U.S.-Soviet Cooperation on PNEs
The Short and Winding Road from the LTBT to the NPT

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by Paul Warnke

Presentation roadmap

Conceptual framework

1. Bureaucratic interests and the shaping of national PNE policy
   a. Compartmentalization of issues
   b. State/ACDA vs. AEC

2. Establishing a hierarchy of interests
   a. Interagency agreement and coordination

3. Importance of institutional advocates for cooperation

Chronology

1. Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963)

2. Nonproliferation and the ENDC (1965-1968)

3. The NPT and Article V (1968)

# U.S and Soviet PNE programs: an overview

Figure 1: Map of the former Soviet Union showing the geographic location of the 122 PNE sites. Sites of multiple explosions are indicated by a letter as described in the legend.

- **U.S. -- Project Plowshare** (1957-1977)
  - Established by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
  - International focus: selling Plowshare services abroad
- **Soviet -- Program No.7 - Nuclear Explosions for the National Economy** (mid 1960s-1989)
  - Extensive industrial use at home

LTBT: Trying to preserve Plowshare under a test ban

Cast of characters

Glenn Seaborg

William Foster

Adrian Fisher

1. AEC and Seaborg wanted to maintain flexibility for Plowshare through PNE exemption under test ban.

2. ACDA officials and SecState Dean Rusk
   a. PNE exception would diminish importance of test ban and would be rejected by Soviets.

   b. Would require elaborate inspection procedures.

LTBT negotiations: Plowshare turns into a bargaining chip

- Last two points of contention in LTBT negotiations
  - PNEs and withdrawal clause

- Soviets argued that PNE exemption would minimize political value and global appeal of LTBT

- Harriman decided to trade PNE provision for formal withdrawal framework
  - Recognized Plowshare was infant program with uncertain future
  - Should not scuttle the treaty

ARTICLE II (Soviets oppose entire article. U.S./U.K.

Delegation prepared to drop if Soviets accept Article III.)

EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES

The explosion of any nuclear device for peaceful purposes which would take place in any of the environments described, or would have the effect proscribed, in paragraph 1 of Article I may be conducted only: (1) if unanimously agreed to by the original Parties; or (2) if carried out in accordance with an Annex hereto, which Annex shall constitute an integral part of this Treaty.

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ARTICLE III

WITHDRAWAL

(Soviet Version)

Soviet   If U.S./U.K. accept this

Harriman asks approval of this/version: version, Soviets will

agree to include it in Treaty on condition we drop Peaceful Purposes Article.

Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary circumstances have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

LTBT takeaways

1. Bureaucratic interests can shape policy as much as the broader national interest, which can either preclude or foster cooperation with Russia

2. Synthesis of competing bureaucratic interests into national policy can lead to confused, inconsistent positions in negotiations

3. Bureaucracies and compartmentalization of issues
   a. Tendency to view problems discreetly, without reference to broader context and implications for national policy

The beginning of U.S.-Soviet PNE cooperation

Khrushchev and Harriman

Bureaucratic alignment and PNE cooperation in NPT

- International PNE service for NNWS and Soviet buy-in
  - AEC: economic lifeline
  - State Dept: source of linkage with Soviet Union
  - ACDA: Strengthen emerging NPT

Lessons for Today

1. Institutional decay and lack of coordination in U.S govt
   a. No advocate for arms control and strategic stability
   b. Gottemoeller + Sherman ➡ Ford + Bolton
   c. Military confrontation over political solutions

2. Congressional vacuum for arms control
   a. Lack of expertise and involvement
   b. Humphrey + Fulbright ➡ Cotton