

J – 80th Session of the UN General Assembly

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First Committee Resolution, 'Possible risks of the integration of artificial intelligence into command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons'

A/C.1/80/L.56

16 October 2025

Vote: Yes 118, No 9, Abstain 44

1. *Demands* that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, human control and oversight is maintained over command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons, including those that integrate artificial intelligence technology;
2. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, *urges* those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so, to adopt and publish national policies and doctrines explicitly affirming and operationalizing that command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons that integrate artificial intelligence will remain subject to human control and oversight and that such systems will not autonomously initiate decisions on the use of nuclear weapons, and, without prejudice to national security, to voluntarily inform relevant forums about these measures and implementation mechanisms;
3. *Stresses* the urgent need to address and develop, within the respective mandates of the disarmament machinery, meetings of parties to relevant treaties and other related multilateral and regional forums, common understandings, confidence-building measures and other appropriate measures to ensure that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, human control and oversight is maintained over command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons;
4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its eighty-first session, under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament", a sub-item entitled "Possible risks of the integration of artificial intelligence into command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons".

First Committee Resolution, 'Modalities of the 2026 meeting on victim assistance and environmental remediation'

A/C.1/80/L.57

[16 October 2025]

Vote: Yes 170, No 4, Abstain 5

1. *Decides* that the formal meeting will be held in early 2026 at United Nations Headquarters, with conference services and with the participation of Member States, observer States and observers of the United Nations General Assembly, where they will share their relevant experience;
2. *Also decides* that the Secretary-General shall invite civil society representatives, including from organizations accredited to the Economic and Social Council, as well as relevant United Nations agencies, scientists, representatives of communities affected by the use, production and testing of nuclear weapons, and academia;
3. *Encourages* participation at the highest possible level;
4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its eighty-first session, under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament", the sub-item entitled "Addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons: providing victim assistance and environmental remediation to Member States affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons".

First Committee Resolution, 'Establishment of

the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification'

A/C.1/80/L.59

16 October 2025

Vote: Yes 170, No 2, Abstain 2

1. *Decides* to establish the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification within the United Nations, consisting of 21 members, participating in their personal capacity and without prejudice to national positions in future negotiations;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to select the experts through a wide call for nominations from Member States, on the basis of their outstanding technical expertise and on as wide a geographical basis as possible and giving due regard to gender balance;
3. *Decides* that the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts will hold four 2-week sessions in Geneva and Vienna, from January 2027 to September 2029;
4. *Also decides* that the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts should seek to achieve consensus in its report, and that, whenever consensus cannot be achieved, each expert will be entitled to incorporate his or her own view;
5. *Requests* the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts to take the actions required to accomplish the following objectives:
 - (a) Identify and consider technical challenges in and possible approaches to nuclear disarmament verification in terms of tools, techniques, processes and procedures;
 - (b) Appraise knowledge on nuclear disarmament verification derived from past and ongoing initiatives on nuclear disarmament verification or related areas;
 - (c) Enable States to participate in technical discussions on nuclear disarmament verification on a voluntary basis;
 - (d) Incorporate and preserve knowledge on nuclear disarmament verification within the United Nations system and provide assurances to the international community that States are focused on this matter;
6. *Also requests* the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts, upon its first meeting, to approve its programme of work, taking into account the following indicative areas:
 - (a) Declarations, including initial and progress declarations;
 - (b) Removal of deployed nuclear warheads;
 - (c) Dismantlement and storage of warhead components;
 - (d) Conversion of nuclear material with classified characteristics;
 - (e) Elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapon-related facilities;
 - (f) Placement of nuclear material and facilities under international safeguards;
 - (g) Verification of the correctness and completeness of the baseline declarations of nuclear material once the State concerned declares that it no longer possesses nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;
 - (h) Means of delivery of nuclear weapons;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide, through the Office for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat, all necessary assistance to the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts, including the provision of relevant documents;

8. *Invites* the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to provide technical assistance to the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts;
9. *Requests* the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs to provide a briefing to the General Assembly at its eighty-first session on the implementation of the present resolution;
10. *Requests* the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts to report on its work to the General Assembly at its eighty-fourth session, with a view to making a possible decision on the extension of the activities of the Group;
11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to bring the report of the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts to the attention of all Member States, as well as to the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and other relevant organizations, and specifically invites the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, to reflect on the report as appropriate;
12. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its eighty-first session an item entitled "Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification".

First Committee Resolution, 'Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East'

A/C.1/80/L.1
[8 October 2025]

Vote in General Assembly: Yes 173, No 3, Abstain 3

See Chapter D

First Committee Resolution, 'The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East'

A/C.1/80/L.2
[8 October 2025]

Vote: Yes 145, No 6, Abstain 30

See Chapter D

First Committee Resolution, 'Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons'

A/C.1/80/L.4
[16 October 2025]

Voting result in the General Assembly as a whole: [147-5-26](#)

1. *Urges* all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to make every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric concerning the use of nuclear weapons, based on the recognition that all States have a shared interest in averting a nuclear war;
2. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to honour and respect all existing negative security assurances undertaken by them, including in connection with the treaties and relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consistent with their respective obligations and commitments;
3. *Calls upon* all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; to immediately pursue enhanced transparency measures by providing information in line with Action 21 of the 2010 Action Plan, related to concrete data on their nuclear arsenals and capabilities,

without prejudice to their national security, as well as national measures related to nuclear disarmament including their nuclear policies, doctrines and nuclear risk reduction measures, including status of production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and to provide frequent and detailed reporting on the implementation of the Treaty and opportunities for discussion of all nuclear-weapon States' reports, taking into account Actions 20 and 21 of the 2010 Action Plan and paragraph 187 (35) of [NPT/CONF.2020/WP.77](#) as a useful reference, recognizing the efforts made by some nuclear-weapon States in this regard; and calls upon nuclear-weapon States, especially those that have yet to do so, to engage with non-nuclear-weapon States in a meaningful dialogue on transparency regarding their nuclear arsenals and avoiding an arms race, including through a regular process for an open explanation of national reports coupled with an interactive discussion with non-nuclear-weapon States and civil society participants at future meetings in the review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, stressing the importance for all nuclear-weapon States to continuously engage in such practices;

4. *Emphasizes* that avoiding a new nuclear arms race, the risk of which is increasing, accompanied by the rapid and non-transparent quantitative expansion and opaque qualitative improvement of nuclear forces by some nuclear-weapon States, is vital in getting closer to a world free of nuclear weapons, and urges all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, regardless of their location, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures;

5. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to immediately commence and bring to an early conclusion, negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with [CD/1299](#) and the mandate contained therein, and upon Conference members to engage in relevant activities of the Conference towards that goal, further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to declare or maintain voluntary moratoriums on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as encourages all States that have not yet done so to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in line with Action 18 of the 2010 Action Plan, and, consistent with Action 16 of the 2010 Action Plan, encourages nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes;

6. *Emphasizes* that the transparency of the management of civil plutonium must be maintained and any attempt to produce or support the production of plutonium for military programmes under the guise of civilian programmes undermines the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, underscores the importance of the implementation of the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC 549), and, in this regard, calls upon all States that committed to reporting annually their holdings of all plutonium in peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA to fulfil those commitments;

7. *Urges* all States that have yet to sign and/or ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to do so in all expediency, particularly the now nine States listed in its Annex 2, whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force, and, pending the entry into force of the Treaty, to refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and any other action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty, and to declare or maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions, as well as to assist the

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in its work in preparing for the entry into force of the Treaty;

8. *Calls upon* all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to commit to further identifying, exploring and implementing effective risk reduction measures necessary to mitigate risks relating to nuclear weapons use that arise from miscalculation, misperception, miscommunication or accident, inter alia, to intensify dialogue among and between the nuclear-weapon States and with the non-nuclear-weapon States, to develop and make every effort to implement effective crisis prevention and management arrangements, mechanisms and tools, to maintain the practice of not targeting each other or any other State with nuclear weapons and keep them at the lowest possible alert levels, while noting that risk reduction is neither a substitute nor a prerequisite for nuclear disarmament;

9. *Also calls upon* all States to continue their strong support for initiatives to develop multilateral disarmament verification and capacity-building in support of nuclear disarmament and as an effective step towards achieving the objectives of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and to further conceptual and practical work on nuclear disarmament verification, taking into account the importance of partnerships between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States on this matter and encouraging broad participation by all States in such initiatives, and welcomes that the Group of Governmental Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues adopted its final report by consensus in May 2023;

10. *Underscores* the importance of complying with the obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and addressing all non-compliance matters in order to uphold the integrity of the Treaty and the authority of the safeguards system;

11. *Reaffirms* the commitment to achieving the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, as well as all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes, of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions, and the obligation of all Member States to fully implement all relevant Security Council resolutions, notes with serious concern the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of 9 September 2022 of an updated law on nuclear policy lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, and supplementation in September 2023 of nuclear force-building policy in its Constitution as well as the revelation of images of nuclear-related facilities including uranium enrichment facilities in September 2024 and January 2025, urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return at an early date to, and fully comply with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and IAEA safeguards, and confirms that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot and will never be recognized as a nuclear-weapon State, as stated in Security Council resolutions [1718 \(2006\)](#) of 14 October 2006 and [1874 \(2009\)](#) of 12 June 2009, and in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

12. *Calls upon* all States to facilitate efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education, which is a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, inter alia, efforts in which the young generation can actively engage, including through dialogue platforms, mentoring, internships, fellowships, scholarships, model events and youth group activities, as well as to raise awareness of the realities of the use of nuclear weapons, including through, among others, visits by leaders, youth and others to and interactions with communities and people, including the hibakusha, those who have suffered the use of nuclear weapons irrespective of their nationalities and origins, and who pass on their experiences to the future generations through long-standing grass-roots efforts around the world, including those of Nihon Hidankyo, recognized with the Nobel Peace Prize 2024, and welcomes concrete

measures in this regard, inter alia, the Young Professionals Network of P5 academics, the Youth4Disarmament Initiative, "Disarmament education: resources for learning" and the "Youth Leader Fund for a world without nuclear weapons";

13. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its eighty-first session, under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament", the sub-item entitled "Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons".

First Committee Resolution, 'Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons'

A/C.1/80/L.17

[16 October 2025]

Voting result in the General Assembly as a whole: [135-11-33](#)

1. *Stresses* that it is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons never be used again, under any circumstances;
2. *Emphasizes* that the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be used again is their total elimination;
3. *Stresses* that the catastrophic effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or design, cannot be adequately addressed;
4. *Expresses its firm belief* that awareness of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons must underpin all approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament;
5. *Calls upon* all States, in their shared responsibility, to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, to prevent their vertical and horizontal proliferation and to achieve nuclear disarmament;
6. *Urges* States to exert all efforts to totally eliminate the threat of these weapons of mass destruction;
7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its eighty-first session, under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament", the sub-item entitled "Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons".

First Committee Resolution, 'Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons'

A/C.1/80/L.18

[16 October 2025]

Voting result in the General Assembly as a whole: [119-45-12](#)

1. *Recalls* the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017;
2. *Welcomes* the entry into force of the Treaty on 22 January 2021;
3. *Notes* that the Treaty has been open for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York since 20 September 2017;
4. *Welcomes* that already 95 States had signed the Treaty and 74 States had become Parties to it as at 10 October 2025, and also welcomes ongoing universalization efforts;
5. *Recalls* the adoption of the Vienna Action Plan at the first Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, held in Vienna, Austria, from 21 to 23 June 2022;
6. *Welcomes* the convening of the third Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, held at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 3 to 7 March 2025, which examined the status and implementation of the Treaty and considered the progress towards achieving its objectives, purpose and the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons, as well as the implementation of the Vienna Action Plan;
7. *Also welcomes* the decisions taken at the third Meeting of States Parties, including the adoption of the declaration entitled

“Strengthening our commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons amid the rising global instability”, as well as the ongoing informal intersessional work to implement the Treaty, the Vienna Action Plan and the Treaty’s underlying rationale regarding the humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons and the resulting security concerns;

8. *Further welcomes* the participation of States signatories, as well as of other States not Party to the Treaty, the relevant entities of the United Nations system, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organizations at the third Meeting of States Parties as observers;

9. *Welcomes* the ongoing work of the Treaty’s Scientific Advisory Group and the update to its report on the status and developments regarding nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon risks, the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and related issues;

10. *Confirms* that the first Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will be held at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 30 November to 4 December 2026;

11. *Expresses its gratitude* to the Secretary-General for his support provided to date, and requests him to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, as may be required, for the first Review Conference and its informal intersessional process;

12. *Calls upon* all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date;

13. *Calls upon* those States in a position to do so to promote adherence to the Treaty and its norms and underlying rationale through bilateral, subregional, regional and multilateral contacts, outreach and other means;

14. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as depositary of the Treaty, to report to the General Assembly at its eighty-first session on the status of signature and ratification, acceptance, approval or accession of the Treaty;

15. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its eighty-first session, under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, the sub-item entitled “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”.

First Committee Resolution, ‘Nuclear disarmament’

A/C.1/80/L.44
[15 October 2025]

Voting result in the General Assembly as a whole: 114-44-19

1. *Urges* all nuclear-weapon States to take effective disarmament measures to achieve the total elimination of all nuclear weapons at the earliest possible time;

2. *Reaffirms* that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are substantively interrelated and mutually reinforcing, that the two processes must go hand in hand and that there is a genuine need for a systematic and progressive process of nuclear disarmament;

3. *Welcomes and encourages* the efforts to establish new nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world, including the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned, which is an effective measure for limiting the further spread of nuclear weapons geographically and contributes to the cause of nuclear disarmament;

4. *Encourages* States Parties to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the nuclear-weapon

States to intensify ongoing efforts to resolve all outstanding issues, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Treaty;

5. *Recognizes* that there is a genuine need to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

6. *Urges* the nuclear-weapon States to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems;

7. *Also urges* the nuclear-weapon States, as an interim measure, to de-alert and deactivate immediately their nuclear weapons and to take other concrete measures to reduce further the operational status of their nuclear-weapon systems, while stressing that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in and the total elimination of nuclear weapons;

8. *Reiterates its call upon* the nuclear-weapon States to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time;

9. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to agree on an internationally and legally binding instrument on a joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons;

10. *Urges* the nuclear-weapon States to commence plurilateral negotiations among themselves at an appropriate stage on further deep reductions of their nuclear weapons, in an irreversible, verifiable and transparent manner, as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament;

11. *Underlines* the importance of applying the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to the process of nuclear disarmament;

12. *Also underlines* the importance of the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States Parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty, and the reaffirmation by the States Parties that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

13. *Calls for* the full and effective implementation of the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference;

14. *Also calls for* the full implementation of the action plan as set out in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly the 22-point action plan on nuclear disarmament;

15. *Urges* the nuclear-weapon States to carry out further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons, including on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

16. *Calls for* the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, in the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein;

17. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to commence as early as possible its substantive work during its 2026 session, on the basis of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work that takes into consideration all the real and existing priorities in the field of disarmament and arms control, including the immediate

commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention;

18. *Calls for* the conclusion of an international legal instrument on unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances;

19. *Also calls for* the early entry into force, universalization and strict observance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a contribution to nuclear disarmament, while welcoming the latest ratification by Papua New Guinea on 13 March 2024;

20. *Reiterates its call upon* the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in 2026 and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time;

21. *Calls for* the convening, as soon as possible, of a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to review the progress made in this regard;

22. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its eighty-first session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

23. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its eighty-first session, under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, the sub-item entitled “Nuclear disarmament”.

First Committee Resolution, ‘Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments’

A/C.1/80/L.55
[16 October 2025]

Voting result in the General Assembly as a whole: 130-39-12

1. *Condemns unequivocally* all nuclear threats, whether explicit or implicit, and irrespective of the circumstances, and calls upon all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to reject any normalization of nuclear rhetoric and, in particular, the threat of use of nuclear weapons, which only serves to undermine the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and is against the Charter of the United Nations;

2. *Stresses* the fundamental role of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in achieving nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, and looks forward to achieving substantive progress during the 2026 Review Conference, in order to strengthen the Treaty and its review process, overcoming the obstacles that prevented a substantive outcome in the two previous Review Conferences held in 2015 and 2022;

3. *Reiterates* that each article of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is binding on the respective States Parties at all times and in all circumstances and that all States Parties should be held fully accountable with respect to strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty;

4. *Reaffirms* the continued validity of the decisions, resolutions and commitments as agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls upon all States Parties, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to reaffirm and implement those decisions, resolutions and commitments;

5. *Strongly urges* nuclear-weapon States to implement the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and as a means to ensure full implementation of article VI of the Treaty;

6. *Urges* all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to implement their article VI obligations and to pursue multilateral negotiations without delay on effective measures for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world, recalling in particular the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to accelerating concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament;

7. *Recognizes* the need for an institutional mechanism to monitor the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations;

8. *Calls upon* all States to give due prominence to the humanitarian imperatives that underpin nuclear disarmament and to the urgency of achieving it, including new evidence presented at the Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, and those imperatives should inform all deliberations, decisions and actions relating to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, including within the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

9. *Urges* the nuclear-weapon States to make concrete reductions in the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, pending their total elimination as agreed by the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the outcome documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, and calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to include such information in their regular reporting details regarding progress towards this end;

10. *Calls upon* other States Parties to the Treaty that maintain a role for nuclear weapons in their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies to provide standardized information at regular intervals on, inter alia, measures taken to reduce the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, the number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed, and alert status) of nuclear warheads within their territories, where applicable, and the number and type of delivery vehicles within their territories, where applicable;

11. *Calls upon* nuclear-weapon States to halt the quantitative increases and qualitative improvement of their nuclear arsenals and the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, and their means of delivery, including those that increase the risk of escalation;

12. *Urges* all nuclear-weapon States to immediately lower the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems in a verifiable and transparent manner with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert status;

13. *Encourages* all States that are part of regional alliances that include nuclear-weapon States to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their collective security doctrines, pending their total elimination;

14. *Encourages* nuclear-weapon States to apply the agreed interrelated principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility in the implementation of their obligations and undertakings, including those agreed by the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at its 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, taking into account that they are strongly interrelated and are not an end in themselves and are not a prerequisite to commence nuclear disarmament;

15. *Stresses* the necessity for enhanced transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of their article VI obligations and nuclear disarmament-related commitments, and urges nuclear-weapon States to implement their nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments, both qualitative and quantitative, in a manner that strengthens accountability and enables all States Parties to regularly monitor progress, including through a standard detailed reporting format, thereby enhancing transparency and increasing mutual confidence, and facilitating the evidence-based evaluation of progress towards the full implementation of article VI and nuclear disarmament commitments;

16. *Urges* the nuclear-weapon States to voluntarily present, jointly or individually, implementation plans for the commitments and undertakings agreed to under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including time frames and benchmarks for progress;

17. *Also urges* the nuclear-weapon States, pending the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals to which they have unequivocally committed, to remove all operational nuclear weapons from high alert status and to put in place, as a matter of urgency, appropriate legal and procedural safeguards aimed at reducing the risk of a nuclear detonation by accident, miscalculation or design;

18. *Further urges* the nuclear-weapon States to report at least twice during a Review Conference cycle at appropriate intervals, and to include in their reports to be submitted during the eleventh review cycle of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons concrete and detailed information concerning the implementation of their obligations and commitments on nuclear disarmament;

19. *Encourages* States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to improve the measurability of the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments, including agreement on but not limited to measures on improved and more structured reporting by the nuclear-weapon States, tools such as a set of benchmarks and timelines and/or similar criteria, in order to ensure and facilitate the objective evaluation of progress, as well as the establishment of a structured dialogue on this issue at the meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and at the Review Conference on these improved and more structured reports, facilitated by the Chairs of the Preparatory Committee meetings, who will provide a joint report to each Review Conference that includes specific recommendations, targets and indicators, to improve the monitoring of and reporting on article VI and disarmament-related commitments;

20. *Encourages* the nuclear-weapon States, as part of their national reporting, to include details on their plans related to the modernization of nuclear weapons; their nuclear capabilities, including quantity, type and status of nuclear warheads, as well as delivery vehicles; doctrinal issues; risk reduction measures; de-alerting measures; quantity of fissile material; and the number and type of weapons and delivery systems they have disarmed;

21. *Encourages* further steps by all nuclear-weapon States to ensure the irreversible removal of all fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes, and calls upon all States to support, within the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the development of appropriate nuclear disarmament verification capabilities and legally binding verification arrangements, thereby ensuring that such material remains permanently outside military programmes in a verifiable and irreversible manner;

22. *Calls upon* all States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work towards the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is inextricably linked to the indefinite extension of the Treaty, and which remains valid until fully implemented;

23. *Urges* the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction as contained in the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, including through support for the convening of the conference on the establishment of such a zone;

24. *Calls upon* all concerned parties referred to in decision 73/546 of 22 December 2018 to actively engage in the sessions of the conference to elaborate a treaty to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons

of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by all States of the region;

25. *Calls upon* all States Parties to spare no effort to achieve the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in this regard urges India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions, and to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and further calls upon South Sudan to join the Treaty at the earliest opportunity;

26. *Urges* the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfil its commitments, to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, to return, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to adhere to its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, with a view to achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful, complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and calls for diplomatic efforts to this end;

27. *Calls upon* both Parties to the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) to urgently extend the Treaty, to ensure that current limits are not abandoned, to re-engage in dialogue and to ensure its full and effective implementation, and thereafter to urgently resume negotiations on a successor agreement;

28. *Calls upon* all Member States to reflect on the vast amount of resources dedicated to the maintenance, development and modernization of nuclear arsenals and to consider whether these resources could be better utilized in pursuit of a better future as envisaged in the Sustainable Development Goals;

29. *Calls upon* Member States to continue to support efforts to identify, elaborate, negotiate and implement further effective legally binding measures for nuclear disarmament, inter alia, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and welcomes the outcomes of the Meetings of States Parties to the Treaty, including the action plan of 2022, its political declaration and decisions;

30. *Urges* all States to exert all efforts to advance diplomatic dialogue and work together towards overcoming obstacles that are inhibiting substantive work within the international disarmament machinery to advance the agenda of nuclear disarmament, particularly through multilateral negotiations;

31. *Recommends* that additional measures be taken to advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education, in particular to increase awareness of the risks and catastrophic impacts and humanitarian consequences of any nuclear detonation, recognizing the important contributions made by academia, civil society and victims of nuclear weapons to this end;

32. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its eighty-first session, under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament", the sub-item entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" and to review the implementation of the present resolution at that session.

First Committee Resolution, 'Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty'

A/C.1/76/L.43
[15 October 2025]

The General Assembly,

[Eds...]

1. Stresses the vital importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions, in order to achieve the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

2. Welcomes the contributions by the signatory States to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, in particular its efforts to fulfil its mandate to ensure that the verification regime of the Treaty will be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty upon its entry into force, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty, and encourages their continuation;
3. Underlines the need to maintain momentum towards the completion of all elements of the verification regime and put into place plans and adequate resources for its long-term sustainability;
4. Urges all States not to carry out nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, to maintain their moratoriums in this regard and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty, while stressing that these measures do not have the same permanent and legally binding effect as the entry into force of the Treaty;
5. Reiterates its condemnation of the six nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions, urges full compliance with the obligations under those resolutions, including that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea abandon its nuclear weapons programme and not conduct any further nuclear tests, reaffirms its support for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, welcomes all efforts and dialogue to this end, and encourages all parties to continue diplomatic efforts;
6. Urges all States to refrain from any action that may hamper progress towards the entry into force of the Treaty and its universalization;
7. Also urges all States that have not yet signed or ratified, or that have signed but not yet ratified, the Treaty, in particular the nine whose ratification is needed for its entry into force, to sign and ratify it as soon as possible and to accelerate their ratification processes with a view to ensuring their earliest successful conclusion;
8. Encourages further expressions from among the remaining States whose ratification is needed for the Treaty to enter into force of their intention to pursue and complete the ratification process;
9. Welcomes the reappointment of Robert Floyd as the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization by States members of the governing body of the Preparatory Commission;
10. Urges all States to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level and, where in a position to do so, to promote adherence to the Treaty through bilateral and joint outreach, seminars and other means;
11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its eighty-first session the item entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty".