

## G – Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

### Section 1: Treaty and Status

#### Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Entered into force 22 January 2021

*The States Parties to this Treaty,*

[Eds...]

#### ARTICLE 1 – PROHIBITIONS

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:

- (a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- (b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
- (c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
- (d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- (e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
- (f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
- (g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

#### ARTICLE 2 – DECLARATIONS

1. Each State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, not later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for that State Party, a declaration in which it shall:

- (a) Declare whether it owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party;
- (b) Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), declare whether it owns, possesses or controls any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- (c) Notwithstanding Article 1 (g), declare whether there are any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such declarations received to the States Parties.

#### ARTICLE 3 – SAFEGUARDS

1. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply shall, at a minimum, maintain its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations in force at the time of entry into force of this Treaty, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.

2. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply that has not yet done so shall conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)). Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. Each State Party shall thereafter maintain such obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.

#### ARTICLE 4 – TOWARDS THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Each State Party that after 7 July 2017 owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for it, shall cooperate with the competent international authority designated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Article for the purpose of verifying the irreversible elimination of its nuclear-weapon programme. The competent international authority shall report to the States Parties. Such a State Party shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.

2. Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), each State Party that owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices shall immediately remove them from operational status, and destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties, in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State Party's nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities. The State Party, no later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, shall submit this plan to the States Parties or to a competent international authority designated by the States Parties. The plan shall then be negotiated with the competent international authority, which shall submit it to the subsequent meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval in accordance with its rules of procedure.

3. A State Party to which paragraph 2 above applies shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence no later than the date upon which implementation of the plan referred to in paragraph 2 is completed. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months after the date of initiation of negotiations. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. Following the entry into force of the agreement referred to in this paragraph, the State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a final declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article.

4. Notwithstanding Article 1 (b) and (g), each State Party that has any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State shall ensure the prompt removal of such weapons, as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties. Upon the removal of such weapons or other explosive devices, that State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article.

5. Each State Party to which this Article applies shall submit a report to each meeting of States Parties and each review conference on the progress made towards the implementation of its obligations under this Article, until such time as they are fulfilled.

6. The States Parties shall designate a competent international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programmes, including

the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. In the event that such a designation has not been made prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for a State Party to which paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article applies, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene an extraordinary meeting of States Parties to take any decisions that may be required.

#### ARTICLE 5 – NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

1. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty.
2. Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

#### ARTICLE 6 – VICTIM ASSISTANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION

1. Each State Party shall, with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, without discrimination, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion.
2. Each State Party, with respect to areas under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, shall take necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of areas so contaminated.
3. The obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be without prejudice to the duties and obligations of any other States under international law or bilateral agreements.

#### ARTICLE 7 – INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE

1. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties to facilitate the implementation of this Treaty.
2. In fulfilling its obligations under this Treaty, each State Party shall have the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties.
3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties affected by nuclear-weapons use or testing, to further the implementation of this Treaty.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the victims of the use or testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
5. Assistance under this Article may be provided, *inter alia*, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or on a bilateral basis.
6. Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it may have under international law, a State Party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices shall have a responsibility to provide adequate assistance to affected States Parties, for the purpose of victim assistance and environmental remediation.

#### ARTICLE 8 – MEETING OF STATES PARTIES

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Treaty, in accordance with its relevant provisions, and on further measures for nuclear disarmament, including:
  - (a) The implementation and status of this Treaty;

(b) Measures for the verified, time-bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, including additional protocols to this Treaty;

(c) Any other matters pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. The first meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of the entry into force of this Treaty. Further meetings of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on a biennial basis, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties. The meeting of States Parties shall adopt its rules of procedure at its first session. Pending their adoption, the rules of procedure of the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, shall apply.

3. Extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be convened, as may be deemed necessary, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at the written request of any State Party provided that this request is supported by at least one third of the States Parties.

4. After a period of five years following the entry into force of this Treaty, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a conference to review the operation of the Treaty and the progress in achieving the purposes of the Treaty. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene further review conferences at intervals of six years with the same objective, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties.

5. States not party to this Treaty, as well as the relevant entities of the United Nations system, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organizations, shall be invited to attend the meetings of States Parties and the review conferences as observers.

#### ARTICLE 9 – COSTS

1. The costs of the meetings of States Parties, the review conferences and the extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be borne by the States Parties and States not party to this Treaty participating therein as observers, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the circulation of declarations under Article 2, reports under Article 4 and proposed amendments under Article 10 of this Treaty shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

3. The cost related to the implementation of verification measures required under Article 4 as well as the costs related to the destruction of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and the elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, including the elimination or conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, should be borne by the States Parties to which they apply.

#### ARTICLE 10 – AMENDMENTS

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of a proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the proposal shall be considered at the next meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first.

2. A meeting of States Parties or a review conference may agree upon amendments which shall be adopted by a positive vote of a majority of two thirds of the States Parties. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted amendment to all States Parties.

3. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party that deposits its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment 90 days following the deposit of such instruments of

ratification or acceptance by a majority of the States Parties at the time of adoption. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other State Party 90 days following the deposit of its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment.

#### ARTICLE 11 – SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties' choice in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute, including by offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time limit for any agreed procedure, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.

#### ARTICLE 12 – UNIVERSALITY

Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty, with the goal of universal adherence of all States to the Treaty.

#### ARTICLE 13 – SIGNATURE

This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States at United Nations Headquarters in New York as from 20 September 2017.

#### ARTICLE 14 – RATIFICATION, ACCEPTANCE, APPROVAL OR ACCESSION

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States. The Treaty shall be open for accession.

#### ARTICLE 15 – ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.

2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

#### ARTICLE 16 – RESERVATIONS

The Articles of this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

#### ARTICLE 17 – DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events that it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect 12 months after the date of the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that 12-month period, the withdrawing State Party is a party to an armed conflict, the State Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Treaty and of any additional protocols until it is no longer party to an armed conflict.

#### ARTICLE 18 – RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER AGREEMENTS

The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty.

#### ARTICLE 19 – DEPOSITARY

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Treaty.

#### ARTICLE 20 – AUTHENTIC TEXTS

The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Treaty shall be equally authentic.

### Status of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

[as at 10 March 2026]

Entry into Force: 22 January 2021

Treaty was signed by 95 states and ratified by 74 states as of 10 March 2026

| State                    | Signature   | Ratification / Accession (a) |
|--------------------------|-------------|------------------------------|
| Algeria                  | 20 Sep 2017 |                              |
| Angola                   | 27 Sep 2018 |                              |
| Antigua & Barbuda        | 26 Sep 2018 | 25 Nov 2019                  |
| Austria                  | 20 Sep 2017 | 08 May 2018                  |
| Bahamas                  | 19 Sep 2023 |                              |
| Bangladesh               | 20 Sep 2017 | 26 Sep 2019                  |
| Barbados                 | 22 Sep 2022 |                              |
| Belize                   | 06 Feb 2020 | 19 May 2020                  |
| Benin                    | 26 Sep 2018 | 11 Dec 2020                  |
| Bolivia                  | 16 Apr 2018 | 06 Aug 2019                  |
| Botswana                 | 26 Sep 2019 | 15 Jul 2020                  |
| Brazil                   | 20 Sep 2017 |                              |
| Brunei                   | 26 Sep 2018 |                              |
| Burkina Faso             | 22 Sep 2022 |                              |
| Cabo Verde               | 20 Sep 2017 | 20 Jun 2022                  |
| Cambodia                 | 09 Jan 2019 | 22 Jan 2021                  |
| Central African Republic | 20 Sep 2017 |                              |
| Chile                    | 20 Sep 2017 | 23 Sep 2021                  |
| Colombia                 | 03 Aug 2018 |                              |

|                                  |             |                 |
|----------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Comoros                          | 20 Sep 2017 | 19 Feb 2021     |
| Congo                            | 20 Sep 2017 | 17 May 2022     |
| Cook Islands                     |             | 04 Sep 2018 (a) |
| Costa Rica                       | 20 Sep 2017 | 05 Jul 2018     |
| Côte d'Ivoire                    | 20 Sep 2017 | 23 March 2022   |
| Cuba                             | 20 Sep 2017 | 30 Jan 2018     |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 20 Sep 2017 | 22 Sep 2022     |
| Djibouti                         | 9 Jan 2023  |                 |
| Dominica                         | 26 Sep 2019 | 18 Oct 2019     |
| Dominican Republic               | 07 Jun 2018 | 22 Sep 2022     |
| Ecuador                          | 20 Sep 2017 | 25 Sep 2019     |
| El Salvador                      | 20 Sep 2017 | 30 Jan 2019     |
| Equatorial Guinea                | 22 Sep 2022 |                 |
| Fiji                             | 20 Sep 2017 | 07 Jul 2020     |
| Gambia                           | 20 Sep 2017 | 26 Sep 2018     |
| Ghana                            | 20 Sep 2017 | 26 Sep 2025     |
| Grenada                          | 26 Dec 2019 | 20 Jun 2022     |
| Guatemala                        | 20 Sep 2017 | 13 Jun 2022     |
| Guinea-Bissau                    | 26 Sep 2018 | 15 Dec 2021     |
| Guyana                           | 20 Sep 2017 | 20 Sep 2017     |
| Haiti                            | 22 Sep 2022 |                 |
| Holy See                         | 20 Sep 2017 | 20 Sep 2017     |
| Honduras                         | 20 Sep 2017 | 24 Oct 2020     |
| Indonesia                        | 20 Sep 2017 | 24 Sep 2024     |
| Ireland                          | 20 Sep 2017 | 06 Aug 2020     |
| Jamaica                          | 08 Dec 2017 | 23 Oct 2020     |
| Kazakhstan                       | 02 Mar 2018 | 29 Aug 2019     |
| Kiribati                         | 20 Sep 2017 | 26 Sep 2019     |

|               |             |                 |
|---------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Kyrgyzstan    | 26 Sep 2025 |                 |
| Laos          | 21 Sep 2017 | 26 Sep 2019     |
| Lesotho       | 26 Sep 2019 | 06 June 2020    |
| Libya         | 20 Sep 2017 |                 |
| Liechtenstein | 20 Sep 2017 |                 |
| Madagascar    | 20 Sep 2017 |                 |
| Malawi        | 20 Sep 2017 | 29 Jun 2022     |
| Malaysia      | 20 Sep 2017 | 30 Sep 2020     |
| Maldives      | 26 Sep 2019 | 26 Sep 2019     |
| Malta         | 25 Aug 2020 | 21 Sep 2020     |
| Mexico        | 20 Sep 2017 | 16 Jan 2018     |
| Mongolia      |             | 10 Dec 2021 (a) |
| Mozambique    | 18 Aug 2020 |                 |
| Myanmar       | 26 Sep 2018 |                 |
| Namibia       | 08 Dec 2017 | 20 Mar 2020     |
| Nauru         | 08 Dec 2019 | 23 Oct 2020     |
| Nepal         | 20 Sep 2017 |                 |
| New Zealand   | 20 Sep 2017 | 31 Jul 2018     |
| Nicaragua     | 22 Sep 2017 | 19 Jul 2018     |
| Niger         | 09 Dec 2020 |                 |
| Nigeria       | 20 Sep 2017 | 06 Aug 2020     |
| Niue          |             | 06 Aug 2020 (a) |
| Palau         | 20 Sep 2017 | 03 May 2018     |
| Palestine     | 20 Sep 2017 | 22 Mar 2018     |
| Panama        | 20 Sep 2017 | 11 Apr 2019     |
| Paraguay      | 20 Sep 2017 | 23 Jan 2020     |
| Peru          | 20 Sep 2017 | 23 Dec 2021     |
| Philippines   | 20 Sep 2017 | 18 Feb 2021     |
| Samoa         | 20 Sep 2017 | 26 Sep 2018     |
| San Marino    | 20 Sep 2017 | 26 Sep 2018     |

|                         |             |                 |
|-------------------------|-------------|-----------------|
| Sao Tome and Principe   | 20 Sep 2017 | 15 Jan 2024     |
| Seychelles              | 26 Sep 2018 | 09 Jul 2021     |
| Sierra Leone            | 22 Sep 2022 | 24 Sep 2024     |
| Solomon Islands         | 24 Sep 2024 | 24 Sep 2024     |
| South Africa            | 20 Sep 2017 | 22 Feb 2019     |
| Sri Lanka               |             | 19 Sep 2023 (a) |
| St Kitts and Nevis      | 26 Sep 2019 | 09 Aug 2020     |
| St Lucia                | 27 Sep 2018 | 23 Jan 2019     |
| St Vincent & Grenadines | 08 Dec 2017 | 31 Jul 2019     |
| Sudan                   | 22 Jul 2020 |                 |
| Thailand                | 20 Sep 2017 | 20 Sep 2017     |
| Timor-Leste             | 26 Sep 2018 | 20 Jun 2022     |
| Togo                    | 20 Sep 2017 |                 |
| Trinidad and Tobago     | 26 Sep 2019 | 26 Sep 2019     |
| Tuvalu                  | 20 Sep 2017 | 12 Oct 2020     |
| Tanzania                | 26 Sep 2019 |                 |
| Uruguay                 | 20 Sep 2017 | 25 Jul 2018     |
| Vanuatu                 | 20 Sep 2017 | 26 Sep 2018     |
| Venezuela               | 20 Sep 2017 | 27 Mar 2018     |
| Vietnam                 | 22 Sep 2017 | 17 May 2018     |
| Zambia                  | 26 Sep 2019 |                 |
| Zimbabwe                | 04 Dec 2020 |                 |

## Section 2: Meetings of State Parties of TPNW

### Agenda. First Meeting of States Parties of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

[18 May 2022]

1. Opening of the Meeting.
2. Election of officers:
  - a. Election of the President;
  - b. Election of other officers.

3. Introduction by the President.
4. High-level opening session: address by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and addresses by high-level officials.
5. Adoption of the agenda.
6. Adoption of the rules of procedure.
7. Confirmation of the Secretary-General of the Meeting.
8. Organization of work.
9. Credentials of representatives to the Meeting:
  - a. Appointment of members of the Credentials Committee;
  - b. Report of the Credentials Committee.
10. General exchange of views.
11. Consideration of the status and operation of the Treaty and other matters important for achieving the objectives and purpose of the Treaty:
  - a. Declarations regarding the ownership, possession or control of nuclear weapons (article 2);
  - b. Universality (article 12);
  - c. Deadlines for the removal from operational status and destruction of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, and their removal from national territories (article 4);
  - d. Competent international authority, including verification (article 4);
  - e. Victim assistance, environmental remediation and international cooperation and assistance (articles 6 and 7);
  - f. National implementation measures (article 5);
  - g. Other matters important for achieving the objectives and purpose of the Treaty, such as:
    - i. Institutionalizing scientific and technical advice for the effective implementation of the Treaty;
    - ii. Intersessional structure for the implementation of the Treaty;
    - iii. Complementarity of the Treaty with the existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
12. Financial matters.
13. Preparations for the second Meeting of States Parties.
14. Other matters.
15. Consideration and adoption of the final document of the Meeting.
16. Closure of the Meeting.

### Declaration of the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

[2022]

#### Our commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons

1. We, the States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, have gathered here for the first Meeting of States Parties

to mark the entry into force of the Treaty, to reaffirm our determination to realize the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to chart our path forward for the full and effective implementation of the Treaty. We welcome the broad participation of signatory States and observers, as well as other observers, civil society representatives and survivors of nuclear weapons use and testing.

2. We celebrate the entry into force of the Treaty on 22 January 2021. Nuclear weapons are now explicitly and comprehensively prohibited by international law, as has long been the case for biological and chemical weapons. We welcome that the Treaty fills this gap in the international legal regime against weapons of mass destruction and reaffirm the need for all States to comply at all times with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.

3. We reiterate the moral and ethical imperatives which inspired and motivated the creation of the Treaty and which now drive and guide its implementation:

- That the establishment of a legally binding prohibition on nuclear weapons constitutes a fundamental step towards the irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons needed for the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons and, hence, for the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

- That the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed, transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival and well-being and are incompatible with respect for the right to life. They inflict destruction, death and displacement, as well as profound long-term damage to the environment, socioeconomic and sustainable development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations, including with regard to the disproportionate impacts they have on women and girls.

- That all States share the responsibility to achieve nuclear disarmament, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to prevent any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and to assist victims, redress the harms and remediate the environmental damage caused by previous use and testing of nuclear-armed States in accordance with their respective obligations under international law and bilateral agreements.

- That the risk of a nuclear weapon detonation by accident, miscalculation or design concerns the security of all humanity and achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world serves both national and collective security interests.

- That the risks posed to all humanity by the existence of nuclear weapons are, thus, so grave that immediate action is needed to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. This is the only way to guarantee that they are never used again, under any circumstances. We cannot afford to wait.

4. We are alarmed and dismayed by threats to use nuclear weapons and increasingly strident nuclear rhetoric. We stress that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. We condemn unequivocally any and all nuclear threats, whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespective of the circumstances.

5. Far from preserving peace and security, nuclear weapons are used as instruments of policy, linked to coercion, intimidation and heightening of tensions. This highlights now more than ever the fallacy of nuclear deterrence doctrines, which are based and rely on the threat of the actual use of nuclear weapons and, hence, the risks of the destruction of countless lives, of societies, and of nations, and of inflicting global catastrophic consequences. We thus insist that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-armed States never use or threaten to use these weapons under any circumstances.

6. We remain gravely concerned that nine States still possess between them approximately 13,000 nuclear weapons and by security doctrines, which set out rationales for the use or threat of

use of nuclear weapons. Many of these weapons are on high alert and ready to be launched within minutes. We are further concerned that some non-nuclear-armed States continue to advocate for nuclear deterrence and encourage the ongoing possession of nuclear weapons. Growing instability and outright conflict greatly exacerbate the risks that these weapons will be used, whether deliberately or by accident or miscalculation. The existence of nuclear weapons diminishes and threatens the common security of all States; indeed, it threatens our very survival.

7. We regret and are deeply concerned that, despite the terrible risks, and despite their legal obligations and political commitments to disarm, none of the nuclear-armed States and their allies under the nuclear umbrella are taking any serious steps to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. Instead, all nuclear-armed States are spending vast sums to maintain, modernize, upgrade or expand their nuclear arsenals and are placing a greater emphasis on and increasing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines. We strongly call for an immediate end to these disconcerting trends. We underscore that these resources could be better utilized for sustainable development.

8. In these circumstances, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is needed more than ever. We will move forward with its implementation, with the aim of further stigmatizing and delegitimizing nuclear weapons and steadily building a robust global peremptory norm against them.

9. Together, we are developing the mechanisms of the Treaty. We will discharge our national obligations in full. We will work in partnership with the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, other international and regional organizations, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and other non-governmental organizations, religious leaders, parliamentarians, academics, indigenous peoples, victims of the use of nuclear weapons (hibakusha), as well as those affected by nuclear testing and youth groups. We recognize and appreciate their valuable contribution to taking forward nuclear disarmament. We will continue to draw on the expertise of leading scientists and consult and work inclusively with affected communities.

10. The humanitarian spirit of the Treaty is reflected in its positive obligations, aimed at redressing the harm caused by nuclear weapons use and testing. We will strengthen international cooperation among States parties to advance the implementation of the positive obligations of this Treaty. We will work with affected communities to provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance without discrimination to survivors of the use or testing of nuclear weapons, and to remediate environmental contamination. We emphasize the innovative gender provisions of the Treaty and stress the importance of the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men in nuclear disarmament diplomacy.

11. We will work to build the membership of the Treaty in all regions. We will harness the public conscience in support of our goal of universal adherence to the Treaty and its full implementation. We will work to implement the Action Plan that we have adopted to guide our efforts to achieve the objectives and goals of the Treaty. We will meet regularly to review the implementation of the Treaty and we will identify any additional measures to strengthen the Treaty and move nuclear disarmament forward.

12. We will also work with States outside the Treaty. We recognize the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and deplore threats or actions that risk undermining it. As fully committed States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we reaffirm the complementarity of the Treaty with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We are pleased to have advanced the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by bringing into force a comprehensive legal prohibition of nuclear weapons, as a necessary and effective measure related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. We urge all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to reinvigorate their efforts to fully implement the obligation of article VI and the actions and commitments agreed at Non-Proliferation Treaty review conferences. We reiterate our

commitment to work constructively with all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve our shared objectives.

13. We will continue to support all measures that can effectively contribute to nuclear disarmament. These include efforts to bring into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, interim measures to reduce the risk of use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, further development of disarmament verification measures, strengthening negative security assurances and a legal instrument prohibiting fissile material for the production for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We pledge to continue collaborating with nuclear-weapon-free zones, affirming that the prohibitions, obligations and objectives of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons are fully compatible with and complementary to the treaties establishing these zones.

14. We pledge to highlight further the urgency of nuclear disarmament, the important evidence regarding the humanitarian consequences and risks posed by the existence of nuclear weapons in all relevant disarmament and non-proliferation processes and to the global public more widely. The prevention of these consequences must be at the centre of our collective efforts to achieve and maintain a world without these weapons.

15. We urge all States to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons without delay. We appeal to those States that are not yet ready to take this step to engage cooperatively with the Treaty and work with us in support of our shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. We deplore the actions of some nuclear-armed States to discourage non-nuclear-armed States from joining the Treaty. We suggest that the energy and resources of these States would be better directed to making concrete progress towards nuclear disarmament. This would truly contribute to sustainable peace, security and development for all. We would welcome and celebrate such progress.

16. We have no illusions about the challenges and obstacles that lie before us in realizing the aims of this Treaty, but we move ahead with optimism and resolve. In the face of the catastrophic risks posed by nuclear weapons and in the interest of the very survival of humanity, we cannot do otherwise. We will take every path that is open to us and work persistently to open those that are still closed. We will not rest until the last State has joined the Treaty, the last warhead has been dismantled and destroyed and nuclear weapons have been totally eliminated from the Earth.

## **Vienna Action Plan. First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons**

[2022]

1. This Action Plan was adopted by the States parties at the first Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, held in Vienna from 21 to 23 June 2022.

2. The purpose of this Action Plan is to facilitate effective and timely implementation of the Treaty and its objectives and goals following the first Meeting of States Parties. The Plan sets out concrete steps and actions and elaborates on roles and responsibilities. The actions are designed to guide States parties and other relevant actors in the practical implementation of the Treaty, and thus to support States parties in meeting their obligations and furthering the objective and purpose of the Treaty in a cooperative spirit among States parties and other involved stakeholders.

3. Implementation and universalization of the Treaty are essential to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons and to addressing the harm caused by nuclear weapons to people and the environment.

4. With the following actions, the States parties establish a framework to guide the implementation of the Treaty and set in motion processes to develop further areas of cooperation and implementation across the different provisions of the Treaty. The Vienna Action Plan details the actions that States parties will take during the intersessional period, primarily in preparation for the

second Meeting of States Parties but also beyond, in order to support implementation and universalization of the Treaty.

### I. Universalization (article 12)

5. Article 12 of the Treaty requires State parties to encourage States not party to the Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty, with the goal of universal adherence of all States to the Treaty.

6. The situations and positions of States currently outside the Treaty differ widely. They include States already adhering to nuclear-weapon-free zones or having comparable national laws in place, States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that do not possess nuclear weapons, and States currently relying on nuclear weapons for their security, including nuclear hosting States as well as nuclear-armed States. These differences need to be taken into account in implementing the universalization obligation stipulated in article 12. Therefore, universalization efforts are understood broadly, including through increasing signatures and ratifications, as well as promoting the underlying rationale of the total elimination of nuclear weapons owing to their inherent risks and catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Universalization should serve as a strategy to maximize the authority of the core norms and principles of the Treaty in international politics.

To this end, States parties resolve:

Action 1: To make universalization efforts a priority of States parties. These efforts should focus on increasing the number of signatures and ratifications, as well as actively engaging in promoting the norms, values and underlying arguments of the Treaty, such as concern about the inherent risks and catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, and the Treaty's effective contribution towards disarmament and international peace and security.

Action 2: To call upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.

Action 3: To promote universalization, including through ministerial or diplomatic démarches or outreach visits, either on their own or in a group of Treaty supporters, to capitals of non-States parties or at regional or other relevant organizations, highlighting the value of the Treaty and the political, legal and practical importance of signature and ratification.

Action 4: To explore potential areas in which further information to facilitate accession to the Treaty might be necessary, and potentially explore options to fill these gaps.

Action 5: To share best practices and provide technical support for the ratification process, for example through capacity-building activities, such as workshops and seminars, to explain the provisions of the Treaty in detail and help to clarify the steps that a prospective State party would have to undertake to implement the Treaty. To that end, parties will endeavour to utilize existing regional and multilateral frameworks, as feasible.

Action 6: To appoint within 60 days national contact points for facilitating the implementation of article 12.

Action 7: To raise awareness of the Treaty at international conferences and regional workshops and seminars, as well as through the commissioning of studies and publications to promote the case for the Treaty.

Action 8: To make every effort to increase the number of States voting in favour of the relevant resolutions before the General Assembly as a positive step in support of the Treaty.

Action 9: To highlight the importance of the Treaty in statements, including at the political level, through joint regional or cross-regional statements, and resolutions and in all relevant forums, including organs of the United Nations disarmament machinery.

Action 10: To highlight the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, the risks associated with these weapons and the

legal and ethical questions regarding the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons and the practice of nuclear deterrence.

Action 11: To cooperate with affected States not party to the Treaty to advance the objectives of the Treaty and to facilitate adherence to the Treaty.

Action 12: To engage with those States that for the moment remain committed to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, inter alia, by providing opportunities for dialogue, highlighting the underlying rationale of the Treaty and the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and their inherent risks, and pursuing a fact-based approach in engaging with concerns or criticisms about the Treaty.

Action 13: To encourage and support involvement and active cooperation of all relevant partners and, to the extent possible, coordinate these universalization efforts to facilitate domestic ratification processes. These partners include the United Nations and the Secretary-General, including United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament, other international institutions and organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and other non-governmental organizations as well as parliamentarians and interested citizens.

Action 14: To share information on their universalization activities within the Treaty through reports to Meetings of States Parties or Review Conferences, updates to the informal contact group on universalization or other appropriate means.

## II. Towards the elimination of nuclear weapons (article 4)

7. Article 4 of the Treaty is one of the fundamental precepts that establish this legal instrument as a disarmament treaty and as part of the broader disarmament legal architecture. To achieve its disarmament goal, the Treaty envisages the designation of a competent international authority or authorities, with particular negotiation and verification mandates. This reflects the awareness of the negotiators of the Treaty that implementing article 4 is a substantial endeavour that should be undertaken in a considered and holistic manner.

8. There is no requirement for the designation of a competent international authority or authorities by the first Meeting of States Parties or by the entry into force of the Treaty for a State party to which article 4 (1) or article 4 (2) applies. In this early stage of implementation of the Treaty, further reflection and work on developing such a mechanism with the input of State parties, as well as relevant scientific and technical input, is the most substantive and meaningful way to approach the implementation of these provisions.

To this end, States Parties resolve:

Action 15: To pursue further discussions during the intersessional period towards developing a coherent approach on matters related to a competent international authority or authorities, from the general obligations of States parties to the specific mandate of the international authority or authorities, and providing guidance for the designation of authorities.

Action 16: To designate within 90 days national contact points with regard to the designation of the competent international authority or authorities.

Action 17: To elaborate during the intersessional period on the specific requirements of extension requests related to article 4 of the Treaty for nuclear-armed States' destruction of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in their ownership, possession or control (article 4 (2)) and for the removal of such weapons or devices from nuclear hosting States (article 4 (4)). This intersessional process should be based upon or informed by advice from the Scientific Advisory Group and information from relevant international technical agencies.

Action 18: To commit their best efforts to advancing and supporting progress on nuclear disarmament verification, while recognizing that verification is not an end in itself, nor a substitute for

nuclear disarmament, but a positive enabler for progress on disarmament.

III. Victim assistance, environmental remediation and international cooperation and assistance (articles 6 and 7)

9. The Treaty's positive obligations are central to the humanitarian goals of the Treaty. They aim to address the harm from past use and testing of nuclear weapons as well as the ongoing and expected future harm from the resulting contamination. Articles 6 and 7 draw on similar provisions in other humanitarian disarmament treaties but they are the first of their kind in a nuclear weapons treaty. These articles are designed to address the human and environmental effects of nuclear weapons and to provide affected States parties with technical, material and financial support to further the implementation of the Treaty.

To this end, States parties resolve:

Action 19: To engage with relevant stakeholders, including international organizations, civil society, affected communities, indigenous peoples, and youth, and work cooperatively to advance the effective and sustainable implementation of articles 6 and 7. In particular, they will closely consult with, actively involve, and disseminate information to, affected communities at all stages of the victim assistance and environmental remediation process.

Action 20: To engage and promote information exchange with States not party to the Treaty that have used or tested nuclear weapons, or any other nuclear explosive devices, on their provision of assistance to affected States parties for the purpose of victim assistance and environmental remediation.

Action 21: To establish national focal points for articles 6 and 7, with appropriate contact details for consultations, no later than three months after the first Meeting of States Parties.

Action 22: To adopt or adapt and implement relevant national laws and policies on articles 6 and 7, where appropriate.

Action 23: To coordinate and develop mechanisms, where needed, to facilitate the provision, by States parties in a position to do so, of the international cooperation and technical, material and financial assistance that affected States parties may require to implement the Treaty's victim assistance and environmental remediation provisions. Mechanisms should match needs, which may arise at any stage of implementing article 6, with offers of assistance.

Action 24: To cooperate with the United Nations system, relevant international, regional or national organizations or institutions, relevant non-governmental organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, and bilaterally, as appropriate, in the development of their implementation framework.

Action 25: To conduct all victim assistance, environmental remediation and international cooperation and assistance activities in accordance, in particular, with the principles of accessibility, inclusivity, non-discrimination and transparency and in coordination with affected communities, and provide victim assistance in a manner that is age- and gender-sensitive, given the disproportionate impact of nuclear weapons use and testing on women and girls and indigenous people.

Action 26: To review the implementation framework as well as implementation of articles 6 and 7 regularly, in particular as new information emerges and situations evolve, and draw, as appropriate, on lessons from implementation measures for positive obligations in other treaty regimes.

Action 27: To recognize the importance of information exchange for the implementation of articles 6 and 7. To this end, consulting with, and bearing in mind the needs and constraints of, affected States, States parties will develop guidelines for voluntary reporting on national measures related to victim assistance, environmental remediation and international cooperation and assistance, including deadlines, as appropriate. In the development

of these guidelines, States parties will draw on the input of relevant stakeholders, including international organizations, civil society, affected communities, indigenous peoples, and youth.

Action 28: To consider developing a voluntary and a non-burdensome format for reporting during the intersessional period before the second Meeting of States Parties, in close cooperation with States concerned, taking into account best practices for reporting under other disarmament treaties. For affected States parties, such reports could include the effects of nuclear weapons in their territory, their progress in implementing the Treaty's victim assistance and environmental remediation obligations and where they may need external support. Other States parties could report on what international cooperation and assistance they have provided and on their outreach to States not party in support of their objectives of articles 6 and 7.

Action 29: To discuss the feasibility of, and propose possible guidelines for, establishing an international trust fund for States that have been affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, taking into account relevant precedents for such a trust fund. The purpose of such a fund would be, *inter alia*, to provide aid to assist survivors and to support measures toward environmental remediation.

States parties affected by nuclear weapons use or testing resolve:

Action 30: To assess the effects of nuclear weapons use and testing with respect to areas under their jurisdiction or control, including, in particular, the needs of victims and contamination of the environment, as well as national capacities to address them. Initial assessments could focus on gathering existing knowledge about ongoing and expected effects, and current and planned responses to date, and determining what additional information is needed. These initial assessments should be completed by and shared with the second Meeting of States Parties.

Action 31: To develop national plans for implementation of their victim assistance and environmental remediation obligations, which include budgets and time frames. Such plans could be integrated into existing frameworks to increase efficiency, and international cooperation and assistance should be provided where needed to reduce the burden on affected States parties. Affected States parties should share their progress with the second Meeting of States Parties.

States parties in a position to do so resolve:

Action 32: To act upon their obligation under article 7 (3) to assist those States parties with clearly demonstrated needs for external support, by contributing to the mobilization of resources and the provision of technical, material and financial assistance to States parties affected by nuclear weapons use or testing, to further the implementation of this Treaty.

#### **IV. Institutionalizing scientific and technical advice for the effective implementation of the Treaty**

10. Further enriching knowledge of the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons and a shared understanding of the risks of nuclear weapons as well as technical guidance for the implementation of article 4 will be important to ensure the effective implementation of the Treaty. The establishment of the Scientific Advisory Group aims to assist States parties in implementing the Treaty and in strengthening the credibility of the implementation process.

To this end, States parties resolve:

Action 33: To support the work of the Scientific Advisory Group, including through the appointment of recognized experts drawn from the broadest possible pool in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and/or the humanitarian consequences and risks associated with nuclear weapons, and the requisite humanitarian response, active at relevant institutions and universities on the basis of their expertise in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of the Treaty.

Action 34: To identify and engage scientific and technical experts and institutions in States parties to the Treaty by the second Meeting of States Parties and, through the Scientific Advisory

Group, establish a geographically diverse and gender-balanced network of experts to support the goals of the Treaty.

#### **V. Relationship of the Treaty with the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime**

11. While the Treaty is a stand-alone legally binding instrument, it builds upon, contributes to and complements a rich and diverse disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. In order to highlight and underscore these complementarities with specific disarmament instruments, particularly the Non-Proliferation Treaty, States parties resolve:

Action 35: To emphasize the complementarity of the Treaty with the existing disarmament and non-proliferation regime at appropriate opportunities, including preparatory meetings and review conferences of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and with relevant multilateral nuclear disarmament-related initiatives and groupings.

Action 36: To appoint an informal facilitator or facilitators to further explore and articulate the possible areas of tangible cooperation between the Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty during the intersessional period, and provide support for the efforts of the informal facilitator or facilitators.

Action 37: To cooperate with other international bodies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, in order to enhance cooperation, including in the areas of nuclear safeguards and verification. Such cooperation should enhance the complementarity between the Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Test-Ban Treaty.

Action 38: To continue to work together on outreach projects in order to raise awareness, not only among Governments, but also with civil society, academia, parliamentarians and the general public, including youth organizations, so as to highlight the complementarity between the Treaty and the existing disarmament and non-proliferation regime, including nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.

#### **VI. Other matters essential for achieving the aims of the Treaty**

##### **Principles of inclusivity and cooperation among stakeholders in the implementation of the Treaty**

States parties resolve:

Action 39: To meet their obligations in the Treaty's established spirit of cooperation, inclusivity and transparency, and to integrate gender considerations across the work of the Treaty's implementation.

Action 40: To cooperate closely with the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, academia, affected communities and other civil society organizations.

Action 41: To facilitate the active participation of relevant stakeholders and take into account the different needs of people in affected communities and indigenous people and ensure strong ownership by all States parties.

Action 42: To contribute on a voluntary basis to initiatives to facilitate widespread representation at meetings of the Treaty.

##### **Additional aspects of support for Treaty implementation**

12. The effective functioning and full implementation of the Treaty have been enhanced through the decisions taken at the first Meeting of States Parties to establish an intersessional structure that takes into account the requirements and resources available in this early phase of the Treaty.

States parties resolve:

Action 43: To support the efforts of the Coordination Committee and the informal working groups in their coordination of the intersessional work between Meetings of States Parties.

Action 44: To continue to reaffirm the valuable role of the United Nations in providing support to Meetings of States Parties.

Action 45: To enhance and make use of synergies between the Treaty and other relevant instruments of disarmament and of international humanitarian and human rights law to which States parties to the Treaty are party.

#### Transparency and exchange of information

States parties resolve:

Action 46: To fulfil their obligation to provide initial declarations under article 2 without delay.

#### Implementing the gender provisions of the Treaty

13. As States parties move forward with Treaty implementation, they should reflect on the gender-related provisions of the Treaty and consider specific implementation actions to operationalize them.

To this end, States parties resolve:

Action 47: To emphasize the gender-responsive nature of the Treaty and recommend that gender considerations be taken into account across all Treaty-related national policies, programmes and projects.

Action 48: To establish a gender focal point to work during the intersessional period to support the implementation of the gender provisions of the Treaty and report on progress made to the second Meeting of States Parties.

Action 49: To begin work during the intersessional period to develop guidelines for ensuring age- and gender-sensitive victim assistance, taking into account relevant approaches in other humanitarian disarmament instruments.

Action 50: To begin work during the intersessional period to develop guidelines for the integration of gender perspectives in international cooperation and assistance, taking into account relevant approaches in other humanitarian disarmament instruments.

## Decisions of the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

[2022]

### Decisions of the first Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

#### Decision 1

#### Deadlines for the removal from operational status and destruction of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, and their removal from national territories (article 4)

In the pursuit of the full and effective implementation of article 4 (2) and article 4 (4) of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the Meeting of States Parties decides:

(a) To adopt a maximum upper limit of 10 years as the deadline required for nuclear weapons destruction, in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State party's nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, pursuant to article 4 (2);

(b) To establish a maximum extension period of up to five years for the destruction of nuclear weapons;

(c) That an extension request may be granted by a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference to overcome unexpected difficulties in the disarmament process;

(d) That the extension request must not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for that State party to complete its

obligations under article 4 (2) and the State party must stay within the maximum allowed extension period;

(e) That such requests should contain:

(i) The duration of the proposed extension;

(ii) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including a description of the challenges met in fulfilment of the original plan;

(iii) An updated and detailed plan for destruction that specifically includes measures to address the challenges met in fulfilling the original plan;

(f) That the specific requirements for extension requests could be elaborated upon by a future Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference of the Treaty, based upon advice from the Scientific Advisory Group and information from relevant international technical agencies;

(g) That any decision on the above by States parties should be informed by the recommendations of the Scientific Advisory Group and relevant international technical agencies;

(h) To adopt a deadline of up to a maximum period of 90 days for the removal of nuclear weapons from hosting States.

#### Decision 2

#### Institutionalizing scientific and technical advice for the effective implementation of the Treaty

The Meeting of States Parties decides:

(a) To establish a Scientific Advisory Group on the basis of the mandate as contained in document [TPNW/MSP/2022/WP.6](#) submitted by the President;

(b) That States Parties are invited to submit nominations for membership of the Scientific Advisory Group within 90 days after the first Meeting of States Parties;

(c) That nominees should be proposed on the basis of their qualifications and experience, with States parties taking into account their publications, scientific, academic or professional activities, distinctions and international and scientific advisory experience;

(d) That nominees should be ready to make substantive contributions to Scientific Advisory Group meetings, during the intersessional periods and at other relevant science and technology events;

(e) That all nominees are to submit a written statement describing how they intend to have a substantial impact on the work of the Scientific Advisory Group and the Treaty;

(f) That the Scientific Advisory Group will be composed of up to 15 members to be appointed by the President following consultations with States parties, taking into account the need for a comprehensive spread of relevant fields of scientific and technological expertise, gender balance and equitable geographical distribution;

(g) That the Scientific Advisory Group will annually elect two Co-Chairs from among its members and take up its work without delay in accordance with its terms of reference;

(h) That the Scientific Advisory Group will convene its constitutive meeting as soon as possible, but not later than 30 days after the appointment by the President, elect two Co-Chairs and take any other decision related to its effective functioning;

(i) That the Scientific Advisory Group will provide a report on its annual activities to the President for circulation among States parties;

(j) That the Scientific Advisory Group will report to the second Meeting of States Parties on the status and developments regarding nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon risks, the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and related issues;

(k) That by the second Meeting of States Parties, with a view to contributing to capacity-building, the Scientific Advisory Group will identify and engage scientific and technical institutions in States parties and more broadly to establish a network of experts to support the goals of the Treaty.

### Decision 3

#### Complementarity of the Treaty with the existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime

The Meeting of States Parties decides to appoint Ireland and Thailand as informal facilitators to further explore and articulate the possible areas of tangible cooperation between the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and other relevant nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments, during the period between the first Meeting of States Parties and the second Meeting of States Parties. The informal facilitators will submit recommendations for distribution through the Coordination Committee, as appropriate, and report to the second Meeting of States Parties.

### Decision 4

#### Intersessional structure for the implementation of the Treaty

The Meeting of States Parties decides:

(a) To establish a Coordination Committee to coordinate the conduct and organization of intersessional work between the first and second Meetings of States Parties. The Committee will comprise the outgoing President, the President of the subsequent Meeting, the Co-Chairs of the informal working groups, the informal facilitators to further explore and articulate the possible areas of tangible cooperation between the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the gender focal point, with the participation as observers of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. The Co-Chairs of the Scientific Advisory Group may be invited to participate by the Coordination Committee;

(b) That the Coordination Committee will meet at least once every quarter or on an ad hoc basis, as necessary, using virtual or hybrid means. The Chair of the Coordination Committee will identify the location of any in-person meeting with a view to maximizing participation. Virtual participation by any State party interested in observing the meeting can be arranged as required;

(c) That the Coordination Committee will be supported by the Secretariat;

(d) To establish the following informal working groups to coordinate and take forward the intersessional work between Meetings of States Parties (or Review Conferences):

(i) Informal working group on universalization. This group will be co-chaired by Malaysia and South Africa between the first and second Meetings of States Parties;

(ii) Informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, international cooperation and assistance. This group will be co-chaired by Kazakhstan and Kiribati between the first and second Meetings of States Parties;

(iii) Informal working group on the implementation of article 4, in particular work related to the future designation of a competent international authority or authorities. This group will be co-chaired by Mexico and New Zealand between the first and second Meetings of States Parties;

(e) That the informal working groups will be open to the participation of all States parties, with the involvement of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the Secretariat and relevant international organizations as observers. The Co-Chairs may invite interested signatory States and additional experts and civil society partners, as well as other relevant stakeholders, to participate as observers, in line with the guiding principles of

transparency and inclusivity and the substantive requirements of the respective informal working groups. The Co-Chairs will communicate to States parties such proposed observers in advance of meetings;

(f) That the informal working groups will meet on a regular basis, using virtual or hybrid means. The Co-Chairs will identify the location of any in-person meeting with a view to maximizing participation;

(g) That the purpose of the informal working groups is to coordinate efforts regarding the implementation of the Treaty and decisions and actions agreed by the Meeting of States Parties, to exchange information and to develop recommendations to be considered at future Meetings of States Parties and Review Conferences;

(h) That the Co-Chairs of the informal working groups, the informal facilitators, the gender focal point and the Co-Chairs of the Scientific Advisory Group will submit regular reports to the Coordination Committee and submit a written report on their activities to each Meeting of States Parties;

(i) That the President will inform States parties on a regular basis, in writing and/or through informal in-person or virtual meetings, of the activities undertaken by the Coordination Committee;

(j) To appoint Chile as gender focal point to work during the intersessional period to support the implementation of the gender provisions of the Treaty and report on progress made to the second Meeting of States Parties.

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## Declaration of the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

[2023]

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### Our commitment to upholding the prohibition of nuclear weapons and averting their catastrophic consequences

1. We, the States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, have gathered for the second Meeting of States Parties in steadfast determination to address the existential threat to humanity posed by nuclear weapons and to uphold our commitment to their prohibition and complete elimination. We welcome the broad participation of signatory States and observer States, as well as other observers, civil society representatives, the scientific community and survivors of nuclear weapons use and testing.

2. We celebrate the successful first Meeting of States Parties, convened in Vienna from 21 to 23 June 2022, and welcome its declaration, outcomes and decisions, including the Vienna Action Plan.

3. We welcome the progress that has been achieved by States parties across a broad range of actions in the Vienna Action Plan and further acknowledge the able stewardship of the Co-Chairs of the informal working groups, facilitators and focal point.

4. Progress also continues towards universalization of the Treaty since the first Meeting of States Parties, and we recognize the significance of and warmly welcome the signatures by the Bahamas, Barbados, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti and Sierra Leone, the ratifications by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Dominican Republic and Malawi, and the accession by Sri Lanka.

5. The Treaty currently stands strong with 93 signatories and 69 States parties. We renew our call upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without delay. We will continue to pursue universalization of the Treaty as one of our priorities.

6. Evidence-based policymaking on the effects of nuclear weapons, the process out of which the Treaty was created,

must be central to all decisions and actions regarding the elimination of nuclear weapons. The establishment and ongoing work of the Scientific Advisory Group strengthens the effective implementation of the Treaty by enabling consideration of the most current scientific and technical knowledge and advice with regard to the implementation of the Treaty, which has helped to inform the deliberations and decisions of States parties. The Scientific Advisory Group, the first international scientific body created to advance nuclear disarmament under a multilateral treaty, is also instrumental in building and maintaining a network with the wider scientific community to reinforce awareness and promote universalization of the Treaty.

7. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons continues to benefit from actively involving a broad range of stakeholders such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, other relevant international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, academia, individuals, religious leaders, and victims of and communities affected by nuclear weapons, among others. We reaffirm the gender provisions of the Treaty and that the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men is essential in nuclear disarmament.

8. Nuclear risks are being exacerbated in particular by the continued and increasing salience of and emphasis on nuclear weapons in military postures and doctrines, coupled with the ongoing qualitative modernization of and quantitative increases in nuclear arsenals and the heightening of tensions. We cannot stand idly by while signs indicate that humanity is moving closer to global nuclear catastrophe at this dangerous inflection point.

9. We reaffirm our grave concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which cannot be adequately addressed, transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival and well-being and would be incompatible with respect for the right to life. Nuclear weapons inflict catastrophic destruction and unspeakable suffering and death. Their use would have long-term damage to the environment, socioeconomic and sustainable development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations, including the disproportionate impact that nuclear weapons have on women and girls.

10. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences and risks associated with nuclear weapons underpin the moral and ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament and the urgency of achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world, which, among other drivers, inspired the creation of the Treaty and guide its implementation. These considerations must be at the centre of all disarmament policies, highlighting the human cost of nuclear weapons and the need to protect human life and the environment.

11. Past use and testing of nuclear weapons have clearly demonstrated the unacceptable humanitarian and environmental consequences and ongoing legacies caused by their uncontrollable destructive capability and indiscriminate nature. We thus reaffirm our support for addressing the harms of nuclear weapons use and testing, including through the positive obligations of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

12. New scientific research has underscored the multifaceted and cascading effects of the catastrophic humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and associated risks. This growing and compelling scientific evidence should be broadened further, including scientific information on those effects that are still not understood in their entirety, and already warrants urgent policy responses at the international level.

13. The continued existence of nuclear weapons and lack of meaningful progress on disarmament undermine the security

of all States, aggravate international tensions, heighten the risk of nuclear catastrophe and pose an existential threat to humanity as a whole. The only guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is their complete elimination and the legally binding assurance that they will never be developed again.

14. We remain deeply alarmed by and firmly deplore threats to use nuclear weapons, as well as increasingly strident nuclear rhetoric. We stress that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and further underscore that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to international humanitarian law. Such threats serve only to undermine the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and international peace and security. We condemn unequivocally any and all nuclear threats, whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespective of the circumstances.

15. We reject attempts to normalize nuclear rhetoric and any notion of so-called “responsible” behaviour as far as nuclear weapons are concerned. The threat of inflicting mass destruction runs counter to the legitimate security interests of humanity as a whole. This is a dangerous, misguided and unacceptable approach to security. Nuclear threats should not be tolerated.

16. We applaud the growing explicit recognition that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible. However, these declarations, such as that agreed by members of the Group of 20, must go beyond statements and result in meaningful and tangible actions.

17. Far from preserving peace and security, nuclear weapons are used as instruments of policy, linked to coercion, intimidation and heightening of tensions. The renewed advocacy of, insistence on and attempts to justify nuclear deterrence as a legitimate security doctrine give false credence to the value of nuclear weapons for national security and dangerously increase the risk of horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation.

18. We regret the growing reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. There are now more States under extended nuclear security guarantees and nuclear stationing arrangements than when we last met. Any tendency towards the erosion of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime is of concern. We are disturbed by any placement of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear-armed States. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons clearly prohibits receiving the transfer of, or control over, nuclear weapons or to allow their stationing, installation or deployment. We urge all States with such nuclear arrangements to put an end to them and join the Treaty.

19. The perpetuation and implementation of nuclear deterrence in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies not only erodes and contradicts non-proliferation but also obstructs progress towards nuclear disarmament.

20. This is not only a security issue. In a world where challenges persist in meeting basic human needs, the investment of substantial financial resources in modernizing and expanding nuclear arsenals is indefensible and counterproductive, as it comes at the expense of investment in sustainable development for genuine human well-being, as well as disarmament, education, diplomacy, environmental protection and health.

21. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations recognized in his recently released New Agenda for Peace, the existential threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity must motivate us to ensure their total elimination. We, the States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, heed this call and reiterate the high priority that we attach to urgent, complete, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament.

22. This increasingly challenging international security context further underscores the vital importance and relevance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We are more determined than ever in our unyielding commitment to delegitimizing, stigmatizing and totally eliminating nuclear weapons.

23. We are playing our part to advance and strengthen the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture as a whole, including under other complementary treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

24. It therefore concerns us that two consecutive review processes of the Non-Proliferation Treaty have been unable to agree on necessary urgent measures to make credible progress on nuclear disarmament or ensure the implementation of a series of agreed measures. In the period since the first Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, none of the nuclear-weapon States have made progress in accordance with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the elimination of their nuclear weapons. Instead, we have seen enhancements of nuclear arsenals, active pursuit of quantitative expansions and even reduced transparency. Unquestionably, this represents a failure to meet their legally binding obligations under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to engage in serious and good-faith negotiations towards the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, as well as the unequivocal undertakings to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals agreed at and reiterated during Non-Proliferation Treaty review conferences.

25. As fully committed States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we, the States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, reaffirm the complementarity between the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We continue to implement our obligations and comply with our responsibilities, undertakings and agreements under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We are pleased to have advanced the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by bringing into force a comprehensive legal prohibition of nuclear weapons.

26. Furthermore, we will continue to advance the provisions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the concern over the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, as well as those on addressing the environmental rehabilitation of the territories affected by radioactive contamination, among others.

27. We once again emphasize that nothing in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of its States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

28. It is vital that all States continue to take decisive steps towards signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Progress towards its entry into force should be strengthened, and we reiterate our commitment to continue to support all efforts to that end. We are concerned that existing and additional delays, preconditions or other conditionalities by annex 2 States continue to make the entry into force an increasingly distant goal. We urge all States that have not signed or ratified, or that have signed but not ratified, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in particular those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force, to sign and ratify it without delay. We urge all States to continue to uphold the global norm against nuclear weapons testing and to relegate the terrible legacy of testing to history.

29. Recognizing the immense contribution of nuclear-weapon-free zones to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and

enhancing international peace and security, we call upon States parties to the treaties establishing such zones which have not yet done so to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons without delay in recognition of the shared basis of such treaties and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and to enhance mutually reinforcing cooperation. We also recognize the importance of the continued strengthening of all existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, inter alia, through the ratification of existing treaties and relevant protocols and the withdrawal or revision of any reservations or interpretative declarations contrary to the object and purpose of the treaties establishing such zones, and of the creation of such zones in areas where they do not currently exist, including in the Middle East.

30. We, as States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, highlight the importance of continuing progress in the universalization and full implementation of these complementary instruments and prevent regression. Work will continue with all States, including through open discourse with those with reservations about the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and other stakeholders on work surrounding complementarity.

31. We unequivocally affirm that our commitment to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and its object and purpose remains unaffected when completing fulfilment of obligations emanating from treaties previously subscribed to, where these do not conflict with obligations of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We shall take all necessary measures for effective implementation of the purposes and objectives of this Treaty and will continue to review our international and bilateral obligations in order to ensure consistency with regard to the Treaty and its object and purpose. We call upon all non-States parties to refrain from any activities that could have an adverse impact on the implementation of the object and purpose of the Treaty.

32. Furthermore, we also believe that the international community must address new and continually evolving developments in science and technology in the nuclear domain, including on the possible implications of some applications of emerging technologies that would inhibit or undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty.

33. Recognizing the instrumental role of a diversity of stakeholders, we renew our pledge to continue to collaborate through an inclusive approach with international organizations, parliamentarians, civil society, scientists, communities affected by nuclear weapons, victims of nuclear weapons, financial institutions and youth.

34. In the light of a global climate characterized by a deficit of trust, we reaffirm the need to build confidence among all members of the international community. As such, we are equally unambiguous on our willingness to work collaboratively with all States, in concerted action to achieve and maintain a world free of nuclear weapons.

35. We, the States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, will not stand by as spectators to increasing nuclear risks and the dangerous perpetuation of nuclear deterrence. We are resolutely committed to the universalization and effective implementation of the Treaty and the fulfilment of the Vienna Action Plan. We will work relentlessly to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons for the sake of current and future generations. We undertake and recommit to ensure that nuclear weapons are never again used, tested or threatened to be used, under any circumstances, and will not rest until they are completely eliminated.

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## Decisions of the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of

## Nuclear Weapons

[2023]

### Decision 1

#### Intersessional structure for the implementation of the Treaty

The Meeting of States Parties decides:

(a) To extend the intersessional structure as contained in decision 4 of the first Meeting of States Parties to the intersessional period between the second and third Meetings of States Parties and that:

(i) The informal working group on universalization will be co-chaired by South Africa and Uruguay;

(ii) The informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, international cooperation and assistance will be co-chaired by Kazakhstan and Kiribati;

(iii) The informal working group on the implementation of article 4, in particular work related to the future designation of a competent international authority or authorities, will be co-chaired by Malaysia and New Zealand;

(iv) Mexico will be appointed as gender focal point;

(b) To reconfirm decision 3 of the first Meeting of States Parties regarding the complementarity of the Treaty with the existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and to appoint Ireland and Thailand as informal facilitators between the second and third Meetings of States Parties;

(c) That the Co-Chairs of the informal working groups, the informal facilitators and the gender focal point will be informed, *inter alia*, by documents [TPNW/MSP/2023/2](#), [TPNW/MSP/2023/3](#), [TPNW/MSP/2023/4](#), [TPNW/MSP/2023/5](#) and [TPNW/MSP/2023/7](#), respectively.

### Decision 2

#### Thematic debates at the Meetings of States Parties

The Meeting of States Parties decides:

(a) That Presidents of future Meetings of States Parties shall have the option to convene thematic debates at the Meetings, taking into account the relevance of specific topics for the implementation of the Treaty's objectives and current international developments, among others;

(b) That, towards that aim, the President – if they so choose – shall select a specific topic for thematic debate and propose it to the States parties, for their concurrence, following consultations with the Coordinating Committee;

(c) That, following the approval of the proposal, the President will work with the Secretariat to include the corresponding thematic debate in the timetable of the Meeting of States Parties.

### Decision 3

#### Voluntary reporting on articles 6 and 7

The Meeting of States Parties decides to adopt, on a provisional basis, for voluntary use by States parties, the reporting guidelines and the reporting format as contained in document [TPNW/MSP/2023/3](#) and further recommends that States parties continue to review the voluntary reporting guidelines and format with a view to further improvement as part of the activities of the informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, international cooperation and assistance.

### Decision 4

#### International trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation

The Meeting of States Parties decides:

(a) That focused discussions will be held under the informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, international cooperation and assistance, taking into account, *inter alia*, document [TPNW/MSP/2023/3](#), regarding the feasibility of, and possible guidelines for, establishing an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation;

(b) That a report will be submitted to the third Meeting of States Parties with recommendations related to the feasibility of, and possible guidelines for, the establishment of an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation, with the aim of examining the establishment of such a trust fund at the third Meeting of States Parties as a priority.

### Decision 5

#### Consultative process on security concerns of States under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The Meeting of States Parties decides:

(a) To establish an intersessional consultative process, between the second and third Meetings of States Parties, among States parties and signatories, with the involvement of the Scientific Advisory Group, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and other stakeholders and experts, to consult and submit a report to the third Meeting of States Parties containing a comprehensive set of arguments and recommendations in order:

(i) To better promote and articulate the legitimate security concerns, threat and risk perceptions enshrined in the Treaty that result from the existence of nuclear weapons and the concept of nuclear deterrence;

(ii) To challenge the security paradigm based on nuclear deterrence by highlighting and promoting new scientific evidence about the humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons and juxtaposing this with the risks and assumptions that are inherent in nuclear deterrence;

(b) That Austria will be appointed as coordinator for the consultative process on security concerns of States under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;

(c) That the coordinator will collaborate closely with the Co-Chairs of the informal working group on universalization to maximize synergies with respect to universalization efforts.

## Declaration of the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

[2025]

### Strengthening our commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons amid the rising global instability

1. We, the States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, convening at the third Meeting of States Parties from 3 to 7 March 2025 at United Nations Headquarters in New York, under the presidency of the Republic of Kazakhstan, reaffirm our unwavering determination to address the existential threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity.

2. This meeting holds profound historical significance, taking place in this eightieth year after nuclear weapons were first tested and used. We solemnly recall the devastating impacts of these weapons on the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and acknowledge the countless victims and survivors who have suffered the effects of nuclear weapons and their testing programmes since the dawn of the nuclear age. The awareness and prevention of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, and a conviction

to prevent them, must continue to guide our work to implement the Treaty and advance nuclear disarmament.

3. Heightened geopolitical tensions, further expansion and modernization of nuclear arsenals, the increasing salience of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines, including through security guarantees, and the growing dangers of nuclear proliferation and potentially devastating nuclear arms races demand immediate and decisive action from the international community. At the same time, the Doomsday Clock now stands at 89 seconds to midnight. Amid unprecedented, interconnected and complex global challenges, the looming threat of nuclear conflict remains an existential threat to humanity. The Treaty stands as a beacon of hope in these turbulent times.

4. We celebrate the achievements of the first and second Meetings of States Parties, held in Vienna from 21 to 23 June 2022, and in New York from 27 November to 1 December 2023, respectively, and we reiterate our commitment to the declarations and decisions adopted therein, which continue to guide our collective efforts.

5. We welcome the participation of signatory States and observer States, as well as other observers, civil society, the scientific community, academia, individuals, religious leaders and survivors of nuclear weapons use and testing. The active and diverse engagement of a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and many others, strengthens our collective impact and amplifies the urgent calls for nuclear disarmament.

6. In this era of geopolitical uncertainty when international law and multilateral cooperation, essential for maintaining global peace and security, are being undermined, the strength and credibility of multilateral institutions are critical to global peace and security. Renewed commitment to achieving a safer and more peaceful future is imperative. Eight decades after the establishment of the United Nations and adoption of the very first United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons, this is more urgent than ever.

7. At the same time, the long-standing disarmament and non-proliferation architecture is being eroded, arms control agreements abandoned, and military postures hardened, further weakening the existing global security architecture. A tense and increasingly polarized international security environment, combined with a lack of trust and communication, exacerbates the existing dangers of nuclear weapons use. Urgent action is needed to rebuild dialogue, restore confidence and trust, recommit to nuclear disarmament and prevent a return to nuclear brinkmanship with catastrophic consequences for all humankind.

8. These global developments demand our collective response. In this volatile environment, the majority of non-nuclear-armed States play an increasingly vital role in bridging divides, promoting diplomacy and reinforcing multilateralism. As champions and stewards of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, its States Parties work relentlessly to unite and mobilize the international community around the imperative and urgency of progress towards eliminating the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons and ensure the Treaty remains a vital element in advancing nuclear disarmament.

9. We welcome the continued significant progress made by States Parties to implement the Vienna Action Plan. We further acknowledge the dedicated leadership of the Co-Chairs of the informal working groups, the facilitators, the gender focal point, and the coordinator for the consultative process on States Parties' security concerns.

10. With 94 signatories and 73 States Parties, we acknowledge and welcome further progress towards universalization of the Treaty, which is growing in support and strength. In this regard, we recognize the significance of and warmly welcome the recent signature by Solomon Islands, the ratifications by Indonesia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone and Solomon Islands. We reaffirm

our commitment to universalizing the Treaty as a priority and call upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty or accede to it without delay.

11. We welcome the important contribution of the Scientific Advisory Group, which plays a crucial role in enhancing evidence-based knowledge and building and maintaining a network with the wider scientific community to reinforce awareness and promote universalization of the Treaty.

12. We reaffirm our commitment to the gender provisions of the Treaty, recognizing that the full, equal and meaningful participation of both women and men is essential to advancing nuclear disarmament and achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

13. We reaffirm our grave concern about the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons, which transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival and well-being and would be incompatible with the right to life. These consequences are substantiated by new scientific evidence. This growing body of research confirms that their effects are more severe, cascading, long-lasting and complex than previously understood, involving long-term damage to the environment, socioeconomic and sustainable development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations, including the disproportionate impact that nuclear weapons have on women and girls, including as a result of ionizing radiation, as well as on infants and children, given their particular vulnerability to the effects of nuclear weapons.

14. We emphasize that these catastrophic consequences cannot be adequately addressed. The only guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences and risks associated with nuclear weapons underpin the moral and ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament and the urgency of achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world, which, among other drivers, inspired the creation of the Treaty and guide its implementation. Our work is and must continue to be guided by these principles and grounded in scientific evidence. In this regard, we welcome the recent establishment by the United Nations General Assembly of an independent Scientific Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War, and we look forward to its findings.

15. We reiterate that all States share the responsibility to achieve nuclear disarmament, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to prevent any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and to assist victims, redress the harms and remediate the environmental damage caused by previous use and testing of nuclear-armed States in accordance with their respective obligations under international law and bilateral agreements.

16. We, the States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, acknowledge the immense human suffering and significant harms of victims of the use and testing of nuclear weapons as experienced by the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (hibakusha) and the numerous communities around the world exposed to nuclear weapons testing.

17. We congratulate Nihon Hidankyo, a long-time supporter and advocate of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, on being awarded the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and for demonstrating through witness testimony that nuclear weapons must never be used again.

18. More than 2,000 nuclear explosive tests have been conducted worldwide and have continued in the twenty-first century. We recognize that the consequences of the use and testing of nuclear weapons have transcended national borders, contaminated environments, and continue to hamper socioeconomic development, threaten food security and harm the health of current and future generations. The experience of those that have suffered from hundreds of nuclear tests, including in a number of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, is a stark reminder of the long-lasting harmful nature of the effects of radiation on health and environment.

19. We condemn any rhetoric or actions that undermine the global taboo on nuclear testing, including as a means to reinforce the fallacy of nuclear deterrence. We underscore and reaffirm our conviction that nuclear testing must not be resumed for any reason or under any pretext and therefore urge all States to uphold the global norm against nuclear weapons testing and to relegate the terrible legacy of testing to history.

20. We remain committed to addressing the harms of nuclear weapons use and testing, including through the positive obligations (articles 6 and 7) of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We commend the steps taken by States Parties to operationalize these provisions, recognizing the need to establish mechanisms for allocation of necessary resources to aid those who have suffered from nuclear weapons use and testing. It is unacceptable that, decades after the use or testing of nuclear weapons, many affected communities still await assistance and environmental remediation, and we, as States Parties to the Treaty, are doing our part by advancing the implementation of the positive obligations of this Treaty, including through, *inter alia*, the discussions on the feasibility and potential establishment, among any other feasible mechanisms, of an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation that is viable, effective and sustainable.

21. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is essential and long overdue. It would complement the prohibition on nuclear weapons testing as contained in article 1 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We call on all annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without any additional delays, preconditions or other conditionalities, as further postponement is unacceptable. We urge all States that have not signed or ratified, or that have signed but not ratified the Treaty, in particular those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force, to sign and ratify it without delay. We welcome new ratifications of the Treaty and note our appreciation for the invaluable work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and its positive contribution to efforts to universalize the Treaty.

22. We are gravely concerned that nine States still possess among them more than 12,000 nuclear warheads with no meaningful reductions since we last met at the second Meeting of States Parties. Many of these weapons are on high alert and ready to be launched within minutes. All States, but especially those with nuclear weapons, have an urgent responsibility to engage in multilateral negotiations to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

23. We are concerned that there is no successor to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), which is set to expire in less than a year, as a means to contain the two largest nuclear weapons arsenals on the planet. We firmly call on both States, especially as depositaries of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to urgently engage in negotiations and conclude a successor agreement that includes further reductions of their nuclear arsenals and delivery systems.

24. We remain alarmed at international developments, which include increased rhetoric on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, intensifying reliance on nuclear deterrence in security doctrines, and the ongoing possession of nuclear weapons. Attempts to perpetuate the retention of nuclear weapons have a negative impact on non-proliferation and progress towards nuclear disarmament. Nuclear deterrence is posited on the very existence of nuclear risk, which threatens the survival of all. Any use of nuclear weapons, whether intentional or accidental, would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences.

25. We are disturbed by any deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear-armed States. We urge all States with any such nuclear arrangements to put an end to them. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons clearly prohibits development of and receiving the transfer of, or control over, nuclear weapons, or allowing their stationing, installation or deployment.

26. Calls for non-nuclear-armed States to develop nuclear weapons are inconsistent with and undermine disarmament and non-proliferation obligations and commitments.

27. We stress that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons violates international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and is inadmissible and contrary to international humanitarian law. We firmly deplore all nuclear threats and increasingly strident nuclear rhetoric, which only undermine disarmament, non-proliferation and international peace and security. We unequivocally condemn any and all nuclear threats, whether explicit or implicit, and irrespective of the circumstances.

28. Nuclear weapons are a threat to the security, and ultimately the existence, of all States, irrespective of whether they possess nuclear weapons, subscribe to nuclear deterrence or firmly oppose it. The inherent risks and transboundary and global consequences of nuclear weapons make clear that all States' security is jeopardized by these weapons and that all States therefore have an urgent security interest in their total elimination. The continued reliance on nuclear weapons by some States in their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies undermines global security and increases escalation, as well as proliferation risks.

29. We therefore persist in rejecting any attempts to normalize nuclear rhetoric and any notion of so-called "responsible" behaviour as far as nuclear weapons are concerned. The threat of inflicting mass destruction runs counter to the legitimate security interests of humanity as a whole. No State or actor has any right to, explicitly or implicitly, threaten humanity's existence with weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear threats cannot be tolerated.

30. We welcome the inclusion in the Pact for the Future, the outcome document of the Summit of the Future held during the seventy-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2024, of the clear rejection of nuclear weapons, including agreement by all United Nations Members that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", and recommitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons heed this call to advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

31. In a world where challenges persist in meeting basic human needs, the continued expenditure of vast financial resources for the modernization and expansion of nuclear weapons is indefensible. These funds should be redirected toward addressing pressing global challenges such as poverty and public health and our efforts in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

32. We regret that two consecutive review processes of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have been unable to agree on urgent further measures to move nuclear disarmament forward. Instead, we have seen enhancements of nuclear arsenals and diminishing transparency. We urge all nuclear-weapon States to make progress on their binding obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in particular article VI, and its related commitments, including their unequivocal undertakings to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. As we approach the 2026 Review Conference, it is imperative that the full implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and its disarmament pillar in particular, is advanced. With the comprehensive legally binding prohibitions on nuclear weapons of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, States Parties have agreed to advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, giving impetus to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

33. We urge all States to cooperate in strengthening the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture as a whole, by upholding and strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. As fully committed States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we, the States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, reaffirm the full complementarity between the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We also stress the complementarity of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons with the broader nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, including the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. We reaffirm our commitment to upholding and strengthening these frameworks and advancing their shared objectives.

34. We recognize the immense contribution of nuclear-weapon-free zones to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and enhancing international peace and security, and note with satisfaction that all nuclear-weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas are now in force. We call upon States to further expand the global coverage of such zones and to enhance mutually reinforcing cooperation. We also recognize the importance of the continued strengthening of all existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, inter alia, through the ratification of existing treaties and relevant protocols and the withdrawal or revision of any reservations or interpretative declarations contrary to the object and purpose of the treaties establishing such zones. We also call for the creation of such zones in areas where they do not currently exist, including in the Middle East.

35. We reaffirm that our commitment to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and its object and purpose remains unaffected when completing fulfilment of obligations emanating from treaties previously subscribed to, where these do not conflict with obligations of the Treaty. We shall take all necessary measures for effective implementation of the purposes and objectives of this Treaty and will continue to review our international and bilateral obligations in order to ensure consistency with regard to the Treaty and its object and purpose. We call upon all non-States Parties to refrain from any activities that could have an adverse impact on the implementation of the object and purpose of the Treaty.

36. The international community must address evolving technologies in the nuclear domain. Some applications could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Emerging technologies incorporated into nuclear weapons systems heighten the risks of nuclear weapon use – intentional, inadvertent or accidental – by increasing miscalculation, escalation and loss of control. Vulnerabilities in command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons risk manipulation and unauthorized use, while artificial intelligence-driven decision-making could accelerate response times, reduce human oversight and even raise the risk of unintended launches of delivery systems. Deploying these technologies without fully understanding their impact further increases nuclear dangers.

37. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear-armed States must maintain meaningful human control over nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in the context of the development of artificial intelligence technology in the military field. However, technical safeguards alone are insufficient; as long as nuclear weapons exist, they remain vulnerable. The only way to eliminate all risks is to eliminate nuclear weapons.

38. We renew our pledge to continue to collaborate through an inclusive approach with all States, international organizations, parliamentarians, civil society, scientists, financial institutions, youth as well as communities and individuals affected by nuclear weapons, including Indigenous Peoples.

39. We reaffirm the need to build confidence among all members of the international community and to achieve and maintain a world free of nuclear weapons, which is a global public good of the highest order. As States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, we will continue to champion the unequivocal rejection of nuclear weapons and work relentlessly for their abolition.

40. We, the States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, stand united in our unwavering determination to confront escalating nuclear dangers. The complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons is not just an aspiration but an imperative for global security and the survival of humanity. We are confident that the effective implementation and universalization of the Treaty will ensure that nuclear weapons are never used, tested or threatened to be used again. The challenges before us can and will be overcome as we progress in bringing every State to join the Treaty, dismantling every warhead, providing justice

to all affected communities and ending the era of nuclear weapons forever.

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## Decisions of the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

[2025]

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### Decision 1

#### Intersessional structure for the implementation of the Treaty

The Meeting of States Parties decides:

(a) To extend the intersessional structure as contained in decision 4 of the first Meeting of States Parties and in decision 1 of the second Meeting of States Parties, to the intersessional period between the third Meeting of States Parties and the first Review Conference and that:

(i) The informal working group on universalization will be co-chaired by Austria, New Zealand and Uruguay. The mandate of the working group is expanded to develop potential products to further promote the universalization of the Treaty, taking into account the recommendations contained in the report of the coordinator for the consultative process on security concerns of States under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;

(ii) The informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, international cooperation and assistance will be co-chaired by Kazakhstan and Kiribati;

(iii) The informal working group on the implementation of article 4, in particular work related to the future designation of a competent international authority or authorities, will be co-chaired by Malaysia and the Philippines;

(iv) Malta will be appointed as gender focal point;

(b) To reconfirm decision 3 of the first Meeting of States Parties regarding the complementarity of the Treaty with the existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and to appoint Ireland and Thailand as informal facilitators between the third Meeting of States Parties and the first Review Conference.

### Decision 2

#### First Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The Meeting of States Parties decides:

(a) To hold the first conference to review the operation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the progress in achieving its purposes during the week of 30 November to 4 December 2026 at United Nations Headquarters in New York;

(b) To elect South Africa as President of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons; the designated representative of South Africa will be communicated to States Parties in due course;

(c) To defer consideration of all other organizational matters related to the first Review Conference to the intersessional period.

### Decision 3

#### International trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation from the consequences of nuclear use and testing

The Meeting of States Parties decides:

(a) That further focused discussions will be held under the informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation and international cooperation and assistance, taking into account, inter alia, document [TPNW/MSP/2025/4](#) and the guiding principles contained therein, regarding the possible guidelines, technical

provisions and/or terms of reference for the establishment of an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation from the consequences of nuclear use and testing that is viable, effective and sustainable;

(b) That a stand-alone report will be submitted no later than four months before the first Review Conference by the Co-Chairs of the informal working group after wide and inclusive consultations among States Parties, with the contribution of relevant stakeholders, containing recommendations for States Parties' consideration on possible guidelines, technical provisions and/or terms of reference of an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation from the consequences of nuclear use and testing, with the aim of establishing, if feasible, such a trust fund at the first Review Conference; and

(c) That States Parties will ensure flexibility and promote progress in implementation of article 6 and 7 obligations of the Treaty and actions 19 to 32 of the Vienna Action Plan, by examining the feasibility of, and continuing efforts to potentially establish, an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation from the consequences of nuclear use and testing, among any other feasible mechanisms.

#### Decision 4

##### Review process for the renewal of the mandate and terms of reference of the Scientific Advisory Group

The Meeting of States Parties decides:

(a) To establish an intersessional consultative process, between the third Meeting of States Parties and the first Review Conference, among States Parties and signatories, with the involvement of the Scientific Advisory Group and other relevant stakeholders and experts, to consult and submit a report to the first Review Conference on the renewal of the mandate and terms of reference of the Scientific Advisory Group and recommendations thereeto; (b) That Mexico will be appointed as coordinator for the consultative process on the renewal of the mandate and terms of reference of the Scientific Advisory Group.

### Section 3: Positions linked to conclusion of negotiations of TPNW

#### Joint Statement by China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States. UNGA 73, First Committee. Thematic Debate (Nuclear Weapons)

[22 October 2018]

We, the nuclear weapon States recognized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty, in all its aspects, fifty years since its signature.

This landmark Treaty has provided the essential foundation for international efforts to stem the threat that nuclear weapons would spread across the globe, and has thereby limited the risk of nuclear war. It has provided the framework within which the peaceful uses of nuclear technology – for electricity, medicine, agriculture and industry – could be promoted and shared, to the benefit of humanity. And by helping to ease international tensions and create conditions of stability, security and trust among nations, it has allowed for a vital and continuing contribution to nuclear disarmament.

We pledge our full and continued support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which plays a critical role in NPT implementation, both in promoting the fullest possible

cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and in applying safeguards and verifying that nuclear programmes are exclusively for peaceful purposes. We emphasise the need to further strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, including the universalisation of the Additional Protocol.

We remain committed under the Treaty to the pursuit of good faith negotiations on effective measures related to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. We support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. We are committed to working to make the international environment more conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament.

It is in this context that we reiterate our opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We firmly believe that the best way to achieve a world without nuclear weapons is through a gradual process that takes into account the international security environment. This proven approach to nuclear disarmament has produced tangible results, including deep reductions in the global stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

The TPNW fails to address the key issues that must be overcome to achieve lasting global nuclear disarmament. It contradicts, and risks undermining, the NPT. It ignores the international security context and regional challenges, and does nothing to increase trust and transparency between States. It will not result in the elimination of a single weapon. It fails to meet the highest standards of non-proliferation. It is creating divisions across the international non-proliferation and disarmament machinery, which could make further progress on disarmament even more difficult.

We will not support, sign or ratify this Treaty. The TPNW will not be binding on our countries, and we do not accept any claim that it contributes to the development of customary international law; nor does it set any new standards or norms. We call on all countries that are considering supporting the TPNW to reflect seriously on its implications for international peace and security.

Rather, we urge all States to commit to the continued success of the NPT: to ensure compliance, to promote universalisation, to ensure the highest standards of non-proliferation, and to respond to ongoing and emerging proliferation challenges, wherever they occur. In this context our five countries reiterate our commitment to continue our individual and collective efforts within the NPT framework to advance nuclear disarmament goals and objectives.

#### Joint Statement to 2019 NPT Prepcom by Austria on behalf of initial sponsors of Resolution 73/48 entitled "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons"

[2 May 2019]

I am taking the floor on behalf of the initial sponsors of the Resolution 73/48 entitled "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons", namely Brazil, Costa Rica, Ireland, Indonesia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, South Africa, Thailand and my own country Austria.

1. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is an historic and ground-breaking agreement. Since it opened for signature in 2017, 70 States have signed and 23 ratified.
2. The international community has long recognised that the threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons is among the most pressing issues facing humanity. This was acknowledged in the very first General Assembly resolution of the United Nations and reaffirmed during the height of the Cold War through the adoption of the NPT.
3. The NPT, the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime recognises "the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war" and establishes that a world without nuclear weapons would be safer for everyone without exception. Article VI enshrines the

obligation to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons in the Treaty.

4. Progress on this obligation has regrettably been lagging behind the implementation of the Treaty's other pillars. Nuclear Weapon States are modernizing their arsenals and delivery systems, overshadowing what progress on nuclear disarmament has been achieved and undermining the implementation of Article VI of the NPT.

5. The implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligation of the NPT remains unsatisfactory. Existing commitments have not been fulfilled and are being called into question by the words and actions of some States. Established arms control and disarmament instruments are being jeopardised and the growing lack of trust and rising geopolitical tensions make it more urgent than ever to strengthen the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime with the NPT at its core.

6. It was in this context, and conscious of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences and inherent risks of nuclear weapons, that the vast majority of states adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7th July 2017.

7. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are fully compatible and, indeed, complementary. After all, both the TPNW and the NPT have the same goal at their core – the abolition of nuclear weapons.

8. The new Treaty complements and strengthens the NPT. First of all, it provides a comprehensive legal prohibition of nuclear weapons. As such, this Treaty encompasses the legal element, indispensable to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.

9. The TPNW strengthens the IAEA safeguards system based on the NPT. It reaffirms the safeguards standard enshrined in NPT Article III, obliges States which already have a higher standard in place to maintain it as a legal obligation, and encourages all States to further raise their level of commitment in terms of safeguards.

10. The TPNW strengthens the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime in general, including the Treaties establishing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). All of these instruments are complementary and are working hand in hand with the NPT. The TPNW represents a concrete manifestation of the will of the vast majority of States to eliminate nuclear weapons.

11. As such, this Treaty makes a concrete contribution to the overarching goal of the NPT, and the bargain upon which it was founded: to avert the danger of nuclear war, to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament

12. The current NPT review cycle, which coincides with the 50th anniversary of the Treaty, presents a significant opportunity for such progress, firmly based and building upon the undertakings agreed during the 1995 and 2000 as well as 2010 Review Conferences. We must use this opportunity to make tangible progress to rid the world of nuclear weapons. The TPNW can play an important and constructive role in this regard and we call on all States Parties to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.

of nuclear weapons, the abandonment of long-standing arms control agreements, and the very real danger of cyberattacks on nuclear infrastructure. Let us heed the warnings of scientists, doctors, and other experts. We must not sleepwalk into a crisis of even greater proportions than the one we have experienced this year.

It is not difficult to foresee how the bellicose rhetoric and poor judgment of leaders in nuclear-armed nations might result in a calamity affecting all nations and peoples. As past leaders, foreign ministers, and defense ministers of Albania, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, and Turkey—all countries that claim protection from an ally's nuclear weapons—we appeal to current leaders to advance disarmament before it is too late. An obvious starting point for the leaders of our own countries would be to declare without qualification that nuclear weapons serve no legitimate military or strategic purpose in light of the catastrophic human and environmental consequences of their use. In other words, our countries should reject any role for nuclear weapons in our defense.

By claiming protection from nuclear weapons, we are promoting the dangerous and misguided belief that nuclear weapons enhance security. Rather than enabling progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, we are impeding it and perpetuating nuclear dangers, all for fear of upsetting our allies who cling to these weapons of mass destruction. But friends can and must speak up when friends engage in reckless behavior that puts their lives and ours in peril.

Without doubt, a new nuclear arms race is under way, and a race for disarmament is urgently needed. It is time to bring the era of reliance on nuclear weapons to a permanent end. In 2017, 122 countries took a courageous but long-overdue step in that direction by adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a landmark global accord that places nuclear weapons on the same legal footing as chemical and biological weapons and establishes a framework to eliminate them verifiably and irreversibly. Soon it will become binding international law.

To date, our countries have opted not to join the global majority in supporting this treaty, but our leaders should reconsider their positions. We cannot afford to dither in the face of this existential threat to humanity. We must show courage and boldness and join the treaty. As states-parties, we could remain in alliances with nuclear-armed states, as nothing in the treaty itself nor in our respective defense pacts precludes that. But we would be legally bound never under any circumstances to assist or encourage our allies to use, threaten to use, or possess nuclear weapons. Given the very broad popular support in our countries for disarmament, this would be an uncontroversial and much-lauded move.

The prohibition treaty is an important reinforcement to the half-century-old nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which, though remarkably successful in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries, has failed to establish a universal taboo against the possession of nuclear weapons. The five nuclear-armed nations that had nuclear weapons at the time of the NPT's negotiation—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China—apparently view it as a license to retain their nuclear forces in perpetuity. Instead of disarming, they are investing heavily in upgrades to their arsenals, with plans to retain them for many decades to come. This is patently unacceptable.

The prohibition treaty can help end decades of paralysis in disarmament. It is a beacon of hope in a time of darkness. It enables countries to subscribe to the highest available multilateral norm against nuclear weapons and build international pressure for action. As its preamble recognizes, the effects of nuclear weapons "transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations, and have a disproportionate impact on women and girls, including as a result of ionizing radiation."

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## Open Letter: In Support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

[21 September 2020]

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The coronavirus pandemic has starkly demonstrated the urgent need for greater international cooperation to address all major threats to the health and welfare of humankind. Paramount among them is the threat of nuclear war. The risk of a nuclear weapon detonation today, whether by accident, miscalculation, or design, appears to be increasing with the recent deployment of new types

With close to 14,000 nuclear weapons located at dozens of sites across the globe and on submarines patrolling the oceans at all times, the capacity for destruction is beyond our imagination. All responsible leaders must act now to ensure that the horrors of 1945 are never repeated. Sooner or later, our luck will run out unless we act. The nuclear weapons ban treaty provides the foundation for a more secure world free from this ultimate menace. We must embrace it now and work to bring others on board. There is no cure for a nuclear war. Prevention is our only option.

The 56 co-signers of the open letter in support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons are:

Lloyd Axworthy, former foreign minister of Canada

Ban Ki-moon, former UN secretary-general and foreign minister of South Korea

Jean-Jacques Blais, former defence minister of Canada

Kjell Magne Bondevik, former prime minister and foreign minister of Norway

Ylli Bufi, former prime minister of Albania

Jean Chrétien, former prime minister of Canada

Willy Claes, former NATO secretary-general and foreign minister of Belgium

Erik Derycke, former foreign minister of Belgium

Joschka Fischer, former foreign minister of Germany

Franco Frattini, former foreign minister of Italy

Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, former foreign minister of Iceland

Bjørn Tore Godal, former foreign minister and defence minister of Norway

Bill Graham, former foreign minister and defence minister of Canada

Hatoyama Yukio, former prime minister of Japan

Thorbjørn Jagland, former prime minister and foreign minister of Norway

Ljubica Jelusič, former defence minister of Slovenia

Tālavš Jundzis, former defence minister of Latvia

Jan Kavan, former foreign minister of the Czech Republic

Alojz Kraperž, former defence minister of Slovenia

Čirts Valdis Kristovskis, former foreign minister and defence minister of Latvia

Aleksander Kwaśniewski, former president of Poland

Yves Leterme, former prime minister and foreign minister of Belgium

Enrico Letta, former prime minister of Italy

Eldbjørg Løwer, former defence minister of Norway

Mogens Lykketoft, former foreign minister of Denmark

John McCallum, former defence minister of Canada

John Manley, former foreign minister of Canada

Rexhep Meidani, former president of Albania

Zdravko Mršić, former foreign minister of Croatia

Linda Mūmiece, former defence minister of Latvia

Fatos Nano, former prime minister of Albania

Holger K. Nielsen, former foreign minister of Denmark

Andrzej Olechowski, former foreign minister of Poland

Kjeld Olesen, former foreign minister and defence minister of Denmark

Ana Palacio, former foreign minister of Spain

Theodoros Pangalos, former foreign minister of Greece

Jan Pronk, former defence minister (ad interim) of the Netherlands

Vesna Pusić, former foreign minister of Croatia

Dariusz Rosati, former foreign minister of Poland

Rudolf Scharping, former defence minister of Germany

Juraj Schenk, former foreign minister of Slovakia

Nuno Severiano Teixeira, former defence minister of Portugal

Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir, former prime minister of Iceland

Össur Skarphéðinsson, former foreign minister of Iceland

Javier Solana, former NATO secretary-general and foreign minister of Spain

Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, former defence minister of Norway

Hanna Suchocka, former prime minister of Poland

Szekeres Imre, former defence minister of Hungary

Tanaka Makiko, former foreign minister of Japan

Tanaka Naoki, former defence minister of Japan

Danilo Türk, former president of Slovenia

Hikmet Sami Türk, former defence minister of Turkey

The late John N. Turner, former prime minister of Canada\*

Guy Verhofstadt, former prime minister of Belgium

Knut Vollebæk, former foreign minister of Norway

Carlos Westendorp y Cabeza, former foreign minister of Spain

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### North Atlantic Council Statement as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Enters Into Force

[15 December 2020]

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We reaffirm our commitment to the preservation and strengthening of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. As the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, or ban treaty, nears entry into force, we collectively reiterate our opposition to this treaty, as it does not reflect the increasingly challenging international security environment and is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture.

Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation have made, and should continue to make, an essential contribution to achieving NATO's security objectives. NATO Allies, individually and collectively, have a long track record of doing their part, and continue to support a number of initiatives that offer real progress on nuclear disarmament with tangible, effective measures. We continue to support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons, in full accordance with all provisions of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including Article VI, in an ever more effective and verifiable way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all. The NPT remains the only credible path to nuclear disarmament. We recognise commitments made under the NPT in the five decades since its entry into force, and we are resolved to contribute to the preservation, universalisation, and full implementation of the NPT. The upcoming NPT Review Conference presents a major opportunity for the international community to this end. On the other hand, the ban treaty lacks any rigorous or clear mechanisms for verification, and has not been signed by any state that possesses nuclear weapons, and thus will not result in the elimination of a single nuclear weapon. It risks undermining the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, with the NPT at its heart for more than 50 years, and the IAEA Safeguards regime that supports it.

NATO is a defensive Alliance. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter

aggression. A world where the states that challenge the international rules-based order have nuclear weapons, but NATO does not, is not a safer world. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. Allies are determined to ensure that NATO's nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective, and reject any attempt to delegitimise nuclear deterrence. We do not accept any argument that the ban treaty reflects or in any way contributes to the development of customary international law. The ban treaty will not change the legal obligations of our countries with respect to nuclear weapons. We call on our partners and all other countries to reflect realistically on the ban treaty's impact on international peace and security, including on the NPT, and join us in working to improve collective security through tangible and verifiable measures that can reduce strategic risks and enable real progress on nuclear disarmament.

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**Statement by Spokesperson for the UN  
Secretary-General on the occasion of the entry  
into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of  
Nuclear Weapons**

[22 January 2021]

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The Secretary-General is pleased to recognize today's entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) — the first multilateral nuclear disarmament treaty in more than two decades.

The TPNW is an important step towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and a strong demonstration of support for multilateral approaches to nuclear disarmament.

The Secretary-General commends the States that have ratified the Treaty and welcomes the instrumental role of civil society in advancing the TPNW's negotiation and entry into force. The survivors of nuclear explosions and nuclear tests offered tragic testimonies and were a moral force behind the Treaty. Entry into force is a tribute to their enduring advocacy.

The Secretary-General looks forward to carrying out the functions assigned by the Treaty, including in preparation for the first Meeting of States Parties.

Nuclear weapons pose growing dangers and the world needs urgent action to ensure their elimination and prevent the catastrophic human and environmental consequences any use would cause.

The elimination of nuclear weapons remains the highest disarmament priority of the United Nations. The Secretary-General calls on all States to work together to realize this ambition to advance common security and collective safety.

Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesman for the Secretary-General