

I – Bilateral Measures – Russia-United States

Section 1: New START

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

[Signed 8 April 2010 Prague;
Entered into Force 5 February 2011 Munich]

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Believing that global challenges and threats require new approaches to interaction across the whole range of their strategic relations,

Working therefore to forge a new strategic relationship based on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation,

Desiring to bring their respective nuclear postures into alignment with this new relationship, and endeavoring to reduce further the role and importance of nuclear weapons,

Committed to the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and to the achievement of the historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat,

Expressing strong support for on-going global efforts in non-proliferation,

Seeking to preserve continuity in, and provide new impetus to, the step-by-step process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms while maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals, and with a view to expanding this process in the future, including to a multilateral approach,

Guided by the principle of indivisible security and convinced that measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will enhance predictability and stability, and thus the security of both Parties,

Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties,

Mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability,

Taking into account the positive effect on the world situation of the significant, verifiable reduction in nuclear arsenals at the turn of the 21st century,

Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance with the obligations under this Treaty, adapted, simplified, and made less costly in comparison to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,

Recognizing that the START Treaty has been implemented by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, and that the reduction levels envisaged by the START Treaty were achieved,

Deeply appreciating the contribution of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to nuclear disarmament and to strengthening international peace and security as non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968,

Welcoming the implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Protocol.
2. Definitions of terms used in this Treaty and its Protocol are provided in Part One of the Protocol.

Article II

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed:
 - (a) 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;
 - (b) 1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;
 - (c) 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.
2. Each Party shall have the right to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.

Article III

1. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph (a) of Article I1 of this Treaty:
 - (a) Each deployed ICBM shall be counted as one.
 - (b) Each deployed SLBM shall be counted as one.
 - (c) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.
2. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article I1 of this Treaty:
 - (a) For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall be the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and on deployed SLBMs.
 - (b) One nuclear warhead shall be counted for each deployed heavy bomber.
3. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph (c) of Article I1 of this Treaty:
 - (a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as one.
 - (b) Each non-deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as one.
 - (c) Each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as one.
 - (d) Each non-deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as one.
 - (e) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.
 - (f) Each non-deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.
4. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBMs:
 - (a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type
 - (b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
 - (c) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
 - (d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an

ICBM or SLBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM or SLBM is installed in it, until an ICBM or SLBM has been launched from it, or until an ICBM or SLBM has been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister shall not be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM if it contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type.

5. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to this Treaty as follows:

- (a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility;
- (b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility;
- (c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when the silo door is first installed and closed;
- (d) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility;
- (e) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched;
- (f) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which components of such a heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to such heavy bomber airframes.

6. ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers shall cease to be subject to this Treaty in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. ICBMs or SLBMs of an existing type shall cease to be subject to this Treaty if all ICBM or SLBM launchers of a type intended for such ICBMs or SLBMs have been eliminated or converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty.

7. For the purposes of this Treaty:

- (a) A missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the provisions of this Treaty apply.
- (b) Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments shall be distinguishable from a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.
- (c) Heavy bombers of the same type shall cease to be subject to this Treaty or to the limitations thereof when the last heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments of that type is eliminated or converted, as appropriate, to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty.

8. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:

- (a) Existing types of ICBMs are:
 - (i) for the United States of America, the Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper;
 - (ii) for the Russian Federation, the RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24.
- (b) Existing types of SLBMs are:
 - (i) for the Russian Federation, the RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56;
 - (ii) for the United States of America, the Trident 11.
- (c) Existing types of heavy bombers are:
 - (i) for the United States of America, the B-52G, B-52H, B-1B, and B-2A;
 - (ii) for the Russian Federation, the Tu-95MS and Tu-160.
- (d) Existing types of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers are:
 - (i) for the Russian Federation, ICBM launchers RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24; SLBM launchers RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56;
 - (ii) for the United States of America, ICBM launchers Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper; the SLBM launchers Trident 11.

Article IV

1. Each Party shall base:
 - (a) deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases;
 - (b) deployed heavy bombers only at air bases.
2. Each Party shall install deployed launchers of SLBMs only on ballistic missile submarines.
3. Each Party shall locate:
 - (a) non-deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases, production facilities, ICBM loading facilities, repair facilities, storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, training facilities, test ranges, and space launch facilities. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases;
 - (b) non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs only at, as appropriate, submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities, maintenance facilities, repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, test ranges, space launch facilities, and production facilities. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases.
4. Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs as well as nondeployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit. Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit between facilities to no more than 30 days.
5. Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at test ranges.
6. Training launchers may be located only at ICBM bases, training facilities, and test ranges. The number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.
7. Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no more than ten.

8. Each Party shall base test heavy bombers only at heavy bomber flight test centers. Non-deployed heavy bombers other than test heavy bombers shall be located only at repair facilities or production facilities for heavy bombers.

9. Each Party shall not carry out at an air base joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

10. Strategic offensive arms shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at such facilities.

11. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be based outside the national territory of each Party. The obligations provided for in this paragraph shall not affect the Parties' rights in accordance with generally recognized principles and rules of international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of submarines to ports of third States. Heavy bombers may be temporarily located outside the national territory, notification of which shall be provided in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.

Article V

1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.
2. When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.
3. Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. Each Party further shall not convert and shall not use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors therein.

Article VI

1. Conversion, elimination, or other means for removal from

accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities shall be carried out in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Notifications related to conversion, elimination, or other means for removal from accountability shall be provided in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.

3. Verification of conversion or elimination in accordance with this Treaty shall be carried out by:

- (a) national technical means of verification in accordance with Article X of this Treaty; and
- (b) inspection activities as provided for in Article XI of this Treaty.

Article VII

1. A database pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty shall be created in accordance with Parts Two and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. Categories of data for this database are set forth in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Each Party shall notify the other Party about changes in data and shall provide other notifications in a manner provided for in Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.

3. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in order to provide and receive notifications, unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty.

4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a voluntary basis, in addition to the notifications specified in paragraph 2 of this Article, if it deems this necessary to ensure confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed under this Treaty.

5. The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission on releasing to the public data and information obtained during the implementation of this Treaty. The Parties shall have the right to release to the public such data and information following agreement thereon within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Each Party shall have the right to release to the public data related to its respective strategic offensive arms.

6. Geographic coordinates relating to data provided for in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty, unique identifiers, site diagrams of facilities provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty, as well as coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty shall not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

7. Notwithstanding paragraph 5 of this Article, the aggregate numbers of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; the aggregate numbers of warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and the aggregate numbers of deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers, may be released to the public by the Parties.

Article VIII

In those cases in which one of the Parties determines that its actions may lead to ambiguous situations, that Party shall take measures to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty and to enhance confidence, openness, and predictability concerning the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. Such measures may include, among other things, providing information in advance on activities of that Party associated with deployment or increased readiness of strategic offensive arms, to preclude the possibility of misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party. This information shall be provided through diplomatic or other channels.

Article IX

By mutual agreement of the Parties, telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be exchanged on a parity basis. The Parties shall agree on the amount of exchange of such telemetric information.

Article X

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the

provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes:

- (a) to use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law;
- (b) not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with this Article; and
- (c) not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. The obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.

Article XI

1. For the purpose of confirming the accuracy of declared data on strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspection activities in accordance with this Article and Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases. The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty; the number of warheads located on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; and the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers. Such inspections shall hereinafter be referred to as Type One inspections.

3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at facilities listed in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty. The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers, types, and technical characteristics of non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and to confirm that strategic offensive arms have been converted or eliminated.

In addition, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at formerly declared facilities, which are provided for in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty, to confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.

The inspections provided for in this paragraph shall hereinafter be referred to as Type Two inspections.

4. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions and have the right to participate in exhibitions conducted by the other Party. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of new types, and to demonstrate the results of conversion of the first item of each type of strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty.

Article XII

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the authority and procedures for the operation of which are set forth in Part Six of the Protocol to this Treaty.

Article XIII

To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties shall not transfer strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty to third parties. The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. This provision shall not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State.

Article XIV

1. This Treaty, including its Protocol, which is an integral part

thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. If either Party raises the issue of extension of this Treaty, the Parties shall jointly consider the matter. If the Parties decide to extend this Treaty, it will be extended for a period of no more than five years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party. Such notice shall contain a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. This Treaty shall terminate three months from the date of receipt by the other Party of the aforementioned notice, unless the notice specifies a later date.

4. As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty shall supersede the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002, which shall terminate as of that date.

Article XV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

2. If it becomes necessary to make changes in the Protocol to this Treaty that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Bilateral Consultative Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments that is set forth in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article XVI

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Prague, this eighth day of April, 2010, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States: Barack Obama

For the Russian Federation: Dmitry Medvedev

Press Statement by Antony J. Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State on the Extension of the New START Treaty with the Russian Federation

[3 February 2021]

President Biden pledged to keep the American people safe from nuclear threats by restoring U.S. leadership on arms control and nonproliferation. Today, the United States took the first step toward making good on that pledge when it extended the New START Treaty with the Russian Federation for five years.

Extending the New START Treaty ensures we have verifiable limits on Russian ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers until February 5, 2026. The New START Treaty's verification regime enables us to monitor Russian compliance with the treaty and provides us with greater insight into Russia's nuclear posture, including through data exchanges and onsite inspections that allow U.S. inspectors to have eyes on Russian nuclear forces and facilities. The United States has assessed the Russian Federation to be in compliance with its New START Treaty obligations every year since the treaty entered into force in 2011.

Especially during times of tension, verifiable limits on Russia's intercontinental-range nuclear weapons are vitally important. Extending the New START Treaty makes the United States, U.S. allies and partners, and the world safer. An unconstrained nuclear competition would endanger us all.

President Biden has made clear that the New START Treaty extension is only the beginning of our efforts to address 21st century security challenges. The United States will use the time provided by a five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue with the Russian Federation, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and partners, arms control that addresses all of its nuclear weapons. We will also pursue arms control to reduce the dangers from China's modern and growing nuclear arsenal. The United States is committed to effective arms control that enhances stability, transparency and predictability while reducing the risks of costly, dangerous arms races.

Just as we engage the Russian Federation in ways that advance American interests, like seeking a five-year extension of New START and broader discussions to reduce the likelihood of crisis and conflict, we remain clear eyed about the challenges that Russia poses to the United States and the world. Even as we work with Russia to advance U.S. interests, so too will we work to hold Russia to account for adversarial actions as well as its human rights abuses, in close coordination with our allies and partners.

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the Extension of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

[3 February 2021]

On February 3, 2021 the MFA of Russia and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow exchanged diplomatic notes regarding the completion of internal procedures required for the entry into force of the Agreement to extend the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010 (New START). Accordingly, this Agreement entered into force on the same day. Thus the Treaty will remain in effect exactly as it had been signed, without any amendments or additions, until February 5, 2026. The telephone conversation between the President of Russia Vladimir Putin and the U.S. President Joseph Biden on January 26, 2021 became key for this development to proceed.

In effect, this core mechanism for maintaining strategic stability is preserved and its further functioning assured on a strictly reciprocal basis, limiting the two countries' nuclear arsenals. Considering the special responsibilities that Russia and the U.S. carry as the world's largest nuclear nations, the decision taken is important as it guarantees a necessary level of predictability and transparency in this area, while strictly maintaining a balance of interests.

We expect that the understanding, reached with Washington regarding the future of the New START Treaty as a cornerstone of international security, would allow to leave behind the trend towards dismantling of arms control and nonproliferation mechanisms, so prevalent in recent years due to U.S. destructive policies. Significant steps would be required to return our bilateral dialogue in this area back to a more stable trajectory, reach new substantial results which would strengthen our national security and global strategic stability.

Russia is ready to do its part. We urge the U.S. to apply a similarly responsible approach and to respond to our initiatives in a constructive manner.

Foreign Ministry statement on the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Russia)

[Moscow, 8 August 2022]

https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1825525/

On August 8, 2022, the Russian Federation officially notified the United States, through diplomatic channels, of its decision to temporarily exempt the inspection activities from the facilities subject to inspection under the Treaty. This exemption includes the

appropriate facilities at which exhibitions may be conducted under the Treaty.

These actions are envisaged in item 5 of Section 1 of Part Five of the Protocol to the Treaty. They may be taken in exceptional cases, and for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty. The Russian Federation is compelled to resort to this measure due to Washington's stubborn striving to achieve, without prior arrangement, the resetting of inspection activities on conditions that do not take into account existing realities and are creating unilateral advantages for the United States, and are de facto depriving the Russian Federation of the right to conduct inspections on American territory.

Our goal is to bring an end to this unacceptable situation and ensure the functioning of all mechanisms in the Treaty in strict conformity with the principles of parity and equality of the parties, as was implied when it was agreed upon and entered into force. At present, these principles are not being observed. Thus, as a result of the US-inspired unilateral anti-Russia restrictions, normal airlifts between Russia and the US have been suspended while the air space over US ally and partner countries is closed to Russian aircraft carrying Russian groups of inspectors to ports of entry on American territory. At the same time, there are no similar restrictions for US inspectors coming to Russia. The Foreign Ministry has raised this question before the countries concerned but has received no answer. Additional difficulties for Russian inspectors and Russian flight crews have been created – again as part of the Washington-inspired unilateral anti-Russia restrictions – through tougher visa requirements in transit countries along potential routes. American inspectors or flight crews are not encountering these difficulties. These and other issues known to the US, on which the parties exchange information via the appropriate channels, must be resolved. Without this, it would be premature to resume inspection activities under the Treaty, as the United States insists.

We hope to continue close cooperation with the American side. We have always advocated and continue to advocate a discussion on the resumption of inspection activities under the Treaty from a position of practical reality. This primarily includes the need to consider the epidemiological situation related to COVID-19 that remains complicated. At this time, there is no obvious indication of a decline in the scale of the coronavirus pandemic or a reduction in the related risks. We have noted the resumed growth rate of the incidence of the disease in the United States, where over 120,000 new COVID-19 cases and 300-400 deaths are recorded every day. In this context, Russia's main priority is to maintain the health and safety of Russian inspectors and flight crews during any inspection on US territory. The same approach applies to American of inspectors on Russian Federation territory.

We believe that under the circumstances, the parties need to abandon any deliberate, counterproductive attempts to artificially expedite the resumption of inspection activities under the Treaty and focus on the thorough analysis of the problems in this area. The successful resolution of these problems would make it possible to return to the full application of the verification mechanisms under the Treaty.

We would like to emphasise that the measures we have adopted are temporary. Russia is fully committed to the observance of the provisions of the Treaty, something we consider to be a very important instrument in maintaining international security and stability. We highly value its unique role in ensuring the necessary transparency and predictability in relations between Russia and the United States in the critical area of nuclear missiles. After the problems related to the resumption of inspections under the Treaty are resolved, we will immediately cancel these exemptions to the inspections, and we will conduct these activities in full again. We believe that this would meet the interests of both Moscow and Washington. We expect the US to adopt a similar approach.

Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the New START Treaty

[03 February 2023]

1. NATO Allies agree the New START Treaty contributes to international stability by constraining Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Therefore, we note with concern that Russia has failed to comply with legally-binding obligations under the New

START Treaty.

2. Russia's refusal to convene a session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) within the treaty-established timeframe, and to facilitate U.S. inspection activities on its territory since August 2022 prevents the United States from exercising important rights under the Treaty, and undermines the United States' ability to adequately verify Russian compliance with the Treaty's central limits. The United States is in compliance with the New START Treaty.

3. NATO Allies continue to view effective arms control as an essential contribution to our security objectives. The New START Treaty remains in the national security interest of all states, including NATO Allies. NATO Allies welcomed the February 2021 agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to extend the New START Treaty for five years. However, Russia's noncompliance undermines the viability of the New START Treaty.

4. We call on Russia to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty by facilitating New START inspections on Russian territory, and by returning to participation in the Treaty's implementation body, the BCC.

Excerpt from Russian Presidential Address to Federal Assembly on suspending its membership in New START

[21 February 2023]

[Eds . . .]

Sure enough, the international situation changed after 1945. New centres of growth and influence have been formed and are rapidly expanding. This is a natural and objective process that cannot be ignored. But the United States trying to refashion the international order to suit exclusively its own needs and selfish interests is unacceptable.

Now, they are using NATO to give us signals, which, in fact, is an ultimatum whereby Russia should, no questions asked, implement everything that it agreed to, including the New START Treaty, whereas they will do as they please. As if there is no connection between strategic offensive weapons and, say, the conflict in Ukraine or other hostile Western actions against our country. As if there are no vociferous claims about them seeking to inflict a strategic defeat on us. This is either the height of hypocrisy and cynicism, or the height of stupidity, but they are not idiots. They are not stupid after all. They want to inflict a strategic defeat on us and also to get to our nuclear sites.

In this regard, I am compelled to announce today that Russia is suspending its membership in the New START Treaty. To reiterate, we are not withdrawing from the Treaty, but rather suspending our participation. Before we come back to discussing this issue, we must have a clear idea of what NATO countries such as France or Great Britain have at stake, and how we will account for their strategic arsenals, that is, the Alliance's combined offensive capabilities.

[Eds . . .]

US State Department Fact Sheet: U.S. Countermeasures in Response to Russia's Violations of the New START Treaty

[01 June 2023]

The United States is committed to full and mutual implementation of the New START Treaty. Consistent with that commitment, the United States has adopted lawful countermeasures in response to the Russian Federation's ongoing violations of the New START Treaty. The Russian Federation's purported suspension of the New START Treaty is legally invalid. As a result, Russia remains bound by its New START Treaty obligations, and is violating the treaty by failing to fulfill many of those obligations. U.S. countermeasures are fully consistent with international law. They are proportionate, reversible, and meet all other legal requirements. International law permits such measures in order to induce a state to return to compliance with its international obligations.

The United States notified Russia of the countermeasures in advance, and conveyed the United States' desire and readiness to reverse the countermeasures and fully implement the treaty if Russia returns to compliance. The United States remains ready to work constructively with Russia on resuming implementation of the New START Treaty.

What are the U.S. countermeasures?

The United States has taken four lawful countermeasures in response to the Russian Federation's ongoing violations of the New START Treaty. The United States continues to abide by the treaty's central limits, and to fulfill all of its New START obligations that have not been included within these countermeasures.

AS OF MARCH 30, 2023

- **BIANNUAL DATA EXCHANGE:** After confirming that Russia would not fulfill its obligation to provide its biannual data update on March 30, 2023, the United States did not provide its March 30 biannual data update to Russia. The New START Treaty requires Russia and the United States to exchange comprehensive databases in March and September of each year. These databases include extensive data on New START Treaty-accountable facilities and nuclear forces, including numbers of deployed warheads and delivery vehicles. In the interest of strategic stability and to promote transparency, on May 15, 2023, the United States proceeded with public release of U.S. aggregate data corresponding to the New START Treaty central limits as of March 1, 2023. The publicly released aggregate data comprise a small portion of the data the United States withheld from Russia in March pursuant to the data-update countermeasure.

AS OF JUNE 1, 2023

- **NOTIFICATIONS:** Beginning June 1, 2023, the United States is withholding from Russia notifications required under the treaty, including updates on the status or location of treaty-accountable items such as missiles and launchers. Russia ceased fulfilling its notification obligation upon its purported suspension of the treaty on February 28, 2023. The fundamental purpose of the majority of notifications is to improve each side's ability to verify the other's compliance with the treaty, especially in combination with on-site inspections. The United States continues to provide Russia with notifications of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launches in accordance with the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notifications Agreement, and to provide notifications of exercises in accordance with the 1989 Agreement on Reciprocal Notification of Major Strategic Exercises.
- **INSPECTION ACTIVITIES:** The United States is refraining from facilitating New START Treaty inspection activities on U.S. territory, specifically by revoking existing visas issued to Russian New START Treaty inspectors and aircrew members, denying pending applications for such visas, and by revoking the standing diplomatic clearance numbers issued for Russian New START Treaty inspection airplanes. The United States had been prepared to facilitate Russian New START Treaty inspection activities on U.S. territory since June 2022, and repeatedly conveyed that readiness to Russia; however, Russia chose not to exercise its right to conduct inspection activities and has also denied the United States its right under the treaty to conduct inspection activities since August 2022, when it refused to accept a U.S. inspection. Russia has not notified the United States of any intent to send a Russian inspection team to the United States since February 25, 2020.
- **TELEMETRY:** The United States will not be providing telemetric information on launches of U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs. The New START Treaty requires that both parties reach agreement within the framework of the treaty's implementation body, the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), on the number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs for which telemetric information will be exchanged each year. Russia has refused to meet in the BCC to reach such an agreement, and the United

States will not provide telemetric information unilaterally. The treaty does not require the United States to take such unilateral action in any event, since it calls for an exchange of telemetric information on an agreed number of launches.

Excerpt from President Putin's Statement to Members of Russian Security Council on reciprocal limits with the US

[Moscow, 22 September 2025]

[Eds . . .]

Let me remind you that the last major political and diplomatic achievement in the field of strategic stability was the conclusion of the Russian-American New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2010. However, owing to the profoundly hostile policies of the Biden administration, which undermined the fundamental principles on which this treaty was built, its full implementation was suspended in 2023. Nevertheless, both parties have declared their intention to continue voluntarily observing the central quantitative limits of the strategic offensive arms treaty until its expiry. For nearly 15 years, this agreement has played a constructive role in maintaining balance and predictability in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons.

The New START Treaty will expire on February 5, 2026, signalling the imminent end of the last international accord directly limiting nuclear missile capabilities. A complete renunciation of this treaty's legacy would, from many points, be a grave and short-sighted mistake. It would also have adverse implications for the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In order to prevent the emergence of a new strategic arms race and to preserve an acceptable degree of predictability and restraint, we consider it reasonable to maintain at this turbulent time the status quo established under New START. Accordingly, Russia is prepared to continue observing the treaty's central quantitative restrictions for one year after February 5, 2026. Following that date, based on a careful assessment of the situation, we will make a definite decision on whether to uphold these voluntary self-limitations. We believe that this measure is only feasible if the United States acts in a similar spirit and refrains from steps that would undermine or disrupt the existing balance of deterrence.

In this connection, I would like to ask the relevant agencies to maintain close oversight of American activities related to the START arsenal in the first place. Particular attention must be directed towards US plans to expand strategic components of its missile defence system, including preparations for the deployment of interceptors in outer space. We believe that the practical implementation of such destabilising measures could nullify our efforts to maintain the status quo in the field of strategic offensive arms. We will respond appropriately in this case. I believe that Russia's initiative, if implemented, could make a substantial contribution to creating the conditions necessary for a substantive strategic dialogue with the United States – provided, of course, that the grounds for its full resumption are secured and that broader steps are taken to normalise bilateral relations and remove core security contradictions.

[Eds . . .]

US Statement to the Conference on Disarmament on Expiry of New START

[Geneva, 6 February 2026]

Today marks the end of one era of arms control and hopefully the beginning of a new one. As of yesterday, February 5th, New START and its central limits have expired. The treaty allowed for a one-time, 5-year extension which was enacted in 2021. The treaty could not legally be further

extended. I am here to tell you that President Trump wants to find a better agreement.

Even if we could have legally extended the treaty, it would not have been beneficial for the United States- or the world- to do so. New START was signed in 2010 and its limits on warheads and launchers are no longer relevant in 2026 when one nuclear power is expanding its arsenal at a scale and pace not seen in over half a century and another continues to maintain and develop a vast range of nuclear systems unconstrained by New START's terms. An arms control architecture designed nearly two decades ago for New START does not allow the United States to credibly uphold both our strategic deterrence commitments to the American people and our extended deterrence commitments to our allies. President Trump has been clear: the power of nuclear weapons is too immense and the cost of their use too great. He has repeatedly expressed his desire to see a world with fewer nuclear weapons. That is why I am here today, at the Conference on Disarmament; to preview how the United States believes this next era of strategic stability and arms control can be realized and how we can fulfill President Trump's vision of a world safer from, in his words, "the single greatest threat to the world."

There are three major themes that I would like to discuss: the history of how we got here; the present – the change in the strategic environment; and, the future – how we aim to improve upon New START in order to achieve a new, better strategic stability and arms control architecture that makes the world safer and more secure.

When New START was signed in 2010, the Russian Federation and the United States maintained the largest nuclear weapons stockpiles in the world. We still do – despite China undergoing a massive and deliberate buildup, as it pursues a nuclear arsenal close to that of the United States and Russia. This buildup is opaque and unconstrained by any arms control limitations. This is the crux of the problem and is emblematic of the change in the global strategic environment over the last 15 years. Today, the United States faces threats from multiple nuclear powers. In short, a bilateral treaty with only one nuclear power is simply inappropriate in 2026 and going forward.

To understand the current place the United States finds itself in, we need to revisit the past. New START reflected the geostrategic landscape of the time, and some of its elements were useful.

Data exchanges and on-site inspections contributed to some level of verification that provided for open channels between states parties and an equilibrium in deployed strategic systems and warheads. Despite these positive attributes, the shortcomings of New START placed unilateral constraints on the United States that were unacceptable.

In 1961, Fred Iklé famously postulated in *Foreign Affairs* that, quote, "what counts when arms control violations are detected are the political and military consequences of those violations since this alone will determine whether or not the violator stands to gain in the end."

President Trump withdrew from the INF and Open Skies treaties in his first administration because Russian violations created an intolerable disadvantage for the United States. Today, unconstrained by the one-way agreements, the United States just a few short years later addressed the unilateral constraints of INF. And today, U.S. INF treaty-range systems near deployment. Among New START's many shortcomings, there is one that merits a discussion in more detail. In 1991, former President Bush announced a series of reductions in tactical or theater-ranged nuclear weapons systems and stockpiles. Thousands of nuclear warheads and missiles were removed from U.S. stockpiles and destroyed. In response, Soviet President Gorbachev announced reciprocal measures that were later reinforced by President Yeltsin in 1992. Known as the "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives" or PNIs, these were political – and therefore not legally binding – commitments.

As has been the case in many other arms control agreements, we had one side that earnestly abided by its commitments under PNI, and one side that disregarded its commitments. The result was that between 1992 and today, Russia not only failed to remove or destroy its theater ranged systems, it modernized and expanded those nuclear forces. American New START negotiators recognized this but were unable to secure an agreement on these weapons. When the agreement was presented for ratification, the United States Senate insisted that the administration seek a follow-on agreement to address this very issue. This seemingly small detail seems to have been lost in almost all discussions around

New START, but is neither obscure nor inane. Its implications were and remain profoundly significant. And exposes the fundamental flaw of the treaty. Simply put, tactical- or theater-ranged nuclear weapons were not covered by New START. And the Russian stockpile numbers in the thousands.

Successive U.S. administrations tried to address this issue but failed to achieve the goal of bringing non-strategic nuclear weapons under the arms control umbrella. This led to the most glaring shortfall in the New START model. Some 34 years later the same intolerable disadvantage exists between U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons. Almost all of the U.S. deployed nuclear forces were subject to New START, while only a fraction of Russia's much larger stockpile was. I should add that exactly zero Chinese nuclear weapons were covered by New START. And as we sit here today, China's entire nuclear arsenal has no limits, no transparency, no declarations, and no controls.

This is more than just a numbers game. Outside the 2010 arms control architecture, Russia's development of novel nuclear systems further threatens global strategic stability. In 2018, Moscow announced the development of several novel nuclear-capable strategic systems such as its nuclear-powered Skyfall cruise missile and its doomsday Poseidon torpedo. New START constrained neither of these systems and Russia has successfully tested both within the last few months. You all may recall the recent news that Russia has begun developing a system that would allow it to put a nuclear weapon in Earth's orbit to use as an anti-satellite weapon. Not only would this weapon have fallen outside of New START limits, but it would also violate the Outer Space Treaty if ever deployed. Such a system – capable of indiscriminately disrupting civilian space assets – would pose significant risks to the entire world.

And last but not least, where the P5 once shared a stance against the DPRK's nuclear weapons program, which is growing in size and sophistication, Moscow has now allied with Pyongyang and described its nuclear program as a "closed issue."

The inadequacies of the unilateral constraints imposed on the United States under New START are most critically compounded by the emergence of a third major nuclear weapons power. China has said that its nuclear policy has been the most consistent in the world. That may have been true in the past but is not true today. In 2010, as the United States and Russia agreed to limits in its strategic arsenals to historic lows, Beijing had a relatively small nuclear arsenal, consistent with its approach to deterrence since the earliest days of China's nuclear program. Since then, China used the opportunity of legally binding U.S.-Russian restraint to begin expanding its arsenal at a historic pace, posing a new threat to strategic stability and the global nonproliferation regime.

Concerns existed in President Trump's first administration that China might seek to double the size of its arsenal. Not long after the extension of New START in 2021, China's three new ICBM silo fields became front page news worldwide. Even now, after years of public evidence and calls for transparency from many countries here in the CD and elsewhere, China continues to deny the evidence of these sites and the extent of its nuclear weapons buildup. China remains on track to have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, and Russia is supporting this build-up by helping China develop the weapons-grade fissile material necessary for its expansion.

We are clear-eyed and realistic about the speed, scale, and quality of China's historic military buildup. As stated in the National Defense Strategy, we will deter China in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation, with the understanding that peace is possible, on terms favorable to Americans and acceptable to the Chinese. But China refuses to contribute to disarmament objectives we are all here to advance. China's release of an Arms Control White Paper is insufficient. Its actions do not demonstrate its commitment to nuclear arms control and disarmament. It would be irresponsible and short-sighted to extend limits with the Russian Federation bilaterally and not account for these realities.

No longer constrained by the political-military circumstances of 2010 and the treaty they yielded, and in response to the destabilizing behavior of these other countries, the United States can now finally take steps, consistent with our National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, to strengthen deterrence on behalf of the American people and our allies. Militarily, the expiration of New START enables the United States to take parallel steps. We will complete our ongoing nuclear modernization programs that were initiated while New START entered into force. The United States also retains non-deployed nuclear capacity that

can be used to address the emerging security environment, if directed by the President. Such actions include expanding current forces, diversifying our capabilities, developing and fielding new theater range nuclear forces, and adapting our extended deterrence posture as necessary.

I'd now like to address an issue where another disparity exists. Last Fall, President Trump instructed the Pentagon to start testing our nuclear weapons "on an equal basis." Specifically, the President was referring to Russian and Chinese nuclear testing in violation of their respective moratoria on yield-producing nuclear tests. Since the President's statement, we have received many questions about what he meant by "an equal basis." The annual U.S. compliance report has previously assessed that Russia has failed to maintain its testing moratorium by conducting supercritical nuclear weapons tests.

Today, I can reveal that the U.S. Government is aware that China has conducted nuclear explosive tests, including preparing for tests with designated yields in the hundreds of tons. The PLA sought to conceal testing by obfuscating the nuclear explosions because it recognized these tests violate test ban commitments. China has used decoupling – a method to decrease the effectiveness of seismic monitoring – to hide their activities from the world. China conducted one such yield producing nuclear test on June 22 of 2020.

This confluence of factors – serial Russian violations, growth of worldwide stockpiles, and flaws in New START's design and implementation- gives the United States a clear imperative to call for a new architecture that addresses the threats of today, not those of a bygone era. This means taking into account all Russian nuclear weapons, both novel and existing strategic systems, and addressing the breakout growth of Chinese nuclear weapons stockpiles.

As I stated earlier, the United States will continue to pursue responsible pathways to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world, consistent with President Trump's vision and our obligation under the NPT, through both bilateral and multilateral venues. Together, we can prevent an unmitigated nuclear arms race, limit the build-up of nuclear arms, restore responsible behavior when it comes to nuclear testing, and, as appropriate, address issues concerning non-NPT nuclear weapons possessing states.

While a treaty limiting nuclear weapons can come only from negotiation among sovereign nuclear weapon states, such an arrangement has implications for the security of all states. We hope CD member states will rise to the challenge and use the 2026 CD session to advance this effort.

As throughout our history, the United States has maintained a willingness to seek strategic stability and arms control arrangements that are verifiable, enforceable, and contribute to the security of the United States and her allies. What we are proposing is not talks for the sake of talks-with this effort, the United States is looking for meaningful progress based in concrete actions.

As we pursue new dialogue and new formats, we won't stand idly by in the face of threats to the United States and our allies. The United States will maintain a robust, credible, and modernized nuclear deterrent to ensure our security preserves peace and stability and negotiate from a position of strength. In doing so, we will prevent anyone from being able to dominate us or our allies so that all nations recognize their interests are best served through peace and restraint. A question for us gathered here today will be how much deterrence is enough. We believe the answer to that question will depend, in part, on the success of upcoming multilateral strategic stability discussions. We must act now to strengthen global security and lead the world towards verifiable nuclear weapons reductions.

February 5, 2026, indeed marks the end of an era: the end of U.S. unilateral restraint. The next era of arms control can and should continue with clear focus, but it will require the participation of more than just Russia at the negotiating table. We cannot promise that this process will be quick or easy. Achieving outcomes of value rarely are. But we remain committed to securing a strong outcome and will not accept one that falls short of our standards, nor will we stay silent on noncompliance. We will achieve President Trump's vision for a new, improved, and modernized nuclear weapons treaty that lasts long into the future.

Russian Statement to the Conference on Disarmament on Expiry of New START

[Geneva, 6 February 2026]

On behalf of the Russian Federation, as the second State Party to the New START Treaty, we would also like to share views on the situation related to its expiration.

Briefly summarizing the results of the New START Treaty implementation, we note that, despite a number of issues, at a certain historical stage this agreement played a significant positive role. The Treaty contributed to efforts to eliminate incentives for a strategic arms race and allowed for significant reductions in strategic offensive arms in the Parties' arsenals. Thanks to the New START Treaty, predictability was ensured in the nuclear missile sphere on a long-term basis.

Even in recent years, specifically after Russia's forced suspension of the New START Treaty due to the previous US administration's violation of the basic principles and understandings upon which the Treaty was founded, the positive significance of this agreement did not disappear. This was due to the fact that in 2023 Russia and the US declared their intention to continue adhering to the central quantitative limits under the New START Treaty.

The termination of this Treaty marks the disappearance, as of 5 February 2026, of the last international agreement on direct limitations on nuclear and missile capabilities. Guided by the understanding that a complete abandonment of the New START legacy would be a mistake from many points of view, our country took an additional constructive step. On 22 September 2025 the President of the Russian Federation put forward an initiative for the States Parties to the New START Treaty to undertake voluntary self-limitations to continue observing the quantitative limits laid down in the Treaty after the end of its life cycle, for at least one more year and with the possibility of subsequent extension of this period.

We note that in the period up to 5 February this year no consent followed from the American side to support the Russian proposal. This is regrettable. Nevertheless, we view such a development of events as a reality that requires consideration when determining further Russian policy in the sphere of strategic offensive arms. Under the current circumstances, we proceed from the fact that the States Parties to the New START Treaty are no longer bound by any legal or political obligations in the context thereof.

At the same time, the statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry published on 4 February this year officially emphasized our country's intention to act responsibly and in a balanced manner. We intend to shape our course in the field of strategic offensive arms based on a thorough analysis of US military policy and the general situation in the strategic sphere.

The said statement also stressed that, going forward, our country remains open to seeking political and diplomatic ways for the comprehensive stabilization of the strategic situation based on equal and mutually beneficial solutions through dialogue – of course, provided that appropriate conditions for such interaction are formed.

Mr. President,

Let me also make a few comments in response to the statement of Mr. DiNanno with regards to the reasons for and legitimacy of the suspension by the Russian Federation of the operation of the New START Treaty.

The operation of the New START Treaty was suspended by the Russian Federation in February 2023 against the backdrop of the unsatisfactory state of affairs with the implementation of certain aspects of the Treaty, as well as due to absolutely unacceptable steps by the Biden administration contrary to the fundamental principles and understandings for this agreement recorded in its preamble. We have repeatedly listed and commented in detail on all those US actions which, in aggregate, were qualified by us as a material breach, incompatible with the further full-fledged implementation of the Treaty.

In 2022 the Biden administration and the US-led NATO openly set out to inflict a "strategic defeat" on Russia in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, which was largely provoked by the alliance's expansion towards Russia's borders. This created a fundamentally different security environment for us, one that was radically different from the one in which the Treaty was drafted and concluded. At the same time, the preamble to the New START Treaty postulates the Parties' commitment to the principle of

indivisible security and to building relations based on mutual trust and cooperation.

A clear example of such extremely provocative actions are the strikes launched by the puppet regime in Kiev against Russian strategic facilities declared under the New START Treaty, which were made with the clear military-technical and intelligence assistance of Western countries.

In addition, Washington's accelerated development of missile defense capabilities should be highlighted, which is contrary to the principle of inseparable link between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons enshrined in the New START Treaty. These actions contradicted the Treaty's objectives in terms of maintaining the balance of power, put significant pressure on its viability, and created grounds for compensatory measures on the part of Russia outside the scope of the New START Treaty in order to maintain strategic balance.

It is also worth recalling Russia's unresolved claim regarding the illegitimate unilateral withdrawal by the US of a significant number of START weapons from the Treaty's scope under the pretext of their conversion.

And this is far from a complete list of negative factors that forced our country to suspend the New START Treaty, which was done in full compliance with international law.

Mr. President,

Also a few words with regards to the Russian novel weaponry systems, mentioned in the statement by Mr. DiNanno. There was no automatic inclusion of weapons systems such as Russia's "Burevestnik" and "Poseidon" complexes in the scope of the New START Treaty. This would have required a full-scale renegotiation of the Treaty. However, its operation was suspended in February 2023 and has now been terminated altogether.

In general, the emergence of these systems must be viewed through the prism of the relationship between strategic offensive weapons and strategic defensive weapons, enshrined in the New START Treaty, which was deliberately ignored by the American side throughout the entire life cycle of the Treaty. As it is well known, Washington's efforts to build a global and deeply destabilizing US missile defense system continued throughout the entire term of the New START Treaty and they currently are part of the "Golden Dome" project, which poses an even more obvious threat to strategic stability.

In these circumstances it is clear that the emergence of new Russian weapons systems outside the scope of the New START Treaty was a compensatory measure aimed at neutralizing the US's actions in the field of missile defense that were contrary to the Treaty and, accordingly, at maintaining strategic balance.

Speculation that the "Oreshnik" complex should have been taken into account in the context of the New START Treaty is completely unfounded. As previously stated publicly and clearly by our country's military and political leadership, this complex belongs to the class of medium-range systems. Thus, this weapon is one of those that clearly do not fall within the scope of the New START Treaty.

Mr. President,

Finally, allow me to react to the calls of the American Side to launch negotiations and begin "a new chapter" in the field of arms control.

To begin with, we kindly ask the American delegation to confirm that it has brought to Geneva an official invitation to begin such negotiations with the participation of the Russian Federation without any preconditions.

In this regard, let me remind you that, as the Russian leadership has repeatedly emphasized, this issue can only be considered in the context of creating the right conditions that would allow us to engage in a truly equal, comprehensive and fruitful dialogue with the US on arms control issues. We need a foundation for the basic normalization of Russian-American relations and progress in resolving fundamental contradictions in the field of security.

If eventually we talk seriously about possible multilateral dialogue on nuclear arms control (and even more so on multilateral nuclear arms reduction), it will be of fundamental importance for Russia to involve in this process also the United Kingdom and France, i.e. military allies of the United States in NATO, which has declared itself a "nuclear alliance".

Dialogue

Reagan-Gorbachev Statement: U.S.-Russia Presidential Joint Soviet-United States Statement on the Summit Meeting in Geneva

[21 November 1985]

By mutual agreement, President of the United States Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev met in Geneva November 19 - 21. Attending the meeting on the U.S. side were Secretary of State George Shultz; Chief of Staff Donald Regan; Assistant to the President Robert McFarlane; Ambassador to the USSR Arthur Hartman; Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Arms Control Paul H. Nitze; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Rozanne Ridgway; Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jack Matlock. Attending on the Soviet side were Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs E. A. Shevardnadze; First Deputy Foreign Minister G. M. Korniyenko; Ambassador to the United States A. F. Dobrynin; Head of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CPSU, A. N. Yakovlev; Head of the Department of International Information of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. M. Zamyatin; Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, A. M. Aleksandrov.

These comprehensive discussions covered the basic questions of U.S.-Soviet relations and the current international situation. The meetings were frank and useful. Serious differences remain on a number of critical issues.

While acknowledging the differences in their systems and approaches to international issues, some greater understanding of each side's view was achieved by the two leaders. They agreed about the need to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and the international situation as a whole.

In this connection the two sides have confirmed the importance of an ongoing dialogue, reflecting their strong desire to seek common ground on existing problems.

They agreed to meet again in the nearest future. The General Secretary accepted an invitation by the President of the United States to visit the United States of America and the President of the United States accepted an invitation by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU to visit the Soviet Union. Arrangements for and timing of the visits will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

In their meetings, agreement was reached on a number of specific issues. Areas of agreement are registered on the following pages.

Security

The sides, having discussed key security issues, and conscious of the special responsibility of the USSR and the U.S. for maintaining peace, have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

Nuclear and Space Talks

The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

They agreed to accelerate the work at these negotiations, with a view to accomplishing the tasks set down in the Joint U.S.-Soviet Agreement of January 8, 1985, namely to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability.

Noting the proposals recently tabled by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, they called for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions

Section 2 Bilateral Strategic Stability

in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement.

During the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon.

Risk Reduction Centers

The sides agreed to study the question at the expert level of centers to reduce nuclear risk taking into account the issues and developments in the Geneva negotiations. They took satisfaction in such recent steps in this direction as the modernization of the Soviet-U.S. hotline.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan reaffirmed the commitment of the USSR and the U.S. to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their interest in strengthening together with other countries the non-proliferation regime, and in further enhancing the effectiveness of the Treaty, *inter alia* by enlarging its membership.

They note with satisfaction the overall positive results of the recent Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The USSR and the U.S. reaffirm their commitment, assumed by them under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty.

The two sides plan to continue to promote the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to support the activities of the Agency in implementing safeguards as well as in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

They view positively the practice of regular Soviet-U.S. consultations on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which have been businesslike and constructive and express their intent to continue this practice in the future.

Chemical Weapons

In the context of discussing security problems, the two sides reaffirmed that they are in favor of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter.

The two sides agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on the level of experts on all aspects of such a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification. They agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.

MBFR

The two sides emphasized the importance they attach to the Vienna (MBFR) negotiations and expressed their willingness to work for positive results.

CDE

Attaching great importance to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and noting the progress made there, the two sides stated their intention to facilitate, together with the other participating states, an early and successful completion of the work of the conference. To this end, they reaffirmed the need for a document which would include mutually acceptable confidence and security building measures and give concrete expression and effect to the principle of non-use of force.

Process of Dialogue

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed on the need to place on a regular basis and intensify dialogue at various levels. Along with meetings between the leaders of the two countries, this envisages regular meetings between the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Secretary of State, as well

as between the heads of other Ministries and Agencies. They agree that the recent visits of the heads of Ministries and Departments in such fields as agriculture, housing and protection of the environment have been useful.

Recognizing that exchanges of views on regional issues on the expert level have proven useful, they agreed to continue such exchanges on a regular basis.

The sides intend to expand the programs of bilateral cultural, educational and scientific-technical exchanges, and also to develop trade and economic ties. The President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU attended the signing of the Agreement on Contacts and Exchanges in Scientific, Educational and Cultural Fields.

They agreed on the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in the spirit of cooperation.

They believe that there should be greater understanding among our peoples and that to this end they will encourage greater travel and people-to-people contact.

Northern Pacific Air Safety

The two leaders also noted with satisfaction that, in cooperation with the Government of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to a set of measures to promote safety on air routes in the North Pacific and have worked out steps to implement them.

Civil Aviation / Consulates

They acknowledged that delegations from the United States and the Soviet Union have begun negotiations aimed at resumption of air services. The two leaders expressed their desire to reach a mutually beneficial agreement at an early date. In this regard, an agreement was reached on the simultaneous opening of Consulates General in New York and Kiev.

Environmental Protection

Both sides agreed to contribute to the preservation of the environment -- a global task -- through joint research and practical measures. In accordance with the existing U.S.-Soviet agreement in this area, consultations will be held next year in Moscow and Washington on specific programs of cooperation.

Exchange Initiatives

The two leaders agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and contacts including some of their new forms in a number of scientific, educational, medical and sports fields (*inter alia*, cooperation in the development of educational exchanges and software for elementary and secondary school instruction; measures to promote Russian language studies in the United States and English language studies in the USSR; the annual exchange of professors to conduct special courses in history, culture and economics at the relevant departments of Soviet and American institutions of higher education; mutual allocation of scholarships for the best students in the natural sciences, technology, social sciences and humanities for the period of an academic year; holding regular meets in various sports and increased television coverage of sports events). The two sides agreed to resume cooperation in combatting cancer diseases.

The relevant agencies in each of the countries are being instructed to develop specific programs for these exchanges. The resulting programs will be reviewed by the leaders at their next meeting.

Fusion Research

The two leaders emphasized the potential importance of the work aimed at utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes and, in this connection, advocated the widest practicable development of international cooperation in obtaining this source of energy, which is essentially inexhaustible, for the benefit for all mankind.

U.S.-Russia Presidential Joint Statement on Strategic Stability

[16 June 2021]

We, President of the United States of America Joseph R. Biden and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, note the United States and Russia have demonstrated that, even in periods of tension, they are able to make progress on our shared goals of ensuring predictability in the strategic sphere, reducing the risk of armed conflicts and the threat of nuclear war.

The recent extension of the New START Treaty exemplifies our commitment to nuclear arms control. Today, we reaffirm the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

Consistent with these goals, the United States and Russia will embark together on an integrated bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue in the near future that will be deliberate and robust. Through this Dialogue, we seek to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures.

US Readout: First Meeting of U.S. – Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue in Geneva

[28 July 2021]

Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman led a U.S. interagency delegation from the National Security Council, Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and Department of Energy to Geneva, Switzerland to participate in the U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov led the Russian delegation.

In the U.S.-Russia Presidential Joint Statement on Strategic Stability on June 16, 2021, President Biden committed to embarking on an integrated Strategic Stability Dialogue with the Russian Federation that would be “deliberate and robust.” We remain committed, even in times of tension, to ensuring predictability and reducing the risk of armed conflict and threat of nuclear war.

Today’s meeting in Geneva was the beginning of this dialogue with the Russian Federation. The U.S. delegation discussed U.S. policy priorities and the current security environment, national perceptions of threats to strategic stability, prospects for new nuclear arms control, and the format for future Strategic Stability Dialogue sessions.

The discussions in Geneva were professional and substantive. The two delegations agreed to meet again in a plenary session at the end of September, and to hold informal consultations in the interim, with the aim of determining topics for expert working groups at the second plenary.

Senior officials from Departments of State and Defense will travel to Brussels, Belgium on July 29 to brief Allies at NATO headquarters.

Joint Statement on the Outcomes of the Second U.S. – Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue in Geneva

[30 September 2021]

Today in Geneva, interagency delegations from the United States and the Russian Federation convened for the second meeting of the bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue since President Biden and President Putin committed to an integrated, deliberate, and robust process in June. The United States delegation was led by Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman, and the Russian delegation was led by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov. The discussion was intensive and substantive.

The two delegations agreed to form two interagency expert working groups – the Working Group on Principles and Objectives for Future Arms Control, and the Working Group on Capabilities and Actions with Strategic Effects. The delegations additionally

agreed that the two working groups would commence their meetings, to be followed by a third plenary meeting.

US Readout: Third Meeting of U.S. – Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue in Geneva

[Geneva, 11 January 2022]

Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman led a U.S. interagency delegation from the Department of State, Department of Defense, Joint Staff, and National Security Council to Geneva, Switzerland to participate in an extraordinary session of the U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue. Russia Federation Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov led the Russian delegation.

Today in Geneva, the U.S. delegation listened to Russia’s security concerns, and presented its own strategic stability concerns and ideas for reciprocal action to improve strategic stability. Deputy Secretary Sherman made clear that the diplomatic path provides the only durable solution to the security concerns of Russia and the United States. The Deputy Secretary stressed that while the United States is committed to diplomacy, it stands ready to impose significant economic and political costs, in close coordination with its allies and partners should Russia escalate its aggressive actions against Ukraine. She also reiterated that the United States would not discuss European security without the participation of our allies and partners, and that those issues would need to be discussed in the appropriate multilateral fora.

Deputy Secretary Sherman will travel to Brussels, Belgium on January 11 to brief the North Atlantic Council at NATO headquarters, and she will also meet on January 11 with the EU Political and Security Committee. Deputy Secretary Sherman will lead the U.S. delegation to a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) on January 12.

Excerpt from US State Department Press Briefing on Strategic Stability Dialogue

[2 June 2023]

[Eds . . .]

Bonnie Denise Jenkins: What I can say regarding the larger issues of Russian nuclear issues is that we continue to focus on issues of arms control, as I said earlier, and we did unfortunately have to suspend the strategic stability talks that we have with Russia as a result of Russia’s invading Ukraine. So we do have existing mechanisms that we want to get back to to talk about nuclear issues and those type of issues with Russia, but unfortunately, because of Russia’s invasion, we have not been able to do that.

[Eds . . .]

Excerpt from US National Security Advisor Statement to Arms Control Association on new arms control proposal

[2 June 2023]

[Eds . . .]

And under the President’s leadership, we’re advancing three new approaches to strengthen arms control and decrease nuclear risks in this changing nuclear age.

First—we have stated our willingness to engage in bilateral arms control discussions with Russia and with China without preconditions.

And before I jump into this—let me just step back and say that “without preconditions” does not mean “without accountability.”

We’ll still hold nuclear powers accountable for reckless behavior. And we’ll still hold our adversaries and competitors responsible for upholding nuclear agreements.

For example—the United States will continue to notify Russia in advance of ballistic missile launches and major strategic exercises, in line with pre-existing nuclear agreements.

But yesterday, we adopted lawful, proportionate, and reversible countermeasures in response to Russia's violations of New START—including suspending our day-to-day notifications to Russia that are required under the Treaty.

These steps will help guarantee that Russia does not receive benefits from a treaty they refuse to abide by, and that the principle of reciprocity—a key tenet of strategic arms control—is upheld.

It will also demonstrate to Russia the benefits of returning to full compliance—including once again receiving detailed information regarding our nuclear forces—a conversation we continue to press for directly with Russian officials.

But, while claiming to suspend New START, Russia has also publicly committed to adhere to the Treaty's central limits—indicating a potential willingness to continue limiting strategic nuclear forces through 2026.

We agree.

It is in neither of our countries' interests to embark on an open-ended competition in strategic nuclear forces—and we're prepared to stick to the central limits as long as Russia does.

And rather than waiting to resolve all of our bilateral differences—the United States is ready to engage Russia now to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework. We are prepared to enter into those discussions.

Now—the type of limits the United States can agree to after the Treaty expires will of course be impacted by the size and scale of China's nuclear buildup.

That's why we're also ready to engage China without preconditions—helping ensure that competition is managed, and that competition does not veer into conflict.

It's our hope that among the topics on the table for diplomatic discussion, Beijing will be willing to include substantive engagement on strategic nuclear issues—which would benefit the security of both of our countries, and the security of the entire world.

[Eds . . .]

Excerpt from Russian Press Briefing on US arms control proposals

[2 June 2023]

[Eds . . .]

Sergey Lavrov: They have recently become aware once again of the importance of nuclear arms control and started sending us signals, including the paper you mentioned, showing their readiness to resume dialogue on these matters. Interestingly, they suggested taking strategic stability talks out of the general military and political context. Every day brings further evidence that we are operating in a hostile environment, which is unacceptable. They denounce us at every corner and call us an aggressor, demanding that we retreat to the 1991 borders and leave the poor democratic Ukraine alone. They did recognise that they were doing all this, but while doing so, they suggested sitting down and focusing on a specific topic: strategic arms limitations and the strategic dialogue in general.

There was a time when they raised this topic just for the sake of resuming inspections and being able to visit our nuclear facilities. At the same time, they sent weapons to the Ukrainians, and these weapons targeted our military bases where strategic bombers are deployed. These people simply lack common decency. I am not even talking about treating national interests in a comprehensive manner or understanding what is possible in international talks and what is not. In this case, they failed to observe the most rudimentary decency. This did not come as a surprise to us.

This makes Russia their enemy and they cast us as an enemy, while showing readiness to discuss whether they can look at our strategic nuclear arsenals, as if it were a separate matter. We understand what they are after. They are trying to use the reciprocity motto in order to be able to control our nuclear arsenals

and to minimise nuclear risks arising from their efforts to carry out a strong-arm policy towards us. More and more people in the West have been talking about a possible direct confrontation between nuclear powers. There are fewer and fewer constraining factors or deterrents. The Poles and the British have been seriously discussing training NATO units to enter Ukraine and take over specific positions. We are hearing this from people who serve in official positions.

We believe that the ideas put forward by the United States are unacceptable. When discussing strategic stability, the Americans do not hide that they wanted to leave aside the means of non-nuclear military confrontation, i.e., the non-nuclear forces. Their goal is rather obvious. The collective West enjoys a substantial edge in this regard, quantity-wise, and wants to strengthen it.

Washington has been waging a hybrid war against Russia. In this context, we do not see any reason not only for taking additional joint measures on arms control or reducing strategic risks, but also for engaging in strategic stability talks with the United States in general.

We do not reject this idea altogether, just as we do not reject and have never rejected efforts to settle the existing differences by political and diplomatic means. However, before we move forward on these opportunities, we will be firm and unwavering in demanding that the West fully rejects its malicious policy of undermining Russia's security and our interests and stops openly neglecting our fundamental interests.

Any future strategic stability discussions would be predicated on the United States demonstrating its readiness to work on this matter considering all the essential strategic stability factors instead of singling out specific aspects according to Washington's preferences. The Americans have never been inclined to apply this comprehensive approach to strategic stability matters, and we have even fewer reasons to expect this to change in today's environment.

We will need to address major differences on security matters created by NATO's eastward expansion. Let me remind you that this is what we said back in December 2021. To be more precise, we have been talking about this for a long time now. In December 2021, we put forward specific proposals which could have averted the conflict we are witnessing today, sparing the European economy. In fact, the US has been proactive and quite effective in undermining the European economy. As you know, our proposals were rejected at that time.

As for your question on whether we informed the Americans, yes, we did. We set forth on paper what I have just told you in general terms, just as the Americans did when they sent us their written proposals. We responded to them in December 2023. We made it clear to Washington that we see no alternative to these assessments. We believe that everything is clear on this matter now.

[Eds . . .]

Section 3: INF Treaty

U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty on August 2, 2019. Press Statement by Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State.

[2 August 2019]

On February 2, 2019, the United States provided its six-month notice of withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty due to the Russian Federation's continuing violation of the treaty.

The U.S. withdrawal pursuant to Article XV of the treaty takes effect today because Russia failed to return to full and verified compliance through the destruction of its noncompliant missile system—the SSC-8 or 9M729 ground-launched, intermediate-range cruise missile.

Russia is solely responsible for the treaty's demise. Dating back to at least the mid-2000s, Russia developed, produced, flight tested,

and has now fielded multiple battalions of its noncompliant missile. The United States first raised its concerns with Russia in 2013. Russia subsequently and systematically rebuffed six years of U.S. efforts seeking Russia's return to compliance. With the full support of our NATO Allies, the United States has determined Russia to be in material breach of the treaty, and has subsequently suspended our obligations under the treaty. Over the past six months, the United States provided Russia a final opportunity to correct its noncompliance. As it has for many years, Russia chose to keep its noncompliant missile rather than going back into compliance with its treaty obligations.

The United States will not remain party to a treaty that is deliberately violated by Russia. Russia's noncompliance under the treaty jeopardizes U.S. supreme interests as Russia's development and fielding of a treaty-violating missile system represents a direct threat to the United States and our allies and partners. The United States greatly appreciates the steadfast cooperation and resolve NATO allies have shown in responding to Russia's violation.

The United States remains committed to effective arms control that advances U.S., allied, and partner security; is verifiable and enforceable; and includes partners that comply responsibly with their obligations. President Trump has charged this Administration with beginning a new chapter by seeking a new era of arms control that moves beyond the bilateral treaties of the past. Going forward, the United States calls upon Russia and China to join us in this opportunity to deliver real security results to our nations and the entire world.

Statement by the President of Russia on US Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles

[5 August 2019]

On February 1, 2019, the United States of America launched a procedure to withdraw from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The six-month period set forth in the Treaty's withdrawal clause has expired. When one of the parties withdraws from the Treaty, it ceases to have effect automatically. Therefore, as of August 2, 2019 the INF Treaty no longer exists. Our US colleagues sent it to the archives, making it a thing of the past.

It is with regret that Russia states that the unilateral withdrawal by the United States from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles under a far-fetched pretext and the dismantlement of one of the last fundamental arms control treaties creates major complications for world affairs and brings about serious risks for everyone. Let me emphasise that all the responsibility for what has happened rests with the United States. Instead of engaging in a meaningful discussion on international security matters, the United States opted for simply undercutting many years of efforts to reduce the probability of a large-scale armed conflict, including the use of nuclear weapons.

Russia cannot ignore the current state of affairs or satisfy itself with hollow peace-loving declarations made by its American colleagues or their allies.

In this context, considering the current situation, I instruct the Defence Ministry, the Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Intelligence Service to monitor in the most thorough manner future steps taken by the United States to develop, produce and deploy intermediate-range and medium-range missiles.

If Russia obtains reliable information whereby the United States completes the development of these systems and starts to produce them, Russia will have no option other than to engage in a full-scale effort to develop similar missiles. Of course, this will take time. Until the Russian army deploys these weapons, Russia will reliably offset the threats related to the withdrawal by the United States from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles by relying on the means that we

already have: the X-101 and the Kinzhal air-launched missiles, the Kalibr sea-launched missile, as well as future weapons systems, including Tsirkon-class hypersonic systems. At the same time, Russia maintains the unilateral commitments it has assumed, and will act only when it has to respond. This applies to developing, producing and deploying land-based intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. We will not deploy them in any given region until US-made intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles are deployed there.

Despite the recent developments, Russia still hopes that common sense prevails, and that our US colleagues and their allies have a sense of responsibility toward their people and the entire international community. It is our belief that the actions taken by the United States that brought about the dismantlement of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles will inevitably devalue and shatter the foundations of the global security architecture, including the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

This scenario could signal a new start for an unfettered arms race. In order to avoid chaos with no rules, restrictions or laws, we need to once more weigh up all the dangerous consequences and launch a serious and meaningful dialogue free from any ambiguity.

Russia considers that it is necessary to revive without delay meaningful talks on ensuring strategic stability and security. We are ready to engage in these efforts.

Statement by Vladimir Putin on additional steps to de-escalate the situation in Europe after the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)

[26 October 2020]

The Russian Federation continues to believe that the INF Treaty was an important element of the architecture ensuring international security and strategic stability. The Treaty played the most particular role in maintaining predictability and restraint in the missile sphere in the European area.

We consider the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, that entailed its termination, as a serious mistake, which increases the risks of triggering a missile arms race, rise of confrontational potential and sliding into an uncontrolled escalation. Given persistent tensions between Russia and NATO, new threats to the European security are evident.

Under these circumstances, active efforts are required to reduce the deficit of trust and to strengthen regional and global stability, as well as to lower the risks arising from misunderstandings and disagreements in the missile sphere.

In this context, we reiterate our commitment to the moratorium earlier declared by the Russian Federation on the deployment of ground-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles until US-manufactured missiles of similar classes appear in the respective regions.

We also believe that our call to NATO countries to consider the possibility of declaring a reciprocal moratorium remains relevant.

To facilitate the search for compromise political and diplomatic solutions, we are ready to take further steps based on the principles of equal and indivisible security and balanced consideration of the parties' interests that are intended to minimize the negative consequences of the collapse of the INF Treaty.

Building up on our earlier proposal to develop verification tools to support Russia's initiative on mutual moratoria, we invite all parties concerned to consider specific options of reciprocal verification measures to remove existing concerns.

In particular, these options could include verification measures with regard to the Aegis Ashore systems with Mk-41 launchers that are deployed at US and NATO bases in Europe, as well as 9M729 missiles at the sites of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

in the Kaliningrad Region. The goal of such verification measures would be to confirm the absence of ground-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles at the sites covered by the agreements and of arms, on specifications and classification of which the parties were unable to reach an agreement (Russian 9M729 missile).

Staying committed to its consistent stance that the 9M729 missile fully complies with the provisions of the former INF Treaty, the Russian Federation, nevertheless, is ready, in the spirit of good will, to continue not to deploy 9M729 missiles in European part of the territory of Russia, but only provided that NATO countries take reciprocal steps that preclude the deployment in Europe of the weapons earlier prohibited under the INF Treaty.

We also call on all the parties concerned to search for patterns of maintaining stability and preventing missile crises “in a post-INF world” regarding the Asia-Pacific region. We are open to pursuing joint work in this direction.

Section 4: Open Skies Treaty

‘United States Withdrawal from the Treaty on Open Skies.’ Remarks by Thomas DiNanno, Senior Bureau Official and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Policy, Emerging Threats, and Outreach at the Open Skies Conference of The States Parties in Vienna, Austria (Virtually)

[6 July 2020]

The United States would like to thank Canada and Hungary as co-depositaries for the Treaty on Open Skies, for hosting this meeting in accordance with Article XV of the Treaty. We also want to thank the other States Parties for coming together to share their views on this important topic.

On May 22, the United States provided notice of its decision to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XV. The United States’ withdrawal will take effect on November 22, 2020. The administration did not take this step lightly. The decision was the culmination of a months’ long review process that included extensive consultations with other States Parties. While this Conference of the States Parties was triggered by the notice of the United States’ decision to withdraw, the primary reason we are here is because of the behavior of one State Party – Russia – whose actions are directly responsible for the erosion of the European security and arms control architecture. I will now share with you some of the reasoning for the United States’ decision to withdraw, including the broader context.

Russia’s violations of the Treaty on Open Skies are merely one part of a pattern of Russian violations of its arms control obligations and commitments. These include: Russia’s material breach of the INF Treaty; its aggressive actions against Georgia and Ukraine, which are flagrantly contrary to its commitments to the principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act; its purported suspension of its obligations under the CFE Treaty; and its selective implementation of the Vienna Document. We should also note Russia’s use of a chemical weapon on the soil of an OSCE participating State, and the many destabilizing hybrid actions including disinformation campaigns, that it has taken.

As a result of Russia’s actions, today’s security environment is no longer what it was when the Treaty on Open Skies was signed in 1992, in an era of hope. In the place of growing confidence, we have growing mistrust. The conclusion we have had to draw is that Russia is no longer committed to cooperative security.

As States Parties are well aware, the United States has long been deeply concerned with Russia’s repeated violations of the Treaty, which have been thoroughly documented in the U.S. State Department’s Compliance Reports from 2005 through 2019. By contrast, the United States has always been and will remain, until the effective date of its withdrawal, in full compliance with our obligations under the Treaty.

Russia’s recent violations include: (1) Russia’s 500-kilometer “sublimit” on flight distances over the Russian exclave of

Kaliningrad since 2015; (2) its refusal to allow observation flights to approach within 10 kilometers of Russia’s border with the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, also since 2015; and (3) most recently, its denial of a flight segment over a major military exercise (TSEINTR) in September 2019.

The broader point here is that Russia has historically treated its Treaty obligations as optional and only to be honored when convenient. This Russian approach has undermined the confidence-building purpose of the Treaty.

In the case of its violation related to its border with Georgia, Russia’s refusal of Open Skies flights within 10 kilometers of its border with the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is an effort to advance its false narrative that these Russian-occupied regions are independent states. In this same vein, although not a Treaty violation, Russia designated an airfield in Russian occupied Crimea which remains a part of the sovereign territory of Ukraine as an Open Skies refueling airfield in an attempt to advance its false narrative that Crimea is legally part of Russia. The United States has not and will never recognize this claim, nor should any other Open Skies partner: implementation of a confidence building Treaty cannot be made a tool of propaganda efforts to support the invasion, occupation, and purported annexation of portions of a sovereign state.

With regard to the TSEINTR violation in 2019, Russia denied a previously agreed flight segment over this important military exercise, effectively preventing its observation. Russia claimed its inability to guarantee flight safety as the reason, yet refused to permit the segment even after the observing Parties offered to adjust the flight plan. This was another illustration of Russia’s willingness to disregard its legal obligations for convenience, undercutting the Treaty’s central purpose of building confidence by demonstrating that a party has nothing to hide.

Finally, as the Director of the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center stated on May 21, 2020: “For years, Russia has used the Open Skies Treaty to collect intelligence on civilian infrastructure and other sensitive sites in America, posing an unacceptable risk to our national security.” Additionally, the United States is concerned Russia may be using imagery collected from Open Skies flights to support the targeting of European critical infrastructure. Although not a Treaty violation to collect civilian infrastructure imagery, if a State Party then uses that imagery to plan military attacks, that is an ugly perversion of the Treaty’s aims. As stated in Article IX of the Treaty, Open Skies imagery “shall be used exclusively for the attainment of the purposes of this Treaty.” Misusing the Treaty in this manner gravely undermines its effectiveness as a confidence-building mechanism.

It is worth reminding States Parties that the United States has acted in good faith in an effort to work with Russia to resolve these compliance concerns through dialogue. From 2015 through 2017, the United States participated with several Allies and partners with Russia in the so-called “Small Group” aimed at resolving Russian violations. Unfortunately, this effort ultimately failed in July 2017 due to Russia’s refusal to cooperate constructively.

Even today, notwithstanding our notice to withdraw under paragraph 2 of Article XV, the United States remains committed to diplomatic efforts to resolve Russian noncompliance with the Treaty on Open Skies. The United States supported the formation of a new Small Group on Open Skies in 2020 and we thank the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Sweden for their leadership in this endeavor. We hope we can work together to resolve – once and for all – Russian violations of the Treaty on Open Skies. As Secretary Pompeo stated on May 21, 2020, the United States may reconsider our withdrawal should Russia return to full compliance with the Treaty.

Foreign Ministry Statement on the withdrawal by the United States from the Open Skies Treaty (Russian Federation)

[22 November 2020]

In the early hours of November 22, the United States completed the procedures to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies. Russia set out its principled position regarding Washington's decision six months ago, in a Foreign Ministry statement dated May 22, 2020. Following up on this statement, we would like to highlight a number of important points.

It is worth noting that it was Washington that initially proposed the concept of mutual aerial observation in the 1950s, revived this idea in the 1980s and initiated the signing of the Treaty on Open Skies. The United States has invariably presented it as evidence of its commitment to transparency. However, it is obvious that in doing so the United States primarily sought to obtain detailed imagery of Soviet territories that it could not access by other means.

More than 10 years ago, our American colleagues also initiated the transition to digital technology under the Treaty on Open Skies, which can be viewed as an attempt to capitalise on their scientific and technological advances.

Washington's attitude towards the Treaty changed for the worse when Russia started making regular flights over US territory, especially when our country was first to develop and install digital surveillance equipment on its open skies aircraft. The United States could not put up with what it viewed as encroaching on its "exceptional" status, and started to create barriers in the operation of the Treaty. Here are just some of them:

- introducing a de facto ban on observation flights over US territory by refusing to allow rest and refuelling stops for Russian An-30B aircraft;
- restricting Russia's ability to observe the Aleutian Islands;
- de facto restricting the maximum flight distance by banning night-time rest stops at the refuelling airfields, which resulted in exceeding crew workload limits;
- a de facto reduction of the flight range over Alaska by wrongfully including into it the transit flight over open seas;
- restricting the observation flight distance over the Hawaiian Islands;
- introducing altitude limits for observation aircraft, which are not set forth in the Treaty on Open Skies and run counter to ICAO's recommendations;
- unjustified delays in issuing visas to designated personnel;
- failing to observe the established timeframe for paying arrears for observation flights;
- inciting Georgia to violate the Treaty on Open Skies;
- sending old aircraft in an unsatisfactory technical condition for performing open skies missions, putting the crews' lives and health at risk.

The United States has arrogantly ignored our proposals to resolve these issues, while insisting that its grievances be addressed immediately, even though we responded to these concerns on numerous occasions. When Washington understood that in order to reach an arrangement it would have to make reciprocal steps and address Russia's concerns, they halted consultations and started accusing our country of violating the Treaty. They used these far-fetched accusations as a pretext for taking "countermeasures," and later for withdrawing from the Treaty.

Over the past months, Washington has been making hypocritical claims that it would be willing to change its decision if Russia revised its stance. In fact, they never thought about changing anything. This was merely a PR stunt in order to mislead European governments and the public who were calling on Washington to come to its senses. Just like with other arms control treaties, the United States has deliberately sought to undermine the Treaty on Open Skies (it has to be reminded that United States participation was a precondition for the Treaty's entry into force).

Now that it has left the Treaty on Open Skies, the United States expects its allies to prevent Russia from carrying out observation flights over US military sites in Europe, while also sharing with Washington their aerial footage of the Russian territory.

Make no mistake: this is unacceptable for Russia. We will seek firm guarantees of compliance by other state parties with their obligations under the Treaty on Open Skies. First, they will have to enable observation over their entire territories. Second, they will have to refrain from transferring observation data to third parties that are not members of the Treaty on Open Skies.

If our colleagues actually want the Treaty to remain operational, and for Russia to remain a state party to the Treaty on Open Skies, they will have to promptly come up with ways to address Russia's concerns.

Washington has made its move. Neither the European security, nor the security of the United States or its allies benefited from this. Many in the West are now asking what Russia's response will be. The answer is simple. As we have said on numerous occasions, we are open to all the possible options. We keep a close eye on whether the actions of other Treaty members are consistent with what they say. Russia will act according to its security interests and those of its allies.

**Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Russian Federation on the Beginning of
Domestic Procedures for the Withdrawal of the
Russian Federation from the Treaty on Open
Skies**

[15 January 2021]

On November 22, 2020 the United States of America withdrew from the Treaty on Open Skies under an artificial pretext. This essentially destroyed the balance of interests of the State-Parties reached when the Treaty was signed, inflicted a severe damage to its functioning and undermined the role of the Open Skies Treaty as a confidence and security building measure.

The Russian side put forward specific proposals consistent with the fundamental provisions of the Treaty aimed at preserving its viability under the new circumstances. We state with regret that they found no support on the part of the US allies.

Due to the lack of progress in eliminating the hindrances for further functioning of the Treaty under the new circumstances, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is authorized to declare the beginning of domestic procedures for the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Treaty on Open Skies. Upon their completion, the respective notification will be sent to the Depositaries.