
What to expect from DPRK on Jan. 1, 2020

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What's next for North Korea's nuclear program



Roll back or speed up

DPRK nuclear weapon program

Governs size of arsenal Governs threat arsenal poses

Bomb-grade Pu or HEU

Governs sophistication of arsenal arsenal poses

Delivery system

- Most difficult part
- •Reactors (Pu) or enrichment (HEU)

Hydrogen bombs

- Tritium
- Deuterium
- Li-6D

- Physics, computers
- High explosives
- Detonators
- Initiators
- Machining
- Assembly
- Explosives tests
- Arming, fuzing, firing
- Nuclear testing

- Plane
- Boat
- •Van
- Missile

Nuclear Capability	November 2019 (Rough estimates)
Plutonium	25 - 48 kg
HEU (highly uncertain)	~450 - 700 kg
Tritium	Very limited
Nuclear devices (sufficient material)	~38 (20 to 60)
Nuclear device deliverable by SCUD & Nodong missiles Progress on solid-fueled missiles (KN-23, KN-24 and PK-3)	Yes Likely can reach all of ROK and most of Japan New conventional MRL's
Nuclear device deliverable by IRBMs & ICBMs	Hwasong-12, 14, 15 Not yet military useful. Need more tests

What's next for North Korea's nuclear program? Roll back Speed up

- Stop Pu/tritium production
 - Kill 5MWe reactor
 - Don't start ELWR allow visit
 - Allow IRT-2000 visit
 - Freeze tritium separation visit
- Halt YB centrifuge facility visit
 - Halt U conversion and fluorination
 - Allow visits to all YB facilities
- Allow visit to Kangson suspect site
- Punggye-ri test site allow visit
- Sohae launch site allow visit
- Written ICBM no-launch agreement
- Agree to no solid-motor rocket tests
- Destroy 5 or so ICBMs
- Destroy 5 or so large TELs

- Resume Pu/tritium production
 - Restart 5MWe reactor
 - Start ELWR
 - Perhaps build new 50MWe G-G reactor
 - Restart IRT-2000 with own fuel
- Complete tritium extraction facility
- Continue operating all centrifuge facilities
- Reopen two P-ri nuclear test tunnels
 - Prepare for more nuclear tests
- Continue solid-motor missile launches
- Deploy KN-23 and KN-24 nuclear missiles
- Continue Pk-3 tests, including sub-launch
- Conduct full trajectory ICBM launches

- Agree to discuss declaration

What's next for North Korea's nuclear program? DPRK's political strategy?

Roll back

- Time to make a deal
- Make economic gains while Trump is in office

Speed up

- Speed up now, deal later
- Gain future negotiating advantage during time of DC turmoil

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Moscow conference – Nov. 7-9, 2019

- Need confidence building
- Doing our best. Actions can't be unilateral. We have taken steps.
- Everything is on the table, willing to move forward.

- US fields hostile forces in spite of our suspensions
- Outrageous to pressure DPRK and ask it to surrender
- Problem is not DPRK nukes, but US hostile policies

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Choson Sinbo – Nov. 13, 2019

- Pyongyang warns again on "Byungjin" revival
- DPRK prepared to take new path