

R – Documents Related to the Syrian Arab Republic

Extract from Interview of IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei

[by Wolf Blitzer, CNN, aired 28 October 2007]

[Eds...]

BLITZER: As you know, the Israelis, in early September, bombed some sort of facility in Syria that was suspected of being a nuclear reactor, maybe a nuclear reactor built on a North Korean model. I know you've seen these pictures. You've seen the before and the after. What's your conclusion? Was this a nuclear reactor that the Syrians were building in their country based on a North Korean model?

ELBARADEI: Wolf, I'm very distressed, frankly, about this Syrian bombing because nobody - there had been chatter for the last few years. John Bolton three years ago went to testify before Congress and said there is concern about Syria. And yet, until today, we have not received information about any nuclear-related activities, clandestine nuclear-related activities in Syria. The bombing, again, happened, and we never, until today, received any piece of information. That to me is very distressful because we have a system. If countries have information that the country is working on a nuclear-related program, they should come to us. We have the authority to go out and investigate. But to bomb first and then ask questions later, I think it undermines the system and it doesn't lead to any solution to any suspicion, because we are the eyes and ears of the international community. It's only the agencies and inspectors who can go and verify the information.

If Syria were working on a nuclear program, a clandestine program, then we'd obviously be able to draw the consequences. But today I don't know where to go. I didn't get any information. I contacted the Syrians. They said this is a military facility, has nothing to do with nuclear. And I would hope if anybody has information before they take the law into their own hands, to come and pass the information on.

BLITZER: So what you're suggesting, Dr. ElBaradei, is neither the Israelis nor the U.S. government - or for that matter, any other government - gave you any hard evidence to back up this claim that this was a North Korean modeled nuclear reactor.

ELBARADEI: Or any evidence at all. Not only hard evidence, Wolf.

BLITZER: I know you've seen some commercial satellite photos though of the before and after. Are there any conclusions you can draw based on what you've seen in those satellite photos?

ELBARADEI: These are commercial satellite photos that we procured ourselves, has not been providing to us. And we're still investigating them. We're still comparing the pre and after. But in addition to us buying commercial photos, I would very much hope that countries will come forward if they have information so we'll do - go through a due process.

BLITZER: We're almost out of time, but based on the commercial photos that you've seen from these satellite reconnaissance, are there any conclusions that you and your team have been able to come up with?

ELBARADEI: Not at this stage, Wolf. Not at all.

BLITZER: All right, and so it would be premature to allege that North Korea was proliferating in cooperation with the Syrians? Is that what you're saying as well?

ELBARADEI: That's correct.

BLITZER: Because I want to play a little clip of what the ranking Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, Peter Hoekstra, told me here on "Late Edition" last Sunday. Listen to this.

[Eds...]

BLITZER: Because he certainly seemed to be concerned, and he's among a handful of members of the U.S. Congress who have been briefed by the Bush administration on what the Israelis did in Syria. He seems to suggest that you can't trust the North Koreans at all because they've been cheating on their promises. I take it

you're not willing to go that far by a long shot.

ELBARADEI: I can't because I don't have any evidence to support that assumption, Wolf.

BLITZER: Would you like the Israelis to brief you on what they know?

ELBARADEI: Absolutely, or anybody who has information. But you can't trust anybody. We don't work on the base of trust. But we - as President Reagan said, "trust and verify." And what I want very much is to be able to verify whether Syria, in fact, were working on a nuclear power program in a clandestine way or not. And the only way to do that is get information and to go out and verify.

BLITZER: You have a lot of credibility in these areas, Dr. ElBaradei, because before the war started with Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein, you were contradicting the Bush administration, insisting there was absolutely no evidence that Iraq under Saddam Hussein was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Do you feel vindicated as a result of that, as you go into this next round of fears that Iran may be developing some sort of nuclear weapons program?

ELBARADEI: Well, Wolf, I don't necessarily feel vindicated. I feel relieved that we discovered that Iraq did not have nuclear weapons. I feel also that people now should listen to us, because we have no hidden agenda. All we want to do is bring the facts out. We should not take decisions that has to do - that crucial to war around peace before we are able 100 percent to make sure that the information on the basis we are working are accurate and professional.

BLITZER: Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei is the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Dr. ElBaradei, thanks very much for joining us. Good luck to you and your entire team.

ELBARADEI: Thank you very much, Wolf. Keep well.

BLITZER: Thank you.

Extract from Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director General Dr Mohamed ElBaradei

[2 June 2008, Vienna]

Implementation of Safeguards in the Syrian Arab Republic

In April of this year, the Agency was provided with information claiming that an installation destroyed by Israel in Syria last September was a nuclear reactor. According to this information, the reactor was not yet operational and no nuclear material had been introduced into it.

It is deeply regrettable that information concerning this installation was not provided to the Agency in a timely manner and that force was resorted to unilaterally before the Agency was given an opportunity to establish the facts, in accordance with its responsibilities under the NPT and Syria's Safeguards Agreement. I should like to remind everybody that NPT States Parties have unanimously reaffirmed that the Agency is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with its Statute and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance by States with their safeguards agreements.

Nonetheless, I should emphasize that Syria, like all States with comprehensive safeguards agreements, has an obligation to report the planning and construction of any nuclear facility to the Agency. We are therefore treating this information with the seriousness it deserves and have been in discussions with the Syrian authorities since this information was provided to the Agency with a view to arranging a visit to Syria at an early date to verify, to the extent possible at this stage, the veracity of the information available to the Agency. It has now been agreed that an Agency team will visit Syria during the period 22-24 June. I look forward to Syria's full cooperation in this matter.

**Extract from Introductory Statement to the
Board of Governors by IAEA Director General
Dr Mohamed ElBaradei**

[22 September 2008, Vienna]

Implementation of Safeguards in the Syrian Arab Republic

In April this year, the Agency received information claiming that an installation destroyed by Israel in September 2007 at Al Kibar in Syria was a nuclear reactor. The Syrian authorities have repeatedly stated that the alleged site was not involved in any nuclear activities.

With Syria's cooperation, the Agency was able to visit Al Kibar in June 2008. Samples taken from the site are still being analysed and evaluated by the Agency, but so far we have found no indication of any nuclear material.

In order to assess the veracity of information available to the Agency, we asked the Syrian authorities in July to provide access to additional information and locations. Syria has not yet responded to this request but has indicated that any further developments would depend on the results of the samples taken during the first visit.

I trust that Syria will show maximum cooperation and transparency and provide all the information needed by the Agency to complete its assessment.

**Extract from Statement of the Syrian Arab
Republic to the 52nd Session of the General
Conference of the IAEA**

[29 September – 4 October 2008]

[Eds...]

We regrettably listened to the statements of some states requesting more transparency and cooperation with the Agency from our side. I would like here to recall that the Director General and the Deputy Director General for Safeguards have indicated in the September meeting of the Board of Governors that Syria was cooperative and complied with the procedures agreed upon with the agency.

We confirm that the government of my country is and will continue to be totally cooperative and transparent with the agency. However, this cooperation will under no circumstances be on the account of exposing our military positions and threatening our national security.

[Eds...]

**Extract from Introductory Statement to the
Board of Governors by IAEA Director General
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei**

[27 November 2008, Vienna]

Implementation of Safeguards in the Syrian Arab Republic

In June this year, I informed the Board that the Agency had been provided with information alleging that an installation destroyed by Israel in Syria in September 2007 was a nuclear reactor. Syria has stated that the Dair Alzour site was a military site and was not involved in any nuclear activities.

The Agency has, in accordance with its responsibility under comprehensive safeguards agreements, conducted a thorough analysis of all information available to it. As I mentioned in my report, the Agency was severely hampered in its assessment by the unilateral use of force and by the late provision of information about the destroyed building. The destruction of the building and the subsequent removal of the debris made the Agency's verification work quite difficult and complex, rendering the results so far inconclusive.

For its assessment of the site immediately after the bombing, the Agency was unable to obtain commercial satellite imagery. It is regrettable, and indeed baffling, that imagery for this critical period, which would have been most valuable in helping to clarify the

nature of the building that was destroyed, was not available. The Agency has recently been able to secure agreement to show Syria imagery from Member State satellites of the site shortly after the bombing, and will do so at the earliest opportunity.

Analysis of environmental samples from the Dair Alzour site revealed a significant number of natural uranium particles, which had been produced as a result of chemical processing. Syria stated that the only explanation for these particles was that they were contained in the missiles used to destroy the building. The Agency is assessing Syria's claim. We have asked Syria to permit the Agency to visit the locations of debris and equipment removed from the site in order to take samples that would help us to assess the origin of the uranium and also to ascertain the possible existence of any nuclear grade graphite that is normally associated with the type of alleged reactor. The Agency has also asked Israel to provide detailed information concerning Syria's claims regarding the origin of the uranium particles.

As stated in the report, while it cannot be excluded that the building in question was intended for non-nuclear use, the features of the building, along with the availability of adequate pumping capacity of cooling water, are similar to what may be found in connection with a reactor site. In light of this, it is important that Syria provide the Agency with documentation in support of its statements concerning the nature and function of the destroyed building.

Syria should also agree, as a transparency measure, to let the Agency visit other locations. As I mentioned in the case of Iran, I am confident that modalities can be developed which will protect the confidentiality of military information while enabling the Agency to continue with its assessment.

For the Agency to complete its assessment, maximum transparency by Syria and the full sharing with the Agency of all relevant information which other States may have are essential.

**Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic**

[GOV/2009/9 19 February 2009]

Report by the Director General

1. On 19 November 2008, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) (GOV/2008/60). The Board requested the Director General to keep it informed of developments, as appropriate. This report covers relevant developments since that date.

A. Chronology of Events

2. As indicated in the Director General's previous report, analysis of the environmental samples taken from the Dair Alzour site revealed a significant number of anthropogenic natural uranium particles (i.e. produced as a result of chemical processing). Syria has stated that the origin of the uranium particles was the missiles used to destroy the building (GOV/2008/60, para. 8).

3. In order to confirm Syria's assertion about the possible source of uranium particles found at Dair Alzour, the Agency requested Syria, in a letter dated 26 November 2008, to provide access to the site (including the water treatment plant at the site), and any other locations where the debris from the building and equipment, and any salvaged equipment removed from Dair Alzour, had been and/or was currently located, so that the Agency could take samples of, and environmental samples from, these items and materials. In that letter, the Agency also:

requested that Syria share the results of any assessments that it may have performed regarding the materials used during, or resulting from, the bombing;

requested, as a transparency measure, that the Agency be permitted to visit additional locations;

reminded Syria that the requests for information and documentation referred to in the Agency's letter of 3 July 2008, which related, inter alia, to information concerning the destroyed building, remained unanswered; and

stated that it stood ready to discuss these matters and to conduct the activities referred to above as soon as possible.

4. In a letter dated 17 February 2009, Syria reiterated its statement that the destroyed facility, and the current facility, on the Dair Alzour site were military installations. Syria provided information in response to some of the questions raised in the Agency's letter of 3 July 2008 concerning the purpose of the water pumping station and the water purification station found on the site and procurement efforts in connection with certain equipment and material. However, the responses Syria provided were only partial and included information already provided to the Agency, and did not address most of the questions raised in the Agency's communications. The Agency is now assessing the information provided by Syria.

5. In a letter to Israel dated 26 November 2008, referring to the claims made by Syria about the origin of the uranium particles found at Dair Alzour, the Agency requested Israel to provide information which would enable the Agency to determine whether munitions alleged to have been used by it could have been the source of the uranium particles (GOV/2008/60, paras 8 and 18). With respect to the Agency's request, Israel, in a letter dated 24 December 2008, stated only that "it rejects Syrian claims on the matter" and that "Israel could not have been the source of the uranium particles found on the site of the nuclear reactor".

B. Agency Verification

6. The Agency has continued its analysis of all information available to it as a result of the 23 June 2008 visit to the Dair Alzour site, as well as information from other sources. Additional analyses of the environmental samples taken from the Dair Alzour site have also been carried out by a

number of laboratories participating in the Agency's Network of Analytical Laboratories. These analyses have revealed additional particles of anthropogenic uranium. These uranium particles, and those identified as a result of the previous analyses, are of a type not included in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material.

7. The Agency's current assessment is that there is a low probability that the uranium was introduced by the use of missiles as the isotopic and chemical composition and the morphology of the particles are all inconsistent with what would be expected from the use of uranium based munitions.

8. As indicated in the Director General's previous report (GOV/2008/60, paras 5-7), the Agency has requested from Syria clarification of efforts by Syrian entities to procure materials and equipment which could support the construction and operation of a nuclear reactor. The Agency is continuing to assess the information related to these procurement efforts, including that provided by Syria in its letter of 17 February 2009.

C. Summary

9. The presence of the uranium particles at the Dair Alzour site, the imagery of the site available to the Agency and information about certain procurement activities need to be fully understood. Syria therefore needs to provide additional information and supporting documentation about the past use and nature of the building at the Dair Alzour site, and information about the procurement activities. Syria needs to be transparent by providing additional access to other locations alleged to be related to Dair Alzour. These measures, together with the sampling of destroyed and salvaged equipment and debris, are essential for the Agency to complete its assessment.

10. The Director General calls upon Syria to take the above measures as soon as possible. The Director General also calls on Israel and other States that may possess relevant information to make the information available to the Agency, including satellite imagery, and to agree to the Agency's sharing of such information with Syria.

11. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

Extract from Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director General Dr Mohamed ElBaradei

[2 March 2009, Vienna]

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic

The Agency has continued its analysis of all information available to it, including from the 23 June 2008 visit to the Dair Alzour site. Further analysis of the environmental samples taken from the Dair Alzour site has been carried out, revealing additional particles of uranium which had been produced as a result of chemical processing. These particles, and those identified as a result of the previous analyses, are of a type not included in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material. Syria has stated that the origin of the uranium particles was the missiles used to destroy the building. In response to a letter from the Agency, Israel denied that the uranium particles originated in Israel. The Agency's current assessment is that there is a low probability that the uranium was introduced by the use of missiles.

In a letter dated 15 February 2009, Syria reiterated that the destroyed facility, and the current facility, on the Dair Alzour site were military installations and not involved in any nuclear activities. The letter did not address many of the questions raised by the Agency. Syria's responses to some of the Agency's questions were only partial and included information already provided to the Agency.

The Agency expects Syria to provide additional information and supporting documentation about the past use and nature of the building at the Dair Alzour site, and information about procurement activities. Providing additional access to other locations alleged to be related to Dair Alzour would be a welcome sign of Syria's transparency. Such access, together with the sampling of destroyed and salvaged equipment and debris, is essential for the Agency to complete its assessment. I urge Syria to take these measures at the earliest possible date. I also urge Israel and other States that may possess relevant information - including satellite imagery - to make it available to the Agency and to agree to the Agency's sharing of such information with Syria.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic

[GOV/2009/36 5 June 2009]

Report by the Director General

[Eds...]

A. Chronology of Events

2. On 2 June 2008, the Director General informed the Board of Governors that the Agency had been provided with information alleging that an installation at the Dair Alzour site in Syria destroyed by Israel in September 2007 had been a nuclear reactor.

3. As indicated in the Director General's previous report, analysis of the environmental samples taken from the Dair Alzour site during the visit of Agency inspectors revealed a significant number of anthropogenic natural uranium particles (i.e. produced as a result of chemical processing) which indicated that the uranium was of a type not included in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material. Syria has stated that the origin of the uranium particles was the missiles used to destroy the building (GOV/2008/60, para. 8; GOV/2009/9, para. 2).

4. As part of its efforts to confirm Syria's assertions about the possible source of uranium particles found at Dair Alzour, the Agency, in a letter dated 13 March 2009, provided Syria with the results of additional analyses of the environmental samples. The Agency also reiterated its request that Syria provide further access to the Dair Alzour site (including the water treatment plant at the site), and any other locations where the debris from the building and equipment, and any salvaged equipment removed from Dair Alzour, had been and/or was currently located, so that the Agency could take samples of, and environmental samples from, these items and materials. The Agency also reiterated its earlier request that Syria share the results of any assessments that it may have

performed regarding the materials used during, or resulting from, the bombing.

5. In a letter dated 21 April 2009, the Agency provided comments to Syria on the statements made by Syria in its letter of 15 February 2009 regarding alleged efforts by Syrian entities to procure materials and equipment which could support the construction of a nuclear reactor. While expressing appreciation for Syria's efforts to answer some of the issues raised in earlier correspondence, the Agency informed Syria that its responses were only partial and did not address most of the questions. The Agency requested further clarification and supporting documentation in relation to the functions of the destroyed and currently existing installations at the Dair Alzour site, as well as the other locations alleged to be related to Dair Alzour, and in relation to procurement activities. The Agency reiterated its 13 March 2009 request for information related to Syria's assertion about the origin of the uranium particles found at Dair Alzour.

6. In a letter dated 18 May 2009, the Agency informed Syria that anthropogenic natural uranium particles had been found in environmental samples taken in 2008 from the hot cells of the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) facility in Damascus. In a letter dated 1 June 2009, Syria responded to the Agency's request for an explanation concerning the presence and origin of the anthropogenic natural uranium particles found at the MNSR. In a letter to Syria dated 5 June 2009, the Agency followed up on Syria's explanation.

7. In a letter to Israel dated 20 May 2009, following up on Israel's letter of 24 December 2008, the Agency requested that Israel provide specific information concerning its statements about whether the

munitions used in the destruction of the building at Dair Alzour could have been the source of the uranium particles found on the site.

8. In letters to the Agency, one dated 12 May 2009 and one dated 17 April 2009, received on 19 and 20 May 2009, respectively, Syria, *inter alia*, questioned the correctness of certain statements contained in reports, technical briefings and communications of the Agency.

9. In a letter dated 24 May 2009, Syria responded to the Agency's letter of 21 April 2009. Syria, *inter alia*, reiterated its earlier statements concerning the nature of the Dair Alzour installations, the water pumping infrastructure and procurement activities, and its statements regarding cooperation with entities from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The letter did not include any of the supporting documentation requested by the Agency.

10. In a letter dated 4 June 2009, the Agency responded to the concerns expressed by Syria in the three letters received by the Agency in May 2009. The Agency also reaffirmed the correctness of its statements and communications and provided comments on the points raised by Syria. The Agency reiterated its request that Syria provide, as a matter of transparency, information and supporting documentation about the past use and nature of the building at the Dair Alzour site, and information about the procurement activities, as well as access to other locations alleged to be related to Dair Alzour.

B. Agency Verification

11. The Agency has continued to investigate the allegations concerning the destroyed building on the Dair Alzour site. The information provided by Syria to date does not enable the Agency to determine the nature of the facility.

12. Since May 2008, the Agency has requested to have substantive discussions with Syria on this matter and has offered to share all of its satellite imagery, and imagery provided by other Member States. Syria has thus far declined to accept this offer.

13. As indicated in the Director General's last report (GOV/2009/9, para. 7), the Agency has assessed that there is a low probability that the uranium particles found at the Dair Alzour site were introduced by use of the missiles used to destroy the building on that site. Since that report, no progress has been made in substantiating Syria's explanation. The Agency is continuing with its assessment of the origin of the uranium.

14. In a letter dated 15 February 2009 responding to the Agency's

letter of 3 July 2008, Syria provided information regarding the procurement of certain equipment and materials, specifically the water pumping equipment observed at the Dair Alzour site, a large quantity of graphite and large quantities of barium sulphate (GOV/2009/9, para. 4). Syria indicated that the procurement efforts were civilian and non-nuclear in nature and related, respectively, to civil water purification, the domestic Syrian steel industry and shielding material for radiation therapy centres. Syria provided further clarifications in its letter dated 24 May 2009. Based on the information currently available to the Agency, it is not in a position to confirm these explanations and, in its letter of 4 June 2009, requested further clarification from Syria.

15. In its letters dated 3 July 2008 and 21 April 2009, the Agency had requested information and clarification regarding allegations of activities of an import/export company from the DPRK with an office in Syria, and regarding cooperation between nuclear scientists from Syria and the DPRK. Syria provided explanations in its letters of 15 February 2009 and 24 May 2009 and denied the allegations. The Agency is assessing Syria's response.

16. The Agency has reiterated its request for information concerning three other locations allegedly functionally related to the Dair Alzour site (GOV/2008/60, para. 7). Syria has not yet responded to the Agency's requests for access to these sites as a transparency measure.

17. In May 2009, the Agency received the results of the analysis of routine environmental samples taken in August 2008 at the MNSR in Damascus. The results showed the presence of particles of anthropogenic natural uranium, of a type not declared at the facility, inside the hot cells and from associated equipment. On 1 June 2009, Syria provided a response to the Agency's request for an explanation concerning the presence and origin of these particles. In its response, Syria provided information about the use of the hot cells and the presence of natural uranium, but did not address the presence and origin of the anthropogenic uranium. In its letter of 5 June 2009, the Agency wrote to Syria following up on its response. The existence of a possible connection between these particles and those found at the Dair Alzour site requires further analysis by the Agency.

C. Summary

18. The presence of the uranium particles at the Dair Alzour site, the imagery of the site available to the Agency and certain procurement activities remain to be clarified. The information provided by Syria to date does not adequately support its assertions about the nature of the site. In order for the Agency to complete its assessment, Syria needs to be more cooperative and transparent.

19. The anthropogenic natural uranium particles found at the MNSR facility are of a type not included in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material. The presence and origin of such particles, as well as those found at the Dair Alzour site, needs to be understood by the Agency.

20. The Director General urges Syria to provide at an early date additional information and supporting documentation, access to other locations alleged to be related to the Dair Alzour site and access to relevant locations for the sampling of destroyed and salvaged equipment and debris. As has previously been indicated to Syria, the Agency expresses its readiness to work out with Syria modalities for managed access that would enable Syria to protect sensitive and confidential information that is not relevant to the Agency's mandate, while enabling the Agency to perform its verification mission. It is clearly in Syria's interest to render to the Agency the necessary cooperation and transparency if it wishes the Agency to be able to corroborate its assertion about the nature of the Dair Alzour site. The Director General equally calls on Israel to cooperate with the Agency in its investigation. The Director General also calls on other States that may possess relevant information to make such information available to the Agency and to agree to the Agency's sharing of such information with Syria. These measures would assist the Agency in establishing the facts and making progress in its verification mandate.

21. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic

[GOV/2009/56 28 August 2009]

Report by the Director General

[Eds...]

8. In its letter dated 13 August 2009, Syria also stated that the destroyed building had been under construction at the time of the bombing and, hence, could not have been the source of the anthropogenic natural uranium particles collected in the environmental samples. Syria also added that due to the disposal of the debris from the site, it was impossible to meet the Agency's request for access to the debris as the Agency's request had been made more than a year after the destruction of the building by Israel.

9. In that same letter, Syria stated that it had provided all the information it had regarding the questions raised by the Agency concerning the Dair Alzour site and that it did not accept that the anthropogenic natural uranium particles found in the environmental samples could be considered undeclared nuclear material. Syria also reiterated that, due to the military and non-nuclear nature of the Dair Alzour site and the three other locations, it had no obligation to provide more information under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency. Syria emphasised its resolve to continue its cooperation with the Agency in accordance with its Safeguards Agreement and the Agency's Statute, provided that "this cooperation never infringes on the confidentiality of its defence capabilities, its sovereignty and its national security". The Agency is continuing its assessment of the information provided by Syria.

10. In relation to the presence of anthropogenic natural uranium particles at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) in Damascus (GOV/2009/36, para. 17), Syria provided additional explanations about the possible origin of the particles in a letter dated 8 June 2009. In that letter, Syria stated its view that the natural uranium particles had resulted from the accumulation of sample and reference materials used in neutron activation analysis. In support of its statement, Syria provided a list of standard reference materials used in those activities and some information on a related shielded transport container.

11. On 8 July 2009, the Agency performed a physical inventory verification (PIV) at the MNSR during which environmental samples were taken, as well as samples from the materials which Syria stated were the source of the anthropogenic natural uranium particles. The Agency is awaiting the results of the analyses of the samples.

Summary

12. Syria has cooperated with the Agency in its verification activities at the MNSR. The Agency is currently analysing samples taken at the MNSR.

13. Syria has not yet provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to determine the origin of the anthropogenic natural uranium particles found in samples taken at the Dair Alzour site. Syria also did not cooperate with the Agency to confirm Syria's statements regarding the non-nuclear nature of the destroyed building on the Dair Alzour site and to determine what, if any, functional relationship existed between the Dair Alzour site and three other locations, or to substantiate Syria's claims regarding certain procurement efforts and its alleged foreign nuclear cooperation.

14. Syria has asserted that, in accordance with its Safeguards Agreement, it is under no obligation to provide further information concerning the Dair Alzour site or the other locations because of their military nature not related to any nuclear activities. However, as the Agency has previously explained to Syria, there is no limitation in comprehensive Safeguards Agreements on Agency access to information, activities or locations simply because they may be military related. The fact that the Agency has found particles of nuclear material of a type which is not in the declared inventory of Syria underscores the need to pursue this matter.

15. The Director General urges Syria to cooperate with the Agency in its verification activities so that, in accordance with its mandate under Syria's Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is able to ensure

that safeguards are applied to all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities. Recognizing Syria's concerns about the sensitivity of certain information and locations, the Director General urges Syria to engage with the Agency to establish the necessary modalities for managed access to such information and locations to enable the Agency to establish the facts and make progress in its verification, while protecting Syria's sensitive military and other information at relevant locations. The Director General also calls on other States, including Israel, which may possess information relevant to the Agency's verification, including information which may have led them to conclude that the installation in question at the Dair Alzour site had been a nuclear reactor, to make such information available to the Agency.

16. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic

[GOV/2009/75 16 November 2009]

[Editorial note – Footnote not included]

Report by the Director General

1. On 28 August 2009, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) (GOV/2009/56). This report covers relevant developments since that date.

[Eds...]

4. [Eds...] The Agency has assessed, based on the isotopic and chemical composition and the morphology of the particles, that there is a low probability that the source of the anthropogenic natural uranium particles was the use of missiles (GOV/2009/9, para. 7). In its 23 October 2009 letter, the Agency once more reiterated its request that Syria share any information it may have to support its statement. To date, Syria has not provided any information to this effect. In this context, Israel has not responded to the Agency's request of 20 May 2009 for specific information on the contents of the munitions used to destroy the building (GOV/2009/36, para. 7).

5. In its 23 October 2009 letter, the Agency also responded to Syria's assertions that, due to the military and non-nuclear nature of the Dair Alzour site and the other three locations, it had no obligation to provide more information under its Safeguards Agreement, and that the anthropogenic natural uranium particles found at the Dair Alzour site do not constitute undeclared nuclear material. The Agency indicated that the Safeguards Agreement between Syria and the Agency places no limitation on Agency access to information, activities or locations simply because they may be military related. The Agency also indicated that the presence at the Dair Alzour site of particles of anthropogenic natural uranium of a type not included in Syria's declared inventory gives rise to questions about the correctness and completeness of Syria's declaration, which the Agency is obliged to pursue.

6. In relation to the presence of anthropogenic natural uranium particles at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) in samples taken there in August 2008 (GOV/2009/36, para. 17), Syria has stated that the presence of natural uranium particles resulted from the accumulation of samples and reference materials used in neutron activation analysis (GOV/2009/56, para. 10). In a letter dated 13 October 2009, the Agency provided Syria with the results from additional samples it had taken during the July 2009 physical inventory verification at the MNSR. The results also showed the presence of anthropogenic natural uranium particles at a number of locations and on certain equipment. However, the results did not indicate the presence of anthropogenic natural uranium particles in either the standard reference materials or on the shielded transport container which Syria had indicated as possible sources of the uranium particles. In light of these results, the Agency requested to meet with Syria to discuss the matter further.

7. In a meeting held on 2 November 2009 in Vienna, Syria was provided with further detailed information concerning the results of the analysis of the environmental samples from the MNSR. At that meeting, Syria identified other possible sources of the anthropogenic natural uranium particles, including domestically

produced yellowcake and small quantities of imported, but previously undeclared, commercial uranyl nitrate. Syria also provided a document to support its explanation for the presence of the uranyl nitrate at the MNSR.

8. In a letter to Syria dated 5 November 2009, the Agency announced its intention to carry out an inspection at the MNSR on 17 November 2009 for the purposes of taking samples of the yellowcake and the uranyl nitrate and taking environmental samples at the locations where the materials are stored and where they were used. The Agency also requested that Syria provide information concerning the yellowcake, the uranyl nitrate and any other uranium-containing materials which may have been the source of the anthropogenic natural uranium particles.

Summary

9. Essentially, no progress has been made since the last report to clarify any of the outstanding issues relevant to the implementation of safeguards.

10. Syria has not yet provided the cooperation necessary to permit the Agency to determine the origin of the anthropogenic natural uranium particles found in samples taken at the Dair Alzour site. Syria has also not provided information or access that would allow the Agency to confirm Syria's statements regarding the non-nuclear nature of the destroyed building on the Dair Alzour site, or to determine if, as alleged, any functional relationship existed between that site and three other locations. Nor has Syria substantiated its claims regarding certain procurement efforts that, in the Agency's view, could support the construction of a reactor. The Agency will continue its verification activities to confirm Syria's statements within the authority available to it and subject to the cooperation provided by Syria.

11. The results of the environmental sampling at the MNSR confirm the presence of particles of anthropogenic natural uranium of a type not in Syria's declared inventory. The results do not support Syria's earlier explanation for the origin and presence of the particles. The Agency is investigating Syria's explanation discussed at the 2 November 2009 meeting for the presence of the particles and has announced its intention to carry out an inspection at the MNSR on 17 November 2009.

12. The Director General urges Syria to cooperate with the Agency in its verification activities so that, in accordance with its mandate under Syria's Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is able to ensure that safeguards are applied to all source and special fissionable material subject to that Agreement. Recognizing Syria's concerns about the sensitivity of certain information and locations, the Director General also urges Syria to engage with the Agency to establish the necessary modalities for managed access to such information and locations that will enable the Agency to establish the facts and make progress in its verification, while protecting military and other information considered by Syria as sensitive. The Director General also calls on other States, including Israel, which may possess information relevant to the Agency's verification, including information which may have led them to conclude that the installation in question at the Dair Alzour site had been a nuclear reactor, to make such information available to the Agency.

13. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic

[GOV/2010/11 18 February 2010]

[Editorial note: Footnotes not included]

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. On 2 June 2008, the Director General informed the Board of Governors that in April of that year the Agency had been provided with information alleging that an installation at the Dair Alzour site in the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria), destroyed by Israel in September 2007, had been a nuclear reactor. Satellite imagery available to the Agency showed that, by the end of October 2007, large scale clearing and levelling operations had taken place at the site which had removed or obscured the remains of the destroyed building.

2. The Agency was provided with access to the site on 23 June 2008, at which time it was permitted to take environmental samples. While it cannot be excluded that the destroyed building was intended for non-nuclear use, the Agency has assessed that the features of the building and the connectivity of the site to adequate pumping capacity of cooling water are similar to what may be found at nuclear reactor sites. The Agency has also assessed that the water pumping equipment seen by it at the Dair Alzour site, and the procurement by Syria of large quantities of graphite and barium sulphate, all of which Syria has stated were acquired for civilian and non-nuclear related uses, could support the construction of a reactor (GOV/2009/36, para. 14).

3. Syria has maintained that the destroyed building was a military non-nuclear installation. The information and access provided by Syria to date has not allowed the Agency to confirm Syria's statements regarding the non-nuclear nature of the destroyed building or to substantiate Syria's claims regarding the procurement efforts for civilian, non-nuclear uses.

4. Analysis of the samples taken in June 2008 at the Dair Alzour site indicated the presence of particles of anthropogenic natural uranium of a type not included in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material. Syria has stated that the origin of these particles was the missiles used to destroy the building. The Agency has assessed that there is a low probability that the source of these particles was the use of missiles. The presence of such particles points to the possibility of nuclear related activities at the site and adds to questions concerning the nature of the destroyed building. Syria has yet to provide a satisfactory explanation for the origin and presence of these particles. In this context, information yet to be provided by Israel might be helpful in clarifying the matter.

5. The Agency has repeatedly requested Syria to have substantive discussions with it on the nature of the destroyed building, and to discuss relevant satellite imagery and other information available to the Agency. In a letter dated 7 January 2010, the Agency reminded Syria of its repeated requests for:

- information concerning the Dair Alzour site, the infrastructure observed at the site and certain procurement efforts which Syria has stated were related to civilian non-nuclear activities;
- access to technical documentation and any other information related to the construction of the destroyed building;
- access to locations where the debris from the destroyed building, the remains of munitions, the debris from equipment and any salvaged equipment had been and/or is now situated; and
- further access to the Dair Alzour site itself and access to three other locations allegedly functionally related to the Dair Alzour site.

6. The Agency has, on several occasions, offered to engage with Syria to establish the necessary modalities for managed access to sensitive information and locations, including the Dair Alzour site and the three other locations. Such access would enable the Agency to establish the facts and make progress in its verification, while protecting military and other information which Syria considers to be sensitive.

7. Since the time of the Agency's visit to the Dair Alzour site in June 2008, Syria has declined to have substantive discussions with the Agency, has not provided any detailed information in response to the Agency's requests and has not agreed to the Agency's requests for further access to the Dair Alzour site and access to the three other locations of interest to the Agency in connection with its investigation.

8. Syria has also maintained its position that, due to the disposal of the debris from the Dair Alzour site, it was impossible to grant the Agency's request for access to it as the Agency's request had been made more than a year after the destruction of the building. Based on the discussions held in June 2008 in Damascus and other information available to the Agency, the Agency has continued to request access to the debris from the destroyed building and any salvaged equipment from the Dair Alzour site.

9. In relation to the anthropogenic natural uranium particles found at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) (GOV/2009/36, para. 17), Syria's initial explanations for the presence of the

particles were that they had originated either from standard reference materials used in neutron activation analysis or from a shielded transport container. These explanations were not supported by the results of subsequent sampling carried out by the Agency at the MNSR (GOV/2009/75, para. 6). In a meeting held on 2 November 2009 in Vienna, Syria suggested that the particles may have originated from other materials present at the MNSR, specifically quantities of yellowcake produced at a pilot phosphoric acid purification plant at Homs, previously undeclared uranyl nitrate compounds derived from the yellowcake and/or small quantities of previously undeclared imported uranyl nitrate materials (GOV/2009/75, para. 7).

10. The possibility of a link between the particles found at the MNSR and those found at the Dair Alzour site requires further sampling and analysis by the Agency. The Agency also needs to determine whether the use of the natural uranium compounds at the MNSR may be relevant to allegations concerning one of the three other locations and whether experiments may have been performed with the larger quantities of yellowcake produced at the Homs plant.

B. Verification Activities

11. On 17 November 2009, during an inspection at the MNSR, the Agency provided Syria with a letter, dated 13 November 2009, in which it listed experimental activities carried out with nuclear material which, according to open sources, had been performed in Syria and which could be of relevance in determining the origin of the particles found at the MNSR. In the letter, the Agency requested access to the persons involved in those activities and to detailed information regarding the nuclear material and equipment used in the experiments. Syria made one of the requested persons available during the inspection and discussions were held on the experimental activities. Following up on Syria's statements concerning nuclear material at the MNSR (para. 9), samples were taken from yellowcake and uranyl nitrate compounds present at the MNSR. Environmental samples were also taken from equipment and locations at the MNSR associated with experimentation involving uranium-containing materials. In a letter to the Agency dated 6 December 2009, Syria provided limited information about some of the nuclear material observed at the MNSR. However, Syria did not address the Agency's concerns regarding the origin and presence of the anthropogenic natural uranium particles found there.

12. In a letter dated 7 January 2010, the Agency requested confirmation of the quantities of nuclear material observed at the MNSR, the complete reporting of all nuclear material, detailed information regarding the use of uranium-containing nuclear material and updates to the design information.

13. In a letter dated 21 January 2010, the Agency provided Syria with the results of the samples taken during the 17 November 2009 inspection. While the results confirmed the characteristics of the material as declared by Syria, the Agency informed Syria that further clarification regarding the presence and use of anthropogenic natural uranium at the MNSR was necessary, and proposed that a meeting be held in Damascus on 8 and 9 February 2010 to discuss these issues.

14. In a letter dated 10 February 2010, Syria declined the Agency's

request for the meeting, indicating that, in the light of the information provided in the same letter, it could be planned for a later stage. The information Syria provided does not clarify the presence and use of anthropogenic natural uranium at the MNSR. The Agency is planning an inspection at the MNSR to be performed on 23 February 2010 to verify nuclear material at the MNSR and examine relevant source documents related to the experiments indicated above.

C. Assessment and Next Steps

15. Syria has not cooperated with the Agency since June 2008 in connection with the unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and the other three locations allegedly functionally related to it. As a consequence, the Agency has not been able to make progress towards resolving the outstanding issues related to those sites since the previous report to the Board of Governors.

16. Syria has provided some additional information concerning the presence and use of the anthropogenic natural uranium at the MNSR. However, Syria has not yet provided a full explanation of the activities and experiments involving nuclear material conducted at the MNSR that may have been the source of the particles found there. Therefore, further clarification from Syria is necessary in order to resolve this issue and to help exclude any possible link between the particles found at the MNSR and those found at the Dair Alzour site. Additionally, Syria is required to provide complete reporting of all nuclear material in Syria and to provide the Agency with access to all relevant documentation. The Agency has requested Syria's cooperation in these respects.

17. Since the November 2009 inspection, Syria has not fully cooperated with the Agency to facilitate the resolution of the issues concerning the MNSR. Syria has also not provided design information concerning the irradiation of uranium at the MNSR or met its nuclear material reporting obligations under the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/407).

18. At both the Dair Alzour and MNSR sites, the Agency has found particles of anthropogenic natural uranium. Given that Syria has no reported inventory of natural uranium, this calls into question the completeness and correctness of Syria's declarations concerning nuclear material and facilities.

19. The Director General urges Syria to engage with the Agency on the above issues so that, in accordance with its mandate under Syria's Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is able to confirm that all nuclear material in Syria is in peaceful activities. For both the Dair Alzour and the MNSR sites, given the passage of time and the possible degradation of information, the Agency requests Syria to provide prompt access to all relevant information for the verification of Syria's declarations. The Director General is ready to agree with Syria on the necessary modalities for managed access to information and locations that will enable the Agency to establish the facts and make progress in its verification, while protecting military and other information considered by Syria as sensitive.

20. The Director General also urges Syria to bring into force an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement which will facilitate the Agency's work in verifying the correctness and completeness of Syria's declarations.

21. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.