



## **Four Emerging Issues in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation: Opportunities for German Leadership**

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**Speakers:** Hon. Gernot Erler (GE), Leonard Spector (LS), Markus Ederer (ME), Miles Pomper (MP)

**LS:** Let me welcome you this morning to our event. I'm Leonard Spector. I'm the director of the Washington, D.C. office of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, which is part of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. As many of you know, our headquarters is in Monterey, California, and the larger portion of the James Martin Center, about thirty of us, are out there, and then I direct the Washington office which has 10 colleagues operating here in town.

We're very privileged this morning to host, on behalf of the Federal Foreign Office of the Republic of Germany, and to present our distinguished guest and keynote speaker, Minister Gernot Erler. I will spend a few moments setting the stage and then I'll introduce our speaker and say a little bit along the way about the order of the morning's events.

In the field of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, Germany stands in a unique position, which provides opportunities for it to stand in a special, bridging role among countries that take sharply different views in these fields. It is a staunch U.S. ally, but it has close ties to Russia. It is a non-nuclear-weapon state with a strong commitment to disarmament, but it's also a leading member of NATO. It derives protection from the U.S. nuclear umbrella and is understood to house U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory. It's an economic powerhouse and has imposed some pretty strong sanctions against Iran but, is a long-time trading partner with that country and has also had the opportunity to serve as an important broker in the discussions of the EU three and the P-5 plus one. In multilateral fora, as we will see, Germany has introduced numerous initiatives in support of disarmament and nonproliferation objectives, and really has used its position to be quite innovative. I won't be able to go into every detail, but you'll see in the report that we've done, which I'll come to in just a second, there is a whole section dealing with the numerous and very far-ranging initiatives that the German government has been pursuing in various fora.

A number of months ago, the policy planning staff of the German Federal Foreign Office asked the James Martin Center to examine four issues within the fields of nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament and to offer recommendations on ways in which Germany might further advance these agendas. We completed the study several weeks ago, in mid-June and we are very gratified that our work has received active attention within the Foreign Office.



This morning, we'll begin with a presentation by Minister Erler, reviewing Germany's efforts in these various areas, and then I will say a few words regarding our study, and actually a few slides, so it'll go on beyond a few words. And we're distributing that here and it's also available on our website. We'll save questions and answers on both presentations until after my remarks, when we'll all be able to respond to your comments.

In this regard, let me introduce Mr. Markus Ederer, Director of Policy Planning for the German Federal Foreign Office and my colleague, Miles Pomper, who is one of the authors of the study and who will be able to provide some detailed responses on a number of the areas that are under discussion.

Let me now introduce Minister of State Gernot Erler. He has been Minister of State at the German Federal Foreign Office since November 2005 and prior to his current position, he served as Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Group of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the German Bundestag, where he has served in that capacity since 1998, but he has been a member of the Bundestag since 1987, so he has a very long and distinguished career in the German Parliament. As a member of the Bundestag, he has held various political positions within the party caucus. He has written and published extensively on world politics, including on issues of Russia and Eastern Europe. His latest book, which I will only give the title of in English, *Russia is Coming--Putin's Country: The Fight for Power and Modernization*, is recently published. He has also written *Global Monopoly: World Politics After the End of the Soviet Union*. He has received a Ph.D. in history, Slavic languages, and political science from the Universities of Berlin and Freiburg. And I believe you represent the Freiburg district in Parliament -- is that correct? [Agreement]. He has been meeting in Washington on not just our issue, but his portfolio includes some other small problems like climate change and some other global issues and he's had the opportunity on the proliferation front and arms control front to have discussions with Ellen Tauscher, who relinquished her parliamentary position to go into the administration. And you have this situation, which is unusual for the United States of straddling both, so we're very interested in hearing your remarks. Without further ado, please join me in welcoming Minister Gernot Erler.

[Applause].

**GE:** Yes. Ladies and Gentlemen, I am grateful to CNS for giving me the opportunity to talk here and watching about Germany's nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation policy. The occasion is the presentation of a new CNS study, carried out on behalf of the policy planning staff at the Federal Foreign Office.

For some considerable time now, Germany has been playing a leading role in disarmament and arms control. It was tough in the past few years, for many believed this was yesterday's issue. But quicker than we could ever have expected, it became a pressing issue of today and tomorrow. This is with thanks, in particular, to the American 'Gang of Four,' whose appeals for a "world free of nuclear weapons" refocused the world's attention on nuclear disarmament and in



Germany, Richard von Weizsäcker, Helmut Schmidt, Hans Dietrich Genscher, and Egon Bahr -- that's our 'Gang of Four.' Germany publically supported this vision.

President Obama's Prague speech showed that the U.S. administration also shares this perception. Global zero may look like a distant vision, like the cloud-covered summit of a high mountain you want to climb. But we know the direction and we can recognize the way and the stations ahead for quite a distance. What matters now, however, are the next steps.

The most important step in the right direction, at present, is the successful conclusion of the negotiation on a follow-on agreement to START by the end of this year. The joint understanding on lowering the limits on strategic warheads and delivery systems by a third compared to the current limits, which was signed by the two presidents at the U.S.-Russian summit in Moscow at the start of the month, gives cause for hope. Success here would have a big impact on the nonproliferation review conference next year. For only if we can find a balance between greatly reduced nuclear weapon stockpiles and enhanced nonproliferation instruments, can the Nonproliferation Treaty fulfill its role as the centerpiece of a functional nonproliferation regime.

This will also require measures, which counter the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation even more effectively. We have to strengthen the IAEA in its role as a verification body and make the Additional Protocol the verification standard. Only on this basis can adequate monitoring of treaty compliance be guaranteed. To date, 91 states have concluded and put into force the Additional Protocol. That is not nearly enough. In this connection, we also want to improve implementation of Resolution 1540, adopted during Germany's Security Council Presidency, to strengthen international export controls and to prevent terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. Germany will hold a G-8 experts workshop on this issue this September. We want to identify concrete measures and areas such as capacity-building, and expert networks, which can help the G-8 foster implementation of Resolution 1540.

Despite the positive signs that the nonproliferation regime has been strengthened, it's impossible to ignore the risks facing the regime, in particular the provocative nuclear and missile tests carried out by North Korea and Iran's failure to cooperate on its nuclear program. These two countries must not be allowed to flagrantly violate international law or violate international stability. In particular, if Iran should manage to acquire the know-how to build nuclear weapons, a nuclear arms race could develop in the Middle East, with unforeseeable risks to world peace. The German government therefore agrees with President Obama's dual approach on Iran. Even after the violence perpetrated by those in power against opposition, he is upholding his offer of negotiations with the EU three plus three while strengthening the united international front on tougher sanctions and isolation of the Iranian regime should it continue to refuse to cooperate. Germany is firmly opposed to military action, for we believe it wouldn't discourage Iran, but could become an explosive force in the whole Middle East.

A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would greatly help overcome the resistance of many non-aligned states, partly in solidarity with Iran, to any attempts to counter the proliferation risks



of the civilian use of nuclear energy. Such a treaty would not only hugely strengthen nuclear disarmament, but also make it easier for states to refrain from acquiring enrichment technology, for it would dispel the impression that there is a two-class society. The German government therefore believes that the adoption of a program of work at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, which ended a ten years' deadlock, offers a great opportunity--for this program will allow us to start negotiations on a verifiable FMCT.

Progress in the negotiations on an FMCT would certainly also help to overcome the skepticism of many states towards the various proposals on the modernization of the nuclear fuel cycle. The IAEA Board of Governors meeting in June showed how strong this skepticism is. The key element in the multilateral sphere is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. President Obama's commitment to achieve Senate consent to the CTBT and to work for ratification by other key states has raised new hope that this important building block of international arms control architecture can finally enter into force.

Along with some other Alliance partners, Germany is keen to involve NATO more in the nuclear disarmament efforts. The necessary discussion on NATO's new strategic concept presents us with an opportunity to consider the changing role of deterrence. I am not talking about giving it up. For what purpose, at what point in time, and under what circumstances nuclear weapons should be used must be examined critically. What's more, the issue of downgrading nuclear weapons with the military and security strategies should be looked at. As a non-nuclear-weapon state, and relying on the nuclear protection of the U.S., Germany supports President Obama's position that deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons should perhaps be made the sole objective of the nuclear strategy. We would welcome it if this approach were to be included in the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review. It would most certainly have an impact on the NATO consultations on the new strategic concept.

For many years now, the Federal Foreign Office's Annual Disarmament Report has called for sub-strategic nuclear weapons to be abolished. I am aware that this issue is more complex than it appears at first. This is partly due to the asymmetry in the arsenals and their range as well as the supposed protection they provide against conventional superiority. In military terms, sub-strategic nuclear weapons don't make sense anymore. However, they are of great symbolic importance, especially for those NATO states, which feel threatened and rely on American protection. Against this background, I believe that gradual reduction and elimination would be best. The announcement at the Moscow Summit that work is to begin next year on a broader agreement, with greater reductions in their nuclear arsenals with a view towards leading the world towards the abolition of all nuclear weapons could in Germany's view also open up the prospect of including tactical nuclear weapons into the U.S.-Russian talks following the successful conclusion of a follow-on agreement to START.

Let me conclude with some remarks on the link between nuclear and conventional disarmament. If we really want to achieve 'global zero,' we will also have to resolve some paradoxes. The less nuclear weapons the world has, the more important conventional weapons will become. This is



true for the U.S., which is only prepared to give up its nuclear weapons if its conventional superiority can guarantee its security. And, it's all the more true for the other nuclear weapon states, which already have a much smaller arsenal of conventional weapons and regard nuclear weapons as compensation for this. Thus, there is the danger that they will see 'global zero' as a weakening of their own position and as a means for America to attain absolute superiority.

It's therefore crucial to find ways of shaping American superiority, in such a way that it's not perceived by the others as a threat. Conventional arms control in Europe illustrates what solutions are possible. Russia considers tactical nuclear weapons as compensation for NATO's conventional superiority. If we want to persuade Russia to reduce its tactical nuclear weapons arsenal, we will have to preserve the substance of the CFE regime, while at the same time adapting it to the changing security situation. For not only have the risks shifted from strategic to regional conflicts, the organization and equipping of the armed forces have also changed.

Ladies and gentlemen, the year 2009 offers great opportunities for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. The conditions and constellations for this have rarely been more favorable. Let us do everything in our power to seize the opportunities offered in 2009 in an optimal fashion. Let us work together to ensure that this year of change doesn't become a year of missed opportunities. Thank you very much for your attention.

[Applause]

**LS:** Good. Now I think our microphone is on. Good. Thank you for those very thoughtful remarks and I was gratified that some of the remarks I'll be making are not so dissimilar, perhaps because we've actually been working together on some of these common themes. As I mentioned earlier, a number of months ago, we were asked to take a look at four issues in the fields of arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament, to try to look at them both from an American perspective, with an appreciation for what was changing here, and also with an appreciation of Germany's interests and how it might augment its profile in this area and be more influential still and develop some new, innovative approaches. It was quite an unusual assignment and one that we were very pleased to have and to work with.

The first topic on the list was mentioned just a moment ago, which is, how do you manage the overhang of U.S. conventional military power, which is really preeminent now in the world, by any measure, as we move to lower levels of nuclear weapons? And what I thought was -- I'll say in a moment -- what was particularly prescient is that this is one of the first occasions in which this issue has been raised that we're aware of. It's come up in an occasional comment. I know that Christopher Ford made a comment a year ago at the U.N., but by and large this issue has not been a part of the discussion in getting to 'global zero,' and I think it's commendable that the German government has been ready to think about this issue and put it on the agenda now, so I'll talk to that a bit more substantively in a moment. We're also looking at how Germany might advance these agendas within NATO and examining U.S. missile defenses and Russian concerns since this is very much a European issue as well as a U.S.-Russian concern. And finally, looking





at the tactical nuclear weapon issue which is -- I think all of these are rather fraught questions, but that one proved to be particularly so within our group, as I'll explain.

Although the United States has been recognized since the end of the Cold War as the preeminent conventional military power, arms control officials are only now beginning to get into this area. The topic has enormous breadth and of course we only had a few months to work a study on the subject. So our goal was -- we knew we could not go into every weapon system, how to make it appear less threatening, and go across the entire spectrum of U.S. military force, but we thought we could at least introduce a style of thinking about the problem. We tried to do this and the first point that we observed, which is not news except if you can see it in this continuum, is that the problem of U.S. conventional capabilities and NATO conventional capabilities is already impinging on the question of nuclear reductions and stability in at least three areas. One is missile defenses, which we know [an issue that] is affecting the START follow-on treaty. It may not interfere with the immediate follow-on to the treaty, although it still may. But certainly, it will impact later on as we go to further reductions. NATO conventional force reductions, as was mentioned, do affect possible reductions in Russian theater nuclear weapons, so again you have this impinging of the conventional on the nuclear. And then conventional Trident, I don't think there's a specific Russian response, but it certainly has raised the issue of crisis stability, which cause great concern and actually led the United States to hold back from funding this particular element of our arsenal.

The difficulty is that as we think about how to shape the conventional capabilities, the problem is, we're also going to be reducing our own nuclear forces and to sell that to the Congress and to the public, it becomes necessary to reinforce how powerful this is to a domestic audience, how powerful our conventional capabilities are. So the more we emphasize this and promote it and brandish it as a possible substitute for nuclear reductions, the more outsiders such as China or Russia are going to have concerns about whether it is wise for them, facing this conventional juggernaut, to reduce their own nuclear arsenals. And of course the problem gets worse and worse as the arsenals might come down.

In our view, the way to try to manage this is to pay attention to how our conventional forces are unfolding and to try to shape them in a way that will at least reduce their profile and make it more reassuring rather than more threatening. As was said earlier, we are already in the process of doing this. We are using voluntary restraints to deal with the near-term challenges, and the way we deal with these can be models for the future. We are using voluntary restraints such as not building, at least at the moment, conventional Trident. We are accepting numerical limitations through CFE and perhaps on the number of launchers for missile defense in Poland. We have keep-out zones and special structures regarding deployment of forces, both in CFE and potentially in other areas we discuss in the paper for the future and then there are various technical restrictions that can be adopted. One that is under discussion now is to tweak the conventional capabilities of the Czech radar so that it doesn't provide any visibility regarding Russian activities.



So for Germany, we thought the particular role on this item was -- for the longer term, I just wanted to stress this, this is where we tried to develop a vision as to how you'd go about shaping the U.S. conventional capability. And we thought these five items -- strategic goals, military doctrine, deployments, military acquisitions, and secrecy -- were key areas to work on. It is important that we make clear our strategic goal is collaborative and cooperative and is not a goal of domination or hegemony. Military doctrine: we should be emphasizing defensive postures, not preemption and so forth. And the sense was that, as we begin to do this today, with respect to specific issues we can adopt a style of thinking about these questions as we move forward and have to imagine new conventional capabilities and postures and the rest, always trying to keep an eye on the impact of these on the nuclear issue. So, for Germany, we thought the most important near-term activity was a rather direct one, and it was to keep a focus on these issues. This is the first time the issue has really been raised publicly by a national government and we think pushing this forward is very desirable, even if all we're doing is setting the stage for more serious discussions later on. Highlighting potential solutions from current models and then we would urge further study of this by the United States and certainly by NATO in coming years.

Second topic [is] dealing with nuclear restraints, Germany and NATO. We had the particular focus on five areas which we thought were the ones with perhaps the most importance: the NPT, CTBT, Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, Nuclear Disarmament, and the Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, and I do not have three slides on each bullet. I have one slide on all of the bullets so don't get worried. [Laughter].

With the CTBT, we thought there was a very important role here for Germany, working especially with NATO as the examination of the new strategic concept goes on. And we thought here it was particularly important to re-cement and reiterate the importance of the CTBT to NATO. This was off the agenda, as we know, during the Bush years. It is now back on the American agenda and it's very important to have it reflected back into the United States from NATO. In particular, we thought it was especially important that we try to see if NATO could make a rather clear statement that it does not feel that extended deterrence will be infringed or impinged upon by virtue of the CTBT. This is definitely going to be an argument; it's already an argument in the Senate and to hear from that our principal allies believe we're better off with the CTBT and with some barely discernible uncertainties regarding the reliability of the deterrent, that as far as NATO is concerned, the tradeoff should be in favor of the CTBT.

On some of the others, there were a variety of recommendations that come together under the fissile material proposals. Certainly a workshop on multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle would be very timely. Germany has one of the most original proposals in this area and is particularly attentive to the interests and participation of potential customers whereas some of the others are top-down. The German proposal is more from the bottom up, so it's quite interesting and novel.

We also thought it would be important for Germany to really play a substantial role in the FMCT negotiations. Germany as knowledgeable about enrichment and reprocessing given its civilian



nuclear history, could play a very significant role in developing verification techniques and so we thought it would be very valuable for it to share a meeting or conference of experts perhaps after the next meeting of the first committee on the U.N. to begin looking at this in earnest.

And then, NATO can be included by taking advantage of some of its NATO science programs, where you might involve not only NATO members, but also members of the Partnership For Peace to look at these issues. We seem to have a great interest in conferences here, but each of these topics is one where Germany does have a special role to play and can be a very valuable convening player. This is such an important area. It's how do you move from nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, to conventional extended deterrence? So you have two jobs to do here. One is to make sure that the reassurance to NATO members and to other security partners is sustained, but at the same time trying to be mindful that if you look too powerful in this area, it has a reverberation on the nuclear postures of other countries. There was also a very interesting proposal Germany had previously introduced of a nuclear weapons register. This is very timely now as we try to bring transparency measures to the area of sub-strategic nuclear weapons. And finally, there is a need for work on the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone and here the thought was to work behind the scenes. The regional states really aren't ready for a big, public discussion like the ACRS Talks, but much work can be done to find areas of common interest and to really identify some of the major impediments apart from the overall peace process, which we know is very central.

Turning to the third study, here much of our work was similar to analyses one is seeing now about the need to try to engage Russia in a variety of fashions, on assessing the Iranian ballistic missile defense threat, reengaging the Russian-NATO engagement on theater missile defenses, pursuing the Putin initiative to use the Russian radars. All of these things are now in place and we certainly support them. We would also say, implement the Bush proposals for the various restraint and transparency measures that were suggested but what I think we brought to the table that was quite new was a work by Dennis Gormley, who is one of the leading experts on cruise missile proliferation, and who believed that the focus on missile defenses in Europe currently is not attentive enough to the cruise missile threat. The Iranians are building quite substantial capabilities. These could be launched from merchant vessels and can really pose a very direct threat not only to Southern Europe the way some of the current ballistic missiles can, but really to all of Europe. There are elements that are in place now, such as the cooperative airspace initiative along the NATO-Russian border and the air sovereignty centers in Eastern Europe. I was not familiar with these until Dennis explained them to us. That could be very, very valuable.

By the way, the authors of this paper were Miles Pomper, Dennis Gormley, and Nikolai Sokov. The paper on the various arms control initiatives with NATO was Patricia Lewis, and I did the initial paper on the conventional and the nuclear tradeoffs.

As for missile defense initiatives, again here there is a very big role for NATO. And Germany within NATO can encourage very specific policies. One is to reinvigorate and really begin pursuing the NATO strategy, which was the active layered theater missile defense system. And





then, the way Obama is sort of suggesting, hold back a little bit on discussions regarding a more elaborate defense against long-range systems. A particularly interesting idea that came into our group was the idea of trying to get a counterpart to the planning group to address defenses. If, and we're not recommending it in the final paper, but if we reach a point where nuclear weapons are removed from Europe, one of the reasons for the Nuclear Planning Group, I won't say evaporates, but the concrete reason for meeting on these very important strategic issues is no longer quite as salient as it would be as long as the U.S. nuclear weapons are present. So it may be valuable to establish a complementary group of perhaps similar importance, looking at defense issues. Finally, I'd say here we wanted to recommend really reinforcing and reinvigorating the missile technology control regime and the HCOC. As an important player in both of these areas, Germany has important opportunities to contribute.

Let me just get to the final paper. This was on tactical nuclear weapons. Here we had a division of views within the Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Although none of these represent institutional positions, they were the consensus for all of the papers of the group that worked on them. We started out at loggerheads, but Nikolai Sokov, who is the ultimate author of this paper, did slowly but surely persuade us as to what the real dynamics were. There are certainly divisions within NATO as what we want to do with these theater nuclear weapons and what role they're going to play, but within Russia in a sense, there's more of a hardline consensus that these weapons are here to stay. They have an important role to play. They shouldn't be traded away in any numbers simply because of the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from NATO.

And Nikolai pounded away at this point and eventually you saw all of these bureaucratic players in the military, in the defense ministry, and others who really see no reason for changing Russia's posture with regard to these weapons. And so, we began to look for ways to get this process moving. There are these weapons -- the last three bullets, the U.S. is part of this -- where there's a sense that some of the longer range sub-strategic weapons are still playing a role in nuclear strategy of both countries, Russia and the U.S. We want them, at least the sub-launched cruise missiles, for a potential nuclear umbrella against Japan and also the Russians, I think, are more interested in the sub-launch cruise missiles as a counter to the U.S. Navy, but also the medium-range bombers and air-delivered weapons as a counter to what they perceive as the encroachment of NATO. So, these weapons are a bit more salient, even though, from the U.S. perspective, many of them are not really seen as having much of a military role. As we work through the problem, I think we agreed with what we're hearing a lot of, that it's important to start with the transparency package to try to understand how many weapons there are out there and try to get their arms around that. And then you might set the stage for a more comprehensive treaty later on. As I was suggesting, only the short-range theater nuclear weapons -- this is a new point that I hadn't appreciated -- are likely to be the ones that could be part of a reduction process.

But how do we shake up Russian intransigence? And here we came up with two initiatives -- they're not brand new, but I think seeing them in this context is -- one was to speak about the



grand bargain, which is to seek concessions on TNW as we also work the CFE problem. And I think it's been very interesting to hear about. We just had a luncheon yesterday that Minister Erler and I participated in that was on the calendar, so to speak. The calendar is, START follow-on and then the subsequent nuclear discussions maybe including tactical nuclear weapons, but you need an intermediate effort and that's got to be on the CFE treaty if you're going to have some movement on the TNW. So our sense was, you almost want to have a separate negotiation where those two items are discussed and make sure there's some horse-trading that's accomplished. Maybe you also do that with missile defenses. Then, the other idea was possibly to withdraw theater nuclear weapons, but retain the infrastructure. That is, to withdraw ours from Europe to put it to the Russians -- "You're sitting on these, you're not doing anything. Here we're making a very important gesture. We expect a response." -- to see if we can at least get something going by way of changes in attitude and starting the process. This is a very fraught issue, obviously.

There are divisions in NATO about what to do with these existing weapons, but Nikolai made a point which we all thought carried some weight, which is, already the U.S. is withdrawing these weapons from Europe. It's being done quietly. We're not getting any political credit for it in the discussions with Russia. If we are going to continue this process, we might want to do it more openly with an open discussion and really try to see if we can't extract something from the Russians in return, which would be a starting of the process, not actual reductions, given what we understand the dynamics to be. So, that was the final point we wanted to make. These issues are now being digested and discussed in Germany, we hope, and it's been a very gratifying experience for us to work with our German colleagues. In my personal case, I'm not a European security specialist, so being able to contribute to this particular study, and to appreciate the dynamics of what is happening has been extremely rewarding. We found this a very, very exciting collaboration. So, thank you. And now, if my colleagues will return, we can take some questions and answers.

[Applause].

**LS:** Greg, why don't you identify yourself for those to whom you're not known?

**Q:** Greg Thielman, Arms Control Association. [German] Foreign Minister [Frank-Walter] Steinmeier has advocated the withdrawal of U.S. tactical, or sub-strategic, nuclear weapons from Germany. Could you give us any more specifics, Mr. Erler, on how he was worked toward that objective? Has he raised it, for example, with Secretary Clinton?

**GE:** You are right that Minister Steinmeier has raised this issue in the past, but we are now, as you know, in the pre-election campaign in Germany, and I don't expect to have this issue as a more important one in the campaigning. We are aware that there is a broader context. I think what we just have heard about reports, everybody can understand that we need a very comprehensive approach to combine the different reductions of theater missiles, of strategic missiles, and there's also a combination with the conventional arms reductions.



I think we are all aware that it's impossible to take only one of these points out and to address this one point and, of course, our ministers are also aware about this. Sometimes it becomes a matter of public discussion and public disputes in Germany. That's unavoidable, but my prediction is that we have now a new chance with the activities of the American president, with also the Moscow visit, and we are patient enough to wait for the most important, and that is the success with the START follow-up in the moment. That is what we need as a momentum for a new, comprehensive disarmament process and, in that context, of course, we expect a moment where we can raise again the question of the withdrawal of these weaponry.

**ME:** If I may add, this was exactly the reason why we gave this task also to CNS, because we felt that the discussion in Germany is not entirely informed about the "bus stops" on the way to reducing tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. So we asked CNS to identify the issues such as: lack of transparency, a much larger amount of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, the Russian fears that if they give away the tactical nuclear weapons that what is left is NATO superiority on the continent, fears by allies who feel that tactical nuclear weapons on their soil are part of extended deterrence, and how to deal with that. So I believe that the study really helps us, also in the public arena for future discussions to make clear on how we get there. I am grateful to CNS for also having made some proposals on how to get there.

There are two proposals. One is having a transparency package and then maybe a tradeoff between CFE and the tactical nuclear weapons issue. Two is a more one-sided approach by which the U.S steps forward, reduces, gets credit, and tries to put moral pressure on the other side. These things need to be discussed and we want an informed discussion on both sides of the Atlantic. I can say that this was the idea behind all these studies. But for this one it's particularly true. It's going to be an issue after the follow on START success, as we all hope, and it needs to be dealt with intellectually and planning now. This is why we are grateful to CNS for having put forward such sensitive proposals here.

**MP:** I'd also like to add. These gentlemen probably can't say this as professional diplomats, but the foreign minister made it very clear that he was speaking as a candidate for chancellor not as a foreign ministry position. There is a coalition government right now in Germany and the other element in that coalition has not expressed support for withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons, so you have to take it in that context.

**ME:** Unfortunately, I have to correct you a little bit, Miles; it is a German position that we want a gradual withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Germany. It comes up in the disarmament report every year and this report is an agreed document within the government, which means that the other side of the coalition, in this case the defense ministry, is involved in formulating in particular such sensitive passages of the report. So it goes a little bit beyond what you say, Miles. I admit that the foreign minister has been more vocal on these issues than other members of the government. I fully agree with that.



**LS:** I'll just add that, as you listen to these different items in the discussion, the tradeoffs among them are very complex. It's almost like scheduling an airline where you have to get the passengers, slots in the hangars, the gates, and the staff all aligned together because withdrawal of TNW leaves Turkey and the Baltic States and Eastern Europe anxious, but they might be reassured by the more powerful missile defenses. But if you do missile defenses, then you have a cascade with everyone elsewhere. The same is true about where forces are deployed under CFE. Some deployments are more reassuring for some of those states that might feel a little bit underprotected if the TNW is removed, but some of those deployments might antagonize Russia and so forth. So not only is each of these issues rather complex but the tradeoffs among them and how they should be negotiated is especially difficult.

**Q:** Jerry Livingston. You keep referring to tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Where are they besides Germany? Are we just talking about tactical nuclear weapons in general? If they are elsewhere then what is the state of play with other countries where other tactical nuclear weapons are stationed? And my comment to you Mr. Ederer is that moral pressure for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons may work in the West but I can't imagine that it will work in Russia. I mean Russian public opinion certainly won't exert much moral pressure on the Russian government to destroy its tactical nuclear weapons.

**MP:** There are tactical nuclear weapons in Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey, and Italy. There is a rotating wing in Turkey. You've got about 100-200 gravity bombs stationed there. Outside of Europe, there's SLCMs that are stored for Japan.

**M.E.** I may have been misunderstood if I made you believe that I adopted that approach. I was talking about two different proposals, two options CNS has put forward, which need to be discussed. My personal take is that just because of that linkage--which CNS establishes rightfully in the first study between nuclear and conventional disarmament-- the option, which has been put forward to find an interrelationship between CFE and TNWs might work better than a unilateral approach. My personal take. But I was talking about two options in the study. I was not kind of adopting one.

**MP:** I would add to that. When I was with *Arms Control Today*, Ambassador Kislyak specifically alluded to this possibility in the interview about the link between conventional forces in Europe and tactical nuclear weapons in the negotiations. So it's certainly something the Russians are certainly talking about.

**Q.** [Inaudible] Certainly one can understand the risk involved in dismantling TNWs in Europe. If you have this big message, which is to go to zero. [Inaudible] I ask you, if you were sitting not in Europe, but outside of Europe and you were watching this complex logic of what is useful, what is the symbolic value of this, what is the reaction of Turkey, how would they feel. [Inaudible] It seems that there is no responsibility from taking the only steps [inaudible] there is no European position of doing this in Europe. [Inaudible] The only responsible action would be to take the lead, we get rid of these weapons, and they are not really useful unless one can say that they are



indeed useful. If you say that they are useful then this contradicts the statement that nuclear weapons should be only for deterrence purposes. The point is that, yes one can get into details at the start. The problem here is that what is missing here is the general message. The general message is we want to follow from the general statement of disarmament to concrete conclusions. [Inaudible] Germany has a very important role. [Inaudible]

**GE:** I would like to say some words to that because I think that it's an important question. We have some contradictions. In one way, we see and we have heard today again that there is a huge complexity of the issues. Generally, it would be best to go ahead on a variety of fields together, but obviously that is pragmatically not possible. It makes no sense to do everything at the same time. So far we have to decide what the priority is. We totally share the approach of the American president that the most important thing is now to start negotiations on a follow-up agreement for START because the treaty is expiring on December 5 and there was a long time during which we had no progress on that field strategic nuclear armament and there is a clear linkage between the success of the Review Conference of the NPT in May next year and some progress made with the strategic nuclear armament issue. We have seen how President Ahmadinejad instrumentized [sic] this lack of progress for polemics especially between the NAM [Non Aligned Movement] states and the rest. He always argued that "I am asked to stop my right to use civilian nuclear power, but Article IV is not implemented by the five official nuclear powers. This has worked quite effective and quite dangerous, especially regarding the atmosphere in the whole disarmament community and in the great majority of countries being members of the NPT. This was a real dangerous approach.

What we desperately need is a message that we have serious talks on disarmament and only on that basis, I think we have a real chance to make the Review Conference of the NPT next year in contradiction to the failure and catastrophe of 2005 into a success. So far it's the right priority setting. It is the right priority setting now to concentrate totally on this issue. I think the U.S. President is very brave. If you look at the time schedule till the end of this year, we'll have some results of these talks. For that it was a problem of logics. For that it was needed to separate the issue of missile defense for a moment, but only for a moment, because before Russia has linked these two issues. That was a real threat for any progress for START follow-up negotiations because it was not possible to accept this linkage. In my view, the biggest success of Obama was to separate these two issues. It is not forever, we know that. Of course, missile defense is part of the game, but you cannot go ahead with success if you can't concentrate on one issue at the moment for a couple of months now, and then, of course, we have to come back to this. The only German message [inaudible] is that we are not interested to leave alone the sub-strategic nuclear weaponry. We have the interest to bring that in the right moment, not now, not tomorrow, but after tomorrow. Maybe we will see another phase of talks about strategic nuclear disarmament. That is also acceptable, but our interest is to have a clear schedule for the future and for that schedule there must be a moment where we have a chance to bring in the problems and the questions of theater nuclear weapons. So I think that it's a very complicated process at the moment, but we need to understand that it is the right way to have success. It is the right decision





to concentrate on for the time being until the end of the year exclusively on the follow-up agreement of the START treaty.

**MP:** What the minister has outlined as the German government's position in terms of gradual withdrawals has been happening. Part of this is that there hasn't been credit for what has been done over the years. Even since 2000 a number of withdrawals have taken places from Italy, from Germany, from Britain, and from Greece. [...in secret...] The biggest prize from the arms control point of view and disarmament point of view are the Russian TNWs and we are trying to find ways in which we can leverage cuts in NATO and US arsenals to bring about those cuts.

**Q:** Ingrid Lombardo. I work for a U.S.-China trade consulting company. And China hasn't been mentioned here yet. My main concern is about the European arms embargo to China. My company helps the U.S. trade civilian items with China while not violating export controls. When we look at the EU arms embargo, there are still a lot of dual-use items being traded with China that the U.S. government wouldn't allow. And so I'm wondering, do you see the arms embargo as a problem? I know China is sending a lot of delegations [inaudible] Do you see the arms embargo as becoming less important or more important in the future?

**GE:** You know that the arms embargo started after the Tiananmen Square issue and is related to human rights issues in China. If the moment comes when we are happy with the situation of human rights in China then we will maybe come to a consensus about lifting of the embargo, but that is not the case at the moment. You know that was a decision made by the entire European Union and we need consensus between all 27 countries concerning the lifting of the embargo. These discussions have been started, but without success. If there is no any consensus between all 27 countries to lift the embargo, and this must be seen in the context after these most recent events, it is not very likely that we are prepared to lift the embargo—all the 27 countries.

**Q:** Jonathan Tucker, Monterey Institute for International Studies. One important issue you haven't mentioned upon is NATO expansion, particularly to Ukraine and Georgia. This is obviously a very neuralgic issue for Russia and it ties with some of its security perceptions. And I just wondered if you had discussed the role of NATO enlargement, and, if not, why?

**MP:** We weren't asked to as a part of the study, that's the basic answer.

**Q [Tucker]:** In principle, isn't this one of the key factors affecting the way Russia perceives its security environment?

**MP:** It's certainly one of them. Kosovo is another question. There is this longstanding sense of Russian encirclement that contributes to its threat assessment. It's a whole other set of dynamics. I'm sure the Minister knows better than I do, but for now it's not going to happen, it's been put on hold for a number of years. Whatever damage has been done by the attempt to move in that direction, that's already been done, so there's this question of trying to rectify it.



**ME:** First of all NATO expansion regarding Ukraine and Georgia is at first aggression for NATO itself. The question is, if we open the way for Ukraine and Georgia for membership in NATO, is it an enhancement of security for us, or the opposite? I think that is the most important question in that context. The second question, and you are totally right about NATO expansion, and the colored revolutions, are very important questions for the general political feeling of Germany's important neighbor, Russia. We feel that every day. We know that this political framework is, of course, and this is the message also coming from the report, extremely important for the chances for complete arms reduction with Russia. No doubt that plays a role. But it is not possible to make NATO expansion or the developments in the post-Soviet space a subtitle or a sub-issue for disarmament. I think that the political framework is important on the one hand, and then we have the disarmament issues on the other hand. It makes no sense to bite each other, it's impossible.

**Q:** Gordon Brook[?]. [Inaudible] I would like to ask another question about another linkage Article VI of the NPT, which will be on the international calendar this fall—the climate change treaty. It has to be a large push. But any treaty that advanced civilian nuclear power [inaudible] offers a solution to the carbon problem. Several of the large nuclear powers... [inaudible] I wonder if Germany is thinking about that linkage and how they plan to approach the conference this fall. [inaudible]

**GE:** The best answer for that is that Germany doesn't answer to the climate change challenge with an enhancement of nuclear power plants. We have a totally different model. You know that we decided to phase out nuclear power plants until 2021. We want to get rid of nuclear power plants and we emphasize the development of renewables, of energy efficiency, of energy economizing strategies and I think that we are heading in the right direction with that. That gives a model for other countries that are trying to answer to the challenges of climate change in a similar way because if a country like Germany with 80 million inhabitants and the hugest economic power in the European Union is able to manage the problem of energy in a different way, without nuclear power plants, then this is a clear signal to other countries.

Of course, we are aware that we have very different answers to the challenge of climate change. We have to look at the developments as more countries go nuclear—usage of civilian nuclear power. You only have to look at the Iranian development to know that we have problems with non-proliferation, but there also we have an answer. The answer is the multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle. There was a very concrete proposal made by our Foreign Minister for international enrichment facility controlled by the IAEA open for any countries. There are different other proposals in the sane direction but we have made this very concrete one. So we are very aware and concerned about the spread of civilian nuclear power by other countries. But, we have given an example--there are alternatives and there are better alternatives. We also have disputes in our domestic scene about that. On the other hand, the answer in our view should be the multilateralization of the fuel cycles.



**MP:** Germany should be commended for its role in the renewable energy and this whole area. I think it has been a real leader. I would hope that, and I think you're right that when they have the negotiations in Copenhagen, then this will be an issue about what qualifies for a carbon offset and if nuclear fits into that package. I would hope that it is something closer to what the Minister says, which is more of a focus on renewable energy, if it ends up in the package. If there is nuclear then it is somehow conditioned on some non-proliferation conditions rather than simply giving money to nuclear regardless of non-proliferation considerations.

**Q:** Marie McLetchie, U.S. Air Force. On the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: given that you're working towards a favorable resolution on that point, you did not address how in the possibly long disarmament process that the aging U.S. nuclear infrastructure would be dealt with. Given your support of the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, are you looking at or pursuing other means to discuss the U.S. nuclear surety.

**ME:** These studies contain proposals and ideas, which can be taken up by the German Government. Then they obviously contain proposals which can only be done by the U.S. Then they also contain proposals that we can do together. When you talk about U.S. infrastructure, I would rather refrain. Maybe the scientists, the think tankers can say more about it, but I would rather refrain from giving good advice to the U.S.

**MP:** The reality is that the U.S. arsenal is reliable, safe and secure, which has been testified to you every year by secretaries of energy and defense and so on. The question about what the political necessity in terms of getting the treaty through the senate is going to require some concessions on the modernization issue, but I think that is more a question of bowing to the political realities than the technical realities.

**Q:** Jerry Livingston. What about Ukraine in the European Union, as Prime Minister [Yulia] Timoshenko testifies in interviews over and over again. Ukrainians are not divided on membership in European Union despite being divided on membership in NATO. So what are the chances of bringing Ukraine into the European Union? That is my question to you.

I also have a comment for Mr. Ederer: There are potential tradeoffs between the reductions of U.S. conventional forces to induce the Russians to reduce their TNWs. And I would guess that will not go down so well in Poland. [Poland's Foreign Minister] Mr. [Radoslaw] Sikorski, in that brief period when he was not in the government, was here in Washington many times. And at one of the talks he gave, he said, "During the Cold War, when Germany was on the front line, how many American soldiers were there in Germany? As many as three hundred thousand. Now, we are on the front line, and how many American soldiers are there in Poland? Three." And you know, they've been trying to get American missile defense batteries around Warsaw, have been trying to get American soldiers to Poland, they've been trying to get the Americans to help train the Polish military. And, I imagine the Baltics feel the same way—the more American soldiers around, the better.



**GE:** About the future perspectives of the Ukraine: As you know, the European Union was enlarged from 2004 until today with 12 new countries, from 15 to 27. We have given since 2003 at the European Council seven additional countries in the western Balkans a clear European perspective. As you know the negotiations with Croatia, for example, are very far, and we expect final results for next year. The other six countries of the western Balkans have the right to start negotiations with the European Union about membership.

In that context and with the hanging situation of the Lisbon Treaty where we don't know when we will have this as a new basis for a broader European Union. Until we have a broad consensus between all 27 countries, it will not be possible to give at the moment any other country a binding perspective for membership in the European Union. That is the broad consensus. This is accepted by countries like Poland for example, that are very engaged to have Ukraine as a member in the future. That is understandable. That is also a geopolitical point because everybody is happy with not being on the border of the European Union, and being in the middle. There are also some other reasons for that Polish engagement. Of course this doesn't mean that we will do nothing about the Ukraine. Ukraine was the first member of the European Neighborhood Policy. That is a very good finance program and Ukraine has today association treaty with the European Union and is now again the most prominent member of this so-called Eastern Partnership that we launched in Prague on May 7 this year. It is a well-financed program with more than 600 million euro and the Ukraine is the top leader in that kind of partnership. So we do something for giving the Ukraine a stable framework in partnership and cooperation and association with the European Union. Looking at the sort of enlargement practice over the last few years where we have seen the European Union enlarge by 12 countries since 2004, it is excluded that we can give a clear European perspective that meets the membership perspective over the next few years.

**ME:** I am grateful for your comment because it points to an issue. 3 points: I also met Sikorski when he was not in government, and then afterwards... And he has adjusted. [Laughter] I remember him in Brussels comparing the Nord Stream pipeline to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. That was with the previous Polish government. The Polish government today has also adjusted its position on that one for example by agreeing what they have previously refused to agree about such as the having interconnectors at the German-Polish border so that if they don't get gas from the East for some reason, then we can provide them with gas from the West. The German-Polish relationship has become very intense. You might have noticed that two foreign ministers, Sikorski and Steinmeier, just made a joint trip to Ukraine. And told the Prime Minister in no uncertain terms that she should put the good of the country in front of her personal ambitions. Thirdly, we have established a very interesting policy planning format between German, Poles, and Russians now which comes up with very meaningful results of trust building measures. So these are the people of Sikorski. I think we are on a good path right here.

Secondly, you are absolutely right about the threat perception by the Poles and the Balkans is different from ours. Many believe that NATO's article V is mainly against Russia and nothing else. That is not really our position. They are also the ones who feel that tactical weapons are part of the guarantee of extended deterrence of America and Europe. This is why I am grateful to CNS people for having brought up these issues in order for us to address them because they have



to be addressed. They have to be addressed in NATO; they have be discussed and talked over with Poles and the Baltic States and so forth. The difference from Sikorski's remarks to reality—he was talking about the Cold War and the front line, but there is no more Cold War, and there is no more front line of the Cold War. You may not agree, but we see it differently.

**LS:** Let me thank you all for coming and thank our panelists for an extremely lively conversation and formal remarks as well. It was a great pleasure to have this group together, and I hope we reassemble perhaps on your next visit to Washington for new developments on this topic. It's been a great pleasure for us. Please, join me in thanking our panelists.

[Applause]

[END]

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