

B — Materials related to the 2026 NPT Review Conference

Draft provisional agenda of the 2026 Review Conference

NPT/CONF.2026/1 (Annex IV)
[9 May 2025]

1. Opening of the Conference by the Chair of the third session of the Preparatory Committee.
2. Election of the President of the Conference.
3. Statement by the President of the Conference.
4. Address by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
5. Address by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
6. Submission of the final report of the Preparatory Committee.
7. Adoption of the rules of procedure.
8. Election of Chairs and Vice-Chairs of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee.
9. Election of Vice-Presidents.
10. Credentials of representatives to the Conference.
 - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
11. Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General.
12. Adoption of the agenda.
13. Programme of work.
14. Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference.
15. General debate.

Allocation of Items to the Main Committees of the 2026 Review Conference

NPT/CONF.2026/1 (Annex V)
[9 May 2025]

The Preparatory Committee decides to allocate the following items to the Main Committees at the 2026 Review Conference.

1. Main Committee I

Item 16. Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference:

(a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:

- (i) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3;
 - (ii) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12;
 - (iii) Article VII, with specific reference to the main issues considered in this Committee;
- (b) Security assurances:
- (i) Security Council resolutions [255 \(1968\)](#) and [984 \(1995\)](#);
 - (ii) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

Item 17. Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security, and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality.

2. Main Committee II

Item 16. Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference:

(c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:

- (i) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7;
- (ii) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to articles III and IV;
- (iii) Article VII;

Item 17. Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security, and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality.

3. Main Committee III

Item 16. Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference:

(d) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II:

- (i) Articles III, paragraph 3, and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III, paragraphs 1, 2 and 4, and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5;
- (ii) Article V;
- (e) Other provisions of the Treaty.

Item 17. Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security, and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality.

Draft Rules of Procedure for the Review Conference

NPT/CONF.2026/1 (Annex III)
[9 May 2025]

Representation and credentials

Delegations of parties to the Treaty

Rule 1

1. Each State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter "the Treaty") may be represented at the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (hereinafter the "Conference") by a head of delegation and such other

representatives, alternate representatives and advisers as may be required.

2. The head of delegation may designate an alternate representative or an adviser to act as a representative.

Credentials

Rule 2

The credentials of representatives and the names of alternate representatives and advisers shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the Conference, if possible not less than one week before the date fixed for the opening of the Conference. Credentials shall be issued either by the head of the State or Government or by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Credentials Committee

Rule 3

The Conference shall establish a Credentials Committee composed of the Chair and two Vice-Chairs elected in accordance with rule 5, and six members appointed by the Conference on the proposal of the President. The Committee shall examine the credentials of representatives and report to the Conference without delay.

Provisional participation

Rule 4

Pending a decision of the Conference upon their credentials, representatives shall be entitled to participate provisionally in the Conference.

II. Officers

Election

Rule 5

The Conference shall elect the following officers: a President and thirty-four Vice-Presidents, as well as a Chair and two Vice-Chairs for each of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee. The officers shall be elected so as to ensure a representative distribution of posts.

Acting President

Rule 6

1. If the President is absent from a meeting or any part thereof, he shall designate a Vice-President to take his place.
2. A Vice-President acting as President shall have the same powers and duties as the President.

Voting rights of the President

Rule 7

The President, or a Vice-President acting as President, shall not vote, but shall appoint another member of his delegation to vote in his place.

III. General Committee

Composition

Rule 8

1. The General Committee shall be composed of the President of the Conference, who shall preside, the thirty-four Vice-Presidents, the Chairs of the three Main Committees, the Chair of the Drafting Committee and the Chair of the Credentials Committee. No two members of the General Committee shall be members of the same delegation and it shall be so constituted as to ensure its representative character.

2. If the President is unable to attend a meeting of the General Committee, he may designate a Vice-President to preside at such meeting and a member of his delegation to take his place. If a Vice-President is unable to attend, he may designate a member of his delegation to take his place. If the Chair of a Main Committee,

the Drafting Committee or the Credentials Committee is unable to attend, he may designate one of the Vice-Chairs to take his place, with the right to vote unless he is of the same delegation as another member of the General Committee.

Functions

Rule 9

The General Committee shall assist the President in the general conduct of the business of the Conference and, subject to the decisions of the Conference, shall ensure the coordination of its work.

IV. Conference Secretariat

Duties of the Secretary-General of the Conference

Rule 10

1. There shall be a Secretary-General of the Conference. He shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Conference, its committees and subsidiary bodies, and may designate a member of the Secretariat to act in his place at these meetings.
2. The Secretary-General of the Conference shall direct the staff required by the Conference.

Duties of the Secretariat

Rule 11

The Secretariat of the Conference shall, in accordance with these rules:

- (a) Interpret speeches made at meetings;
- (b) Receive, translate and circulate the documents of the Conference;
- (c) Publish and circulate any report of the Conference;
- (d) Make and arrange for the keeping of sound recordings and summary records of meetings;
- (e) Arrange for the custody of documents of the Conference in the archives of the United Nations and provide authentic copies of these documents to each of the depository Governments; and
- (f) Generally perform all other work that the Conference may require.

Costs

Rule 12

The costs of the Conference, including the sessions of the Preparatory Committee, will be met by the States parties to the Treaty participating in the Conference in accordance with the schedule for the division of costs as shown in the appendix to these Rules.

V. Conduct of business

Quorum

Rule 13

1. A majority of the States parties to the Treaty participating in the Conference shall constitute a quorum.
2. To determine whether the Conference is quorate, any State party may call for a roll call at any time.

General powers of the President

Rule 14

1. In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him elsewhere by these Rules, the President shall preside at the plenary meetings of the Conference; he shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting, direct the discussion, ensure observance of these Rules, accord the right to speak, ascertain consensus, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. He shall rule on points of order. The President, subject to these Rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings and over the maintenance of order thereat. The President may propose to the Conference the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the

time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each State may speak on the question, the adjournment or the closure of the debate and the suspension or the adjournment of a meeting.

2. The President, in the exercise of his functions, remains under the authority of the Conference.

Points of order

Rule 15

A representative may at any time raise a point of order, which shall be immediately decided by the President in accordance with these Rules. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President. The appeal shall be immediately put to the vote, and the President's ruling shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the representatives present and voting. A representative may not, in raising a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Speeches

Rule 16

1. No one may address the Conference without having previously obtained the permission of the President. Subject to rules 15, 17 and 19 to 22, the President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

2. Debate shall be confined to the subject under discussion and the President may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not relevant thereto.

3. The Conference may limit the time allowed to speakers and the number of times the representative of each State may speak on a question; permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives in favour of and to two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote. In any event, the President shall limit interventions on procedural questions to a maximum of five minutes. When the debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call him to order without delay.

Precedence

Rule 17

The Chair of a committee may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the conclusion arrived at by his committee.

Closing of list of speakers

Rule 18

During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Conference, declare the list closed. When the debate on an item is concluded because there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure pursuant to rule 22.

Right of reply

Rule 19

Notwithstanding rule 18, the President may accord the right of reply to a representative of any State participating in the Conference. Such statements shall be as brief as possible and shall, as a general rule, be delivered at the end of the last meeting of the day.

Suspension or adjournment of the meeting

Rule 20

A representative may at any time move the suspension or the adjournment of the meeting. No discussion on such motions shall be permitted and they shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

Adjournment of debate

Rule 21

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of the debate on the question under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives in favour of and to two opposing the adjournment, after which the motion shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

Closure of debate

Rule 22

A representative may at any time move the closure of the debate on the question under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

Order of motions

Rule 23

The motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- (a) To suspend the meeting;
- (b) To adjourn the meeting;
- (c) To adjourn the debate on the question under discussion;
- (d) To close the debate on the question under discussion.

Submission of proposals and substantive amendments

Rule 24

Proposals and substantive amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretary-General of the Conference, who shall circulate copies to all delegations. Unless the Conference decides otherwise, proposals and substantive amendments shall be discussed or decided on no earlier than twenty-four hours after copies have been circulated in all languages of the Conference to all delegations.

Withdrawal of proposals and motions

Rule 25

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before a decision on it has been taken, provided that it has not been amended. A proposal or a motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

Decision on competence

Rule 26

Any motion calling for a decision on the competence of the Conference to adopt a proposal submitted to it shall be decided upon before a decision is taken on the proposal in question.

Reconsideration of proposals

Rule 27

Proposals adopted by consensus may not be reconsidered unless the Conference reaches a consensus on such reconsideration. A proposal that has been adopted or rejected by a majority or two-thirds vote may be reconsidered if the Conference, by a two-thirds majority, so decides. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be immediately put to the vote.

VI. Voting and elections

Adoption of decisions

Rule 28

1. The task of the Conference being to review, pursuant to paragraph 3 of article VIII of the Treaty, the operation of the Treaty with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized, and thus to strengthen its effectiveness, every effort should be made to reach agreement

on substantive matters by means of consensus. There should be no voting on such matters until all efforts to achieve consensus have been exhausted.

2. Decisions on matters of procedure and in elections shall be taken by a majority of representatives present and voting.

3. If, notwithstanding the best efforts of delegates to achieve a consensus, a matter of substance comes up for voting, the President shall defer the vote for forty-eight hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort, with the assistance of the General Committee, to facilitate the achievement of general agreement, and shall report to the Conference prior to the end of the period.

4. If by the end of the period of deferment the Conference has not reached agreement, voting shall take place and decisions shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting, provided that such majority shall include at least a majority of the States participating in the Conference.

5. If the question arises whether a matter is one of procedure or of substance, the President of the Conference shall rule on the question. An appeal against this ruling shall immediately be put to the vote and the President's ruling shall stand unless the appeal is approved by a majority of the representatives present and voting.

6. In cases where a vote is taken, the relevant rules of procedure relating to voting of the General Assembly of the United Nations shall apply, except as otherwise specifically provided herein.

Voting rights

Rule 29

Every State party to the Treaty shall have one vote.

Meaning of the phrase "representatives present and voting"

Rule 30

For the purposes of these Rules, the phrase "representatives present and voting" means representatives casting an affirmative or negative vote. Representatives who abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

Elections

Rule 31

All elections shall be held by secret ballot, unless the Conference decides otherwise in an election where the number of candidates does not exceed the number of elective places to be filled.

Rule 32

1. If, when only one elective place is to be filled, no candidate obtains in the first ballot the majority required, a second ballot shall be taken, confined to the two candidates having obtained the largest number of votes. If in the second ballot the votes are equally divided, the President shall decide between the candidates by drawing lots.

2. In the case of a tie in the first ballot among the candidates obtaining the second largest number of votes, a special ballot shall be held among such candidates for the purpose of reducing their number to two; similarly, in the case of a tie among three or more candidates obtaining the largest number of votes, a special ballot shall be held; if a tie again results in this special ballot, the President shall eliminate one candidate by drawing lots and thereafter another ballot shall be held in accordance with paragraph 1.

Rule 33

1. When two or more elective places are to be filled at one time under the same conditions, those candidates, in a number not exceeding the number of such places, obtaining in the first ballot the majority required and the largest number of votes shall be elected.

2. If the number of candidates obtaining such majority is less than the number of places to be filled, additional ballots shall be held to fill the remaining places, provided that if only one place remains to be filled the procedures in rule 32 shall be applied. The ballot shall be restricted to the unsuccessful candidates having obtained the largest number of votes in the previous ballot, but not exceeding twice the numbers of places remaining to be filled. However, in the case of a tie between a greater number of unsuccessful candidates, a special ballot shall be held for the purpose of reducing the number of candidates to the required number; if a tie again results among more than the required number of candidates, the President shall reduce their number to that required by drawing lots.

3. If such a restricted ballot (not counting a special ballot held under the conditions specified in the last sentence of paragraph 2) is inconclusive, the President shall decide among the candidates by drawing lots.

VII. Committees

Main Committees and subsidiary bodies

Rule 34

The Conference shall establish three Main Committees for the performance of its functions. Each such Committee may establish subsidiary bodies so as to provide for a focused consideration of specific issues relevant to the Treaty. As a general rule each State party to the Treaty participating in the Conference may be represented in the subsidiary bodies unless otherwise decided by consensus.

Representation on the Main Committees

Rule 35

Each State party to the Treaty participating in the Conference may be represented by one representative on each Main Committee. It may assign to these Committees such alternate representatives and advisers as may be required.

Drafting Committee

Rule 36

1. The Conference shall establish a Drafting Committee composed of representatives of the same States that are represented on the General Committee. It shall coordinate the drafting of and edit all texts referred to it by the Conference or by a Main Committee, without altering the substance of the texts, and report to the Conference or to the Main Committee as appropriate. It shall also, without reopening the substantive discussion on any matter, formulate drafts and give advice on drafting as requested by the Conference or a Main Committee.

2. Representatives of other delegations may also attend the meetings of the Drafting Committee and may participate in its deliberations when matters of particular concern to them are under discussion.

Officers and procedures

Rule 37

The rules relating to officers, the Conference secretariat, conduct of business and voting of the Conference (contained in chaps. II (rules 5–7), IV (rules 10–11), V (rules 13–27) and VI (rules 28–33) above) shall be applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to the proceedings of committees and subsidiary bodies, except that:

(a) Unless otherwise decided, any subsidiary body shall elect a Chair and such other officers as it may require;

(b) The Chairs of the General, the Drafting and the Credentials Committees and the Chairs of subsidiary bodies may vote in their capacity as representatives of their States;

(c) A majority of the representatives on the General, Drafting and Credentials Committees or on any subsidiary body shall constitute a quorum; the Chair of a Main Committee may declare a meeting open and permit the debate to proceed when at least one

quarter of the representatives of the States participating in the Conference are present.

VIII. Languages and records

Languages of the Conference

Rule 38

Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish shall be the official languages of the Conference.

Interpretation

Rule 39

1. Speeches made in a language of the Conference shall be interpreted into the other languages.

2. A representative may make a speech in a language other than a language of the Conference if he provides for interpretation into one such language. Interpretation into the other languages of the Conference by interpreters of the Secretariat may be based on the interpretation given in the first such language.

Language of official documents

Rule 40

Official documents shall be made available in the languages of the Conference.

Sound recordings of meetings

Rule 41

Sound recordings of meetings of the Conference and of all committees shall be made and kept in accordance with the practice of the United Nations. Unless otherwise decided by the Main Committee concerned, no such recordings shall be made of the meetings of a subsidiary body thereof.

Summary records

Rule 42

1. Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Conference and of the meetings of the Main Committees shall be prepared by the Secretariat in the languages of the Conference. They shall be distributed in provisional form as soon as possible to all participants in the Conference. Participants in the debate may, within three working days of receipt of provisional summary records, submit to the Secretariat corrections on summaries of their own interventions, in special circumstances, the presiding officer may, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the Conference, extend the time for submitting corrections. Any disagreement concerning such corrections shall be decided by the presiding officer of the body to which the record relates, after consulting, where necessary, the sound recordings of the proceedings. Separate corrigenda to provisional records shall not normally be issued.

2. The summary records, with any corrections incorporated, shall be distributed promptly to participants in the Conference.

IX. Public and private meetings

Rule 43

1. The plenary meetings of the Conference and the meetings of the Main Committees shall be held in public unless the body concerned decides otherwise.

2. Meetings of other organs of the Conference shall be held in private.

X. Participation and attendance

Rule 44

1. Observers

(a) Any other State which, in accordance with article IX of the Treaty, has the right to become a party thereto but which has neither acceded to it nor ratified it may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for observer status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. Such a State shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the plenary and of

the Main Committees other than those designated closed meetings and to receive documents of the Conference. An observer State shall also be entitled to submit documents for the participants in the Conference.

(b) Any national liberation organization entitled by the General Assembly of the United Nations to participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly, all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly and all international conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for observer status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. Such a liberation organization shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the plenary and of the Main Committees other than those designated closed meetings and to receive documents of the Conference. An observer organization shall also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Conference.

2. The United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency

The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or their representatives, shall be entitled to attend meetings of the plenary and of the Main Committees and to receive the Conference documents. They shall also be entitled to submit material, both orally and in writing.

3. Specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations

The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific Forum, other international and regional intergovernmental organizations, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and any specialized agency of the United Nations may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for observer agency status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. An observer agency shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the plenary and of the Main Committees, other than those designated closed meetings, and to receive the documents of the Conference. The Conference may also invite them to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as Conference documents.

4. Non-governmental organizations

Representatives of non-governmental organizations who attend meetings of the plenary or of the Main Committees will be entitled upon request to receive the documents of the Conference.

Working paper submitted by the Chair of the working group on further strengthening the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.34

[3 August 2023]

Recommendations to the Preparatory Committee that would improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the review process of the Treaty

1. The present working paper is presented following the conclusion of the working group established by [NPT/CONF.2020/DEC.2](#), which met from 24 to 28 July 2023. It is presented under the Chair's own authority and is not intended to represent or imply agreement by States parties on possible draft recommendations for the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

2. The Chair welcomed the substantial, interactive and in-depth dialogue undertaken by States parties throughout the working group discussions, especially those related to transparency and accountability. The draft recommendations contained in the

present paper are intended as a contribution to further discussion on these issues.

3. The Chair presented the below recommendations to the working group established as a means of improving the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the review process of the Treaty, without prejudice to previously agreed outcomes of Review Conferences in line with the established rules of procedure.

Recommendation 1

Strict time limits may be imposed by the chairs of the Preparatory Committee and the President of the Review Conference on statements in the general debate to allow more time for substantive discussions.

Recommendation 2

During each substantive cluster of the Preparatory Committee, one plenary meeting should be dedicated to structured discussion on specific topics related to the substance of that cluster. Topics will be decided following consultations among States parties.

Recommendation 3

The Main Committees of the Review Conference should be structured such that each State party is given the opportunity to deliver one formal statement, before the Committee moves to an interactive format without a formal list of speakers.

Recommendation 4

In accordance with decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, the Main Committees of the Review Conference should devote their meetings to reviewing the implementation of the Treaty over the past review cycle and to addressing priorities for implementation of the Treaty over the next review cycle.

Recommendation 5

Main Committee I of the Review Conference should focus on the following: review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as well as commitments undertaken by States parties in the final outcomes of Review Conferences (e.g. the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-up actions of the 2010 Review Conference), specifically article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12; security assurances and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; nuclear weapon-free zones; and disarmament education.

Recommendation 6

Main Committee II of the Review Conference should focus on the following: review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as well as commitments undertaken by States parties in the final outcomes of Review Conferences (e.g. the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-up actions of the 2010 Review Conference), specifically article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7; articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to articles III and IV; and regional matters, including the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

Recommendation 7

Main Committee III of the Review Conference should focus on the following: review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as well as commitments undertaken by States parties in the final outcomes of Review Conferences (e.g. the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and the conclusions

and recommendations for follow-up actions of the 2010 Review Conference), specifically article IV, the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II; article III, paragraph 3; preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III, paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5; article V; and other provisions of the Treaty, including article X and universality.

Recommendation 8

In order to provide States parties with time to properly consider and discuss the final outcome, the President of the Review Conference should circulate a draft final outcome document at the end of the second week of the Review Conference.

Recommendation 9

Subsidiary bodies should conduct their work in an interactive format and focus on specific issues related to Main Committee work that require further in-depth discussion.

Recommendation 10

The third session of the Preparatory Committee should establish the subsidiary bodies for the Review Conference and decide on the topics to be discussed. The chairs of the subsidiary bodies should be nominated at the third session of the Preparatory Committee.

Recommendation 11

The secretariat should compile proposals from working papers submitted by States parties into thematic omnibus documents for the consideration of States parties two weeks prior to the meetings of the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference to facilitate focused discussions.

Recommendation 12

The chairs of the Preparatory Committee sessions should be nominated before the first session of the Committee, and the President of the Review Conference should be nominated at the third session of the Committee. The President-designate of the Review Conference should commence their work upon the conclusion of the third session of the Committee. The President and chairs should function as a "President's bureau" under the authority of the President and engage in joint consultations and outreach as appropriate. Should a member of the bureau no longer be able to discharge their duties, the relevant regional group will nominate a replacement, taking into account the principle of continuity. The work of the President's bureau will not supersede or overlap with the work of the General Committee and will not take decisions on matters of substance and procedure.

Recommendation 13

The chair of the first session of the Preparatory Committee should, under their own authority, prepare a report to be sent to the second session of the Committee, identifying areas of convergence and recommending areas of focused discussion by States parties at the second session. The chair of the second session of the Committee should, under their own authority, prepare a report to be sent to the third session of the Committee further identifying areas of convergence and recommending areas of focused discussion by States parties at the third session. The chair of the third session of the Committee should prepare a set of recommendations, taking into account discussions at the third session and the reports of chairs of the first and second sessions on specific issues for consideration by the Review Conference and topics for subsidiary bodies.

Recommendation 14

Prior to the commencement of a new review cycle, the secretariat should arrange a handover between the incoming Preparatory Committee chairs and the outgoing "President's bureau" to ensure institutional knowledge transfer.

Recommendation 15

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs should be recognized as the permanent secretariat for the review process of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency should continue supporting the Treaty review process on issues related to non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

Recommendation 16

Consistent with action 20 and action 21 of the 2010 Action Plan, nuclear-weapon States should report using a standard template that should build on the disarmament elements of the 2013 common reporting framework and include reporting on, without prejudice to national security: plans related to the modernization of nuclear weapons, and related changes to their nuclear capabilities; the number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed) of nuclear warheads; the number and type of delivery vehicles; the measures taken to reduce the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; the measures taken to reduce the risk of unintended, unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons; the measures taken to de-alert or reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems; the number and type of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts; and the amount of fissile material for military purposes.

Recommendation 17

In implementing action 20 of the 2010 Action Plan, non-nuclear weapon States should develop a standard reporting template to use for national reporting.

Recommendation 18

Two plenary meetings of the second session of the Preparatory Committee and one plenary meeting of Main Committee I of the Review Conference should be dedicated to open and focused discussions on national reports by all nuclear-weapon States on the implementation of article VI and the relevant commitments undertaken in final outcomes from Review Conferences, notably decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference and the 2010 Action Plan. This is without prejudice to voluntary reporting on other aspects of the implementation of the Treaty.

Recommendation 19

Discussion of reports should take place in an interactive format that enables questions to be raised and clarification sought and made on the content of national reports. To enable the interactive process, national reports should be submitted three months in advance of the relevant meeting. Questions to nuclear-weapon States should be submitted one month in advance of the relevant meeting. This does not preclude the opportunity to raise questions during the relevant meetings.

Recommendation 20

States parties should engage during the current review cycle in dialogue on clearly defined, mutually understood and agreed-upon criteria or benchmarks for reviewing the implementation of the Treaty, particularly as related to article VI.

Recommendation 21

In addition to the established practice of conducting consultations with the established Treaty groups, the chairs of the Preparatory Committee sessions and the President of the Review Conference should undertake consultations with States parties in different geographical regions.

Recommendation 22

States parties should establish a form of needs-based financial assistance to facilitate the participation of States parties in Preparatory Committee sessions and Review Conferences.

Recommendation 23

Preparatory Committee chairs and the President of the Review Conference should facilitate informal intersessional consultations between States parties and non-governmental organizations, taking into account balanced geographical representation.

Recommendation 24

Preparatory Committee chairs should be granted discretion to invite experts to provide introductory presentations for substantive discussions by States parties.

Recommendation 25

Each Main Committee of the Review Conference should allocate time for presentations by non-governmental organizations, taking into account balanced geographical representation.

Recommendation 26

The Review Conference should allocate one plenary meeting to discuss issues of inclusivity.

Reflections of the Chair of the 2024 session of the Preparatory Committee

NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/WP.43
[2 August 2024]

Towards 2026: reflections of the Chair of the 2024 session of the Preparatory Committee

Explanatory note

In 1998, at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference, it was proposed that a concise assessment on the state of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons be prepared by the Chair of the Preparatory Committee to reflect on the current status of the implementation of the Treaty with a view to enhancing its authority, integrity and universality. One rationale being that it was important to pronounce on the importance of the Treaty annually at Preparatory Committee sessions in addition to the discussions and outcomes of quinquennial review conferences. Eventually, starting in 2017, the Chairs of the Preparatory Committee initiated the practice of issuing “Chair’s reflections”, and this useful practice continued in 2018, 2019 and 2023.

The Chair is pleased to maintain this practice and recommends that the Chair of the third Session and future Chairs of the Preparatory Committee sessions also continue this practice.

It is the Chair’s view that the following elements, *inter alia*, reflect some of the general sentiments of views in the discussions at the 2024 session of the Preparatory Committee for the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is the hope of the Chair that these could serve as a possible reference point for finding common ground to build further discussions in the current review cycle as it moves to formulate recommendations to the review conference scheduled for 2026.

Chair’s reflections: the state of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

1. The Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the essential near universal cornerstone of multilateral nuclear disarmament (pillar 1) and nuclear non-proliferation (pillar 2), and for facilitating cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including non-power applications (pillar 3).
2. The Treaty has shown itself to be a dynamic instrument, successfully adapting over the past five decades to changing political, technological, military and other circumstances while preserving its core authority and integrity. Today, the Treaty’s ability to evolve and remain fit for purpose is of vital importance. States parties have demonstrated commitment to ensure the continuing integrity and relevance of all aspects of the Treaty and its strengthened review process.
3. Safeguards implementation has been rightfully entrusted by the Treaty and States parties to the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA), which has continued to work to evolve safeguards technologies and procedures to meet new technological challenges. All States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, as well as those with additional protocols, should ensure full cooperation with the Agency to enable it to provide the safeguards conclusions required by the Treaty and the Agency's safeguards system.

4. IAEA is deservedly recognized as the sole competent independent technical international authority responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the Statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority and independence of IAEA in that regard. Full implementation of the Treaty builds confidence in achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons; assuring utilization of nuclear materials and technologies under IAEA safeguards for exclusively peaceful purposes; and promoting international cooperation for further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

5. Over the past two review cycles, the deteriorating international security situation has led to significant weakening of the nuclear disarmament architecture and seen the reinforcement of the role of nuclear weapons and a lack of progress in implementing the commitments agreed at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. These trends must be reversed; full unambiguous implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligations and related commitments must be ensured without further delay.

6. Cooperation among States parties to achieve the full range of technological and developmental benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear science and technology should continue to ensure the highest standards of nuclear safety and nuclear security, under appropriate relevant controls and without undue restrictions. The Agency's "Atoms for Peace and Development" mandate supports States parties' efforts to reach the 17 Sustainable Development Goals set out in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In that context, nuclear science and technology contributes to meet the objectives of 9 of the 17 Goals in areas including energy, human health, food production, water management and environmental protection.

7. Implementation of the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East, remains unfinished business. Its full implementation must be a priority for all States parties. Practical new ideas, initiatives and genuine engagement by all stakeholders and States parties are essential to secure the implementation of the resolution.

8. Universal adherence to the Treaty remains an urgent priority. All States not yet parties to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective.

9. Security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty reinforce both the nuclear disarmament and the nuclear non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty. The Security Council, in its resolutions [255 \(1968\)](#) and [984 \(1995\)](#), adopted unanimously on 19 June 1968 and 11 April 1995, respectively, as well as the declarations of the nuclear-weapon States concerning security assurances in connection with nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, should be fully respected. Further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument. Nuclear-weapon States should take every effort to ratify the relevant protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and to engage in constructive dialogue on how to remove any reservations to those protocols to enable the full benefit of those treaties to their States parties.

10. Despite the prevailing international security situation and tensions, it is important that States parties enable "habits of dialogue" by maintaining an open, non-confrontational, inclusive

and transparent dialogue at the meetings of the Review Conference and the sessions of the Preparatory Committee. States parties are encouraged to strive to make these deliberations as effective and efficient as possible, maximizing their coherence and continuity, ensuring results-based outcomes to keep the Treaty fit for purpose to meet new challenges as they arise. Civility in dialogue is essential.

11. Looking forward to the eleventh Review Conference, in 2026, States parties should coalesce to identify the areas where further progress can be achieved in strengthening the full implementation across all three pillars, as well as the authority, integrity and universality of the Treaty through realistic flexibility and compromises to agree on a relevant updated action plan for the next review cycle.

12. Despite best efforts, the Treaty's strengthened review process has not been properly utilized to its full potential. Clearly this trend must be reversed; realistic benchmarks and timelines should be agreed for continuing actions to assure the full implementation of the Treaty, and in this regard States parties need to work assiduously for achieving successes and avoiding repeated failures that will erode the credibility of this essential Treaty.

Final report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2026/1
[9 May 2026]

I. Terms of reference and organization of work

1. At its seventy-seventh session, the General Assembly, in its resolution [77/66](#) of 14 December 2022, took note of the decision of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, following appropriate consultations, to hold the first session of the Preparatory Committee in Vienna from 31 July to 11 August 2023.

2. Accordingly, the Preparatory Committee held its first session in Vienna from 31 July to 11 August 2023. Following the decisions taken at its first and second sessions, respectively, the Committee held its second session in Geneva from 22 July to 2 August 2024 and its third session in New York from 28 April to 9 May 2025. Reports covering the first two sessions of the Committee were issued as documents [NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/6](#) and [NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/7](#), respectively.

3. At the first session of the Preparatory Committee, an understanding was reached among delegations, according to which a representative of the Western Group should be proposed to chair the first session, a representative of the Group of Eastern European States should be proposed to chair the second session, a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be proposed to chair the third session and a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty should be proposed for the presidency of the 2026 Review Conference. It was further decided that, when not serving as Chairs, the Chairs of the sessions of the Committee would serve as Vice-Chairs of the Committee.

4. Pursuant to the understanding referred to in the paragraph above, at its first session, the Preparatory Committee elected Jarmo Viinanen (Finland) to serve as Chair of the first session. It also elected Akan Rakhmetullin (Kazakhstan) to serve as Chair of the second session.

5. At its second session, the Preparatory Committee elected Harold Agyeman (Ghana) to serve as Chair of the third session.

6. At its third session, the Preparatory Committee authorized its Bureau and the President-designate to handle technical and other organizational matters, as well as to carry out consultations with States parties before the 2026 Review Conference. It also decided that the Chair of the third session of the Committee should open the Conference.

7. At its first session, the Preparatory Committee adopted its agenda as contained in document [NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/2](#), as follows:

1. Opening of the session.
2. Election of the Chair.
3. Adoption of the agenda.
4. General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee.

5. Statements by non-governmental organizations.

6. Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East, adopted in 1995; the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference.

7. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee:

- (a) Election of officers;
- (b) Dates and venues for further sessions;
- (c) Methods of work:
 - (i) Decision-making;
 - (ii) Participation;
 - (iii) Working languages;
 - (iv) Records and documents.

8. Report on the results of the session to the next session of the Preparatory Committee.

9. Organization of the 2026 Review Conference:

- (a) Dates and venue;
- (b) Draft rules of procedure;
- (c) Election of the President and other officers;
- (d) Appointment of the Secretary-General;
- (e) Provisional agenda;
- (f) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee;
- (g) Background documentation;
- (h) Final document(s).

10. Adoption of the final report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the Review Conference.

11. Any other matters.

8. Christopher King, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Office for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Preparatory Committee. Jacek Bylica, Chief of Cabinet, Office of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, represented the Agency at the first, second and third sessions.

9. Delegations of the following 145 States parties participated in one or more sessions of the Preparatory Committee: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran

(Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands (Kingdom of the), New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

10. At its first session, the Preparatory Committee decided to make every effort to adopt its decisions by consensus. In the event that consensus could not be reached, the Committee would then take decisions in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 2022 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which would be applied mutatis mutandis.

11. At the same session, the Preparatory Committee decided that:

(a) Representatives of States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their countries' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Committee;

(b) Representatives of specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their organizations' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as documents of the Committee. Furthermore, the Committee decided, based on the agreement at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, which would be applied mutatis mutandis, that specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations should be invited to make oral presentations to the Committee upon the decision of the Committee, on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, the following specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations were represented as observers at the meetings of the Committee: the African Commission on Nuclear Energy; the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean; the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; the European Union; the International Committee of the Red Cross; the League of Arab States; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization; and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research;

(c) Representatives of non-governmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed, to be seated in the designated area, to receive documents of the Committee and, at their own expense, to make written material available to the participants in the Committee. The Committee would also allocate a meeting to non-governmental organizations to address each session of the Committee. Representatives of 66 non-governmental organizations attended one or more sessions of the Committee.

12. Also at the same session, the Preparatory Committee decided to use Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish as its working languages.

13. In accordance with the Preparatory Committee's decision at its first session, summary records were provided, at each session, for the Committee's opening meetings, the general debate and the closing meetings, as well as for any other meetings during which decisions were taken. The summary records of the first session were issued as documents [NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/SR.1-6](#), [NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/SR.18](#) and [NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/SR.19](#). The summary records of the second session were issued as documents [NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/SR.1-6](#), [NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/SR.16](#) and [NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/SR.17](#). The summary records of the third session will be issued separately from the present report as documents [NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/SR.1-7](#), and [NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/SR.16-20](#) (see annex I).

14. Also, at each session, the Preparatory Committee set aside one meeting for presentations by representatives of non-governmental organizations.

II. Substantive work of the Preparatory Committee

15. The Preparatory Committee held 29 meetings devoted to substantive discussions under agenda item 6.

16. The discussion at each session of the Preparatory Committee was structured according to indicative timetables (first and second session) and a programme of work (third session), which provided equal time for the consideration of three clusters of issues and three specific blocs of issues.

17. The Preparatory Committee considered the following three clusters of issues on the basis of the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the 2022 Review Conference ([NPT/CONF.2020/1](#), annex V):

(a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security (articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3; article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12; article VII, with specific reference to the main issues considered in this cluster); security assurances (Security Council resolutions [255 \(1968\)](#) and [984 \(1995\)](#); effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons);

(b) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones (article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7; articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to articles III and IV; article VII);

(c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II (articles III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5; article V); and other provisions of the Treaty.

18. The Preparatory Committee considered the following three specific blocs of issues:

(a) Nuclear disarmament and security assurances;

(b) Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East;

(c) Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the Treaty.

The Committee also considered the issue of improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process.

19. The Preparatory Committee had before it a number of documents submitted by delegations. The list of the documents submitted during the Committee's sessions is contained in annex II to the present report.

III. Organization of the 2026 Review Conference

20. In the course of its sessions, the Preparatory Committee considered the following questions relating to the organization and work of the 2026 Review Conference:

(a) Dates and venue;

(b) Draft rules of procedure;

(c) Election of the President and other officers;

(d) Appointment of the Secretary-General;

(e) Provisional agenda;

(f) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee;

(g) Background documentation;

(h) Final document(s).

Dates and venue of the 2026 Review Conference

21. At its third session, the Preparatory Committee decided to hold the 2026 Review Conference in New York from 27 April to 22 May 2026.

Draft rules of procedure

22. At its third session, the Preparatory Committee considered the draft rules of procedure for the 2026 Review Conference. It agreed to recommend to the Conference the draft rules of procedure as contained in annex III to the present report.

23. At the same session, the Preparatory Committee agreed to recommend to the Conference that, notwithstanding rule 44, paragraph 3, of the draft rules of procedure, specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations be invited to make oral presentations to the Conference upon the decision of the Conference, on a case-by-case basis.

24. Also at the same session, the Preparatory Committee agreed to recommend to the Conference that, in accordance with the draft rules of procedure, representatives of non-governmental organizations be allowed to attend meetings, other than those designated as closed, and to receive documents of the Conference; that, in accordance with past practice, non-governmental organizations be allowed to make written material available, at their own expense, to the participants of the Conference; and that non-governmental organizations be allowed to address the Conference, consistent with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

Election of the President and other officers

25. At its third session, the Preparatory Committee considered the question of the nomination of the President of the 2026 Review Conference. The Committee expressed its full support for the intention of Viet Nam, with the endorsement of the Non-Aligned Movement, to nominate a candidate for the President of the 2026 Review Conference and notes that the name of the candidate will be communicated to States Parties in due course. The Preparatory Committee agreed that, upon communication of the name of the candidate by Viet Nam, the Chair of the third session of the Committee would inform States parties accordingly of that nomination.

26. At the same session, the Preparatory Committee agreed to recommend that the Main Committees should be chaired by the Chairs of the consecutive sessions of the Preparatory Committee, or their successors, as follows: Main Committee I should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, namely, the Chair of the third session of the Preparatory Committee; Main Committee II should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States, namely, the Chair of the second session of the Preparatory Committee; and Main Committee III should be chaired by a representative of the Western Group, namely, the Chair of the first session of the Preparatory Committee.

27. The Preparatory Committee also agreed to recommend that the post of Chair of the Drafting Committee be assumed by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States, and the post of Chair of the Credentials Committee by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty.

Appointment of the Secretary-General

28. At its first session, the Preparatory Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the members of the Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 2026 Review Conference, a nomination to be confirmed by the Conference itself. At its third session, the Committee was informed of the decision of the Secretary-General, taken after consultations with the members of the Committee, to nominate Christopher King, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Office for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, to serve as provisional Secretary-General of the Conference. The Committee took note of the nomination.

Provisional agenda

29. At its third session, the Preparatory Committee adopted the draft provisional agenda of the 2026 Review Conference, as contained in annex IV to the present report.

30. At the same session, the Preparatory Committee adopted the draft decision on the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the Conference, as contained in annex V to the present report.

Financing of the 2026 Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee

31. At its second session, the Preparatory Committee had before it the estimated cost of the 2026 Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee ([NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/1](#)).

32. In order to promote greater financial transparency and accountability and taking into account the practice of multilateral and other organizations, the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference, at the 12th plenary meeting of its second session, held on 6 May 2008, adopted a decision by which it requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to provide a financial report to the Review Conference and each session of its Preparatory Committee, to be circulated as an official document. Pursuant to this decision, financial reports were submitted at each session of the Committee ([NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/5](#), [NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/6](#) and [NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/7](#)).

33. At its third session, the Preparatory Committee agreed to the schedule for the division of costs. The schedule for the division of costs is contained in the appendix to the draft rules of procedure, as reflected in annex III to the present report.

Background documentation

34. At its third session, the Preparatory Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General to prepare documentation, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. The decision on background documentation is contained in annex VI to the present report.

Final document(s)

35. At its third session, the Preparatory Committee decided to defer the consideration of the matter to the 2026 Review Conference.

Draft Chair's Elements Paper on Strengthening the Review Process

NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III/CRP.1
[25 April 2025]

1. At the 1995 Review and Extensions Conference, States parties to the Treaty examined the implementation of

article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and in accordance with Decision 1, "agreed to strengthen the review process for the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized". States parties also decided that in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, the Review Conferences should continue to be held every five years.

2. During the 2022 Review Conference, a Working Group was established on further strengthening the review process of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Working Group convened at the first session of the Preparatory Committee meeting held in Vienna from 31 July to 11 August 2023 and had constructive discussions on the strengthened Review Process. The Chair of the first Session of the Preparatory Committee, in a strong effort to reflect the common understandings of States parties, captured the convergence of views and presented a working paper (NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.34 of 3 August 2023).
3. The second Session of the Preparatory Committee meeting held by States parties in Geneva from 22 July to 2 August 2024 continued discussions on strengthening the review process and built upon previously discussed positions.
4. During informal and virtual consultations held by the Chair of the third session of the Preparatory Committee with States parties and regional groups since October 2024, delegations have emphasized the need to advance the work on strengthening the review process at the 2026 Review Conference. Despite the general support for this goal, procedural concerns exist over how to carry forward the useful recommendations already made in light of the expiration of the mandate of the Working Group.

II. Objective

5. With a view to assisting States parties achieve consensus for a decision on strengthening the review process, the Chair has prepared this Conference Room Paper to support the work of States parties on improving the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination, and continuity of the review process of the treaty.

III. Recommendations

6. To facilitate a pathway for decision-making by States parties at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference, the Chair for the session recommends that delegations consider the under-listed elements to forge a concrete decision for adoption by the 2026 Review Conference.

7. On effectiveness and efficiency:

- (a) Strict time limits should be enforced by the Chairs of the Preparatory Committee meetings and the President of the Review Conference on statements to be made during general debate to allow more time for substantive and interactive discussions among States parties.
- (b) The Chairs of Preparatory Committee meetings and the President of the Review Conference should adopt a rolling agenda to facilitate the efficient use of conference services during the meetings and Conference.
- (c) The Chair of the first Session of the Preparatory Committee should at the end of the session and under their own authority prepare a Working Paper for the second session, identifying recommendations of convergence and those of divergence. The Working Paper should be the subject of further consideration at the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee and, where possible, should be finalized by

the third Session for adoption by the Review Conference.

- (d) The President of the Review Conference should circulate a draft final outcome document for final consideration and adoption no later than by the end of the second week of the Review Conference to allow State parties adequate time to consider and forge consensus on any outstanding matters of divergence.
- (e) In accordance with Decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, the Main Committees of the Review Conference should devote their meetings to reviewing the implementation of the Treaty over the past review cycle and to addressing priorities for implementation of the Treaty over the next review cycle.
- (f) The work of subsidiary bodies should be conducted in an interactive format and focused on topics related to the mandate of a Main Committee but which require further in-depth discussions and would not duplicate the work of the Main Committee.
- (g) Negotiations on the draft final outcome document of the Review Conference should be carried out in a transparent and inclusive process.

8. Concerning transparency and accountability:

- (a) In furtherance of actions 20 and 21 of the 64-point Action Plan of 2010, nuclear-weapon States should present to the Review Conference their national report using a standard template that builds on the disarmament elements of the 2013 common reporting framework without prejudice to national security.
- (b) Non-nuclear weapon States may develop a standard reporting template to use for national reporting in furtherance of the implementation of action 20 of the 64-point Action Plan of 2010, with due regard, as applicable, for considerations such as nuclear sharing and umbrella arrangements.
- (c) The submission of national reports for consideration within the context of the Review Conference should be presented at least three months before the start of the Review Conference (questions can be submitted ahead and raised during the relevant meetings).
- (d) The discussion on national reports of nuclear-weapon States at the 2026 Review Conference should take place in the subsidiary body of Main Committee I, within the context of the interactive format required of all subsidiary bodies, and it is therefore recommended that Main Committee I establish a subsidiary body for national reports in accordance with rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure. As appropriate, the Review Conference may agree on criteria for the selection of the reports of some non-nuclear weapon States for consideration, taking into account the constraints of time and the efficiency requirements of the Review Conference.
- (e) The Chair of the subsidiary body under Main Committee I may invite a representative of UNIDIR and other independent organizations as shall be agreed by States Parties to make a presentation on the state of nuclear disarmament and commitments already undertaken for the fulfilment of article VI before the presentation and exchanges on national reports.

9. In respect of continuity and coordination:

- (a) The President of the Review Conference should be nominated and approved by States Parties early and no later than at the third session of the Preparatory Committee meeting of the Review Conference. The President-designate should commence work immediately upon the conclusion of the third session of the Preparatory Committee and constitute an interim "President's Bureau" with the Chairs of the Preparatory

Committees to facilitate early consultations with States parties with a view to achieving consensus on the draft final outcome document.

- (b) The topics for discussion by subsidiary bodies at the Review Conference should be decided upon at the third session of the Preparatory Committee meeting and the chairs for those subsidiary bodies nominated at that session for the approval of the Review Conference.
- (c) Under the guidance of the President of the Review Conference, the Chairs of the Main Committees should enhance coordination with the chairs of subsidiary bodies to avoid overlapping discussions between the Main Committee debates and the interactive discussions of the subsidiary bodies. Also, as contained in paragraph 5 of Decision 1 of 1995, overlaps of discussions in Main Committees should be resolved by the General Committee.
- (d) Preparatory Committee Chairs and the President of the Review Conference should facilitate informal intersessional consultations between States parties and non-governmental organizations taking into account the need for equitable geographical representation.
- (e) Pending a decision on a Permanent Secretariat for the review process, the United Nations Office for Disarmament (UNODA) should function as the Secretariat of the review process of the non-proliferation treaty with continuing support from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on issues related to non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
- (f) The Secretariat should compile proposals from working papers submitted by States parties into thematic omnibus documents for the consideration of States parties at least two weeks prior to the meetings of the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference to facilitate focused discussions.
- (g) A trust fund managed by UNODA may be established to support the Chairs of the Preparatory Committees and the President of the Review Conference to undertake their consultations with States parties, regional groups, and the immediate past President and Chairs.
- (h) The outgoing President and the Chairs of the review cycle should jointly elaborate a common reflection paper of their experience and lessons learnt to hand over to the incoming Preparatory Committee Chairs and the President-designate.

Annex I

Main Committee I

Main Committee I of the Review Conference should focus on the following: review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as well as commitments undertaken by States parties in the final outcomes of Review Conferences (e.g. the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-up actions of the 2010 Review Conference), specifically article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12; security assurances and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; nuclear weapon-free zones; and disarmament education.

Main Committee II

Main Committee II of the Review Conference should focus on the following: review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as well as commitments undertaken by States parties in the final outcomes of Review Conferences (e.g. the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and the conclusions and

recommendations for follow-up actions of the 2010 Review Conference), specifically article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7; articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to articles III and IV; and regional matters, including the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

Main Committee III

Main Committee III of the Review Conference should focus on the following: review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as well as commitments undertaken by States parties in the final outcomes of Review Conferences (e.g. the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-up actions of the 2010 Review Conference), specifically article IV, the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II; article III, paragraph 3; preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III, paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5; article V; and other provisions of the Treaty, including article X and universality.

Noteworthy Joint Statements from the 2025 NPT Precom

Joint Statement on the Principle of Irreversibility in Nuclear Disarmament delivered by Norway: NPT 3rd Preparatory Committee

[April 2025]

I am delivering this statement on behalf of Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Ecuador, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, The Netherlands, Panama, Peru, Philippines, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and my own country, Norway.

The NPT is the cornerstone of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We underline our unwavering commitment to the Treaty and its full implementation. We reaffirm the continued validity of past agreements and obligations, and that they continue to guide current and future work on NPT implementation.

States Parties to the NPT have agreed on three principles which underpin the disarmament process: transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility. These three principles are concurrent, complementary, mutually reinforcing and strongly interrelated; they represent a path for how to effectively attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.

The principle of irreversibility should be further explored. This was acknowledged during discussions at the Tenth Review Conference of the NPT. States Parties voiced interest in and support to building a common understanding of the application of irreversibility measures in attaining and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons, and to exchanging information on the application of the principle of irreversibility in relation to the implementation of their Treaty obligations — including both past and intended future actions.

Efforts to understand irreversibility, like transparency and verification, are not an end in themselves. They are not a prerequisite to commence nuclear disarmament, in compliance with the spirit and letter of article VI of the NPT. Nor are they a prerequisite to implement the obligations and commitments agreed within the framework of the treaty. We are however convinced that the application of these three principles can ensure more effective and sustainable nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We are equally convinced that the implementation of these obligations and commitments will benefit from work already having been done on these three principles.

We reiterate the central importance of applying the agreed principles of transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility to any nuclear disarmament efforts, and towards the sustainability of all pillars of the NPT.

We are, therefore, supportive of enhanced dialogue among States Parties to build a common understanding of the application of irreversibility, in its technical, legal, normative and political dimensions. This dialogue could be informed by a growing body of academic work on the principle.

We understand irreversibility in nuclear disarmament as a spectrum of mutually reinforcing elements aimed at making the reconstitution of nuclear capacities as difficult as possible, including i.a. legal, economic, social, societal, normative, political and technical measures. Nothing is ever truly irreversible and the capacity to develop nuclear weapons cannot go to zero, but weapons can be irreversibly eliminated in a verifiable and transparent manner.

We also highlight that while all States have an interest in attaining and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons, the main focus of such a dialogue would be on irreversibility in the actions and activities of nuclear-weapon States to implement their agreed obligations and commitments on nuclear disarmament. These actions and activities will benefit from work already having been done on the three principles.

Moreover, we also acknowledge that nuclear disarmament efforts become significantly more irreversible when they are underpinned by a legally binding obligation on the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear disarmament should be irreversible as all States Parties of the NPT are concerned about the catastrophic consequences that would arise from the use of such weapons.

We undertake to work towards the Eleventh NPT Review Conference with a view to further enhance our understanding of the substance and application of the principle of irreversibility and invite State Parties to engage with us in this effort. This is crucial to continuing taking forward the obligations and commitments agreed on the total elimination of nuclear weapons, so that when nuclear disarmament is a reality, we have all the necessary tools to ensure its effectiveness and sustainability.

Based on the foregoing, we submit the following recommendations to the Preparatory Committee for further recommendation to the Review Conference:

1. The Review Conference should reaffirm the importance of all states applying the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility in relation to the implementation of their disarmament and non-proliferation treaty obligations.
2. The Review Conference should reaffirm that further work is required to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament and, as a first step, encourage all States to build an understanding of the application of irreversibility measures in attaining and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons, and to exchange information on the application of the principle of irreversibility in relation to the implementation of their Treaty obligations. Time should be allocated for a discussion of irreversibility at the Review Conference, as well as in the next review cycle.
3. The Review Conference should acknowledge the importance of providing assistance, in particular to developing countries, through capacity building in order to enhance participation in efforts to apply the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Joint Statement on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education delivered by Japan: NPT 3rd Preparatory Committee

[1st May 2025]

On behalf of the following 94 NPT States Parties — Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria,

Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Gambia (Republic of The), Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Nepal, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Zambia, and my own country, Japan, I would like to deliver a joint statement on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education.

This year marks the 80th year since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Over the past eight decades, national governments, local municipalities, educational, academic and research institutions, the private sector, media, and civil society have amassed a profound body of knowledge on the devastating and multifaceted impacts and consequences resulting from the use of nuclear weapons, in both short and long term. This understanding spans disciplines as diverse as medicine, public health, civil engineering, social sciences, environmental sciences, and cultural studies. The vast wealth of knowledge has made significant contributions to multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation diplomacy and education.

Among the disarmament education efforts around the world, the invaluable testimonies of those who experienced and witnessed the devastation caused by nuclear explosions and its aftermath have played an indispensable role, including the distinguished work of Nihon Hidankyo, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize last year, and of other long-standing advocacy endeavors of the hibakusha, those who have suffered the use of nuclear weapons irrespective of their nationalities and origins. In this regard, disarmament and non-proliferation education, while multidisciplinary in nature, is always human-centered.

However, with time, it is becoming more and more difficult to have the opportunity to hear firsthand accounts of those who experienced, witnessed and were embroiled in such devastation, making each remaining testimony even more precious. We, the 94 countries joining this statement, commend the recent visits to affected sites and engagement with them by political, senior, mid-career and young leaders as well as youth delegations, and encourage all NPT States Parties to promote such initiatives, to ensure the stories and memories of those affected are preserved and passed on to future generations.

The value of disarmament and non-proliferation education itself has long been recognized by the vast majority of the international community. In the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, education was underscored as a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

Moreover, Action 22 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan encouraged all NPT States Parties to implement the 34 recommendations contained in the 2002 report of the Secretary-General entitled "United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education (A/57/124)." The same point is repeatedly reaffirmed in the biennial UN General Assembly resolutions on the United Nations study, led by Mexico, and in other relevant resolutions, co-sponsored by a large number of delegations each year. We call on all NPT States Parties to renew their commitment to implement these recommendations.

Educating, empowering, and equipping each and every individual with critical thinking and other essential skills are crucial in navigating the complexities of the contemporary Atomic Age. This should aim at fostering a new generation of experts both inside and outside governments, capable of addressing risks, challenges and opportunities brought by the power of atoms, while simultaneously

raising public awareness of the importance of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

At the same time, the international community must remain mindful of the rapidly changing technology landscape. As those risks, challenges and opportunities become more diverse, complex, and interconnected, reflecting the realities of current international situation, disarmament and non-proliferation education must continuously evolve, integrating established knowledge from yesterday with today's new findings, to meet the needs of tomorrow. In doing so, it is particularly essential to promote scientific understanding and education. In addition, advances in information and communication technologies, including artificial intelligence, have transformed the way people access, process, and accumulate information. This is particularly relevant for younger generations, who have prolific use and good command of such technologies. Education providers must adapt accordingly and ensure that their programs remain relevant in such a dynamic environment.

To this end, we emphasize the necessity of expanding engagement with new actors, particularly from the private sector, while fostering greater cooperation and collaboration among a diverse range of stakeholders, such as governments, international and regional organizations, civil society, academia, educational institutions. We believe in the power of youths in advancing disarmament and non-proliferation and underscore the importance of engaging with and investing in them. Such an approach will create synergies and maximize the impact of educational initiatives, making them more agile, inclusive, and up-to-date.

The 2026 NPT review process presents an invaluable opportunity for the international community to reaffirm the essential contribution of education on disarmament and non-proliferation to the objectives of this Treaty, as well as to sustaining peace. We believe in the transformative power of education to empower people and make a difference. We therefore call on all NPT States Parties — nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike — to actively promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, share progress, and exchange expertise within the review process. By strengthening our collective commitment in this regard, the international community can build upon existing efforts and advance towards a world without nuclear weapons and sustain it.

Joint Statement on NPT Transparency & Accountability delivered by Ireland: NPT 3rd Preparatory Committee

[9 May 2025]

Delivered on behalf of: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kiribati, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Türkiye, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Ireland.

I deliver this statement on behalf of the aforementioned group of States. I refer to the Joint Statements delivered by New Zealand at the 1st and 2nd Preparatory Committee sessions of this NPT review cycle, on behalf of a group of respectively 28 and 47 States.

Our governments are fully committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The NPT is a fundamental instrument in the pursuit of international peace and security, and we reaffirm the urgent need for its full implementation. A desire to see the obligations and commitments under the Treaty implemented in full, and the total elimination of nuclear weapons realised, has motivated our governments to pursue improvements to transparency and accountability in the implementation of disarmament obligations and commitments this review cycle.

Alongside verification and irreversibility, transparency is a fundamental principle that underpins the full implementation of the NPT and, in enabling accountability, functions as a critical component of States' confidence in the Treaty. For this reason, every NPT decision since, and including, the Review and Extension Conference in 1995 has recognised its centrality. This was further elaborated in the 13 Practical Steps in 2000 and the 2010 Action Plan which sets out the commitments of States Parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, with regard to reporting on implementation of Article VI and related nuclear disarmament commitments.

The necessity to improve transparency and accountability on the implementation of Article VI and its related commitments has been further reinforced by many delegations throughout this Review Cycle, with specific recommendations to this effect being formulated by various States and Groups.

We welcome the national reports - and draft reports - that were submitted to this Meeting, in particular by nuclear weapons States.

With these elements in mind, we deem it vitally important that States Parties are able to achieve concrete progress on, inter alia, transparency as an essential element of accountability at next year's 11th Review Conference. Based on deliberations in this Review Cycle, we consider that the following elements have emerged as essential considerations:

1. Transparency is a fundamental principle in relation to the implementation of treaty obligations.
2. A particular need exists to strengthen accountability through enhanced transparency in relation to the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments, guided by Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the 2010 Action Plan.
3. A formalised process is required, agreed among all States Parties, that clarifies the submission and consideration of national reports by all the nuclear-weapon States.
4. As part of this, nuclear-weapon States should present their national reports at NPT meetings, and engage in interactive discussions on them.
5. The content of their national reports should include standardised and comparable information, with specific criteria to be considered among States Parties at the forthcoming Review Conference.

In order to agree on concrete measures on transparency and accountability at next year's Review Conference, we urge the President-designate of the Review Conference and all States Parties to prioritise this issue, including through dedicating time at the Review Conference to consider this issue, and to develop a forward-looking decision, or decisions, on transparency and accountability.

Joint Statement on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Conflict delivered by Philippines: NPT 3rd Preparatory Committee

[9 May 2025]

Delivered on behalf of: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Benin, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the Philippines.

I am taking the floor on behalf of 35 State parties. Building on our joint statement at the 2nd Preparatory Committee of the Non-proliferation Treaty, as part of our overall goal of nuclear disarmament, we reaffirm our commitment to reducing the risk of nuclear conflict, in paving the way towards disarmament.

Risk reduction is in no way a substitute for nuclear disarmament, nor should it in any way detract from efforts towards disarmament. To the contrary, pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, risk

reduction goes hand in hand with the need to realize Article VI goals and contributes to our enduring interest in the prevention of nuclear war.

Avoiding escalation and reducing risks of nuclear weapons use is a matter of urgency in the current deteriorating security environment.

While pursuing nuclear disarmament-related goals under the NPT and respecting legitimate interests of non-nuclear weapon states, nuclear weapon States bear the primary responsibility in preventing nuclear conflict. Additional efforts by nuclear weapon States in this regard include measures to enhance trust, promote transparency, and advance nuclear disarmament. At the same time, all NPT States Parties must play an active role in promoting nuclear disarmament and contributing to reducing risks of nuclear weapon use.

NPT States Parties have long recognized the importance of reducing the risks of nuclear conflict. Indeed, the preamble to the NPT opens with the words "considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to avert the danger of such war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples." Furthermore, States Parties called for measures to minimize the risk that nuclear weapons are ever used in both the 2000 NPT Practical Steps and the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

Reducing the risks of nuclear conflict and arms races and promoting further progress in nuclear disarmament are our immediate objectives. We seek to support the urgent development of concrete, credible, and practical measures that could reduce the risk of nuclear weapon use, and move States from dialogue to action, from proposals to implementation. This should be an objective of all nuclear weapon States.

All nuclear weapon States have in the recent past highlighted the need to pursue strategic risk reduction measures and substantive bilateral and multilateral dialogues on the subject, as evidenced by the 2022 Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races and the strategic risk reduction working paper submitted by the nuclear-weapon States in 2021.

There is a rich tradition of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral risk reduction measures, ranging from transparency and communication, restraint on doctrines and deployment, to negative security assurances and negotiations on nuclear arms control and disarmament. These measures have helped to prevent nuclear war for decades, and we need to ensure they are being implemented by all relevant actors today.

We simultaneously reaffirm our unwavering commitment to implementing Article VI of the NPT and continued efforts towards nuclear disarmament, including through reciprocal and verifiable agreements, with a view to promoting international peace and security.

As the UN Secretary General has emphasized on multiple occasions, the risk of nuclear conflict is rising. The case has never been clearer for concrete action. At this juncture, we stress the consequent need to make every effort towards reducing the risk of nuclear conflict and encourage the next Review Conference to incite States Parties to consider this issue. We stand ready to work with States Parties to find common ground in this regard.

Joint Statement on New START delivered by Austria: NPT 3rd Preparatory Committee

[9 May 2025]

I take the floor on behalf of Cambodia, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, San Marino, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste and my own country, Austria.

As we all know, the NPT does not exist or operate in a vacuum. Our deliberations in this review process must be aimed at reaching the same destination: a world without nuclear weapons.

The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) is set to expire on 6 February 2026.

This Treaty, which entered into force on February 5, 2011, in its preamble makes very clear reference to both sides "commitment to the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" and "to the achievement of the historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat".

Building on prior arms control treaties and agreements, the New START Treaty serves an important stabilizing role as well as a major confidence building measure. This in particular through its successful setting and the subsequent achievement of limits on deployed strategic nuclear arsenals since February 5, 2018.

Current high tensions underscore the need for urgent progress on nuclear disarmament, including by a return to arms control and their risk reduction, trust-building and stabilizing functions.

It is therefore urgent to preserve and achieve further reductions and limitations of deployed strategic nuclear arsenals. We emphasize that it is in the interest of all States' security that the New START Treaty is fully implemented and that further reductions and limitations of deployed strategic nuclear arsenals are achieved. Furthermore, it is in the interest of the NPT.

In light of this and the rapidly approaching expiration of the New START Treaty, we therefore call for the urgent commencement of negotiations for a successor agreement and call for a return to full and mutual compliance with the limits set by the Treaty until such time as a successor pact is concluded in order to secure the achievements of the New START Treaty before its expiry and to achieve further progress on the limits on and reductions of deployed strategic nuclear arsenals. We urge both parties to the Treaty to spare no efforts in this regard and the rest of the States Parties of the NPT should be fully supportive.

We would welcome all relevant efforts and transparency in this regard and stand ready to assist or facilitate dialogue to enable progress.