

## E – N5/P5 Conferences on Confidence Building and Nuclear Disarmament (CBND)

### Section 1 Recent meetings

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#### Excerpt: National Report of the UK to 11 th NPT Review Conference

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[Eds . . . ]

The UK assumed the role of Chair of the P5 Process in September 2025. We have convened two meetings under our chair, most recently in December 2025. As Chair we have supported substantive exchanges including nuclear doctrines, perceptions of strategic risk and practical steps that could reduce risk. We have also facilitated an accompanying non-governmental dialogue, the Young Professionals Network, which brings together a new generation of civil society and academic expertise from across the P5 to generate new ideas.

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#### Chinese Press Release by China on P5 meeting in Dubai

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[Beijing, December 2024]

On December 4, 2024, as the chair of the P5 mechanism, China convened an expert-level P5 meeting in Dubai, UAE. Representatives from the five nuclear-weapons States (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) attended the meeting. The parties had a candid discussion on nuclear doctrines. It was agreed that such discussion was timely for the purposes of enhancing understanding of each other's nuclear doctrines and avoiding misunderstanding and miscalculation. In its capacity as the chair, China will continue to facilitate the P5 discussions.

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#### Russian Press Release on P5 meeting in Geneva

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[Moscow, July 2024]

As part of the ongoing P5 process, a working-level meeting of the five Nuclear Weapon States under the NPT (the People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America) was held on July 23, 2024 on the margins of the Second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference in Geneva, Switzerland.

This was the last event in a series of the P5 activities in 2023 and 2024 under the Russian Chair. The chairmanship will be soon transferred to the People's Republic of China.

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#### Russian Press Release on P5 meeting in Riyadh

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[Moscow, March 2024]

As part of the ongoing P5 process, a working-level meeting of the five Nuclear Weapon States under the NPT (the People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America) was held under the Russian Chair in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on February 29, 2024.

### Section 2 Historical documents

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#### Joint Statement on the First P5 Conference

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[London, 2009]

The P5 states (China, France, Russia, UK and US) met in London on 3-4 September for a conference on confidence building measures towards disarmament and non-proliferation issues. After the conference they issued a statement reaffirming their commitment to all objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The conference was originally proposed by the UK Defence Secretary at the Conference on Disarmament in February 2008 and was referred to by the UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, in a speech on 17 March 2009.

The P5 reaffirmed their commitment to all objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and that we should advance on all fronts to achieve them. They reiterated their enduring commitment to the fulfilment of their obligations under Article VI of the NPT and noted that these obligations apply to all NPT States Parties. They stressed their intention to work with all States Parties to the NPT in creating the conditions to enable further progress under Article VI. They called upon all non NPT States to work towards the same objective.

In a wide ranging discussion, the P5 considered the confidence-building, verification and compliance challenges associated with achieving further progress toward disarmament and non-proliferation, and steps to address those challenges. They looked at ways to increase mutual understanding by sharing definitions of nuclear terminology and information about their nuclear doctrines and capabilities. They made presentations on enhancing P5 strategic stability and building mutual confidence through voluntary transparency and other measures. They also considered the international challenges associated with responding to nuclear accidents and undertook to consider ways to co-operate to address these challenges.

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#### Joint Statement on the Second P5 Conference

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[Paris, 2011]

The P-5 met in Paris on 30 June – 1 July for their first follow-up meeting to the NPT Review Conference, with a view to considering progress on the commitments they made at this Conference, as well as to following up on the London Conference on Confidence Building Measures towards Nuclear Disarmament in September 2009.

They reaffirmed their unconditional support for the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They also reaffirmed the recommendations set out in the balanced Action Plan agreed in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and called on all States Parties to the NPT to work together to advance its implementation.

They met with the determination to work together in pursuit of their shared goal of nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT, including engagement on the steps outlined in Action 5, as well as reporting and other efforts called for in the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. They called on all States, both States Parties and Non Parties, to contribute to this nuclear disarmament objective, including by ensuring that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime remains robust and reliable.

The P-5 continued their previous discussions on the issues of transparency and mutual confidence, including nuclear doctrine and capabilities, and of verification, recognizing such measures are important for establishing a firm foundation for further disarmament efforts. In order to increase efficiency of P-5 nuclear consultation, they approved to continue working on an agreed glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms and established a dedicated working group.

The P-5 discussed the particular political and technical challenges associated with verification in achieving further progress towards disarmament and ensuring non-proliferation. They shared information on their respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification. They will continue their discussion of this issue later this year at an expert-level meeting in London.

As a follow-up to the 2010 NPT RevCon discussions, the P-5 shared their views on how to respond to notifications of withdrawal from the Treaty, while recognizing the provisions of Article X. They also stressed the need for strengthening IAEA safeguards, including through promoting the adoption of the Additional Protocol

and the reinforcement of IAEA's resources and capabilities for deterring and detecting non-compliance.

The P-5 States recalled their commitment to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its universalization. They called upon all States to uphold the moratorium on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the objective and purpose of the treaty pending its entry into force. They reiterated their support for immediate commencement of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including verification provisions. In order to sustain the potential of negotiations in the CD, the P-5 will, prior to the next United Nations General Assembly, renew their efforts with other relevant partners to promote such negotiations.

The P-5 welcomed the steps taken by the U.S., Russia and the UK towards holding a Conference on a Middle East WMD Free Zone (MEWMDFZ) in 2012.

The P-5 will follow on their discussions and hold a third P-5 Conference in the context of the next NPT Preparatory Committee.

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### Joint Statement on the Third P5 Conference

[Washington DC, 2012]

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The five Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear-weapon states, or "P5," met in Washington on June 27-29, 2012, in the wake of the 2009 London and 2011 Paris P5 conferences to review progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and to continue discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT – non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences.

The P5 reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and emphasized the importance of working together in implementing the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. The P5 reviewed significant developments in the context of the NPT since the 2011 Paris P5 Conference. In particular, the P5 reviewed the outcome of the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, continued their discussion of how to report on their relevant activities, and shared views, across all three pillars of the NPT, on objectives for the 2013 Preparatory Committee and the intersessional period. The 2012 PrepCom outcome included issuance of a P5 statement comprehensively addressing issues in all three pillars (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/12).

The P5 continued their previous discussions on the issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification, and considered proposals for a standard reporting form. The P5 recognize the importance of establishing a firm foundation for mutual confidence and further disarmament efforts, and the P5 will continue their discussions in multiple ways within the P5, with a view to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom, consistent with their commitments under Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 RevCon final document.

Participants received a briefing from the United States on U.S. activities at the Nevada National Security Site. This was offered with a view to demonstrate ideas for additional approaches to transparency.

Another unilateral measure was a tour of the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center located at the U.S. Department of State, where the P5 representatives have observed how the United States maintains a communications center to simultaneously implement notification regimes, including under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Vienna Document.

The P5 agreed on the work plan for a P5 working group led by China, assigned to develop a glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms that will increase P5 mutual understanding and facilitate further P5 discussions on nuclear matters.

The P5 again shared information on their respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification, including information on the P5 expert level meeting hosted by the UK in April, at which the UK

shared the outcomes and lessons from the UK-Norway Initiative disarmament verification research project. The P5 heard presentations on lessons learned from New START Treaty implementation, were given an overview of U.S.-UK verification work, and agreed to consider attending a follow-up P5 briefing on this work to be hosted by the United States.

As a further follow-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the P5 shared their views on how to discourage abuse of the NPT withdrawal provision (Article X), and how to respond to notifications made consistent with the provisions of that article. The discussion included modalities under which NPT States Party could respond collectively and individually to a notification of withdrawal, including through arrangements regarding the disposition of equipment and materials acquired or derived under safeguards during NPT membership. The P5 agreed that states remain responsible under international law for violations of the Treaty committed prior to withdrawal.

The P5 underlined the fundamental importance of an effective International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system in preventing nuclear proliferation and facilitating cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 discussed concrete proposals for strengthening IAEA safeguards, including through promoting the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol; and the reinforcement of the IAEA's resources and capabilities for effective safeguards implementation, including verification of declarations by States.

The P5 reiterated their commitment to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its universalization. The P5 reviewed progress in developing the CTBT's verification regime in all its aspects and efforts towards entry into force. Ways to enhance the momentum for completing the verification regime, including the on-site inspection component, were explored. The P5 called upon all States to uphold their national moratoria on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force. The moratoria, though important, are not substitutes for legally binding obligations under the CTBT.

The P5 discussed ways to advance a mutual goal of achieving a legally binding, verifiable international ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The P5 reiterated their support for the immediate start of negotiations on a treaty encompassing such a ban in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), building on CD/1864, and exchanged perspectives on ways to break the current impasse in the CD, including by continuing their efforts with other relevant partners to promote such negotiations within the CD.

The P5 remain concerned about serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime and in this connection, recalled their joint statement of May 3 at the Preparatory Committee of the NPT.

An exchange of views on how to support a successful conference in 2012 on a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction was continued.

The P5 agreed to continue to meet at all appropriate levels on nuclear issues to further promote dialogue and mutual confidence. The P5 will follow on their discussions and hold a fourth P5 conference in the context of the next NPT Preparatory Committee.

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### Joint Statement on the Fourth P5 Conference

[Geneva, 2013]

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The five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear-weapon states, or "P5," met in Geneva on April 18-19, 2013 under the chairmanship of the Russian Federation to build on the 2009 London, 2011 Paris, and 2012 Washington P5 conferences. The P5 reviewed progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and continued discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT – non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. The P5 also had a positive exchange with representatives of civil society during the Geneva P5 Conference.

The P5 reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament as provided for in Article VI of the NPT, and emphasized the importance of continuing to work together in implementing the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. The P5 reviewed the outcome of the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, and significant developments in the context of the NPT since the 2012 Washington P5 Conference. They assessed issues relating to strategic stability and international security, and exchanged views concerning prospects for further steps to promote dialogue and mutual confidence in this area, including in a multilateral format.

In addition, the P5 welcomed a briefing by the Russian Federation and the United States on the ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty and its success to date. The P5 were also briefed by the Russian Federation and the United States on the joint 2012 inspection in Antarctica conducted pursuant to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and its Environmental Protocol. This joint inspection included verification that the international stations are implementing relevant environmental rules and that facilities are used only for peaceful purposes. The P5 shared views on objectives for the 2013 Preparatory Committee, the intersessional period thereafter, and looked ahead to the 2014 Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference.

The P5 discussed the latest developments in the area of multilateral disarmament initiatives including the situation at the Conference on Disarmament. They expressed their shared disappointment that the Conference on Disarmament continues to be prevented from agreeing on a comprehensive program of work, including work on a legally binding, verifiable international ban on the production of fissile material (FMCT) for use in nuclear weapons, and discussed efforts to find a way forward in the Conference on Disarmament, including by continuing their efforts with other relevant partners to promote such negotiations within the CD. The P5 reiterated their support for the immediate start of negotiations on a treaty encompassing such a ban in the Conference on Disarmament. They noted the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on FMCT, and expressed the hope that its work will help spur negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. The P5 reaffirmed the historic contribution of the pragmatic, step-by-step process to nuclear disarmament and stressed the continued validity of this proven route. In this context, they also emphasized their shared understanding of the serious consequences of nuclear weapon use and that the P5 would continue to give the highest priority to avoiding such contingencies.

The P5 advanced their previous discussions of an approach to reporting on their relevant activities across all three pillars of the NPT Action Plan at the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting, consistent with the NPT Action Plan, and resolved to continue working on this issue under France's leadership. They plan to continue their discussions in multiple ways within the P5 with a view to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom, consistent with their commitments under Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 RevCon Final Document. They welcomed the progress made on the development of the P5 glossary of key nuclear terms under China's leadership and discussed next steps. They stressed the importance of this work, which will increase P5 mutual understanding and facilitate further P5 discussions on nuclear matters. The P5 reaffirmed their objective to submit a P5 glossary of key nuclear terms to the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The P5 are working toward the establishment of a firm foundation for mutual confidence and further disarmament efforts. They shared further information on their respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification and resolved to continue such exchanges.

The P5 recalled their Joint Statement of 3 May 2012 at the Preparatory Committee of the NPT Review Conference and pledged to continue their efforts in different formats and at various international fora to find peaceful diplomatic solutions to the outstanding problems faced by the non-proliferation regime. They reiterated their call on the states concerned to fulfill without delay their international obligations under the appropriate UN Security Council resolutions, undertakings with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other appropriate international commitments. In the context of the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013 and the continued pursuit of certain nuclear activities by Iran, both contrary to the relevant UN Security

Council resolutions and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, the P5 reaffirmed their concerns about these serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime.

The P5 underlined the fundamental importance of an effective IAEA safeguards system in preventing nuclear proliferation and facilitating cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 stressed the need for strengthening IAEA safeguards including through the promotion of the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol and the development of approaches to IAEA safeguards implementation based on objective state factors. They also discussed the role of the P5 in assisting the IAEA in cases involving possible detection of nuclear weapon programs in non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) in conformity with the provisions of the NPT.

The P5 continued their previous discussions of efforts to achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and reviewed the recent UK-hosted P5 Experts Meeting on CTBT, at which the P5 identified a number of areas for future P5 collaboration and decided to pursue further intersessional work, in particular ahead of the Integrated Field Exercise in 2014. The P5 called upon all States to uphold their national moratoria on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force.

The P5 shared their views on how to prevent abuse of NPT withdrawal (Article X). The discussion included modalities under which NPT States Party could respond collectively and individually to a notification of withdrawal, including through arrangements regarding the disposition of equipment and materials acquired or derived under safeguards during NPT membership. They resolved to make efforts to broaden consensus among NPT States Party on the latter issue at the 2014 PrepCom, thus making a further contribution to the NPT Review Process.

The P5 reiterated the importance of the implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference decisions related to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, in particular those related to the convening of a conference to be attended by all the States of the Middle East on the establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the states of the region. They underlined their support for all States concerned, making all efforts necessary for the preparation and convening of the Conference in the nearest future. They also reiterated their full support to the ongoing efforts of the facilitator.

The P5 reviewed their efforts to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. They reaffirmed their view that establishment of such zones helps to build confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, enhance regional and international security, and reinforce the NPT and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. They reaffirmed their readiness to sign the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as soon as possible. They underlined the importance of holding consultations, including on the margins of the Second PrepCom, with the States Party to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia. They noted also the parallel declarations, adopted by the P5 and Mongolia concerning Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, at the United Nations headquarters in New York on 17 September 2012.

The P5 pledged to continue to meet at all appropriate levels on nuclear issues to further promote dialogue and mutual confidence. The P5 plan to follow up their discussions and hold a fifth P5 conference in 2014.

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### Joint Statement on the Fifth P5 Conference

[Beijing, 2014]

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1. The five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear-weapon states, or P5, met in Beijing on April 14-15, 2014, under the chairmanship of the People's Republic of China, to build on the 2009 London, 2011 Paris, 2012 Washington, and 2013 Russian-hosted Geneva P5 conferences. The P5 reviewed progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), and continued discussions on issues

related to all three pillars of the NPT – disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 also had a useful discussion with representatives of civil society during the Conference.

2. The P5 reviewed significant developments at the 2013 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and in the context of the NPT since the 2013 Geneva P5 Conference. The P5 reaffirmed that the NPT remains the essential cornerstone for the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and they remain committed to strengthening the NPT. They emphasized the importance of continuing to work together in implementing the Action Plan adopted by consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament as provided for in Article VI of the NPT. The P5 intend to continue to seek progress on the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament, which is the only practical path to achieving a world without nuclear weapons and in keeping with our NPT obligations.

3. The P5 intend to strengthen P5 engagement to advance progress on NPT obligations and 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan commitments. The P5 advanced their previous discussions on the issues of transparency, confidence-building, and verification, and welcomed the achievement under France's leadership of P5 consensus on a reporting framework. They introduced to each other their national reports consistent with this reporting framework and Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 NPT RevCon Final Document, with a view to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom. They encourage other NPT States Party to submit reports, consistent with Action 20 of the NPT RevCon Final Document.

4. The P5 reviewed the work carried out by the Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms under China's leadership, and in this regard, noted the success of the Second Experts' Meeting of the Working Group held on 26-27 September 2013, in Beijing, which established milestones for the completion of the first phase of the Glossary effort for the 2015 RevCon. The progress made in this effort provides a solid foundation for the Working Group to submit its outcome on the terms currently under discussion to the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The P5 stressed again the importance of this work, which is increasing mutual understanding and will facilitate further P5 discussions beyond 2015 on nuclear issues.

5. The P5 had an exchange of views on their nuclear doctrines, strategic stability, and international security from their individual country perspectives to gain better understanding and build strategic trust. They also discussed the importance of verification in achieving progress towards further disarmament and ensuring the success of nonproliferation efforts. The P5 welcomed briefings by the Russian Federation and the United States on aspects of the New START Treaty's implementation, as well as on implementation of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly-Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons, signed in Washington, D.C. on 18 February 1993, and its related Protocol on HEU Transparency Arrangements. The P5 shared further information on their respective experiences in verification and resolved to continue such exchanges.

6. The P5 visited the Chinese National Data Centre for the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), as an endeavor to enhance transparency and mutual understanding. They recalled their commitment in the 2010 NPT RevCon Final Document to promote and take concrete steps towards early entry into force of the CTBT and its universalization. They called upon all States to uphold their national moratoria on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty pending its entry into force. The P5 intend to continue their cooperative work to strengthen the CTBT verification regime. The P5 confirmed their support for the ad referendum arrangement for collaborative work by their CTBT technical experts towards improved critical on-site inspection techniques and technology.

7. The P5 supported efforts to revitalize the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and continue to be concerned with the impasse

at the CD. They discussed efforts to find a way forward in the CD and reiterated their support for a comprehensive program of work, which includes the immediate start of negotiations in the CD on a legally binding, verifiable international ban on the production of fissile material (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty or FMCT) for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. The P5 participated fully in the first session of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on FMCT, established in UNGA/RES/67/53, and look forward to further engagement in this group.

8. In reaffirming the historic contribution of the pragmatic, step-by-step process to nuclear disarmament and stressing the continued validity of this proven route, the P5 also emphasized their shared understanding of the severe consequences of nuclear weapon use and their resolve to continue to give the highest priority to avoiding such contingencies, which is in the interests of all nations.

9. The P5 shared their views on topical proliferation issues and remain concerned about serious challenges to the nonproliferation regime. They pledged to continue their efforts in different formats and at various international fora to find peaceful diplomatic solutions to the outstanding issues faced by the nonproliferation regime. As they did previously, and looking ahead to the 2014 PrepCom, they called on the states concerned to fulfill without delay their international obligations under the appropriate UN Security Council resolutions, undertakings with the IAEA and other appropriate international commitments.

10. The P5 shared their views on how to prevent abuse of NPT withdrawal (Article X). They resolved to make efforts to broaden consensus among NPT States Party on the withdrawal issue at the 2014 PrepCom, thus making a further contribution to the NPT Review Process.

11. The P5 reviewed their efforts to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties as soon as possible. They also reiterated their support for the early convening of a conference, to be attended by all the States of the Middle East, on the establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the states of the region.

12. The P5 discussed issues related to strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. They stressed the need for strengthening IAEA safeguards including through the promotion of the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol and the development of approaches to IAEA safeguards implementation based on objective state factors. The P5 also discussed the role of the nuclear-weapon-states, in conformity with the provisions of the NPT, in assisting the IAEA in cases involving possible detection of nuclear weapon programs in non-nuclear weapon states.

13. The P5 noted that they are now more engaged than ever in regular interactions on disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation issues. The P5 pledged to continue to meet at all appropriate levels on nuclear issues to further promote dialogue and mutual confidence. In addition to meeting at all appropriate levels, the P5 intend to hold a sixth P5 conference. The P5 welcomed the offer by the United Kingdom to host this conference in London in 2015.

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### Joint Statement on the Sixth P5 Conference

[London, 2015]

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The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS), or P5, met in London, 4-5 February 2015, for the sixth P5 Conference to review progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and to discuss the next steps for the P5 Process. In particular the P5 considered the implementation of the 2010 Action Plan adopted by consensus as a roadmap for long term action. The P5 also considered a wide array of issues related to and steps towards making progress on all three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition, the P5 had constructive and productive discussions with a number of non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society representatives.

In reaffirming their commitment towards achieving a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the NPT, the P5 reflected on the contribution that the P5 Process has made in developing the mutual confidence and transparency among the P5 that is essential to make progress towards multilateral nuclear disarmament. At the start of the second cycle of the process, all of the P5 noted the value of having an established dialogue, with each P5 state having now hosted a conference at least once. They welcomed how each conference had built on the success of the last and the increasing amount of intersessional work on issues such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the achievement of P5 consensus on a common reporting framework and the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, which have all contributed towards the implementation of the 2010 Action Plan.

At their 2015 Conference the P5 restated their belief that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the essential cornerstone for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and is an essential contribution to international security and stability. They reviewed the NPT Preparatory Committee process over the course of this Review Cycle and considered the upcoming 2015 Review Conference, where the P5 intend to make a joint statement. The P5 looked forward to working with all States Parties to the NPT to ensure a positive outcome to the Review Conference that is balanced across the three mutually reinforcing pillars.

The P5 reaffirmed that a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security for all remains the only realistic and practical route to achieving a world without nuclear weapons. To this end, the P5 discussed issues related to international security and strategic stability and their nuclear doctrines in order to enhance mutual understanding in these areas. This included updates on New START implementation and the verification experiences of both the Russian Federation and the United States in relation to the New START Treaty. It was noted that, since the entry into force of the NPT, the step-by-step approach has already dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons held by the NWS from their Cold War peak. The P5 all reaffirmed the importance of full compliance with existing, legally-binding arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and obligations as an essential element of international peace and security.

The P5 stressed that addressing further prospects for nuclear disarmament would require taking into account all factors that could affect global strategic stability. In doing so they stressed the importance of engaging in frank and constructive dialogue to that end.

The P5 reiterated their shared understanding about the severe consequences of nuclear weapon use and underlined their resolve to prevent such an occurrence from happening. They also reaffirmed their commitment to existing security assurances regarding the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons, including, in accordance with UNSCR 984 (1995), their readiness to assist non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT that may become the victims of a nuclear attack (terrorist or otherwise).

The P5 discussed efforts to achieve entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and recalled their commitment in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document to promote and take concrete steps towards early entry into force of the CTBT and its universalization. They called upon all states to uphold national moratoria on conducting any nuclear explosion. It was noted that all members of the P5 have such a voluntary moratorium in place. P5 collaboration on improving and maintaining the International Monitoring System was reviewed. The P5 intend to release a joint statement on minimizing the impact of medical isotope production on the International Monitoring System. Further, particular note was made of the successful completion of the Integrated Field Exercise 2014 in Jordan, to which all members of the P5 contributed equipment, personnel and effort. The P5 decided to continue regular technical meetings aimed at enhancing the verification regime and to hold a workshop on data quality objectives for radionuclide measurements for on-site inspections.

The P5 reiterated their full support for the United Nation's disarmament machinery, including the Conference on

Disarmament (CD), and the Disarmament Commission. Whilst there was shared disappointment over the long-standing lack of consensus on a Programme of Work in the CD, the P5 welcomed the increased activity of the CD in its 2014 session and in particular informal substantive discussions held on all CD agenda items under the Schedule of Activities and the efforts of the Informal Working Group which sought to produce a Programme of Work robust in substance and progressive over time in implementation. The P5 discussed efforts to find a way forward in the CD and reiterated their support for a comprehensive and balanced Programme of Work which includes the immediate start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)) on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. The P5 stressed in this regard the importance of the ongoing discussions of the Group of Governmental Experts established by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 67/53.

The P5 also decided that they should increasingly engage with the wider disarmament community. To this end, a number of non-nuclear-weapon states were invited, for the first time, to a briefing and discussion session as part of the P5 Conference. The P5 delivered a briefing on the Conference before discussing a number of NPT-related matters in greater depth and expressed their desire to continue such discussions when preparing for the important steps of the next review cycle, building on the increased engagement that has taken place in recent months with the NNWS. In addition to this an outreach event was organised in conjunction with Chatham House, providing civil society the opportunity to engage with the P5.

The P5 co-operative work featured heavily during the discussions and progress was made on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. The P5 announced their intention to release the first edition for the Ninth Review Conference. The P5 intend to revise and update the Glossary as appropriate in due course.

The P5 received updates on a variety of bilateral and multilateral projects regarding disarmament verification, including from some P5 members.

The P5 reiterated the need to find peaceful and diplomatic solutions to challenges to the non-proliferation regime. The P5 welcome the ongoing diplomatic process between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1, and highlighted their continued commitment to negotiations on a comprehensive settlement that would guarantee the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's programme. Regarding the interaction between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran, they noted the urgent need for full co-operation in order to resolve all outstanding issues, including those related to possible military dimensions. Additionally, the P5 stressed their resolve for a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula so as to achieve its complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization in accordance with the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks.

The P5 stressed the importance of maintaining and strengthening the IAEA's safeguards system. Discussions covered matters such as the universalisation of the Additional Protocol.

In discussing nuclear-weapon-free zones, the P5 welcomed the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in 2014 and its subsequent ratification by France and the UK, and noted the relevant efforts by others to bring about the Protocol's entry into force. The P5 also expressed hope that progress would be made on the signature of the Protocol to the South East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, and encouraged the parties to that Treaty to continue to engage constructively in order to find solutions to outstanding issues. Furthermore, the P5 reaffirmed their full support for the efforts of the facilitator and co-conveners in holding a conference on establishing a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East, and urged all states of the region to redouble their efforts to reach consensus on arrangements so that a conference could be convened.

The P5 continued their discussion on the issue of withdrawal from the NPT. Whilst noting that every State Party has the right to

withdraw under the provisions of Article X.1, the P5 expressed the hope that the Review Conference would reach consensus on recommendations concerning potential abuse of the exercise of the right of withdrawal.

The P5 reviewed actions by each of the P5 to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to the NPT in conformity with Articles I, II, and III of the NPT, and reaffirmed their support for the programs of the IAEA in this area, including the Technical Cooperation Programme.

The NWS looked forward to continuing their dialogue in order to make progress on NPT obligations. The P5 welcomed France's generous offer to host the next P5 Conference. They looked forward to a consensual, balanced outcome to the 2015 Review Conference, which would do much to enhance the P5's continuing efforts to strengthen the NPT.

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## Joint Statement on the Seventh P5 Conference

[Washington DC, 15 September 2016]

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1. As Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America met in Washington, D.C., 14-15 September 2016, for the seventh P5 Conference to demonstrate continued commitment to the NPT, and to review progress made on nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy including in fulfilling commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The P5 reaffirmed the ongoing relevance of all provisions of the Action Plan adopted by consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference that remains an indispensable roadmap for the implementation of all the three pillars of the NPT. The P5 took stock of the 2015 NPT Review Conference and discussed ways to enhance prospects for the 2020 NPT Review Cycle. The P5 look forward to working with all States Parties to the NPT to ensure a positive outcome to the 2020 NPT Review Cycle.

2. The P5 recognized the considerable progress made together through the P5 process since the first such conference in 2009 and reaffirmed the value of this format for fostering dialogue, transparency, and cooperation among Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and with international partners. The development of a common reporting framework for the 2015 NPT Review cycle, the work of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Experts Group, and the publishing of a Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms provide a sound foundation for further cooperative work. They resolved to continue working together through the P5 process to make further progress during the 2020 NPT Review Cycle.

3. The P5 reaffirmed that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, a framework for expanding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy amongst States Parties to the Treaty, and the foundation for the collective pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The P5 committed to working together and with other States Parties to strengthen in a balanced and effective manner each of the NPT's mutually reinforcing pillars – disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 reaffirmed that the preservation of the integrity of the NPT, achieving its universality and its strict implementation are essential to regional and international peace and security.

4. At their 2016 Conference, the P5 reaffirmed the shared goal of and commitment to nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, as referenced in the preamble and provided for in Article VI of the NPT. The P5 restated their steadfast commitment to seeking a safer world for all and achieving a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT. We continue to pursue a progressive step by step approach towards this end, in a way that promotes international stability, peace, and security, and based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all. We continue to believe that this approach is the only practical way to make progress toward nuclear disarmament while enhancing

international peace and stability, and is the only realistic way to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. The P5 stressed that addressing further prospects for nuclear disarmament would require taking into account all factors that could affect global strategic stability. The P5 all reaffirmed the importance of full compliance with existing, legally-binding arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and obligations as an essential element of international peace and security.

5. The P5 expressed their deep concern with efforts to pursue approaches to nuclear disarmament that disregard the global strategic context. Such efforts will threaten the consensus-based approach that has served for decades to strengthen the NPT regime and enhance the Treaty's contribution to international security and may negatively affect the prospects for consensus at future NPT Review Conferences. The P5 reiterated a call upon all members of the international community to engage in an open and constructive dialogue on nuclear disarmament, international security, and stability issues that is inclusive of all states and focused on practical measures leading to a world without nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

6. The P5 reiterated their full support for the United Nations' disarmament machinery, including the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and the Disarmament Commission. While noting their disappointment at the long-standing lack of consensus on a Program of Work in the CD, the P5 acknowledged creative efforts to find a compromise during the 2016 session and discussed a number of proposals towards that end. In this regard, the P5 reaffirm their support and readiness to explore all of the options to get the CD back to work, taking into account all previous proposals and agreements amongst themselves and bearing in mind the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

7. The P5 reaffirmed that, as stated in UN Security Council Resolution 1887 (2009), the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security. They reaffirmed that all NPT States Parties must ensure strict compliance with their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT. The P5 remained deeply concerned by the challenge that non-compliance by States Parties poses to the integrity of the NPT and emphasize the role of the UN Security Council in determining if such situations constitute a threat to international peace and security. The P5 emphasized the Security Council's primary responsibility in addressing such threats. The P5 reiterated the importance of seeking peaceful and diplomatic solutions to the challenges facing the non-proliferation regime. They also noted the need to further strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, including the universalization of the Additional Protocol.

8. They strongly condemned the January 6 and September 9 2016 nuclear tests, and the continued ballistic missile tests and ballistic missile launches carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in violation of its obligations pursuant to relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in contravention of its commitments under the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. The P5 recalled the press statement of the UN Security Council on September 9, 2016. The P5 reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia at large. The P5 reaffirmed their commitment to the full implementation of the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and urged the DPRK to respond to diplomatic efforts aimed at the eventual resumption of the Six-Party Talks and achieving complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. They stressed the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula.

9. They also welcomed and reaffirmed their commitment to the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Successful implementation of this JCPOA will ensure that Iran's nuclear program is and remains exclusively peaceful and will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as recognized in the relevant articles of the NPT in line with its obligations therein. They called for full implementation of all commitments pursuant to the JCPOA. They expressed their strong support for the IAEA's essential and independent role.

10. The P5 noted that global stocks of nuclear weapons are now at their lowest point in over half a century as the result of unprecedented efforts on the part of nuclear weapon states. They further underlined the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament in accordance with the Preamble and Article VI of the NPT and in a way that promotes international security and stability and taking into account all factors that could affect strategic stability.

11. The P5 discussed global strategic stability and their respective nuclear doctrines. In their shared effort to strengthen international peace and security and to address further prospects for nuclear disarmament, they stressed their readiness to engage in frank and constructive dialogue that takes into account all factors that could affect global strategic stability. The P5 also decided to seek enhanced international understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in the overall international security environment.

12. The P5 noted that 2016 marks twenty years since the opening for signature of the CTBT, and reiterated their commitment in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document to promote and take concrete steps toward early entry into force and universalization of the Treaty. They called upon all states to uphold national moratoria on conducting nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion pending entry-into-force of the CTBT. The P5 reviewed efforts to build and maintain the International Monitoring System (IMS), supported by the International Data Centre (IDC), as well as a strong On-site Inspection (OSI) regime.

13. The P5 reviewed various areas of cooperation and reaffirmed their shared commitment to broaden and deepen dialogue and cooperation. The P5 decided to undertake further activities on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. The P5 also reaffirmed the value of continuing regular meetings of technical experts to promote completion of the CTBT's verification regime and enhance its effectiveness. The P5 also decided to support and encourage dialogue among academic experts and scientists on mutually agreed issues related to international security and stability, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 decided to pursue further interaction and dialogue with non-nuclear weapon States in various multilateral formats. They shared further information on their respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification and resolved to continue such exchanges.

14. The P5 reiterated their common understanding of the severe consequences of use of nuclear weapons. They underscored their resolve to prevent such an occurrence from happening. They further reaffirmed their commitment to existing security assurances regarding the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons and recalled their statements on negative and positive security assurances as noted in UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995), and as revised since then. The P5 intend to continue to exchange views on the issue.

15. The P5 reaffirmed the protocols to existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone treaties as an important mechanism for providing legally binding negative security assurances and recalled their signature of the Protocol to the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty in 2014 and their readiness to sign the protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone at the soonest possible time. They reiterated the importance of the 1995 NPT Review Conference Resolution on the Middle East and underlined their readiness to undertake efforts, including with states in the region, aimed at its implementation. The P5 underscored the need for renewed engagement among the states in the region in order to convene an initial conference on a Middle East Zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

16. The P5 underscored their commitment to prevent nuclear terrorism and their support for measures to strengthen overall nuclear security. They recalled the series of Nuclear Security Summits. Welcoming the entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in May 2016, they renewed their support to the universalization of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities as well as of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. They reaffirmed their support for relevant international organizations such as the United Nations, IAEA, and INTERPOL as well as international initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. They

also further reaffirmed the central role of the IAEA in international cooperation in the area of nuclear security and expressed support for the international conference on nuclear security to be held in Vienna on December 5-9, 2016.

17. The P5 remain steadfast in their commitment to broaden access of NPT States Parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and they reiterated the right of NPT States Parties to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear energy without discrimination and in conformity with their nonproliferation obligations and highest standards of nuclear safety and security. The P5 noted their extensive support for international cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally, on peaceful use, including the IAEA Technical Cooperation Program and multiple initiatives to strengthen IAEA programs in these areas as appropriate. They welcomed the progress in establishing the IAEA low-enriched uranium (LEU) bank in Kazakhstan and expressed their continuing support for the IAEA LEU Reserve in Angarsk (Russia), the American Assured Fuel Supply, and the UK Assurance of Supply of Enrichment Services. They affirmed that these initiatives pave the way for the assured access to nuclear fuel, which promote sustainable development and energy security and benefit all NPT States Parties.

18. The P5 welcomed France's plans to host the next Conference in 2017.

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### **P5 Statement on The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)**

[15 September 2016]

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Our commitment to nuclear disarmament extends to efforts to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force at an early date. We welcome that 183 States have signed the treaty and 166 States have ratified the Treaty, including several nuclear weapons States. We pledge to strive for the Treaty's early ratification and prompt entry into force and urge all states that have not done so to sign and ratify the treaty. We take this opportunity to reaffirm our own moratoria on nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the CTBT's entry into force, as such moratoria are an example of responsible international behavior that contributes to international peace and stability, while stressing that such moratoria do not have the same permanent legally binding effect as entry into force. We call on other states to do likewise, recognizing that a nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT.

The CTBT constrains the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and thereby provides an effective disarmament and nonproliferation measure. We further note that our nuclear stockpile maintenance and stewardship programs are consistent with NPT and CTBT objectives. We emphasize the very substantial efforts made in achieving the cessation of the nuclear arms race as called for in Article VI of the NPT and affirm our intention never to engage in such an arms race.

We are working closely with the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization in Vienna on the development of the Treaty's verification regime, including its International Monitoring System, International Data Centre, and On-Site Inspection, while recognizing the high effectiveness and reliability of this regime to date, the Preparatory Commission is currently operating the IMS and IDC, and their respective means of communication, on a testing and provisional basis. We continue to contribute extensively to the development of the Treaty's on-site inspection element, supplying personnel, equipment, and research. This has been in addition to our long standing efforts to reinforce the organization's detection capability through contributions in-kind, equipment transfers, and expert participation in Working Groups. We also call for all signatories to support efforts to complete the necessary

preparation for the effective implementation of the CTBT's verification regime, on its entry into force.

## Briefing on P5 Beijing Conference by Ambassador LI Song to the Conference on Disarmament

[5 February 2019]

On 30th of January, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, or the P5, held the 8th formal P5 Conference in Beijing. It is the first time over the past two years that the P5 has held a formal conference. The conference was presided over by H.E. Mr. Zhang Jun, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, Deputy Minister Sergey Ryabkov of Russia, Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson of the United States, Director for Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament Mr. Nicolas Roche of France, Mr. Philip Barton, Director General for Consular and Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Wood, Ambassador Liddle, Ambassador Fu Cong, who is now Director General of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and myself participated in this conference. Focusing on the theme of "Strengthening the P5 Coordination and Safeguarding the NPT Regime", we had a candid and in-depth exchange of views on nuclear policies and doctrines, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and other issues. Since China was hosting this conference in its capacity of the coordinator of the P5,<sup>1</sup> have the pleasure to share with distinguished colleagues the following important consensus we reached during the Beijing Conference.

First, the P5 undertook to jointly fulfilling the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. The P5 recognized that the current international security environment is facing severe challenges, and maintaining sound relations with each other is of crucial importance to global strategic issues. The P5 agreed to have an objective assessment of each other's strategic intentions, enhance dialogue on nuclear policies and doctrines, promote strategic trust and common security, and make utmost efforts to prevent nuclear risks, in particular resulting from miscalculation and misperception. The P5 also recalled the importance of

maintaining the existing international arms control architecture, emphasized the importance of compliance with all international arms control agreements, and reaffirmed their commitment to existing negative and positive security assurances. The P5 expressed their readiness to renew engagement with the parties to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, and continue to work towards the establishment of a Middle East Zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Second, the P5 undertook to jointly safeguard the NPT regime. The P5 emphasized that the NPT constitutes the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as part of the international security architecture, and reiterated their commitment to abiding by all provisions of the NPT and promoting its universality. The P5 agreed to work to make the international security environment more conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament, and to achieve a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, through a gradual approach. The P5 hold the view that the TPNW contradicts, and risks undermining the NPT, and reaffirmed their opposition to the TPNW. The P5 undertook to make maximum efforts in seeking peaceful and diplomatic solutions to the challenges facing the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and support the IAEA to strengthen the safeguards system within its mandate. The P5 will promote international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and enhance coordination and cooperation on nuclear safety and nuclear security. As previously agreed, the P5 reiterated their commitment to submitting their respective national implementation reports by the 2020 NPT Review Conference, and to working together to make the Review Conference a success.

Third, the P5 agreed to enhance coordination and dialogue through the P5 process. At present, the international security situation is undergoing complex and profound change. Interaction among major countries has a bearing on the international security environment, the evolution of the international order and the

confidence of the international community. The P5 agreed to maintain their strategic dialogue on nuclear policies and doctrines, strengthen their coordination in the NPT review process, and in this regard to explore follow-up measures through Ambassador of Disarmament in Geneva. The P5 will continue to call upon all members of the international community to engage in an open and constructive dialogue. The P5 reaffirmed their support to China to lead the efforts to advance the work of the second phase of the P5 Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. The P5 welcomed the offer by the UK to host the next formal P5 Conference in 2020. The P5 is also proactive in having open and constructive dialogue with the international community. On 31 January, the P5 had a dialogue in Beijing with representatives from international academia, the media and embassies of some non-nuclear-weapon states. My briefing here today is also a new attempt to this end. The P5 stand ready to further interact with the international community in various venues, particularly under the framework of the NPT.

As the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the nuclear-weapon states recognized by the NPT, the P5, despite some differences on specific issues, were able to have an in-depth exchange of views in the spirit of mutual respect and in a frank and pragmatic manner, reached consensus on many issues, and identify the direction for future cooperation. This demonstrates the positive attitudes taken by the major countries to address international security challenges through cooperation and coordination, thus reinforcing the international community's positive outlook on the international security environment.

In conclusion, I would like to thank the other P5 countries for their support and cooperation in making the Beijing Conference a success. China will continue to work with the other P5 countries in building consensus and managing differences in the field of strategic security, and call for major-country coordination to replace major-country competition, and win-win cooperation to replace zero-sum game, so as to make positive contributions to world peace and stability.

## Statement by UK to the Conference on Disarmament on the P5 process

[21 February 2020]

The five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear weapon states, or "P5", met in London on 12-13 February 2020 for the ninth P5 Conference, to discuss the preparations for the 2020 NPT Review Conference.

They welcomed the confirmation of Gustavo Zlauvinen of Argentina as President-designate of the Review Conference, and had a fruitful exchange of views with him and the other members of the Bureau, Ambassador Syed Hasrin of Malaysia, Ambassador Adam Bugajski of Poland, and Ambassador Marjolijn van Deelen of The Netherlands. They also had a valuable dialogue with representatives of civil society from the P5 countries and across the wider NPT membership, in partnership with King's College London and the European Leadership Network.

During the course of the Conference, the P5 each reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT in all its aspects, fifty years since its entry into force and 25 years since its indefinite extension. They reiterated that the NPT provides the essential foundation for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby limiting the risk of nuclear confrontation; for the promotion and sharing of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, to the benefit of humanity; and for nuclear disarmament, by helping to ease international tensions and create conditions of stability, security and trust among nations. They reiterated their commitment to continue their individual and collective efforts to uphold their obligations and to advance the goals and objectives of the NPT in all its aspects.

In a wide-ranging discussion, the P5 exchanged views on the current situation in the international security environment and other issues relevant to the Review Conference, including proliferation challenges in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, nuclear disarmament verification, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. They also pledged their full and continued support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and for its new

Director-General, Rafael Mariano Grossi. They acknowledged that the IAEA plays a critical role in NPT implementation, both to promote the fullest possible cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and to apply safeguards and verify that nuclear programmes are entirely peaceful.

Specifically, they reviewed progress on the five areas of work agreed at the Beijing P5 Conference in January 2019.

First, they welcomed the continued exchange of views on their respective nuclear doctrines and policies, and confirmed their intention to hold a side event presenting them at the Review Conference. They agreed to continue these expert-level meetings beyond the Review Conference. They also underlined the importance of reducing nuclear risk and promoting stability, and agreed that experts should continue and deepen their dialogue on strategic risk reduction up to and beyond the Review Conference.

Second, they endorsed the progress made on the second phase of the Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, which is conducive to strengthening the NPT and enhancing mutual trust. They agreed to publish the results of the Working Group ahead of the Review Conference.

Third, they reaffirmed their commitment to the aims and objectives of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone, and welcomed ongoing discussions between the P5 and the ASEAN countries on the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty.

Fourth, they reiterated their readiness to negotiate, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty to end the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices – a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) – on the basis of consensus and with the participation of all relevant countries. In this context, they welcomed the ongoing P5 expert-level discussions on FMCT-related issues.

Fifth, they reiterated their commitment to share with the international community the many benefits of nuclear technology and its applications for peaceful purposes, and to continue their contributions to IAEA or bilateral development projects. They also announced their intention to host a joint P5 side event focusing on peaceful uses at the Review Conference.

Finally, the P5 reaffirmed their commitment to present their respective national implementation reports to the Review Conference, based on the common reporting framework agreed in 2013.

The P5 looked forward to continuing their dialogue and their work on these and other relevant issues up to the Review Conference and beyond, and welcomed France's generous offer to host the next P5 Conference in 2021.

### **Statement by France to the Conference on Disarmament on the P5 process**

[26 August 2021]

As coordinator of the P5 format, which brings together the 5 NPT Nuclear Weapon States, France wishes to brief the Member states of the Conference on disarmament on the P5 process.

The P5 has a special responsibility in maintaining international peace and security. Given the tense international security context, the pursuit and strengthening of the dialogue amongst the members of the P5 is key to strategic stability. The exchange of doctrines and nuclear policies enables the strengthening of predictability, confidence and mutual understanding within the P5, subsequently contributing to the reduction of strategic risks. The P5 is determined to pursue a constructive dialogue which respects and recognizes national security interests at stake.

The P5 is firmly engaged in the full respect and implementation of the NPT and of its three pillars which are indissociable and mutually reinforcing, including its article VI, by which each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes « to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a

treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control ». The P5 is committed to creating a security environment conducive to progress on matters of disarmament, with the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons, with undiminished security for all.

In September 2020, France succeeded to the United Kingdom as coordinator of the P5. The P5 members are pursuing the implementation of the joint roadmap approved in Beijing in January 2019, with the aim of contributing in a concrete and positive manner both to the next review conference and to next NPT review cycle.

Following the postponement of the NPT review conference (to early 2022), France has subsequently decided to postpone the Paris conference, initially scheduled in July 2021. Given the importance of the P5 work which needs to be pursued as actively as possible despite the current health situation, France convened a virtual meeting of the « Principals » on 8 July, to measure the progress achieved in implementing the P5 roadmap as well as to reinforce the general work dynamic.

This meeting, presided by Philippe BERTOUX, Director of strategic affairs, for France, to which participated Fu CONG, Director General for arms control, for China, Vladimir LEONTIEV, Deputy Director for Strategic Affairs, Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, for Russia, Samantha JOB, Director of Defence and International Security for the United- Kingdom, and Eliot KANG, acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, constituted an important milestone of the P5 process in the preparation of the upcoming NPT review conference. It allowed to recognize that despite the impact of the health crisis, work has continued, with the P5's determination to register progress under these workstreams remaining intact.

1. The importance of the dialogue on doctrines and nuclear policies has been reaffirmed. The P5 members have reaffirmed their intention to organize a side event to present their doctrines at the review conference and their desire to pursue exchanges on doctrines. Strategic risk reduction has been recognized as an increasingly important topic, on which the P5 members are ready to work on in the long-term.

2. Regarding the FMCT, the P5 has reaffirmed its desire to negotiate a multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable non discriminatory treaty, banning the production of fissile materials used to produce nuclear weapons and other explosive nuclear devices (Fissile material cut off treaty – FMCT/TIPMF), on a consensus basis and with the participation of all countries involved within the Conference on disarmament. The P5 has agreed to resume expert meetings to provide the NPT review conference with its vision on this essential topic.

3. Works on the glossary of nuclear terms presented by China and its almost ready-for-print status, as well as the perspective of this 2nd edition of the P5 glossary being formally presented at the review conference, have been welcomed.

4. The P5 reaffirmed its support to the objectives of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and their availability to deepen exchanges with ASEAN member-states pertaining to the Bangkok treaty. The P5 wish to express their strong political commitment on this topic.

5. Regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the Principals voiced their support to the idea of a P5 joint statement and side event on the margins of the review conference.

The P5 agreed to pursue and intensify efforts at expert-level on each of these workstreams in the run-up to the NPT review conference. The work will take the form of concrete deliverables for the review conference. The Middle-East WMD-Free Zone and nuclear disarmament verification were also discussed.

The meeting was also the opportunity to examine proposals aiming at reinforcing the dialogue with non-nuclear-weapon states as well as with civil society. Meetings with the NPDI and the Stockholm Initiative have been programmed to this effect.

France will keep the Conference on disarmament informed on the next steps of the P5 process and the upcoming the Paris Conference, and remains available to any delegation wishing to obtain additional information.

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### Joint Communiqué by Tenth P5 Conference

[Paris, 2-3 December 2021]

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1. Representatives from the five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), or "P5", met in Paris on 2-3 December 2021 for the 10<sup>th</sup> P5 Conference, to discuss the preparations for the upcoming 10<sup>th</sup> NPT Review Conference and related matters.
2. For over fifty years since its entry into force, the NPT has made invaluable contributions to humanity as a whole by providing an international framework that is indispensable to curbing the threat of nuclear proliferation. At the Paris Conference, the NWS reaffirmed their enduring commitment to the NPT across all three pillars, and their unconditional support for its universalisation. They emphasised the primacy of the NPT as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.
3. Just one month ahead of the 10<sup>th</sup> NPT Review Conference (4-28 January 2022), they reiterated their active determination to approach this milestone event in the most positive and constructive manner. In this regard, they expressed their full support to President-designate Gustavo Ziaurvinen in his endeavour to achieve a meaningful outcome.
4. The Paris Conference gave an opportunity to reflect and take stock of NWS efforts and the contribution of this work to the strengthening of the NPT. Twelve years after the establishment of the P5 process, the NWS firmly believe that this forum has proved useful, and will continue to be a key mechanism for fostering a better mutual understanding among NWS and to examine the means through which they can collectively help facilitate the goals of the NPT.
5. They reaffirmed their commitment under the NPT to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. They support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. By helping to ease international tensions and create conditions of stability, security and trust among nations, the NPT has made a vital contribution to nuclear disarmament and to reducing proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT continues to help create conditions that are essential for further progress on nuclear disarmament.
6. They also recalled the instrumental role of the NPT in providing confidence that, in line with article III of the Treaty, nuclear energy is not diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The NPT provides a foundation for the promotion and sharing of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, to the benefit of all. In this regard, they reiterated their full and continued support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in implementing the safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols, in promoting the benefits of peaceful uses and in verifying States' compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.
7. They also reflected on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the importance of its entry into force, twenty-five years after it was opened for signature, and recalled the importance of moratoria on nuclear tests to the achievement of disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.
8. They reviewed progress achieved concerning the different workstreams under the P5 Process in preparation for the 10<sup>th</sup> NPT Review Conference:
  - a) They exchanged updates on their respective nuclear doctrines and policies and reiterated their commitment to the ongoing discussions in this area that contribute to strengthening predictability, confidence and mutual understanding among the NWS. In this regard, they consider this workstream as a tangible risk reduction measure, and reaffirmed their willingness to pursue these discussions, as well as to host a dedicated side-event on nuclear doctrines and policies at the Review Conference;
  - b) They recognised their responsibility to work collaboratively to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. They intend to build on their fruitful work on strategic risk reduction within the P5 Process in the course of the next NPT review cycle, in order to reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons use. This is complementary to the NPT's overarching goals and is consistent with the NWS' long-term efforts towards disarmament and the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all;
  - c) They endorsed the second edition of the P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, which contributes to enhancing mutual trust and understanding among the NWS. They decided to submit the Glossary as a P5 working paper to the 10<sup>th</sup> NPT Review Conference and hold a side-event during the Conference;
  - d) They reaffirmed their commitment to the objectives of the Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones, including the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone, and recalled the importance of advancing discussions between the NWS and the ASEAN countries on the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty. They also recalled their support to the establishment of a Middle-East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
  - e) They reiterated their support for the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) – banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices - on the basis of the Shannon mandate and with the participation of all countries in the Conference on Disarmament;
  - f) They stressed the shared benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the need to strengthen this pillar of the NPT. As such, they reaffirmed their strong support for broadening access within the NPT community to the numerous benefits of nuclear energy, science and technology and their applications for peaceful purposes, their support for the role of nuclear energy in addressing climate change and in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. They will promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy during the 10<sup>th</sup> NPT Review Conference.
9. The Paris Conference also provided an opportunity for substantial discussions among the NWS on the international security environment, non-proliferation issues and the importance of strategic stability. They agreed on the urgency of a full return to the JCPoA and on the need to achieve complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula
10. They emphasised the importance of transparency and outreach. In that regard, they conducted fruitful dialogues with the NPT Bureau, Non-Nuclear Weapon States and civil society representatives, and intend to keep open all communications channels to contribute to a positive outcome of the NPT Review Conference. They decided to launch a pilot project to develop a Young Professionals Network of P5 academics.

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### Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races

[3 January 2022]

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The People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America consider the avoidance of war between Nuclear-Weapon States and the reduction of strategic risks as our foremost responsibilities.

We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences, we also affirm that nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war. We believe strongly that the further spread of such weapons must be prevented.

We reaffirm the importance of addressing nuclear threats and emphasize the importance of preserving and complying with our bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control agreements and commitments. We remain committed to our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, including our Article VI obligation “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

We each intend to maintain and further strengthen our national measures to prevent unauthorized or unintended use of nuclear weapons. We reiterate the validity of our previous statements on de-targeting, reaffirming that none of our nuclear weapons are targeted at each other or at any other State.

We underline our desire to work with all states to create a security environment more conducive to progress on disarmament with the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. We intend to continue seeking bilateral and multilateral diplomatic approaches to avoid military confrontations, strengthen stability and predictability, increase mutual understanding and confidence, and prevent an arms race that would benefit none and endanger all. We are resolved to pursue constructive dialogue with mutual respect and acknowledgment of each other's security interests and concerns.

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**Statement by the New Agenda Coalition in  
response to Joint Statement by the Leaders of  
the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing  
Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races**

[25 January 2022]

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1- The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) takes note of the ‘Joint statement on preventing nuclear war and avoiding arms races’ issued by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America on 3 January 2022.

2- The NAC also takes note of the joint-statement's emphasis on the continued pursuit of ‘bilateral and multilateral diplomatic approaches to avoid military confrontations, strengthen stability and predictability, increase mutual understanding and confidence, and prevent an arms race that would benefit none and endanger all.’

3- At a time when tension is heightened, the NAC sees the joint-statement as a necessary effort to stabilise strategic relations and we hope it signals the beginning of greater cooperation between the nuclear-weapon States in the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations. In particular, the joint affirmation that ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’ is an important signal, which must now be translated into concrete action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

4- While diplomatic cooperation is needed and welcome, the NAC is concerned about recent policy statements by the nuclear-weapon States relating to the modernisation of their nuclear weapon programmes. These statements undermine their commitment to nuclear disarmament and increase the risk of the use of nuclear weapons and of a new arms race. Nuclear disarmament is not only an international legal obligation, it is a humanitarian and moral imperative.

5- The NAC is of the view that nuclear weapons and security policies grounded in nuclear deterrence cannot provide meaningful stability or predictability and potentially risks encouraging proliferation. The continued existence of nuclear weapons further aggravates tensions in the international security environment and represents a grave threat to humanity. Stabilisation efforts are not sufficient on their own without each of the nuclear weapon States taking tangible steps towards diminishing the salience of nuclear weapons in their strategic doctrines, leading to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Such intermediary steps could include the provision of legally binding negative security assurances.

6- The NAC supports measures aimed at reducing the risks of nuclear war. We believe that risk reduction efforts are interim solutions, and that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their use or threat of use. Without a direct link to the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, strategic and nuclear risk reduction measures only contribute to the illusion that we can live with nuclear weapons indefinitely. While nuclear weapons continue to exist, they will always pose an unacceptable risk to humanity.

7- In this regard, the NAC recalls the expression of deep concern at the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and its resolve to seek a safer world for all and to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. Grave concern at the danger to humanity posed by nuclear weapons should inform all deliberations, decisions and actions relating to nuclear disarmament.

8- The NAC stresses the unequivocal undertaking of the Nuclear-Weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States Parties are committed under Article VI of the NPT. The NAC rejects the notion that these obligations are conditional, as suggested in the statement of the nuclear-weapon States. The current global security environment reinforces the need for urgency and determination in their implementation.

9- The NAC advocates for the implementation of concrete, transparent, mutually reinforcing, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament measures. We also call for the urgent fulfilment of obligations and commitments within the framework of the NPT, which remain valid until implemented.

10- Finally, the NAC is disappointed that, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Tenth NPT Review Conference, which was due to convene in New York in January 2022, was further postponed. However, the postponement now provides the nuclear-weapon States with an opportunity to publicly reiterate and make progress on the full implementation of their unequivocal undertaking. Such a reaffirmation, matched by actionable, specific measures, would bolster the NPT and its Review Process, and give additional effect to the efforts referred to by the nuclear-weapon States in their joint-statement”.

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**Statement by the Stockholm Initiative in  
response to Joint Statement by the Leaders of  
the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing  
Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races**

[3 February 2022]

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The Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament is encouraged by the “Joint Statement on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races” by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the USA of January 3, 2022.

A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The affirmation of this important truth by all five NPT nuclear-weapon States collectively is a welcome development, which the Stockholm Initiative strongly supports and expects to contribute to the strengthening of the NPT regime.

Today, dialogue and cooperation between the P5 are more important than ever before to reduce tensions and the risk of escalation. But in order to move closer to the common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament are also urgently needed.

The Stockholm Initiative has presented a feasible way forward in this regard, one that is both realistic and ambitious, through our two joint working papers *Stepping Stones for Advancing Nuclear Disarmament* and *A Nuclear Risk Reduction Package*. We urge all States Parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States to positively consider our proposals. Pending the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons, we must advance nuclear disarmament and ensure that, in the interest of humanity, nuclear weapons will never be used again.

The Stockholm Initiative will use the time until the postponed Review Conference of the NPT to press for further progress.