution mechanism, lack the standing to invoke its provisions.
3. Against this backdrop, we affirm that, in accordance with paragraph 8 of resolution 2231 (2015), all its provisions are terminated after 18 October 2025. We reiterate that the full and timely conclusion of resolution 2231 (2015) marks the end of the Security Council's consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue and contributes to strengthening the authority of the Council and the credibility of multilateral diplomacy.
4. We emphasize that it is essential that the relevant parties stay committed to finding a political settlement that accommodates the concerns of all parties through diplomatic engagement and dialogue based on the principles of mutual respect, and refrain from unilateral sanction, threat of force or any other action that may escalate the situation, and that all countries should contribute to creating a favourable atmosphere and conditions for diplomatic efforts.
5. We would appreciate it if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

## Letter from E3 on Snapback Mechanism & Iran

[21 November 2025]

**Letter dated 20 November 2025 from the representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

The objective of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the E3) has not changed since 2003: to find a lasting diplomatic solution ensuring that Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon. This objective has been the guiding principle of the E3's policy towards Iran and led to the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, based on the conviction that a durable and verifiable solution had been found to ensure Iran's nuclear programme was strictly used for peaceful purposes and abided by the international non-proliferation architecture.

Under the JCPOA, sanctions and other restrictive measures were temporarily lifted under the condition that Iran implements its commitments. Iran freely committed to the JCPOA in 2015.

However, the same JCPOA was undermined by Iran starting from 2019. Since then, Iran has exceeded all of the limits on its nuclear programme, as documented by numerous International Atomic Energy Agency reports. Faced with Iran's continued nuclear escalation, the E3 pursued comprehensive good-faith efforts to resolve the issue and avoid resorting to snapback. Following Iran's non-compliance with the JCPOA from May 2019 onwards, the E3 triggered the Dispute Resolution Mechanism under paragraph 36 of the JCPOA on 14 January 2020, which the JCPOA Coordinator publicly and formally acknowledged on the same day. We also engaged in extensive talks with Iran over the past few years to find a diplomatic solution and even proposed a temporary and conditional extension of the snapback in July 2025 to allow additional time for diplomacy. Regrettably, Iran chose not to take up the offer. Against this backdrop, the E3 notified the Security Council of Iran's significant non-performance of its commitments under the JCPOA on 28 August 2025, in accordance with paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). On 28 September 2025, the snapback procedure was duly completed in accordance with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The E3 followed the procedural steps laid down in resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to the letter. Triggering the snapback opened a 30-day process during which the Security Council had to decide whether to continue the termination of past resolutions provided for under resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). On 19 September 2025, the Security Council rejected the resolution that would have maintained sanctions-lifting on Iran, with 9 votes against. This shows that a majority of Security Council members consider Iran's proliferating behaviour as a threat to international security that required sanctions to come back into force.

Consequently, Security Council resolutions [1696 \(2006\)](#), [1737 \(2006\)](#), [1747 \(2007\)](#), [1803 \(2008\)](#), [1835 \(2008\)](#) and [1929 \(2010\)](#) have been reinstated after the 30-day period following the notification had expired. As a result, the United Nations Secretariat has issued the notifications required to re-establish the United Nations sanctions regime to all States Members of the United Nations. The website and designation lists of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1737 \(2006\)](#) are back online. As a result of the reinstatement of past resolutions, the architecture of the United Nations sanctions regime was also re-established. The E3 firmly reject the claims by Iran, Russia and China that the snapback procedure that was duly completed in accordance with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) in the light of Iran's years-long nuclear escalation and the E3's notification of the Security Council of Iran's significant non-performance of its commitments under the JCPOA is "null and void" and that resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) expired on 18 October 2025. These claims have no legal basis and undermine the very authority of the Security Council, given the clear procedure laid out in resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which was followed to the letter. Such attempts stand in contradiction with article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, according to which "the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."

The E3 emphasize that promoting a false narrative about the legality of snapback and the expiration of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) cannot alter the reality that the E3 triggered the snapback in accordance with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In accordance with paragraph 12 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the completion of the snapback mechanism on 28 September 2025 has terminated paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) well before the "Termination Day" deadline set out in paragraph 8 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which is therefore no longer valid. Resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) did not expire on 18 October 2025, and the Security Council remains seized of the Iranian nuclear issue, for example through biannual [2231 \(2015\)](#) council meetings as per established practice.

The E3 condemn any attack on the United Nations Secretariat, which has acted in strict compliance with its mandate.

Iran's nuclear program is now constrained by the six reinstated Security Council resolutions. These resolutions are not new: they contain a set of sanctions and other restrictive measures that were previously imposed by the Security Council with unanimous P5 support and relate to Iran's proliferation activities. These include an obligation for Iran to suspend its enrichment-related, reprocessing-related and heavy water-related activities. These resolutions are legally binding for all States Members of the United Nations. The E3 are counting on the strict vigilance of all States to ensure the proper implementation of these measures. To that end, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1737 \(2006\)](#) and the related Panel of Experts must take up their work without any hindrance.

The E3 had no other choice but to activate snapback: this decision was a direct consequence of Iran's continuous non-performance of its JCPOA commitments and its rejection of two viable proposals put forward by the JCPOA Coordinator in 2022 and of the E3's most recent offer of a conditional snapback extension to allow for additional time to seek a diplomatic solution. Yet, this decision does not mean the end of diplomacy with Iran, and the E3 continue to be ready for diplomatic engagement and work towards reaching a comprehensive and lasting agreement. The E3 urge Iran to refrain from any escalatory action and to urgently return to full compliance with its legal obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Security Council resolutions. The E3 will continue to work with all parties towards a new diplomatic solution to ensure Iran never gets a nuclear weapon.

We would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

### IAEA Board of Governors. NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General

GOV/2026/8

[27 February 2026]

#### A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors (Board) and, in parallel, to the United Nations Security Council (Security Council) is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), as requested by the Board in its resolution GOV/2025/71 adopted on 20 November 2025.
2. The Board, in its resolution GOV/2025/71, noting that "the provisions of UNSC resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) shall apply from 28 September 2025 in the same manner as they applied before the adoption of UNSC resolution 2231 (2015)" and that "the requests to the Agency for implementing, verifying and reporting on the implementation of the provisions of UNSC resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) have also been reinstated since 28 September 2025", requested the Director General to: "report before each quarterly Board meeting on the implementation of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement, and implement and report on the

provisions of all relevant UNSC resolutions, including 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010), consistent with past practice”; “ensure that the report requested in [operative paragraph (OP) 1] includes information on the verification of Iran’s uranium stockpile, including the locations, quantities, chemical forms, and enrichment levels, and the inventories of centrifuges and related equipment”; and “in parallel provide the reports at [OPs 1 and 2] to the UNSC, consistent with established Agency practice”.

#### B. Previous developments

3. The Director General, on 13 June 2025, reported to the Board and to the Security Council that the Agency had been informed of a military operation launched by Israel, which included attacks on several of Iran’s nuclear facilities. These attacks took place between 13-24 June 2025. On 22 June 2025, the United States conducted attacks on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran at the commencement of the military attacks and, by the end of June 2025, had decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons.
  4. In his statement to the Board on 13 June 2025, the Director General, *inter alia*, recalled the relevant General Conference resolutions, in particular GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533, which provided, *inter alia*, that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency”. The Director General also reiterated that he had repeatedly stated that nuclear facilities must never be attacked, regardless of the context or circumstances, as it could harm both people and the environment, and that such attacks have serious implications for nuclear safety, security and safeguards, as well as regional and international peace and security. On the same day, the Director General also briefed the Security Council on the matter where he called “on all parties to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid further escalation” and reaffirmed his readiness and the Agency’s readiness “to facilitate technical discussions and support efforts that promote transparency, safety, security and the peaceful resolution of nuclear-related issues in Iran”.
  5. On 2 July 2025, the President of Iran signed into force a law suspending cooperation with the Agency. The Director General in his communications to Iran, indicated the importance of re-establishing normal collaboration between Iran and the Agency in order to ensure compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement. He also indicated that in view of the possible impact of this law on the implementation of safeguards in Iran it was essential and urgent to arrive at an agreement on modalities that could guarantee the necessary compliance. The Director General made it clear that it was indispensable and urgent to restart safeguards activities in Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and that implementation of the Agreement could not be suspended under any circumstances.
  6. To this end, the Director General presented a number of concrete steps, including the preparation and submission by Iran of a special report for highly enriched uranium (HEU) and low enriched uranium (LEU) and the provision of updated design information questionnaires (DIQs) for the nuclear facilities affected by the military attacks. In doing so, the Agency reminded Iran at the end of July 2025 that the Agency’s timeliness goal for the detection of the diversion of one significant quantity (SQ) of HEU is one month and, therefore, verification of Iran’s declared inventory of HEU was already overdue. For facilities unaffected by the military attacks, the Director General proposed that the Agency would continue to provide advance notice for inspections and design information verifications (DIVs). The Director General also expressed the Agency’s readiness to discuss with Iran the modalities for accessing the affected facilities and conducting inspections and DIVs, and indicated the Agency’s
- readiness to take into account Iran’s security concerns, provided that such approaches remained consistent with the rights and obligations of Iran and the Agency under the NPT Safeguards Agreement.
7. At the end of August 2025, the Agency resumed inspections at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) as part of its planned verification activities at this facility.
  8. On 9 September 2025, the Director General signed an agreement with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Dr Abbas Araghchi, in Cairo on ‘Practical Steps on Safeguards Implementation in Iran pursuant to the NPT Safeguards Agreement following the armed attacks on its safeguarded nuclear facilities’ (Cairo agreement) that provided an understanding of the procedures for Agency inspections, notifications and safeguards implementation covering all declared nuclear facilities and nuclear material in Iran. While taking into consideration Iran’s concerns, these procedures were in line with the relevant provisions of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement.
  9. During October and November 2025, the Agency conducted three inspections/DIVs at the three unaffected facilities at BNPP and seven inspections/DIVs at four other unaffected facilities at the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) site in Tehran.
  10. On 7 November 2025, the Agency also reminded Iran that the provision by Iran “without delay” of a report for the affected facilities and associated nuclear material is a requirement under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, and which Iran had agreed to provide under the Cairo agreement. The Agency indicated that such a report would enable Iran and the Agency to discuss the modalities for the Agency to verify its contents, and was indispensable for the Agency to provide assurances that nuclear material subject to safeguards in Iran remained in peaceful nuclear activities and that the facilities subject to safeguards were not being misused.
  11. At the end of the previous reporting period, the Agency had conducted inspections/DIVs at 7 of the 13 unaffected facilities, but had yet to conduct inspections/DIVs at any of the 8 affected facilities or at the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant (IFEP).

#### C. Recent developments

12. As indicated earlier, the Board, in its resolution GOV/2025/71 of 20 November 2025, requested the Director General, *inter alia*, to “report before each regular quarterly Board meeting on the implementation of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, and implement and report on the provisions of all relevant [Security Council] resolutions, including 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010), consistent with past practice”. In these resolutions, the Security Council decided, *inter alia*, that Iran shall suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities: all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency; and work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the Agency; provide such access and cooperation as the Agency requests to be able to verify such suspension; comply fully and without qualification with the NPT Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 and called upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol that it signed on 18 December 2003 and to ratify it promptly. The Board in its resolution GOV/2025/71 also requested the Director General to ensure that such reports include “information on the verification of Iran’s uranium stockpile, including the locations, quantities, chemical forms, and enrichment levels, and the inventories of centrifuges and related equipment”.
13. Iran, in a letter dated 20 November 2025, informed the Director General that the Cairo agreement was “no longer valid and shall henceforth be regarded as terminated”.

14. In order to conduct planned routine verification activities at the six remaining – out of the 13 – unaffected facilities and the LOF, the Agency had provided Iran with advance notifications in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement. Between the issuance of the Director General's previous report and 29 January 2026, Iran only provided access to four of these six remaining unaffected facilities.
15. The Agency, in a letter dated 29 January 2026, reiterated its request to Iran to facilitate verification at one of the two remaining unaffected nuclear facilities and to the LOF to enable the Agency to conduct the required annual physical inventory verifications (PIVs). The Agency also requested Iran to provide the reports and declarations on the status of the affected declared nuclear facilities to enable discussion between the Agency and Iran of the technical modalities for verifying such reports and declarations. The Agency indicated that in the absence of such access, reports and declarations, the Agency would not be able to conclude that there had been no diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities in Iran.
16. Iran, in its reply dated 2 February 2026, informed the Agency that its request to conduct inspections at the two locations referred to by the Agency was "currently under consideration". Iran also stated that "given the conditions resulting from acts of aggression and the continuation of threats have created a situation in which the normal implementation of safeguards is legally untenable and materially impracticable" and that "it would be inconsistent with Iran's essential security considerations". Iran also indicated that "[c]onversely, the elimination of such threats would create the necessary conditions for further cooperation between Iran and the Agency".
17. The Director General, in his reply dated 3 February 2026, informed Iran that the required cooperation between the Agency and Iran to facilitate the implementation of safeguards, which is stipulated in Article 3 of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, could not be made conditional upon the elimination of perceived threats. Moreover, while the Agency had informed Iran of its readiness to start discussions immediately on modalities for reporting and access related to affected facilities within the framework of the NPT Safeguards Agreement, the Agency had received no communication from Iran on its willingness to start such discussions. The Director General reiterated his disposition to engage on modalities and to work constructively with Iran without delay to facilitate access to all facilities and locations under safeguards in Iran.
18. The Agency, in a letter dated 6 February 2026, requested Iran to facilitate as soon as possible the conduct of design information examination (DIE) and DIV at IFEP that had been cancelled by the Agency in June 2025.
19. The Agency, in the same letter of 6 February 2026, also informed Iran that it had observed, through the analysis of commercially-available satellite imagery, regular vehicular activity around the entrance to the tunnel complex at Isfahan in which UF6 enriched up to 20% and 60% U-235 for four of Iran's declared nuclear facilities – the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF), the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP), the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) and the Enriched UO<sub>2</sub> Powder Plant (EUPP) – was stored. The Agency, in light of this activity, requested Iran to facilitate, as soon as possible, the conduct of a DIV and inventory verification at all those parts of the tunnel complex at Isfahan belonging to the four above-mentioned nuclear facilities.
20. While the Agency has observed, through the analysis of commercially-available satellite imagery, activities being conducted at some of the affected nuclear facilities, including the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow, without access to these facilities it is not possible for the Agency to confirm the nature and purpose of the activities.
21. Iran, in its reply dated 6 February 2026, reiterated its position that "in light of prevailing circumstances [...] the expectation of the normal implementation of safeguards in Iran is, from legal, technical, and operational perspectives, untenable". With regard to IFEP and the tunnel complex at Isfahan, Iran stated that they had both been "subjected to illegal military attacks". Iran also stated that it considered any measures adopted on the basis of the so-called "snapback" to be "without legal basis, null and void, and devoid of any legal effect, and accordingly does not recognize or accept their validity". Iran maintained that its "willingness to engage constructively endures".
22. On 14 and 15 February 2026, the Agency conducted inspections at the LOF and Karaj Waste Storage, respectively.
23. As of the date of this report, Iran had provided access to the Agency to each of its unaffected nuclear facilities at least once since the military attacks of June 2025, with the exception of Karun Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP), which is in the early stages of construction and does not contain nuclear material. However, Iran has not provided the Agency with declarations, reports or access in relation to any of its declared nuclear facilities that had been affected by, or subjected to, military attacks. Therefore, the Agency has not been able to fulfil its obligations under the NPT Safeguards Agreement in relation to these facilities and associated nuclear material or to verify if Iran has suspended the activities as required in the above-mentioned Security Council resolutions.
24. The Agency, in a letter dated 18 February 2026, informed Iran that it was essential that the Agency conduct the long-delayed DIE for IFEP as soon as possible and, if possible, the DIV immediately afterwards in order to confirm Iran's statement that the facility had been "subjected to" military attacks. The Agency reiterated that it was prepared to conduct the DIE either at the site as originally planned or at another location, such as AEOI Headquarters in Tehran. The Agency requested Iran to facilitate the necessary access.

#### D. Diplomatic engagement

25. On 16 February 2026, the Director General held in-depth technical discussions with Iran's Foreign Minister Araghchi in Geneva in preparation for negotiations the following day. The Director General was in attendance at the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran that took place on 17 February 2026, in which he provided advice on issues relevant to the verification of Iran's nuclear programme.
26. On 26 February 2026, the Director General was in attendance at the following round of negotiations between the United States of America and Iran, in which he again provided advice on issues relevant to the verification of Iran's nuclear programme. The bilateral negotiations are ongoing and are without prejudice to Iran's obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. A successful outcome of these negotiations would have a positive impact on the effective implementation of safeguards in Iran and the resolution of issues described in this report. Technical discussions will take place in Vienna in the week beginning 2 March 2026.

#### E. Implementation of Safeguards in Iran

##### E.1. Declared Facilities

27. Under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 22 nuclear facilities and one LOF (see Annex I). According to its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran is required to provide the Agency with nuclear material accounting reports, design information for facilities and the LOF, and access to enable the verification of such reports and information, to ensure that no declared nuclear material has been diverted from peaceful nuclear activities and that there has been no undeclared production

or processing of nuclear material at those facilities and the LOF.

28. As previously reported, on 12 June 2025, Iran notified the Agency of a new enrichment facility – IFEP – to which the Agency requested immediate access to conduct a DIE and DIV, which was agreed by Iran. However, the Agency cancelled these planned verification activities due to the commencement of the military attacks on 13 June 2025.
29. The seven declared facilities that the Agency assesses were affected by the military attacks and which contained declared nuclear material are: the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP); the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP); the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP); UCF; FMP; FPPF; and EUPP. The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR), which was under construction and did not contain nuclear material, was also affected by the attacks. In addition, as indicated earlier, Iran informed the Agency in February 2026 that IFEP had also been “subjected” to military attacks, although it has not indicated whether it contained nuclear material at the time. As mentioned earlier, the Agency does not know the precise whereabouts of this facility and, therefore, cannot verify its status for safeguards purposes. Indeed, Iran has yet to confirm the current status for safeguards purposes of any of these affected facilities and associated nuclear material to the Agency.
30. The 13 declared facilities that the Agency confirms were unaffected by the military attacks are: Tehran Research Reactor (TRR); Process Research Facility (PRF); Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility); the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL); Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR); Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR); Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR); Isfahan Research Reactor 10MW (IRR-10); Karaj Waste Storage; BNPP Units 1, 2 and 3 (BNPP-1, BNPP-2, BNPP-3); and the Karun Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) at Darkhovin. The LOF was also unaffected.

## E.2. Enrichment-related activities

31. Pursuant to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is required to suspend all enrichment-related activities – to be verified by the Agency. In addition, pursuant to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran is required, inter alia, to provide the Agency with access to its declared nuclear facilities and LOF in order for the Agency to verify that no declared nuclear material has been diverted from peaceful nuclear activities and that there has been no undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at those facilities and LOF. As indicated earlier, the Board requested in OP 2 of GOV/2025/71 that this report include information on the verification of Iran's uranium stockpile, including the locations, quantities, chemical forms, and enrichment levels, and the inventories of centrifuges and related equipment.
32. During the current reporting period, Iran did not provide access to the Agency to any of Iran's four declared nuclear enrichment facilities. The Agency does not know whether IFEP contains nuclear material or is operational. Iran has not provided the Agency with access to this facility since it was first declared by Iran over eight months ago.
33. Based on the information provided by Iran by 12 June 2025, previous Agency verification activities and estimates based on the past operating records of the relevant declared facilities, the Agency's estimate of Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile, as of 13 June 2025, was 9874.9 kg: comprising 9040.5 kg of uranium in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> and 834.4 kg of uranium in other forms. The total enriched uranium stockpile in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> of 9040.5 kg comprised: 2391.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235; 6024.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235; 184.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235; and 440.9 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235.
34. As noted above, on 7 November 2025, 29 January 2026 and 3 February 2026, the Agency reminded Iran that the provision by Iran of reports and declarations for the affected facilities and associated nuclear material is a requirement under its NPT Safeguards Agreement and, inter alia, is indispensable for the Agency to provide assurances that nuclear material subject to safeguards in Iran remains in peaceful nuclear activities and that the facilities subject to safeguards are not being misused.
35. Due to the lack of access to any of Iran's four declared enrichment facilities to perform verification activities the Agency cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran or whether Iran has suspended all enrichment related activities, including R&D. In addition, due to the lack of access since February 2021 to Iran's centrifuge component manufacturing, centrifuge assembly and testing workshops for the Agency to perform verification activities, the Agency cannot provide any information on Iran's current inventory of centrifuges or whether it has suspended their manufacture, assembly and testing.

## E.3. Reprocessing Activities

36. Pursuant to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is required to suspend all reprocessing-related activities, including R&D – to be verified by the Agency. The Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at the TRR and the MIX Facility, and the R&D activities at JHL. It is only with respect to the facilities to which the Agency has had access that the Agency can confirm that, as of late December 2025, there were no ongoing reprocessing-related activities at TRR or MIX. The Agency last conducted routine verification activities at JHL on 3 November 2025, during which there were no indications of reprocessing-related activities.

## E.4. Heavy Water Related Projects

37. Pursuant to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is required to suspend work on all heavy water related projects – to be verified by the Agency – , including, at Arak, the ongoing construction of the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR), which was hit during the military attacks, and the production of heavy water at the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP), which was damaged during the military attacks and which is assessed not to have been fully operational since that time. The Agency has not accessed KHRR since 14 May 2025.

## E.5. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication

38. As indicated above, pursuant to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is required to suspend all enrichment-related activities and heavy-water-related projects – to be verified by the Agency. In the past, UCF, EUPP, FMP and FPPF facilities were involved in enrichment-related activities and heavy-water-related projects. Since the military attacks, the Agency has not been provided with access to any of these facilities and cannot, therefore, assess either their current status or the status of the associated nuclear material, previously reported as being contained therein, or verify if Iran has suspended related activities.

## E.6. Modified Code 3.1

39. Contrary to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.
40. The modified Code 3.1 provides for the submission to the Agency of design information for new nuclear facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier. The modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed early in the

project definition, preliminary design, construction, and commissioning phases.

41. Iran stopped implementing modified Code 3.1 on 23 February 2021. The Agency has reminded Iran on many occasions that implementation of modified Code 3.1 is a legal obligation for Iran under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its NPT Safeguards Agreement. In February 2024, the Agency again reiterated to Iran that the Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be modified, or their implementation suspended, unilaterally by Iran. The Agency reminded Iran that Iran had accepted modified Code 3.1 in 2003 and that, according to Article 39 of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement, the Subsidiary Arrangements can only be changed by agreement with the Agency. Iran remains the only State with significant nuclear activities in which the Agency is implementing a CSA that is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1.

42. Iran's failure to implement the provisions of modified Code 3.1 has prevented the Agency from receiving early design information for any of the new nuclear reactors which Iran has publicly announced it plans to construct. This significantly obstructs the Agency's ability to conduct DIVs in respect of such new facilities and to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

### E.7. Additional Protocol

43. Contrary to the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol (AP). Iran is called upon to act in strict accordance with the provisions of the AP and promptly to ratify it. The Additional Protocol equips the Agency with important additional tools that provide broader access to information and locations. The measures provided for under the AP thus significantly increase the Agency's ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in Iran.

44. Iran stopped provisionally applying its AP in February 2021, since which date Iran has not provided updated declarations and the Agency has not been able to conduct complementary access to any sites and other locations in Iran. Unless and until Iran implements its AP, the Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

## F. Unresolved safeguards issues

### F.1. Comprehensive Assessment

45. The Director General's report of 31 May 2025 provided a "comprehensive and updated assessment on the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme". The report identified a number of unresolved safeguards issues related, inter alia, to Iran not declaring nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at undeclared locations; the possible presence of undeclared nuclear material in Iran; and Iran's limited cooperation with the Agency to address the outstanding safeguards issues. Unless and until Iran assists the Agency in resolving these issues, the Agency will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

### F.2. Board Resolution

46. The Board considered the Director General's report and, on 12 June 2025, adopted resolution GOV/2025/38 in which the Board, inter alia:

- found that "Iran's many failures to uphold its obligations... constitutes non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement" (operative paragraph 3);
- found that "the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material" (operative paragraph 4);

- reaffirmed its decision that "it is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations" (operative paragraph 7);
- called upon Iran to "urgently remedy its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement" (operative paragraph 10); and
- decided to remain seized of the matter (operative paragraph 13).

### F.3. Recent developments

47. During this reporting period Iran has not engaged the Agency on the unresolved safeguards issues described in the Director General's report, GOV/2025/25.

## G. Summary

48. To date, Iran has not provided to the Agency any report on the status for safeguards purposes of the nuclear facilities affected by the military attacks of June 2025 and associated nuclear material, or provided access to these facilities as required under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. Therefore, the Agency was unable to discharge its safeguards responsibilities at these facilities in Iran. Consequently, the Agency cannot verify the status, for safeguards purposes, of these affected nuclear facilities and associated nuclear material.

49. Overall, the Agency cannot verify:

- whether Iran has suspended all enrichment-related activities, including research and development;
- whether Iran has suspended all reprocessing activities;
- the size of Iran's uranium stockpile at the affected facilities;
- whether Iran has suspended work on all heavy water-related projects;
- Iran's inventories of centrifuges and related equipment.

In addition, Iran is not implementing the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, nor is it implementing the Additional Protocol. Moreover, in light of Iran's continued unwillingness to address the unresolved safeguards issues, the Agency has outstanding concerns about the possible presence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

50. The Director General has emphasized to Iran that it is indispensable and urgent to implement effectively the NPT Safeguards Agreement, which remains in force, and that its implementation cannot be suspended by Iran under any circumstances.

51. While the Agency acknowledged that the military attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities had created an unprecedented situation, it is critical for it to conduct verification activities in Iran without any further delay in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and, as required, under the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions.

52. Within the group of affected facilities, it is a matter of increasing concern that Iran has never provided the Agency with access to its fourth declared enrichment facility since it was first declared by Iran in June last year.

53. Iran is the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State to have produced and accumulated uranium enriched up to 60% U-235, of which it had accumulated 440.9 kg by the time of the military attacks in mid-June 2025. The Agency's lack of access to verify the previously declared HEU and LEU, for over eight months – which is long overdue according to standard safeguards practice – is a matter of proliferation concern and of compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement. The Agency's loss of continuity of knowledge

over all previously declared nuclear material at affected facilities in Iran needs to be addressed with the utmost urgency.

54. The Director General notes that once again Iran has not engaged the Agency during this reporting period on the unresolved safeguards issues.
55. The Director General calls on Iran to engage the Agency constructively in order to facilitate the full and effective implementation of safeguards in Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement and implement the relevant provisions of Security Council and Board resolutions.
56. On 17 and 26 February 2026, the Director General was in attendance at the negotiations between the United States of America and Iran, in which he provided advice on issues relevant to the verification of Iran's nuclear programme. The bilateral negotiations are ongoing and are without prejudice to Iran's obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. A successful outcome of these negotiations would have a positive impact on the effective implementation of safeguards in Iran and the resolution of issues described in this report. Technical discussions will take place in Vienna in the week beginning 2 March 2026.
57. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

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### Security Council Resolution 2817

[S/RES/2817, 11 March 2026]

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*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the letter dated 28 February 2026 from the representative of Bahrain, submitted on behalf of the Member States of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, concerning the missile and unmanned aerial vehicle attacks by the Islamic Republic of Iran against their territories,

*Reiterating* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan,

*Recalling* its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

*Noting* all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran,

*Recalling* Resolution [552 \(1984\)](#), which takes into consideration the importance of the Gulf region to international peace and security and its vital role to the stability of the world economy, and reaffirms the right of navigation for shipping en route to and from all ports and installations of the littoral States that are not parties to the hostilities,

*Affirming* the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in response to the deplorable armed attacks by the Islamic Republic of Iran, as recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,

*Deploing* the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian objects by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including airports, energy installations, objects necessary for food production and distribution, and critical civilian infrastructure, as well as the indiscriminate use of weapons in populated areas and their consequences for the civilian population, as well as attacks and threats on merchant and commercial vessels in and near the Strait of Hormuz and at the disruption of maritime security and the adverse impact on international trade, energy security and global economy resulting from destabilizing activities and regional tensions in violation of international law,

*Further noting* the strenuous efforts made by the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and other countries in the region by engaging in mediation efforts to facilitate dialogue between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the international community and to address differences and settle disputes by peaceful means to spare the region the dangers of escalation,

*Affirming* its full commitment to promoting the maintenance of peace and stability in the Middle East,

1. *Reiterates* its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan;
2. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the egregious attacks by the Islamic Republic of Iran against the territories of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan and determines that such acts constitute a breach of international law and a serious threat to international peace and security;
3. *Further condemns* that residential areas were attacked, that civilian objects have been targeted and that the attacks resulted in civilian casualties and damage of civilian buildings; and expresses solidarity with these countries and their people;
4. *Demands* the immediate cessation of all attacks by the Islamic Republic of Iran against Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan;
5. *Demands* that the Islamic Republic of Iran immediately and unconditionally cease from any provocation or threats to neighboring States, including the use of proxies;
6. *Calls* upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply fully with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, particularly regarding the protection of civilians and civilian objects in armed conflict;
7. *Reaffirms* the exercise of navigational rights and freedoms by merchant and commercial vessels, in accordance with international law, must be respected, particularly around critical maritime routes, and takes note of the right of Member States, in accordance with international law, to defend their vessels from attacks and provocations, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms;
8. *Condemns* any actions or threats by the Islamic Republic of Iran aimed at closing, obstructing, or otherwise interfering with international navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, or threatening maritime security in the Bab Al Mandab; affirms that any attempt to impede lawful transit passage or freedom of navigation in these international waterways constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security; and calls upon Iran to refrain immediately from any actions or threats in accordance with international law;
9. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

### Section 2 Ukraine

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#### IAEA Board of Governors. The safety, security and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine

[GOV/2022/17, 3 March 2022]

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The Board of Governors,

(a) Recalling the Statute and the need to conduct activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations to promote peace and international co-operation,

(b) Reaffirming the 2009 General Conference unanimous decision GC(53)/DEC/13, which recognised the importance attached to safety, security and physical protection of nuclear material

and nuclear facilities, and noting General Conference resolutions GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533 regarding attacks against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes,

and

(c) Noting the Director General's statements since 24 February 2022 in which he appealed for maximum restraint and stated that "it was of vital importance that the safe and secure operations of the [Chornobyl Exclusion] zone's nuclear facilities should not be affected or disrupted in any way",

1. Deplores the Russian Federation's actions in Ukraine, including forcefully seizing control of nuclear facilities and other violent actions in connection with a number of nuclear facilities, nuclear and other radioactive material, which have caused and continue to pose serious and direct threats to the safety and security of these facilities and their civilian personnel, significantly raising the risk of a nuclear accident or incident, which endangers the population of Ukraine, neighbouring States and the international community;

2. Expresses further grave concern that the Russian Federation's aggression is impeding the Agency from fully and safely conducting safeguards verification activities at Ukrainian nuclear facilities within its internationally recognised borders, in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Ukraine's safeguards agreement and the Statute;

3. Calls upon the Russian Federation to immediately cease all actions against, and at, the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant and any other nuclear facility in Ukraine, in order for the competent Ukrainian authorities to preserve or promptly regain full control over all nuclear facilities within Ukraine's internationally recognized borders and ensure their safe and secure operations, and in order for the Agency to fully resume its safeguards verification activities, including the necessary verification of material accountancy and control; and

4. Requests that the Director General and the Secretariat continue to closely monitor the situation, with a special focus on the safety and security of Ukraine's nuclear facilities and report to the Board on these elements, as required.

### **Oral report by IAEA Director General. The Safety, Security and Safeguards Implications of the Situation in Ukraine**

[9 June 2022]

Under extraordinary circumstances, the IAEA in close collaboration with Ukraine, has made notable progress in identifying and beginning to address what needs to be done to uphold the highest possible level of safety and security at Ukraine's nuclear facilities, while continuing to implement safeguards under Ukraine's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol.

Since the start of the war, I have reported on the situation at its nuclear facilities and on the IAEA's relevant work. I have done so in my regular updates and in more detail in a written report published 28 April, and I will continue to do so. I am happy for the opportunity to present you with an oral report today.

Before I go into the detail of our work, I would like to reiterate what I said when we met in March, the best action to ensure the safety and security of Ukraine's nuclear facilities and its people would be for this armed conflict to end now.

Let me start by taking you back to 24 February. The IAEA's International Incident and Emergency Centre immediately initiated its prepared technical response framework for these unprecedented circumstances. On the night of 3-4 March, not 48 hours after I addressed the Board's special session on the nuclear safety, security and safeguards implications of the conflict in Ukraine, the physical integrity of the site of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, was violated. The IEC immediately went to the highest alert level for the first time since the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident. The IEC's experts conferred with Ukrainian counterparts to assess the impact of the damage sustained by Ukrainian nuclear facilities and to provide a prognosis of the consequences of the shelling and fires. Since that night, we remain on alert with teams on-call 24/7 to be able to respond within minutes whenever needed.

Military action has compromised the safety of radiation sources; destroyed infrastructure at Ukraine's Neutron Source and other nuclear facilities; damaged waste repositories; threatened collateral

damage at nuclear power plants, and has negatively impacted Chornobyl NPP and Exclusion Zone, and Zaporizhzhya NPP, and their staff, in multiple ways. Day after day, our Ukrainian colleagues and we have reviewed the technical status of the nuclear facilities. With this information, the IEC provides the factual, technical information and assessments we use to inform stakeholders globally.

But this has been far more than a communication exercise. Even amid this unprecedented and volatile situation, we have managed, together with Ukraine and with the generous support of many Member States, to develop and begin to deliver the comprehensive programme of assistance that will help to uphold the seven inalienable pillars of nuclear safety and security amid the first military conflict to be fought around the facilities of a major nuclear energy programme.

We have been able to do this because the IAEA has worked with Ukraine both remotely and in person, on-the-ground in Ukraine. In the past months, I have led two missions to Ukraine, one to South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant and one to Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant and Exclusion Zone, which occurred a few weeks after the withdrawal of Russian troops from the site. These missions accomplished real progress. At Chornobyl, for example, we reestablished the flow of safeguards information; we took crucial measurements of radiation in the environment, assessed Ukraine's needs, and delivered a preliminary batch of equipment.

Our meetings, including my meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on 26 April, shaped our comprehensive programme of assistance, which is made up of four parts: remote technical assistance; on-the-ground technical assistance; the delivery of equipment; and the readiness to rapidly deploy assistance if needed.

The combined approach of remote and the on-the-ground technical assistance is crucial to the ongoing success of the programme. As many of you know, on-the-ground observations and hands-on implementation are indispensable and that is why we are committed to travelling to Ukraine. This approach has allowed us to develop an Assistance Action Plan and make detailed assessments of Ukraine's security and safety needs.

At Chornobyl NPP, our most immediate on-the-ground assistance at the site is focused on radiation protection, safety of waste management, and nuclear security.

Just last week, a follow-up mission of experts travelled to Chornobyl NPP and Exclusion Zone. As I said in my statement to the Board on Monday, during the visit, Agency staff from the Department of Safety and Security:

- Visited the main facilities for the management of radioactive waste and spent fuel to discuss and assess their status with staff there and to identify areas for future support
- Provided training on the radiation monitoring equipment delivered by the IAEA in April
- Observed the physical protection arrangements at nuclear, spent fuel, waste and radioactive material facilities located in the same area and identified potential areas of cooperation
- Provided support on emergency preparedness and response and discussed the additional assistance that could be provided through the IAEA Response and Assistance Network (RANET) mechanism, and
- Discussed the re-establishment of the automated radiation monitoring system and the forthcoming connection of this system with the IAEA International Radiation Monitoring Information System (IRMIS).

Separately, staff members of the IAEA Department of Safeguards:

- Verified declared nuclear material and activities at facilities selected by the IAEA, and
- Checked the functioning of the remote safeguards data transmission from the Chornobyl NPP to IAEA

headquarters which was re-established at the end of April after two months of interruption.

Since then, further important progress has been made. Dozens of radiation detectors are once again transmitting data from the area around the Chornobyl NPP after Ukraine – with technical support from the IAEA – succeeded in reviving a vital information link that was cut at the start of the conflict more than 100 days ago. This important achievement is a testament to the dedication, skill and collaborative spirit of the operators at Chornobyl NPP.

In the meantime, eleven IAEA Member States registered in RANET have so far offered to provide specialised equipment to Ukraine, in response to a comprehensive request for equipment Ukraine said it needed for the safe and secure operation of its nuclear facilities. Ukraine's list, submitted in late April, included radiation measurement devices, protective material, computer-related assistance, power supply systems and diesel generators, among other items. We have updated Ukraine's list of needs with details of the offers received and with the ongoing preparations for equipment procurement and delivery. We are identifying priorities and avoiding duplications.

This endeavour and the crucial technical work and dialogue we have with Ukraine and our Member States every day, may not grab the attention of the world media, but it is what we are here to do, and it is what we are doing. Through this work we are upholding our responsibilities under the frameworks that govern our response to emergencies; and fulfilling our unique and indispensable mandate.

I will not sugar coat it. This work requires agility and tenacity so that we overcome challenges, whether it is that our progress is often affected by wider issues beyond our control; or because of the practical and logistical challenges of travelling and working amidst a military conflict.

I am now working actively to agree, organize an IAEA-led international mission to Ukraine's Zaporizhzhya NPP to carry out essential nuclear safety, security and safeguards work at the site.

The site of Zaporizhzhya NPP, Ukraine and Europe's largest NPP, remains under the control of the Russian forces there. I have repeatedly expressed my grave concern at the extremely stressful and challenging working conditions under which Ukrainian management and staff are operating the plant. The current situation is untenable. Every day it continues; every day that vital maintenance work is delayed; every day that supply chain interruptions cause a break in the delivery of vital equipment; every day the decision-making ability of Ukrainian staff is compromised; every day the independent work and assessments of Ukraine's regulator are undermined; the risk of an accident or a security breach increases.

With concerns about interruptions in the supply chain of spare parts to Zaporizhzhya NPP, the number of indispensable nuclear safety and security pillars that have been compromised at the plant is at least five out of the seven. This is why IAEA safety and security experts must go to ZNPP.

As I said in my opening statement to the Board, one clear line of Ukrainian operational control and responsibility is vital, not only for the safety and security of Zaporizhzhya NPP, but also so that IAEA inspectors are able to continue to fulfil their regular, indispensable verification activities. There can be no delay in this. The transmission of safeguards information between Zaporizhzhya NPP and the IAEA has now been interrupted for more than a week. It is time.

Mr Chairperson,

Having said this, let me now turn in detail to the safeguards situation in Ukraine, first more broadly and then returning to the critical issue of safeguards at Zaporizhzhya NPP.

We continue to implement safeguards under Ukraine's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol in all the other facilities. We are in regular contact with the state authority responsible for safeguards, SNRIU; we receive reports and declarations from them and we perform field verification activities in accordance with our established annual implementation plans.

Since the beginning of the military conflict on 24 February, we have conducted all time-critical safeguards verification activities. Safeguards inspectors inspected all nuclear power plants in Ukraine with the exception of Zaporizhzhya NPP.

Safeguards technicians were also present on some of the missions to ensure the functioning of the remote data transmission systems that we have at Nuclear Power Plant sites. In the case of Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant and Exclusion Zone, there was a period of two months during which such transmission was interrupted. During my first mission to Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant and Exclusion Zone at the end of April, we deployed new transmission channels based on satellite technologies and managed to re-establish the connection between Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant and Exclusion Zone and the IAEA Headquarters.

Based on all our evaluations conducted so far, I can confidently state that we have not found any indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material or any indication that would give rise to a proliferation concern.

However, the Ukrainian regulator has informed us that they have "lost control over" the facilities nuclear material that is subject to the Safeguards Agreement between Ukraine and the IAEA. In addition, there has been a loss of safeguards data communication from Zaporizhzhya NPP to the IAEA.

In a written, public statement and in corresponding directly with the IAEA, the Ukrainian government at the highest levels has requested that the IAEA send a mission to Zaporizhzhya NPP. This mission is not a matter of wanting or wishing, it is an obligation on the side of Ukraine and on the side of the IAEA. The IAEA will go to Zaporizhzhya NPP under the legally binding safeguards agreement that Ukraine has with the IAEA.

It is vital that Ukraine be able to continue to fulfil its safeguards obligations unimpeded.

At Zaporizhzhya NPP we have reached the point where the presence of inspectors is essential. Though our safeguards systems are designed for data to be stored locally even when they are not being transmitted, the ongoing break in data reaching the IAEA is insupportable. Without the data, and without the in-person inspections that must occur in regular intervals, the IAEA cannot assure the nuclear material at Zaporizhzhya NPP is safeguarded.

The IAEA-led international mission to Zaporizhzhya NPP is essential and cannot be delayed, and therefore I have been engaging, and will continue to engage, with all parties to make it happen.

In closing, let me reiterate the following: Everyone here shares the same goal: that Ukraine's nuclear facilities are safe, secure and well safeguarded. The need for us to be there is clear to all. Logistics and other such considerations must not prevent it. We must find a solution to the hurdles preventing progress at Zaporizhzhya NPP. It's the IAEA's responsibility and my job to continue to pursue this and I will. I count on your active support to get it done. Thank you.

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### **IAEA Board of Governors. The safety, security and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine**

[GOV/2022/58, 15 September 2022]

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The Board of Governors,

(a) Reaffirming the 2009 General Conference unanimous decision GC(53)/DEC/13, which recognised the importance attached to safety, security and physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, and noting General Conference resolutions GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533 regarding attacks against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes,

(b) Reaffirming resolution GOV/2022/17 entitled "The safety, security and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine" adopted by the Board of Governors on 3 March 2022,

(c) Noting the Director General's statements since 24 February 2022 and his First Summary Report on Nuclear Safety, Security and

Safeguards in Ukraine of 28 April; and welcoming the Director General's expert mission to South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant, the DG-led Agency expert mission to the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, and the DG-led IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya (ISAMZ), and

(d) Noting with concern the Director General's Second Summary Report on Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine of 6 September on the situation at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and the Director General's Report on Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine (GOV/2022/52) of 9 September which refer to the continued presence of Russian military personnel, vehicles, and equipment and Rosatom personnel at the site and assesses that all of the Director General's 'seven indispensable pillars for nuclear safety and security' have been compromised, and underscoring the Director General's call for the establishment of a nuclear safety and security protection zone around the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant,

1. Expresses grave concern that the Russian Federation has not heeded the call of the Board to immediately cease all actions against and at nuclear facilities in Ukraine;

2. Deplores the Russian Federation's persistent violent actions against nuclear facilities in Ukraine, including forcefully seizing of control of nuclear facilities and other violent actions in connection with GOV/2022/58 Page 2 a number of nuclear facilities and other radioactive materials and the ongoing presence of Russian forces and Rosatom personnel at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, which continue to pose serious and direct threats to the safety and security of these facilities and their civilian personnel, thereby significantly raising the risk of a nuclear accident or incident, which endangers the population of Ukraine, neighbouring States and the international community;

3. Calls upon the Russian Federation to immediately cease all actions against, and at, the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and any other nuclear facility in Ukraine, in order for the competent Ukrainian authorities to regain full control over all nuclear facilities within Ukraine's internationally recognized borders, including the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, to ensure their safe and secure operation, and in order for the Agency to fully and safely conduct its safeguards verification activities, in accordance with Ukraine's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement entered into force pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Statute;

4. Supports the Director General's and Secretariat's ongoing efforts to address the nuclear safety, security and safeguards implications of the current situation in Ukraine, including through the ISAMZ and the continued physical presence of Agency technical experts at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant;

5. Emphasizes the importance of nuclear safety and security regarding peaceful nuclear facilities and materials in all circumstances, including in armed conflict, and of the IAEA Director General's 'seven indispensable pillars on nuclear safety and security' derived from IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance;

6. Encourages Member States to respond to assistance requests from Ukraine, including through the provision of necessary equipment through the Agency or on a bilateral basis; and

7. Requests that the Director General continue to closely monitor the situation and report formally to the Board on these matters as long as required.

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### **IAEA Board of Governors. The safety, security and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine**

[GOV/2022/71, 17 November 2022]

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The Board of Governors,

(a) Reaffirming the 2009 General Conference unanimous decision GC (53)/DEC/13, which recognised the importance attached to safety, security and physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, and noting General Conference resolutions

GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533 regarding attacks against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes,

(b) Reaffirming resolutions GOV/2022/17 and GOV/2022/58 entitled "The safety, security and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine" adopted by the Board of Governors on 3 March 2022 and 15 September 2022 respectively,

(c) Recalling resolution A/RES/ES-11/4 adopted by the UN General Assembly on 12 October 2022 and welcoming the Director General's confirmation that the Agency is acting in accordance with this resolution and does not recognize any altered status of any part of Ukraine,

(d) Noting the Director General's statements since 24 February 2022 and his First and Second Summary Reports on Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards in Ukraine of 28 April and 6 September, and welcoming the Director General's expert mission to South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant, the DG-led Agency expert mission to the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, and the DG-led IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya (ISAMZ),

(e) Noting with serious concern the Director General's report GOV/2022/66 (10 November 2022) which described the situation at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant as "dangerous, precarious, and challenging" including as a result of the "relentless levels of stress and pressure" on operating staff due to Russia's attempts to take control of the facility as well as the repeated disruption of off-site power supply due to shelling and military activity following Russia's seizure of the plant, and further underlining the Director General assessment that his 'seven indispensable pillars for nuclear safety and security' have been compromised at the site at all times,

(f) Supporting the Director General's efforts to establish a nuclear safety and security protection zone around the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, and

(g) Welcoming the Director General's assessment that the Agency has found no indications of undeclared nuclear activities or materials related to the development of radiological dispersal devices ("dirty bombs") at three locations in Ukraine, following complementary accesses conducted at the request of Ukraine, in accordance with Ukraine's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, in response to allegations made by the Russian Federation thereby showing these allegations to be unfounded,

1. Expresses grave concern that the Russian Federation has not heeded the calls of the Board to immediately cease all actions against and at nuclear facilities in Ukraine and requests that the Russian Federation do so immediately;

2. Deplores and does not recognize, consistent with resolution A/RES/ES-11/4 adopted by the UN General Assembly on 12 October, the Russian Federation's attempts to take ownership of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and its attempted illegal annexation of the Ukrainian territory on which the plant is located and calls upon the Russian Federation to immediately abandon its baseless claims of ownership of the plant;

3. Expresses grave concern with the unacceptable pressure on and detentions of Ukrainian operating personnel at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and repeated disruption of external power supply following shelling in the surrounding area, which pose serious and direct threats to the safety and security of the facility and its civilian personnel, thereby significantly raising the risk of a nuclear accident or incident, which endangers the population of Ukraine, neighbouring States and the international community;

4. Calls upon the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw its military and other personnel from the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, in order for the competent Ukrainian authorities to regain full control of the plant to ensure its safe and secure operation, and in order for the Agency to fully and safely conduct its safeguards verification activities, in accordance with Ukraine's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, entered into pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Statute, and the Additional Protocol thereto;

5. Supports the Director General's and Secretariat's ongoing efforts to address the nuclear safety, security, and safeguards implications

of the current situation in Ukraine, including through the ISAMZ and the continued physical presence of Agency technical experts at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine;

6. Emphasizes the importance of nuclear safety and security regarding peaceful nuclear facilities and materials in all circumstances, including in armed conflict, and of the IAEA Director General's 'seven indispensable pillars on nuclear safety and security' derived from IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance;

7. Encourages Member States to respond to assistance requests from Ukraine, including through the provision of necessary equipment through the Agency or on a bilateral basis; and

8. Requests that the Director General continue to closely monitor the situation and regularly report formally to the Board on these matters as long as required.

### IAEA Board of Governors. Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine

[GOV/2024/18, 7 March 2024]

The Board of Governors,

(a) Recalling the resolutions GOV/2022/17, GOV/2022/58, and GOV/2022/71 adopted by the Board of Governors on 3 March 2022, 15 September 2022, and 17 November 2022 respectively as well as resolution GC(67)/RES/16 adopted by the General Conference in September 2023,

(b) Noting with serious concern that the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) remains "very precarious" and that six of the Director General's 'seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security in an armed conflict' have been "compromised either fully or partially" at the site,

(c) Deploring that it has been more than two years that Russian military and other unauthorized personnel have remained at the ZNPP,

(d) Further noting the importance of the Director General's announcement on 30 May 2023 at the United Nations Security Council of five concrete principles for protecting the ZNPP and stressing that the implementation of these principles must be carried out in full respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine,

1. Expresses grave concern with the precarious nuclear safety and security situation at the ZNPP, especially the lack of adequate qualified staffing at the site, gaps in routine maintenance activities, the lack of reliable supply chains, the vulnerable status of water and off-site power supply, and the replanting of anti-personnel mines in a buffer zone between the facility's internal and external fences;

2. Reiterates its grave concern that the Russian Federation has not heeded the previous calls of the Board of Governors and General Conference contained in their respective resolutions to withdraw its military and other personnel from the ZNPP;

3. Calls for the urgent withdrawal of all unauthorized military and other unauthorized personnel from Ukraine's ZNPP and for the plant to be immediately returned to the full control of the competent Ukrainian authorities consistent with the existing licence issued by the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) to ensure its safe and secure operation and in order for the Agency to conduct safe, efficient, and effective safeguards implementation, in accordance with Ukraine's comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol;

4. Supports the ongoing efforts of the Director General and Secretariat to address the nuclear safety, security, and safeguards implications of the current situation in Ukraine, including through the continued physical presence of Agency technical experts at the ZNPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine;

5. Underscores the need for the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) to be provided with timely and appropriate access to all areas important for nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP in order to allow the Agency to confirm that the five concrete principles are being observed at all times; and

6. Requests the Director General to continue to report comprehensively on the observance of the five concrete principles to help ensure nuclear safety and security at ZNPP as well as the Director General's 'seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security'; and that he continue to closely monitor the situation and continue to report formally to the Board on these matters for as long as required.

### Briefing by IAEA Director General to the UN Security Council on Ukraine Nuclear Safety

[15 April 2024]

*(As prepared for delivery)*

I thank the President of the Security Council for allowing me the opportunity to update you on the IAEA's activities concerning nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine. I also thank the Council for their continuing support of the IAEA's efforts.

It has been more than two years since the war began, the first ever to be fought amid the facilities of a major nuclear power programme.

The IAEA has been monitoring the situation closely and assisting Ukraine every day since the start of the war. IAEA staff are continuously present, monitoring the situation at all five of Ukraine's nuclear power plants, including at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, which remains under Russian operational control.

Today my statement will focus on the recent grave violations of the five concrete principles that I first established in this very chamber on 30 May. These five concrete principles are there to prevent a nuclear accident and to maintain the integrity of the Zaporizhzhya NPP. Let me remind them what they are:

1. There should be no attack of any kind from or against the plant, in particular targeting the reactors, spent fuel storage, other critical infrastructure, or personnel;
2. ZNPP should not be used as storage or a base for heavy weapons (i.e. multiple rocket launchers, artillery systems and munitions, and tanks) or military personnel that could be used for an attack from the plant;
3. Off-site power to the plant should not be put at risk. To that effect, all efforts should be made to ensure off-site power remains available and secure at all times;
4. All structures, systems and components essential to the safe and secure operation of ZNPP should be protected from attacks or acts of sabotage;
5. No action should be taken that undermines these principles.

On 30 May last year I said here that observing these principles was essential to avoid the danger of a catastrophic nuclear incident and that I had respectfully and solemnly asked both sides to commit to them.

At our meeting last May distinguished Members of the Security Council and Ukraine clearly supported those principles.

Nevertheless, Madame President, over the past ten days, the first of these principles has been violated repeatedly in what marks a step-change increase in risk to nuclear safety and security at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant.

On Sunday, 7 April, the International Support and Assistance Mission to ZNPP (ISAMZ) confirmed the first attacks since November 2022 to directly target ZNPP.

The ISAMZ team was able to inspect the location of one direct strike at the apex of the containment dome of the Unit 6 reactor building. Whilst the damage to the structure is superficial, the attack sets a very dangerous precedent of the successful targeting of the reactor containment.

The other two attacks were in close proximity to the main reactor buildings and resulted in at least one casualty.

Agency experts at the site have been informed by ZNPP of a drone strike against the site's oxygen and nitrogen production facility; two attacks on the training centre located just outside the site perimeter

and reports of a drone shot down above the turbine hall of Unit 6.

These reckless attacks must cease immediately. Though, fortunately, they have not led to a radiological incident this time, they significantly increase the risk at Zaporizhzhya NPP, where nuclear safety is already compromised.

I am not only concerned about the attacks themselves, but also the context in which they have occurred. For several months before these direct attacks there had already been an increase in isolated drone incursions in the vicinity of the facility and in the nearby town of Energodar.

In other areas of nuclear safety degradation, the plant is currently relying on just two lines of external power. There have been at least four occasions in the past year when the plant has had only one line of external power supply, with the precarity lasting for periods of up to four months.

Let me put it plainly. Two years of war are weighing heavily on nuclear safety at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. Every one of the IAEA's 7 pillars of nuclear safety and security have been compromised. We cannot sit by and watch as the final weight tips the finely balanced scale.

Even though the plant's six reactors are now in cold shutdown, with the final unit shifting into that status two days ago following the IAEA's recommendation, the potential dangers of a major nuclear accident remain very real.

The Agency will continue closely to follow the operational status of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and provide technically viable alternatives in a context of rapid changes and challenges.

Our work at this facility remains essential. This has been recognized by all, irrespective of their side in this conflict. But to be effective, the IAEA teams need timely access to assess the condition of the plant and evaluate the cumulative impact that more than 26 months in a war zone have had on nuclear safety.

Madame President,

We are getting dangerously close to a nuclear accident. We must not allow complacency to let a roll of the dice decide what happens tomorrow. We must do everything in our power today to minimize the risk of an accident.

The five principles established in this very chamber one year ago must be adhered to. They are there to prevent a major nuclear accident with potentially significant radiological consequences.

The latest attacks represent a flagrant violation of these crucial principles and must stop.

I am asking this Council for its steadfast support for the five principles and the IAEA's seven pillars of nuclear safety and security which they help to underpin. And I am asking for your continued support of the IAEA's role monitoring the situation, in the service of the international community.

Despite huge challenges, the IAEA has kept open the indispensable lines of communication and will continue doing so. The support of your nations and of the Council as a whole is a necessity.

I thank the Council for inviting me today, thereby demonstrating your continuing commitment to this critical issue.

The IAEA and myself remain at your disposal to assist this body in its mission to preserve international peace and security.

Thank you, Madame President.

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### **UN General Assembly. Safety and security of nuclear facilities of Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant**

[A/78/L.90, 5 July 2024]

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*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

*Recalling also* the obligation of all States under Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or

political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, and reaffirming that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal,

*Recalling further* the order of provisional measures of the International Court of Justice of 16 March 2022,<sup>1</sup> *Recalling its relevant resolutions adopted at its eleventh emergency special session*<sup>2</sup> as well as its resolutions 68/262 of 27 March 2014, 78/8 of 8 November 2023 and 78/221 of 19 December 2023,

*Condemning in the strongest terms* the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter, including the ongoing temporary control or occupation by the Russian Federation of part of the territory of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and certain areas of the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and reaffirming that the attempted illegal annexation of these regions has no validity under international law and does not form the basis for any alteration of the status of these regions of Ukraine,

*Recalling* that attacks must not be directed against civilians or civilian objects, and recalling also article 56 (1) of Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, to which Ukraine and the Russian Federation are parties, which includes the provision that works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population,

*Taking note* of decision GC(53)/DEC/13 of 18 September 2009 of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, entitled "Prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction", as well as relevant resolutions of the General Conference of the Agency,

*Taking note also* of resolution GC(67)/RES/16 of 28 September 2023, entitled "Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine", of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as resolutions GOV/2022/17 of 3 March 2022, GOV/2022/58 of 15 September 2022 and GOV/2022/71 of 17 November 2022, entitled "The safety, security and safeguards implications of the situation in Ukraine", and GOV/2024/18 of 7 March 2024, entitled "Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine", of the Board of Governors of the Agency,

*Condemning* the attacks by the Russian Federation against critical energy infrastructure of Ukraine, which increases the risk of a nuclear accident or incident at all nuclear facilities of Ukraine,

*Condemning also* the illegal and unprecedented forceful seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant of Ukraine, and stressing that it has been more than two years that Russian military and other unauthorized personnel have remained at the plant, and recalling that direct threats to the safety and security of the site and its civilian personnel significantly raise the risk of a nuclear accident or incident, which endangers the population of Ukraine, neighbouring States and the international community,

*Expressing grave concern* over the precarious nuclear safety and security situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and that all of the "seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict" of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency have been "compromised either fully or partially" at the site, including the denial of access to Ukrainian operating personnel, gaps in routine maintenance activities, the lack of reliable supply chains, the vulnerable status of water and off-site power supply due to attacks on critical energy infrastructure, the planting of anti-personnel mines in a buffer zone between the facility's internal and external fences, and other actions by Russian military and other unauthorized personnel present at the site,

*Emphasizing* the importance of the International Atomic Energy Agency Director General's "seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict", derived from Agency safety standards and nuclear security guidance, and the five

concrete principles to help to ensure nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and stressing that the implementation of Agency safety standards and security guidance must be carried out in full respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine,

*Taking note* of the Summit on Peace in Ukraine, held on 15 and 16 June 2024, at which it was, inter alia, emphasized that any use of nuclear energy and nuclear installations must be safe, secured, safeguarded and environmentally sound, and that Ukrainian nuclear power plants and installations, including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, must remain under full sovereign control of Ukraine in line with International Atomic Energy Agency principles,

1. *Reaffirms its commitment* to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, extending to its territorial waters;
2. *Demands* that the Russian Federation immediately cease its aggression against Ukraine and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders;
3. *Also demands* that the Russian Federation urgently withdraw its military and other unauthorized personnel from the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and immediately return the plant to the full control of the sovereign and competent authorities of Ukraine to ensure its safety and security and in order for the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct safe, efficient and effective safeguards implementation in accordance with the comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol of Ukraine, consistent with the repeated calls by the General Conference and the Board of Governors of the Agency;
4. *Condemns* the failure of the Russian Federation to implement relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the General Conference and the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
5. *Calls for* immediate cessation of the attacks by the Russian Federation against critical energy infrastructure of Ukraine, which increase the risk of a nuclear accident or incident at all nuclear facilities of Ukraine;
6. *Welcomes and encourages* the continued efforts of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to address the risks to nuclear safety and security, as well as to safeguards implementation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear powerplant, caused by the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, including through the continued and reinforced physical presence of the International Atomic Energy Agency Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia;
7. *Calls upon* the Russian Federation, until it returns the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant of Ukraine to the full control of the sovereign and competent authorities of Ukraine, to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia with timely and full access to all areas at the plant that are important for nuclear safety and security in order to allow the Agency to report fully on the nuclear safety and security situation at the site;
8. *Calls upon* all parties to the armed conflict to respect international humanitarian law in all circumstances;
9. *Also calls upon* all parties to the armed conflict to implement fully the “seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict” and the five concrete principles of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to help to ensure nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant;
10. *Urges* the Russian Federation to immediately remove all anti-personnel mines placed along the perimeter of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant;
11. *Calls upon* Member States to continue to support the efforts of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to uphold nuclear safety, security and safeguards implementation at all nuclear facilities in Ukraine;
12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide his good offices in close cooperation with the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency;

13. *Decides* to continue its consideration of the matter at its seventy-ninth session under the agenda item entitled “The situation in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine”.

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### **IAEA Board of Governors. Implications of Unstable Energy Infrastructure Critical to Safety and Security of Nuclear Power Plants**

[GOV/2024/73, 12 December 2024]

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The Board of Governors,

- (a) Recognizing the critical importance of maintaining nuclear safety and security during armed conflicts,
  - (b) Recalling the IAEA Director General's “seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict, which derive from the IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance”, and, in particular, pillar number four stating that “there must be secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites”,
  - (c) Noting with concern the Director General's reporting indicating that renewed attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure have further endangered nuclear safety and that Ukraine's energy infrastructure remains extremely fragile and vulnerable,
  - (d) Welcoming the ongoing efforts of the IAEA, as requested, to expand its assistance to Ukraine and to report on risks to critical energy infrastructure with relevance for nuclear safety,
1. Emphasizes that attacks targeting Ukraine's energy infrastructure critical for the off-site power supply of nuclear power plants represent a direct threat to nuclear safety and security, as outlined in the fourth “indispensable pillar for nuclear safety and security in an armed conflict”;
  2. Calls on the IAEA to continue to assess the risks and extent of damage to energy infrastructure in Ukraine including substations identified as essential for maintaining nuclear safety and security;
  3. Encourages all Member States to continue to provide political, financial, technical, and in-kind support to strengthen the IAEA's technical assistance and monitoring activities in Ukraine; and
  4. Requests the Director General to continue providing regular updates to the Board of Governors on the nuclear safety, security and safeguards situation in Ukraine, including the status of critical energy infrastructure essential for nuclear safety and security, and to propose additional measures immediately if risks arise to prevent a nuclear accident.

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### **Summary of Report by the Director General Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine. IAEA Board of Governors**

[GOV/2025/54, 1 September 2025]

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#### **D. Summary**

146. The armed conflict continues to threaten the nuclear safety and security in Ukraine. Three and a half years into the conflict, drone strikes are observed to have intensified significantly, further endangering the nuclear safety and security of all of Ukraine's NPPs.
147. For over three months, the ZNPP has relied on a single off-site power line, as military activity has reportedly prevented the repair and reconnection of the backup line. On 4 July 2025, the ZNPP experienced its ninth total loss of off-site power since the start of the armed conflict, highlighting the precarious state of nuclear safety and security at the site. The Agency continues to assess that six of the Seven Pillars remain fully or partially compromised.
148. The reduced water level in the ZNPP cooling pond remains a concern. The Agency notes that the ZNPP implemented additional measures to help maintain the availability of water required for the nonessential service water system. If this cooling water system becomes unavailable, it could affect several systems and result in further degradation of nuclear safety at the ZNPP.
149. ISAMZ continued to report frequent sounds of explosions at varying distances from the site and gunfire originating both within and outside the site perimeter. ISAMZ was also informed of drone-

related military activity near the site and at varying distances from it — including in the city of Enerhodar, where most staff live. In addition, ISAMZ reported the ongoing presence of Russian armed forces and military equipment at the site. These activities continue to put the Five Principles and the overall nuclear safety and security of the plant at great risk.

150. The Agency's ability to make its assessment and report impartially and objectively on the nuclear safety and security situation at the ZNPP, and to fully assess whether all Five Principles are being observed at all times, continues to be limited by the restrictions on access and information imposed on ISAMZ at the site.

151. During the reporting period, the ChNPP site, the KhNPP, the RNPP and the SUNPP continued to face challenges arising from the continued military activity in Ukraine. Agency staff present at these sites frequently reported air raid alarms, some of which required them to shelter.

152. During the reporting period, Agency staff on the ground observed that additional air attacks had taken place at the substations they had visited — facilities essential to the safe operation of Ukraine's NPPs. Some of these substations had partially regained functionality and repairs on critical equipment were still ongoing.

153. The Agency continued to provide technical support and assistance to Ukraine related to nuclear safety and security, and to make progress in delivering various components of the comprehensive programme of assistance to Ukraine.

154. The Agency maintained a continuous presence at all nuclear sites without interruption. The rotations at the ChNPP site, the KhNPP, the RNPP and the SUNPP were completed as planned during the reporting period, while the rotations at the ZNPP continued to face challenges arising from the ongoing military activities putting the safety of Agency staff at risk and were conducted with delays.

155. As of 29 August 2025, a total of 217 missions comprising 176 Agency staff members had been deployed as part of the continued presence at all five nuclear sites in Ukraine, totalling 474 person-months.

156. During the reporting period, 18 deliveries of procured nuclear safety and security equipment, medical equipment and supplies, and other items based on nuclear or isotopic techniques were delivered to various organizations in Ukraine, bringing the total to 152. Since the start of the armed conflict, more than €19.2 million of equipment has been delivered to 29 organizations in Ukraine.

157. The Agency continued implementing the second phase of ISAMRAD, while noting the challenges posed by the ongoing military activity in initiating efforts to recover the high-activity radioactive sources that remain vulnerable due to the armed conflict.

158. The Agency continues to provide technical support and assistance to Ukraine in the area of nuclear safety and security, a major undertaking that relies on substantial technical, human and financial resources. These efforts are made possible through significant cash and in-kind extrabudgetary contributions from 30 Member States and the European Union. To maintain the current level of programme delivery through to the end of 2026, an estimated €22 million in funding is still required.

159. The Director General is grateful to all donors for the extrabudgetary contributions provided to the Agency for assisting Ukraine in the area of nuclear safety, security and safeguards and would welcome any further support.

160. The continued commitment of Member States and their close cooperation with the Agency are essential for ensuring nuclear safety and security in Ukraine under all circumstances and for providing assistance efficiently while ensuring the timely delivery of the Agency's programmatic activities.

161. The Agency has continued to undertake a vital verification role to reach independent conclusions that nuclear material under safeguards remains in peaceful activities and that safeguarded facilities are not used for the undeclared production or processing of nuclear material. The Agency continues to implement safeguards in Ukraine, including in-field verification activities, in accordance with Ukraine's CSA and AP. Based on the evaluation of all safeguards-

relevant information available to the Agency to date, the Agency has not found any indication that would give rise to a proliferation concern.

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## **IAEA Board of Governors. Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine: Implications of unstable energy infrastructure critical to safety and security of nuclear power plants in Ukraine**

[GOV/2026/25, 5 March 2026]

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The Board of Governors,

(a) Recalling previous Board of Governors discussions on the implications of unstable energy infrastructure critical to safety and security of nuclear power plants, including resolution GOV/2024/73 adopted on 12 December 2024,

(b) Recognizing the critical importance of maintaining nuclear safety and security during armed conflicts,

(c) Recalling the IAEA Director General's "seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict", which derive from relevant IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance, and, in particular, pillar number four stating that "there must be secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites",

(d) Noting with concern the Director General's reporting, including in GOV/2026/7, indicating that repeated and intensified attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure have created "ever present risks to nuclear safety and security", including heightened risks posed to operating nuclear power plants and that Ukraine's energy infrastructure remains extremely degraded and vulnerable, reducing the reliability of external power for nuclear power plants,

(e) Emphasizing that the reliability of off-site power supply is a fundamental prerequisite for maintaining essential nuclear safety functions and that damage to energy infrastructure supporting this supply increases the risk of a total loss of off-site power and challenges emergency power arrangements, and

(f) Welcoming the ongoing efforts of the IAEA, as requested, to provide assistance to Ukraine and to report on risks to critical energy infrastructure with relevance for nuclear safety as well as the Agency's ongoing efforts to negotiate localized cease fires allowing for the urgent repair of power lines supplying the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP),

1. Reemphasizes that attacks targeting Ukraine's energy infrastructure critical for the off-site power supply of nuclear power plants, including at the ZNPP, represent a direct threat to nuclear safety and security as outlined in the fourth "indispensable pillar for nuclear safety and security in an armed conflict";

2. Reiterates its support for the IAEA's expert missions to assess the nuclear safety risks and extent of damage to energy infrastructure in Ukraine, including at electrical substations identified as essential for maintaining nuclear safety and security;

3. Encourages all Member States to continue to provide political, financial, technical, and in-kind support to strengthen the IAEA's technical assistance and monitoring missions in Ukraine; and

4. Requests that the Director General continue to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors on the implications of unstable electrical infrastructure in Ukraine for nuclear safety and security, including findings from relevant expert missions, and to propose additional measures to prevent a nuclear accident if additional risks arise.

### **Section 3 AUKUS**

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## **Report by IAEA Director General Naval nuclear propulsion: Australia**

[November 2025]

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[Eds . . .]

Summary

23. Since September 2021, the Agency has conducted a series of

technical consultations with the parties and discussed the possible implications of Australia's naval nuclear propulsion programme on the implementation of Agency safeguards for Australia under its CSA and AP.

24. Since the announcement of the parties in March 2023, Australia has provided to the Agency the required information under its CSA and AP. The Agency has been able to conduct in-field verification activities in Australia as well as a transparency visit. The Agency will conduct further verification activities in Australia as and when necessary.

25. The Agency and Australia have continued the bilateral discussions on technical aspects, structure and content of the Article 14 arrangement, and on ways to facilitate possible verification and monitoring activities, including voluntary transparency measures, in relation to Australia's naval nuclear propulsion programme. Detailed technical discussions, including on legal aspects, will continue in order to develop the required Article 14 arrangement. Once the Article 14 arrangement is finalized, the Director General will transmit it to the Board of Governors for appropriate action.

26. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

### **UK Right of Reply on behalf of AUKUS partners to the IAEA Board of Governors**

[November 2025]

I take the floor on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to respond to misleading claims about Australia's acquisition of a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability through the AUKUS partnership. Once again, we are compelled to invoke our Right of Reply to address remarks that purposefully mischaracterise the nature of our collaboration.

Australia's cooperation with the UK and US on this matter is being undertaken in full compliance with our respective obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear-Weapons (NPT), South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), and Australia's safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

The repeated attempts by one member state to add this item to this meeting's agenda falsely implies an active compliance problem where none exists and shows a clear intent to manipulate the Board's agenda solely for political purposes.

It is particularly disappointing that this agenda item has been insisted upon at this particular Board of Governors, given we have already discussed this matter under the DG's dedicated item on Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Australia. This unnecessary agenda item does not, and has never, enjoyed consensus support. Given that the Board has other important business and that the DG is reporting under his own agenda item as appropriate, it may soon be time to seriously consider the utility of this agenda item.

Under this item, the Board continues to hear unsubstantiated claims that ignore or misrepresent information AUKUS partners have provided in good faith, and assertions that disregard the statements made by the Director General. There are plenty of issues I could respond to here today, but in the interests of time I will focus on reminding the Board that:

- Naval Nuclear Propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT. Article 14 of the IAEA's model CSA (INFCIRC/153) – on which Australia's CSA is based – is the specific provision enabling States Parties to use nuclear material in NNP, within the safeguards framework.
- The IAEA has the clear authority under its Statute to negotiate directly and in-confidence with individual Member States on the establishment and application of safeguards and verification arrangements. Interference would politicise the IAEA's independence, mandate and technical authority and establish a deeply harmful precedent.
- Attempts to legitimise 'intergovernmental discussions' outside of the well-established, and appropriate mechanisms for inter-state dialogue in the Board on all

safeguards matters undermines the right of all states to engage the Agency bilaterally, and confidentially, on their safeguards arrangements.

- Furthermore, the transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level among States Parties is not prohibited by the NPT, provided the transfer is carried out in a manner consistent with any relevant safeguards obligations. Australia's naval nuclear propulsion programme will be subject to a robust package of verification measures consistent with its longstanding non-proliferation obligations.
- Under Australia's Article 14 arrangement, the IAEA will be enabled to continue meeting its technical objectives at all stages of the submarines' lifecycle, verifying that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material; no misuse of declared nuclear facilities; and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia.
- Once the Article 14 arrangement is agreed between Australia and the IAEA Secretariat, the Director General has stated that he will transmit it to the Board for 'appropriate action'. To suggest that the Board will somehow be bypassed is false.
- The bilateral Geelong Treaty – signed by Australia and the UK on 26 July – reflects and restates our long-standing commitment to set the highest non-proliferation standard for Australia's acquisition of nuclear-powered, conventionally-armed submarines. It specifically reaffirms that all activities under the Treaty must be carried out in accordance with the UK and Australia's respective nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

We continue to oppose any proposal for this item to be a standing agenda item, or any efforts that undermine and politicise the independent, technical mandate of the Agency.

All three AUKUS partners continue to take seriously our commitment to openness and transparency with member states on this matter. We will continue to engage in good faith, as we have done by providing an update under the DG's item earlier in this meeting.

We welcome the Director General's continued commitment to provide updates on naval nuclear propulsion, as and when he deems appropriate.

### **China Right of Reply on AUKUS to the IAEA Board of Governors**

[November 2025]

At the November Board of Governors meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) four years ago, the Chinese delegation for the first time proposed including "issues related to the transfer of nuclear materials and safeguards supervision involved in the US-UK-Australia nuclear submarine cooperation, and their implications for various aspects of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)" on the agenda of IAEA formal meeting. Practice has shown that such intergovernmental discussions are necessary and effective; they are crucial for upholding principles, clarifying the facts, safeguarding the NPT regime, and preventing the IAEA from being misled or exploited.

AUKUS is clearly not a peaceful cooperation on nuclear energy in the traditional sense, just as a tiger cannot be called a cat. From the very first day Australia the UK and the US announced their AUKUS cooperation, China pointed out incisively that this is a textbook case of nuclear proliferation. The core purpose and objective of the NPT is to maintain global and regional peace and stability by preventing nuclear proliferation. If nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, through military alliances and for geopolitical and strategic military purposes, extend their strategic nuclear cooperation beyond the scope that the NPT has upheld for half a century, would that not amount to crossing the threshold of nuclear proliferation?

Safeguards over AUKUS cooperation is not routine safeguards and is fundamentally different from the hundreds of safeguards programs implemented by the IAEA. In fact, IAEA has never implemented safeguards on any nuclear submarine of Nuclear-Weapon-States, let alone on safeguards on a nuclear submarine cooperation project between Nuclear-Weapon-States and Non-Nuclear-Weapon-State. Therefore, AUKUS related safeguards obligations and arrangements will certainly bring safeguards practice into unprecedented territory, thus setting an important precedent and having a significant impact on the development and improvement of safeguards regime. Based on existing practices and regulations, IAEA secretariat is not in a position to provide a comprehensive, objective, scientific, and convincing answer on AUKUS safeguards. Also, no single state has the authority to dictate rules to the IAEA and other Member States on these issues.

As many have noticed, several countries in the Asia-Pacific region have recently expressed strong interest in developing nuclear submarines. Right-wing forces in one country even claimed their intentions to break the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles". These are all military allies of a superpower. It seems that the issue of "nuclear submarine proliferation" will become an increasingly significant challenge for the international community and the NPT regime.

Australia, the US and UK claim that the IAEA can only discuss technical issues and not political ones. They consistently label countries that express differing opinions on AUKUS as politicizing the issue. In response, I must point out that the IAEA, as a crucial international organization for maintaining the NPT regime and promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear technology, deals with many issues that involve significant political principles. Member States must always view and address major challenges like AUKUS from a political and strategic perspective. Resisting intergovernmental discussions, suppressing dissenting opinions, seeking special exceptions, engaging in bloc confrontation, and taking sides are blatant politicization. Member states should resist such behavior, and the Secretariat must be highly vigilant.

Throughout the IAEA's history, the improvement and development of the IAEA safeguards regime has always relied on universal participation, joint efforts and consensual endorsement among Member States. How we are viewing and handling the AUKUS safeguards issue is related to the integrity, effectiveness and future applicability of the comprehensive safeguards system and is closely related to the common interests of all Member States. Everyone has a voice, and we should jointly study and decide on the matter. Defending the historical tradition of the development and improvement of the comprehensive safeguards system should be regarded as the most important political principle of the IAEA. If this tradition is challenged or even undermined by AUKUS, causing divisions among Member States, it will inevitably have an immeasurable and profound negative impact on the IAEA's safeguards system and the NPT regime. No one can afford such a historical responsibility, and the AUKUS partners should think twice.

Mr. Chair,

In actively promoting intergovernmental discussions on AUKUS, China has consistently advocated for sovereign equality, adherence to international rule of law, and the practice of multilateralism. It has stayed committed to the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, prioritized the legitimate security concerns of all countries, and insisted on resolving differences between countries through dialogue and consultation, rather than conflict and confrontation. These are the key concepts fully embodied in the Global Governance Initiative and Global Security Initiative put forward by President Xi Jinping. Adhering to these principles serves the common interests of all Member States and is essential for upholding the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Given the long-term, complex, controversial, and uncertain nature of AUKUS cooperation, the IAEA must handle

AUKUS issues in the most cautious, responsible, and prudent manner. China advocates that Member States adhere to the principles of seeking common ground while shelving differences, taking a long-term approach, maintaining unity, and avoiding division, and continue to engage in open, inclusive, democratic, transparent, meaningful, and sustainable intergovernmental discussions on all aspects of the AUKUS issue based on equality and mutual respect, gradually explore solutions that will be agreed upon by all Member States and that will stand the test of time and practice.

China respects and supports the Secretariat in carrying out its mandate in accordance with the Statute. At the same time, China hopes that the Secretariat will fully recognize the complexity and sensitivity of the AUKUS issue, fully respect and carefully listen to the different opinions of Member States, objectively reflect the progress of intergovernmental discussions, especially the differences among the parties, and assist intergovernmental discussions with a scientific and professional attitude.

China is willing to work with all parties to continue to actively participate in and promote the intergovernmental discussion process on all aspects of AUKUS, with a view to contributing to the maintenance of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Thank you.

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China appreciates the different views and opinions expressed by various Member States on the AUKUS issue, which all constitute contributions to the intergovernmental discussions on AUKUS. Over the past four years, the Chinese delegation has consistently communicated with the Secretariat and relevant parties in a rational, professional, and responsible manner. The positive results of the intergovernmental discussion process are evident. The IAEA Board of Governors should be a forum for reasoned discussion, not quarrels. Member States should take the maintenance of the NPT regime and the integrity of the IAEA safeguards system as a common goal, and engage in full and substantive exchanges of views on all aspects of safeguards related to AUKUS.

Australia, the US, and the UK have labeled China's actions of "politicization." On this point, I must emphasize: refusing to listen to differing opinions, denying others the opportunity to speak, blatantly rejecting multilateral discussions, and forcing Member States to take sides—that is true politicization. Attempting to use their majority seats in the IAEA Board of Governors to obstruct the intergovernmental discussion process is nothing less than complete politicization.

China has also noted that Australia, the US, and the UK in their statements, have hinted at taking action against China's agenda item. Over the past four years, they have made such threats multiple times. I must stress that, according to the Board's rules of procedure, any IAEA Member State has the right to request the inclusion of any important agenda item for the Board's consideration. In the history of the IAEA, there has never been a case in which a Member State's proposed agenda item was blocked through voting or other means. The claim by the US, UK, and Australia that they can block China's agenda item constitutes a flagrant challenge to the Board's rules of procedure, the legitimate and equal rights of Member States, the principles of mutual respect and democratic practice in the IAEA's work, and the tradition of consensus-based decision-making. It severely undermines the working atmosphere of the Board. IAEA Member States should firmly oppose and jointly resist such hegemonic and overbearing behavior. We urge the parties concerned not to attempt to provoke confrontation or create division. Such attempts will not succeed.

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The Chinese delegation takes note of the DG's report on AUKUS and listened carefully to all statements. I am

requesting the right of reply to make the following three points.

First, China not in favor of discussing the AUKUS issue under the title "Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Australia". This is our consistent position. AUKUS is by no means a routine cooperation project on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It is fundamentally different from the hundreds and thousands of peaceful nuclear projects conducted by Member States since the IAEA's establishment. Australia, the US, and the UK packaged AUKUS as a peaceful nuclear cooperation project, which is just like covering one's ears while attempting to steal the bell. As is well known, AUKUS is a strategic military cooperation between two Nuclear-Weapon states and their non-Nuclear-Weapon military ally, which involves the transfer of tons of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU). From the perspective of its purpose, nature, and the activities involving the transfer of weapons-grade nuclear material, this cooperation is unprecedented, and falls outside the coverage of the IAEA's current safeguards regime. It is highly controversial.

For the above reasons, over the past 4 years, China has consistently raised the agenda item, which requests reviewing AUKUS from a non-proliferation perspective at each IAEA Board of Governors meeting and General Conference. The agenda item "Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Australia" does not accurately reflect the nature and the significant controversies of the AUKUS submarine cooperation. China has made clear reservations on this matter, and thus we disassociate from this wording.

Second, the report submitted by the DG on AUKUS does not comprehensively and objectively reflect the intergovernmental discussions among IAEA Member States on AUKUS. We express deep concern and dissatisfaction with this.

Over the past four years, with the active engagement of Member States, intergovernmental discussions on the AUKUS issue within the IAEA framework have continued to deepen. For three consecutive years, China has convened AUKUS-related workshops at the VIC, bringing together IAEA Member States, the Secretariat, as well as experts and scholars from various think tanks. China, numerous other Member States, and even Australia have presented differing views at these events—fully reflecting the diversity of intergovernmental perspectives and the complexity and contentious nature of the AUKUS issue—and further fostering understanding and reflection among Member States. The Director General's decision to overlook these significant developments in his report is both unusual and inappropriate.

The discussions and different opinions that have arisen in previous Board of Governors meetings and General Conference, have already, and will continue to, form an important part of IAEA Member States' deliberations of AUKUS related nuclear proliferation and safeguards issues. They are consistently reflected in the records and the chair's summaries of past meetings. Summary of three AUKUS workshops hosted by China were also circulated as INFCIRC documents. These are undeniable facts and ongoing history, which will become an important chapter in the history of the IAEA. We continue to call on the DG and the Secretariat to treat the intergovernmental discussions with an objective and impartial attitude. Only in such a way can the Secretariat demonstrate its independence and professionalism.

Third, Article 14 of any CSA has never made any clear provisions for such cooperation as AUKUS. The safeguards involved in this cooperation constitute one of the most contentious and challenging issues under the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards system. It is not something that can be handled or resolved through private deals between the Australia, the US, the UK, and the Secretariat. The AUKUS partners claim that safeguards arrangements between them and the Secretariat will set the "strongest precedent" and the "highest standard" for non-proliferation. But I ask, who gave you the right to set such "precedents"

and "standards" for other Member States? The Secretariat said that it has the "technical capacity". But I ask, since the IAEA has never carried out safeguards on nuclear-powered submarines, nor has it ever engaged in related cooperation with Nuclear-Weapon states, where does the so-called "technical capacity" come from?

AUKUS involves the transfer of tons of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and raises numerous complex political, legal, procedural, and technical issues. It also involves safeguard obligations that Australia, as a non-Nuclear-Weapon state, and the United States and the United Kingdom, as Nuclear-Weapon states, have never previously undertaken. No one can provide answers to these questions now, just as no one can predict the future of AUKUS. AUKUS is not a simple routine safeguards issue, nor can it be solved casually. Such complex issues can only be resolved through patient and careful intergovernmental discussions among all IAEA Member States, especially those that are interested and concerned, to arrive at a solid, credible, mature, reliable, universally accepted, and time-tested solution. We hope that DG and the Secretariat will play an independent, professional, and constructive supporting role in future intergovernmental discussions.

This is why China requests this Board session to continue to set a separate formal agenda item on the AUKUS issue, focusing on the transfer of weapons-grade nuclear materials involved in the AUKUS cooperation. I will further elaborate China's position under agenda item 7, and welcome IAEA Member States including AUKUS partners to participate in the discussion.

## Section 4 FMCT

### Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty

[New York, 23 September 2024 ]

High level representatives from Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States of America convened a High-Level Meeting to launch the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) on 23 September 2024 in New York, on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly High Level Week.

They reaffirmed that achieving a world without nuclear weapons is a common goal for the international community and that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would represent a significant practical contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts amid the heightened risk of destabilization.

To this end, the participants confirmed that they would work closely together to realize the common objectives of the group, which are to maintain and enhance political attention to an FMCT as a priority action to forestall a recurrence of a nuclear arms race, and to contribute to expanding the support for the immediate commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. They underlined their expectations that the Conference on Disarmament will take this forward as a matter of priority in its work, in a manner consistent with CD/1299.

The participants also welcomed actions and efforts taken thus far, inter alia, voluntary moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of such fissile material and substantive proposals on an FMCT, as important interim steps pending the entry into force of an FMCT, as well as reporting on stockpiles of civil plutonium. In this regard, they encouraged relevant States to take concrete actions, including engaging in transparency and confidence building measures, as called for by over 140 nations in UN General Assembly resolution 78/28 in 2023.

The Friends of FMCT, a cross-regional group with the participation of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, remain open to working with countries and partners to advance the long overdue objective of launching negotiations of an FMCT.

**Joint Statement by Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands on L.31, "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" to the First Committee of the 79th session of the UN**

[New York, 1 November 2024 ]

We are delivering this statement on behalf of Canada, Germany, and The Netherlands, the main sponsors of this year's decision "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". The resolution on this topic was supported by 155 states last year.

A treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons would make an important contribution to advancing nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. Our shared objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons will require trust and political will – but it will also require tangible, verifiable steps, including controlling and, ultimately, eliminating fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Year after year, we have underscored the urgent need to make substantial, practical, and verifiable progress. States that do not possess nuclear weapons, and that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), already have controls in place that amount to a de facto Fissile Material Treaty: we neither produce fissile material intended for nuclear weapons, nor stockpile any fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

Therefore, those states that produce and possess fissile materials for nuclear weapons must take the initiative on this issue.

Important work in support of treaty negotiations has already been done by the Group of Governmental Experts (2014-2015) and the High-Level Expert Preparatory Group (2017-2018). Since then, we have continued to call for the immediate start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

This year, we have reached the regrettable conclusion that there is currently not enough support amongst the key states to negotiate a treaty. We believe that there is insufficient justification to introduce another resolution at the 79th session of UNGA First Committee.

Instead, we introduced a decision this year. The operative elements of the 2023 resolution remain valid, but do not need to be repeated. However, it is clear that political will is urgently needed to break this deadlock.

We welcome the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs' recent outreach to the states that produce or possess fissile material for nuclear weapons. This follows the adoption of OP4 in our resolution last year, which called for transparency and confidence building measures among those states.

In this context, we also welcome the launch of the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty at its high-level meeting in New York last September. This is a cross-regional group proposed by Japan that aims to maintain and enhance political support for a treaty. We look forward to actively participating in the efforts of the group.

We continue to believe that the CD would be the most appropriate venue for negotiating a treaty. However, given the CD's lack of progress over the past 30 years, the international community, including those states that possess and produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, should be open to other venues.

Summarizing, we call on all states that produce or possess fissile material for nuclear weapons to:

- adopt moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
- engage in transparency and confidence-building measures among themselves with a view to launching negotiations, with the Secretary-General and the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs facilitating any such efforts; and
- start negotiations in good faith.

The broader UN membership has an important role in this regard.

We urge you to join us in holding to account – without exception – all those states that produce or possess fissile material for nuclear weapons.

**Section 5 Other documents**

**Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy. COP**

[Dubai, UAE, 02 December 2023]

*Recognizing* the key role of nuclear energy in achieving global net-zero greenhouse gas emissions / carbon neutrality by or around mid-century and in keeping a 1.5°C limit on temperature rise within reach and achieving Sustainable Development Goal 7;

*Recognizing* the importance of the applications of nuclear science and technology that contribute to monitoring climate change and tackling its impacts, and emphasizing the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in this regard;

*Recognizing* that nuclear energy is already the second-largest source of clean dispatchable baseload power, with benefits for energy security;

*Recognizing* that analyses from the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and World Nuclear Association show that global installed nuclear energy capacity must triple by 2050 in order to reach global net-zero emissions by the same year;

*Recognizing* that analysis from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change shows nuclear energy approximately tripling its global installed electrical capacity from 2020 to 2050 in the average 1.5°C scenario;

*Recognizing* that analysis from the International Energy Agency shows nuclear power more than doubling from 2020 to 2050 in global net-zero emissions by 2050 scenarios and shows that decreasing nuclear power would make reaching net zero more difficult and costly;

*Recognizing* that new nuclear technologies could occupy a small land footprint and can be sited where needed, partner well with renewable energy sources, and have additional flexibilities that support decarbonization beyond the power sector, including hard-to-abate industrial sectors;

*Recognizing* the IAEA's activities in supporting its Member States, upon request, to include nuclear power in their national energy planning in a sustainable way that adheres to the highest standards of safety, security, and safeguards and its "Atoms4NetZero" initiative as an opportunity for stakeholders to exchange expertise;

*Recognizing* the importance of financing for the additional nuclear power capacity needed to keep a 1.5°C limit on temperature rise within reach;

*Recognizing* the need for high-level political engagement to spur further action on nuclear power;

**The Participants in this pledge:**

*Commit* to work together to advance a global aspirational goal of tripling nuclear energy capacity from 2020 by 2050, recognizing the different domestic circumstances of each Participant;

*Commit* to take domestic actions to ensure nuclear power plants are operated responsibly and in line with the highest standards of safety, sustainability, security, and non-proliferation, and that fuel waste is responsibly managed for the long term;

*Commit* to mobilize investments in nuclear power, including through innovative financing mechanisms;

*Invite* shareholders of the World Bank, international financial institutions, and regional development banks to encourage the inclusion of nuclear energy in their organizations' energy lending policies as needed, and to actively support nuclear power when they have such a mandate, and *encourage* regional bodies that have the mandate to do so to consider providing financial support to nuclear energy;

*Commit* to supporting the development and construction of nuclear reactors, such as small modular and other advanced reactors for power generation as well as wider industrial applications for

decarbonization, such as for hydrogen or synthetic fuels production;

*Recognize* the importance of promoting resilient supply chains, including of fuel, for safe and secure technologies used by nuclear power plants over their full life cycles;

*Recognize* the importance, where technically feasible and economically efficient, of extending the lifetimes of nuclear power plants that operate in line with the highest standards of safety, sustainability, security, and non-proliferation, as appropriate;

*Commit* to supporting responsible nations looking to explore new civil nuclear deployment under the highest standards of safety, sustainability, security, and non-proliferation;

*Welcome and encourage* complementary commitments from the private sector, non-governmental organizations, development banks, and financial institutions;

*Resolve* to review progress towards these commitments on an annual basis on the margins of the COP;

*Call* on other countries to join this declaration.

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### Declaration from First Nuclear Energy Summit

[Brussels, March 2024]

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We, the leaders of countries operating nuclear power plants, or expanding or embarking on or exploring the option of nuclear power, and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), gathered in Brussels for the inaugural Nuclear Energy Summit to reaffirm our strong commitment to nuclear energy as a key component of our global strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from both power and industrial sectors, ensure energy security, enhance energy resilience, and promote long-term sustainable development and clean energy transition. We are determined to do our utmost to fulfil this commitment through our active and direct engagement, in particular by enhancing cooperation with countries that opt to develop civil nuclear capacities in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in a nationally determined manner, including for transitioning away from fossil fuels, in a just, orderly and equitable manner, as outlined in the First Global Stocktake of the 28th United Nations Climate Change Conference.

Climate change presents an existential threat to our planet and all humankind. The warning signs are mounting worldwide, from raging wildfires to historic floods, making the need to achieve global net-zero greenhouse gas emissions increasingly urgent. In this regard, an increasing number of countries have set their targets for climate neutrality, carbon neutrality, greenhouse gas neutrality, or net zero emissions. The ambitious target of global net zero emissions necessitates a comprehensive approach to radically reduce emissions of the world's most emission-intensive sectors including electricity generation, transportation, and industry.

Nuclear energy is a reliable and dispatchable zero emission source of electricity generation and a firm backbone for clean energy systems to keep them resilient and sustainable. We praise the recognition at the 28th United Nations Climate Change Conference of nuclear energy as an essential component of a multifaceted and all-inclusive clean energy transition sufficient to reduce greenhouse gases in an effective, timely, and nationally determined manner. In particular, we welcome the inclusion of nuclear energy in the outcome of the First Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement and welcome the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy by 2050.

We commit to work to fully unlock the potential of nuclear energy by taking measures such as enabling conditions to support and competitively finance the lifetime extension of existing nuclear reactors, the construction of new nuclear power plants and the early deployment of advanced reactors, including small modular reactors worldwide while maintaining the highest levels of safety and security, in accordance with respective national regulations and circumstances. In this drive for more clean energy and innovation, we commit to support all countries, especially emerging nuclear ones, in their capacities and efforts to add nuclear energy to their energy mixes consistent with their different national needs, priorities, pathways, and approaches and create a more open, fair, balanced and inclusive environment for their development of nuclear energy, including its non-electrical applications, and to continue effectively implementing safeguards, consistent with Member States' national

legislation and respective international obligations.

We are committed to continuing our drive for technological innovation, further improving the operational performance, safety and economics of nuclear power plants, enhancing the resilience and security of global nuclear energy industrial and supply chains. We reaffirm our commitment to ensuring safe, secure and sustainable spent nuclear fuel management, radioactive waste management and disposal, in particular deep geological disposal, and decommissioning, including decommissioning by design. We call for an intensified collective effort on ensuring the security of energy supply and resilience of individual, regional, and multinational clean energy resources.

We are committed to creating a fair and open global market environment for nuclear power development to promote exchanges and cooperation among countries. We encourage nuclear regulators to enhance cooperation to enable timely deployment of advanced reactors, including small modular reactors. We emphasize the value of coordinated cooperation in nuclear fuel supply, nuclear power equipment manufacturing and resource security to ensure the stability of the nuclear energy industrial and supply chains.

We reiterate the role of the IAEA as the global centre for cooperation in the nuclear field, including leading to and promoting a strong and sustainable global framework for nuclear safety and security, and verifying adherence to respective safeguards obligations. In this regard, we stand ready to work with the IAEA to identify and provide the necessary resources needed for the fulfilment of these objectives, subject to the availability of funds and any applicable domestic legal requirements.

We support enhancing efforts to facilitate mobilization of public investments, where appropriate, and private investments towards additional nuclear power projects. We emphasize that concrete measures in support of nuclear energy may include, as appropriate, tools such as direct public financing, guarantees to debt and equity providers, schemes to share revenue and pricing risks. We call for greater inclusion of nuclear energy in the Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) policies in the international financial system, considering that it is one of the zero emission sources of power generation that can contribute substantially to decarbonize our societies and enhance a sustainable economic development.

We call upon relevant international organizations and institutions to support appropriate conditions for nuclear energy development. In particular, we invite multinational development banks, international financial institutions and regional bodies that have the mandate to do so to consider strengthening their support for financing nuclear energy projects and to support the establishment of a financial level playing field for all zero emission sources of energy generation.

To ensure the future availability of skilled nuclear sector professionals, we need to contribute further to nuclear education and research, and we consider of the utmost importance to train and retain a large and motivated workforce. Investment in skills, including re-skilling, through education and research is critical for the sector through the whole value chain.

We welcome and support the IAEA in convening, in cooperation with a Member State, another Nuclear Energy Summit in due course to maintain the momentum and continue building support for nuclear energy to decarbonize our world.

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### International Group of Eminent Persons for a World without Nuclear Weapons

[Tokyo, 31 March 2025]

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The danger of nuclear war looms larger than it has in decades. Rising geopolitical tensions, resurgent nuclear salience, and the advent of emerging technologies have brought us closer to the precipice, threatening to plunge the world into a perilous era of unrestrained arms races, with consequences extending beyond nuclear rearmament. Most alarming is the growing risk that an escalating conventional conflict could push us over the edge into nuclear use. It is time for us to face the fact that the consequences could be catastrophic and to take urgent action to prevent nuclear war.

Too often, nuclear weapons are discussed in abstract terms, with insufficient attention given to nuclear dangers. The Hibakusha have worked to correct this for several decades, highlighting the appalling inhumanity of the 1945 nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nearly eighty years later, we owe it to the Hibakusha and to ourselves to acknowledge the devastating impact that escalating war could have using today's weapons in our interconnected world; we must make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, and thus ensure that Nagasaki is the last place to experience nuclear devastation.

The 2026 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides a crucial opportunity for us to come together to take a collective step back from the nuclear precipice. Working for a positive RevCon outcome is vital following the failure to achieve consensus outcomes in 2015 and 2022. We must use this precious chance to reaffirm the core principles that underpin the NPT, which remains the strongest international bulwark against nuclear disaster. We must also use it as an opportunity to adopt bold, actionable measures to prevent nuclear war and pursue a world without nuclear weapons.

### CORE PRINCIPLES

Respecting the following core principles will help us chart a safer course and a path toward a world without nuclear weapons:

1. **Compliance with the UN Charter:** All states have an obligation to comply with the United Nations (UN) Charter in its entirety, including by not committing acts of aggression and by renouncing the use of force for the acquisition of territory.
2. **International Law:** All states must comply with applicable international law including international humanitarian law at all times.
3. **Responsibility to Lead:** All states bear responsibility to work for a world without nuclear weapons, but the states with the biggest responsibility to lead are the states that possess nuclear weapons.
4. **Multilateral Cooperation:** All states must foster a culture of dialogue and cooperation to uphold and reinforce the multilateral non-proliferation regime, with the NPT at its centre. They also should work together to ensure that it is agile in responding to emerging challenges and opportunities, including those related to technological innovation.
5. **Moving Beyond Deterrence:** All states must keep working to move away from dependence on nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence has not proven to be, nor should it be, the final form of security.

The core principles set out above are currently being disregarded by some states, with grave and worsening consequences. All states must reassert these principles and demonstrate their adherence to them.

### URGENT STEPS

To address this dangerous situation and underpin our collective efforts to pursue a world without nuclear weapons, states must take urgent steps to:

1. Prevent war and hence nuclear use.
2. Stop nuclear arms racing and reduce proliferation risks.
3. Ensure a constructive outcome from the 2026 NPT RevCon.

#### 1) Prevent nuclear war

Nuclear-armed states have a primary responsibility to prevent nuclear use. We, the IGEP, call on them to take the following urgent steps to reduce the risk of nuclear war:

- i. Take measures to avoid direct military confrontation and prioritize nuclear restraint, including by not making explicit and implicit nuclear threats.
- ii. Engage in sustained strategic dialogues to address mutual security concerns and avoid misperception leading to conflict and

conflict escalation.

- iii. Prioritize crisis prevention.
- iv. Uphold moratorium on explosive nuclear testing.
- v. Ensure effective human oversight in all decisions related to nuclear weapons.
- vi. Refrain from cyber-attacks against nuclear facilities and command-and-control networks.
- vii. Provide pre-launch notifications on missile and space vehicle launches.

**All states that do not possess nuclear weapons can and should help reduce the risk of nuclear war. They must:**

- viii. Urge the nuclear-armed states to take the urgent steps outlined above.
- ix. Fully implement the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), including via pre-launch notifications.
- x. Explore, with nuclear-armed states, measures that would reduce nuclear salience and increase confidence in no-first use, negative security assurances, and other declaratory commitments.

**All states must:**

- xi. Avoid taking military action that would cause radioactive release.

#### 2) Stop nuclear arms racing and reduce proliferation risks

Progress toward a world without nuclear weapons is being undermined by renewed nuclear arms racing and proliferation dynamics. All states have a responsibility to address these dynamics, in line with the core principles. We call on states to implement the following steps to reduce nuclear salience and demonstrate a shared commitment to pursue a world without nuclear weapons:

- i. Russia and the United States engage in strategic dialogue and keep New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) limits while negotiating a follow-on framework for arms control.
- ii. China, France and the United Kingdom engage in discussion on their respective conceptions of minimum deterrence, as a contribution to arms control.
- iii. Nuclear-weapon states reinvigorate the P5 process to explore new forms of arms control and invite all other nuclear-armed states to participate.
- iv. Nuclear-armed states improve nuclear transparency to reduce mistrust, including by sharing information on nuclear arsenals, doctrines, postures, and future development plans.
- v. Nuclear-armed states engage with each other to discuss ways to reduce the risks associated with military use of Artificial Intelligence (AI), in particular as applied to nuclear command, control and communications (NC3), including voluntarily sharing risk assessments and best practices of risk management.
- vi. All states engage in and sustain dialogues on threat perceptions and security concerns.
- vii. All states strengthen measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems by any state or non-state actor.
- viii. All states engage in diplomatic efforts to address proliferation concerns in the Middle East.
- ix. All stakeholders engage in diplomatic efforts to address concerns associated with the Iranian nuclear programs, bearing in mind that the principle of restraint in the use of force to resolve issues must be maintained and that once an agreement is reached, all stakeholders should implement it in good faith.
- x. All stakeholders promote and facilitate engagement on the Korean peninsula aimed at mutual reassurance of non-aggression and the establishment of a multilateral dialogue on regional security, while launching a diplomatic effort to reduce nuclear risks in the region, leading to denuclearization.
- xi. All states work to bridge deterrence and disarmament perspectives, including those of states parties to the NPT and to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), by engaging

widely in discussion in relevant international forums on deterrence assumptions, the consistency of nuclear policies with international humanitarian law, effects of nuclear war, and on alternative measures to maintain security that can lead to nuclear disarmament.

xii. All states support and promote initiatives that raise awareness among leaders and publics about nuclear dangers, including the risk of proliferation and profound consequences of nuclear use.

xiii. All states encourage visits of leaders, youth, and others to Hiroshima and Nagasaki to better comprehend the effects of nuclear use.

### 3) Work for a constructive 2026 NPT Review Conference

The nuclear non-proliferation regime must be preserved and strengthened to enhance international peace and security, reduce nuclear dangers, and facilitate movement toward a world without nuclear weapons. States must work together to ensure a constructive 2026 NPT Review Conference. We call on states parties to incorporate the following commitments into the 2026 Final Document and to work to achieve a consensus outcome:

i. Commit to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, recalling the first UN General Assembly resolution and consensus outcome documents adopted at past NPT Review Conferences, including the 2010 Action Plan.

ii. Uphold the moratorium on nuclear explosive testing and work harder to achieve entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and encourage nuclear weapon states to voluntarily provide unilateral or reciprocal transparency at their nuclear testing sites.

iii. Agree to a moratorium on producing fissile material for nuclear weapons, and hold high-level meetings to underscore the urgency of concluding a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).

iv. Strengthen NPT accountability by submitting more detailed national reports during the 2030 NPT review cycle to help build confidence through increasing the transparency of nuclear arsenals, doctrines and postures, and clarifying steps taken to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles.

v. Agree to submit five-year, forward-looking national action plans outlining steps for fulfilling NPT obligations and commitments including concrete steps/measures toward nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament.

vi. Work to raise awareness of the effects of nuclear war, including by discussing the findings of the study requested by UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/79/238 ('Nuclear war effects and scientific research'), and highlight harms to the environment and public health of peoples and nations not involved in the conflict.

vii. Encourage all states to invest in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education.

viii. Respect the status of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) and strengthen them by signing and ratifying the relevant protocols.

ix. Work together to address gaps in the non-proliferation regime to improve its agility to address challenges and opportunities associated with emerging technologies.

### CONCLUSION

Nuclear dangers are accelerating with alarming speed—demanding not only sober reflection, but bold, coordinated action. The enduring message of the Hibakusha—and the recent awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Nihon Hidankyo (Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations)—remind us of the humanitarian imperative and moral urgency to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. This recognition is not only tributes to the past but urgent an urgent call to the present. As we approach the 2026 NPT Review Conference, the international community has a pivotal opportunity to step back from the nuclear precipice, reaffirm shared principles, and take concrete, cooperative measures to reduce nuclear dangers, enhance security and revitalize disarmament commitments. It is the earnest hope of all members of the IGEP that this document will serve as a constructive contribution toward inspiring renewed commitment, fostering dialogue, and guiding collective progress on the long and challenging path to a world free of nuclear weapons.