

## B — Materials Relating to the 2009 NPT Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference

### Provisional Agenda

[Reproduced from NPT/CONF.2010/1, Annex IV  
20 May 2009]

1. Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee.
2. Election of the President of the Conference.
3. Statement by the President of the Conference.
4. Address by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
5. Address by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
6. Submission of the final report of the Preparatory Committee.
7. Adoption of the rules of procedure.
8. Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee.
9. Election of Vice-Presidents.
10. Credentials of representatives to the Conference:
  - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
  - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
11. Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General.
12. Adoption of the agenda.
13. Programme of work.
14. Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference.
15. General debate.
16. Review of the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII (3), taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference:
  - (a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security:
    - (i) Articles I and II, and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3;
    - (ii) Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12;
    - (iii) Article VII, with specific reference to the main issues in (a) and (b);
  - (b) Security assurances:
    - (i) United Nations Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995);
    - (ii) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
  - (c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones:
    - (i) Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7;
    - (ii) Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 in their relationship to articles III and IV;
    - (iii) Article VII;
  - (d) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II:
    - (i) Articles III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5;
    - (ii) Article V;
  - (e) Other provisions of the Treaty.
17. Role of the Treaty in the promotion of Non-Proliferation of

nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security, and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality.

18. Reports of the Main Committees.
19. Consideration and adoption of Final Document(s).
20. Any other business.

### Draft Rules of Procedure

[Reproduced from NPT/CONF.2010/1 Annex III,  
20 May 2009]

[*Editorial note:* Footnotes not included]

#### I. Representation and credentials

##### **Delegations of Parties to the Treaty - Rule 1**

1. Each State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter "the Treaty") may be represented at the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (hereinafter the "Conference") by a head of delegation and such other representatives, alternate representatives and advisers as may be required.
2. The head of delegation may designate an alternate representative or an adviser to act as a representative.

##### **Credentials - Rule 2**

The credentials of representatives and the names of alternate representatives and advisers shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the Conference, if possible not less than one week before the date fixed for the opening of the Conference. Credentials shall be issued either by the head of the State or Government or by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

##### **Credentials Committee - Rule 3**

The Conference shall establish a Credentials Committee composed of the Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen elected in accordance with rule 5, and six members appointed by the Conference on the proposal of the President. The Committee shall examine the credentials of representatives and report to the Conference without delay.

##### **Provisional participation - Rule 4**

Pending a decision of the Conference upon their credentials, representatives shall be entitled to participate provisionally in the Conference.

#### II. Officers

##### **Election - Rule 5**

The Conference shall elect the following officers: a President and thirty-four Vice-Presidents, as well as a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen for each of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee. The officers shall be elected so as to ensure a representative distribution of posts.

##### **Acting President - Rule 6**

1. If the President is absent from a meeting or any part thereof, he shall designate a Vice-President to take his place.
2. A Vice-President acting as President shall have the same powers and duties as the President.

##### **Voting rights of the President - Rule 7**

The President, or a Vice-President acting as President, shall not vote, but shall appoint another member of his delegation to vote in his place.

#### III. General Committee

##### **Composition - Rule 8**

1. The General Committee shall be composed of the President of the Conference, who shall preside, the thirty-four Vice-Presidents, the Chairmen of the three Main Committees, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee and the Chairman of the Credentials Committee. No two members of the General Committee shall be members of the same delegation and it shall be so constituted as to ensure its representative character.

2. If the President is unable to attend a meeting of the General Committee, he may designate a Vice-President to preside at such meeting and a member of his delegation to take his place. If a Vice-President is unable to attend, he may designate a member of his delegation to take his place. If the Chairman of a Main Committee, the Drafting Committee or the Credentials Committee is unable to attend, he may designate one of the Vice-Chairmen to take his place, with the right to vote unless he is of the same delegation as another member of the General Committee.

#### **Functions - Rule 9**

The General Committee shall assist the President in the general conduct of the business of the Conference and, subject to the decisions of the Conference, shall ensure the coordination of its work.

#### **IV. Conference Secretariat**

##### **Duties of the Secretary-General of the Conference - Rule 10**

1. There shall be a Secretary-General of the Conference. He shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Conference, its committees and subsidiary bodies, and may designate a member of the Secretariat to act in his place at these meetings.

2. The Secretary-General of the Conference shall direct the staff required by the Conference.

##### **Duties of the Secretariat - Rule 11**

The Secretariat of the Conference shall, in accordance with these rules:

- (a) Interpret speeches made at meetings;
- (b) Receive, translate and circulate the documents of the Conference;
- (c) Publish and circulate any report of the Conference;
- (d) Make and arrange for the keeping of sound recordings and summary records of meetings;
- (e) Arrange for the custody of documents of the Conference in the archives of the United Nations and provide authentic copies of these documents to each of the depository Governments; and
- (f) Generally perform all other work that the Conference may require.

##### **Costs - Rule 12**

The costs of the Conference, including the sessions of the Preparatory Committee, will be met by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in the Conference in accordance with the schedule for the division of costs as shown in the appendix to these Rules.

#### **V. Conduct of business**

##### **Quorum - Rule 13**

1. A majority of the States Parties to the Treaty participating in the Conference shall constitute a quorum.

2. To determine whether the Conference is quorate, any State Party may call for a roll-call at any time.

##### **General powers of the President - Rule 14**

1. In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him elsewhere by these Rules, the President shall preside at the plenary meetings of the Conference; he shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting, direct the discussion, ensure observance of these Rules, accord the right to speak, ascertain consensus, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. He shall rule on points of order. The President, subject to these Rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings and over the maintenance of order thereat. The President may propose to the Conference the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each State may speak on the question, the

adjournment or the closure of the debate and the suspension or the adjournment of a meeting.

2. The President, in the exercise of his functions, remains under the authority of the Conference.

##### **Points of order - Rule 15**

A representative may at any time raise a point of order, which shall be immediately decided by the President in accordance with these Rules. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President. The appeal shall be immediately put to the vote, and the President's ruling shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the representatives present and voting. A representative may not, in raising a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

##### **Speeches - Rule 16**

1. No one may address the Conference without having previously obtained the permission of the President. Subject to rules 15, 17 and 19 to 22, the President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

2. Debate shall be confined to the subject under discussion and the President may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not relevant thereto.

3. The Conference may limit the time allowed to speakers and the number of times the representative of each State may speak on a question; permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives in favour of and to two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote. In any event, the President shall limit interventions on procedural questions to a maximum of five minutes. When the debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call him to order without delay.

##### **Precedence - Rule 17**

The Chairman of a committee may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the conclusion arrived at by his committee.

##### **Closing of list of speakers - Rule 18**

During the course of a debate the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Conference, declare the list closed. When the debate on an item is concluded because there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure pursuant to rule 22.

##### **Right of reply - Rule 19**

Notwithstanding rule 18, the President may accord the right of reply to a representative of any State participating in the Conference. Such statements shall be as brief as possible and shall, as a general rule, be delivered at the end of the last meeting of the day.

##### **Suspension or adjournment of the meeting - Rule 20**

A representative may at any time move the suspension or the adjournment of the meeting. No discussion on such motions shall be permitted and they shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

##### **Adjournment of debate - Rule 21**

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of the debate on the question under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives in favour of and to two opposing the adjournment, after which the motion shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

##### **Closure of debate - Rule 22**

A representative may at any time move the closure of the debate on the question under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

##### **Order of motions - Rule 23**

The motions indicated below shall have precedence in the

following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- (a) To suspend the meeting;
- (b) To adjourn the meeting;
- (c) To adjourn the debate on the question under discussion;
- (d) To close the debate on the question under discussion.

#### **Submission of proposals and substantive amendments - Rule 24**

Proposals and substantive amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretary-General of the Conference, who shall circulate copies to all delegations. Unless the Conference decides otherwise, proposals and substantive amendments shall be discussed or decided on no earlier than twenty-four hours after copies have been circulated in all languages of the Conference to all delegations.

#### **Withdrawal of proposals and motions - Rule 25**

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before a decision on it has been taken, provided that it has not been amended. A proposal or a motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

#### **Decision on competence - Rule 26**

Any motion calling for a decision on the competence of the Conference to adopt a proposal submitted to it shall be decided upon before a decision is taken on the proposal in question.

#### **Reconsideration of proposals - Rule 27**

Proposals adopted by consensus may not be reconsidered unless the Conference reaches a consensus on such reconsideration. A proposal that has been adopted or rejected by a majority or two-thirds vote may be reconsidered if the Conference, by a two-thirds majority, so decides. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be immediately put to the vote.

### **VI. Voting and elections**

#### **Adoption of decisions - Rule 28**

1. The task of the Conference being to review, pursuant to paragraph 3 of article VIII of the Treaty, the operation of the Treaty with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized, and thus to strengthen its effectiveness, every effort should be made to reach agreement on substantive matters by means of consensus. There should be no voting on such matters until all efforts to achieve consensus have been exhausted.
2. Decisions on matters of procedure and in elections shall be taken by a majority of representatives present and voting.
3. If, notwithstanding the best efforts of delegates to achieve a consensus, a matter of substance comes up for voting, the President shall defer the vote for fortyeight hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort, with the assistance of the General Committee, to facilitate the achievement of general agreement, and shall report to the Conference prior to the end of the period.
4. If by the end of the period of deferment the Conference has not reached agreement, voting shall take place and decisions shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting, provided that such majority shall include at least a majority of the States participating in the Conference.
5. If the question arises whether a matter is one of procedure or of substance, the President of the Conference shall rule on the question. An appeal against this ruling shall immediately be put to the vote and the President's ruling shall stand unless the appeal is approved by a majority of the representatives present and voting.
6. In cases where a vote is taken, the relevant rules of procedure relating to voting of the General Assembly of the United Nations shall apply, except as otherwise specifically provided herein.

#### **Voting rights - Rule 29**

Every State party to the Treaty shall have one vote.

#### **Meaning of the phrase "representatives present and voting" - Rule 30**

For the purposes of these Rules, the phrase "representatives present and voting" means representatives casting an affirmative or negative vote. Representatives who abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

#### **Elections - Rule 31**

All elections shall be held by secret ballot, unless the Conference decides otherwise in an election where the number of candidates does not exceed the

number of elective places to be filled.

#### **Rule 32**

1. If, when only one elective place is to be filled, no candidate obtains in the first ballot the majority required, a second ballot shall be taken, confined to the two candidates having obtained the largest number of votes. If in the second ballot the votes are equally divided, the President shall decide between the candidates by drawing lots.

2. In the case of a tie in the first ballot among the candidates obtaining the second largest number of votes, a special ballot shall be held among such candidates for the purpose of reducing their number to two; similarly, in the case of a tie among three or more candidates obtaining the largest number of votes, a special ballot shall be held; if a tie again results in this special ballot, the President shall eliminate one candidate by drawing lots and thereafter another ballot shall be held in accordance with paragraph 1.

#### **Rule 33**

1. When two or more elective places are to be filled at one time under the same conditions, those candidates, in a number not exceeding the number of such places, obtaining in the first ballot the majority required and the largest number of votes shall be elected.

2. If the number of candidates obtaining such majority is less than the number of places to be filled, additional ballots shall be held to fill the remaining places, provided that if only one place remains to be filled the procedures in rule 32 shall be applied. The ballot shall be restricted to the unsuccessful candidates having obtained the largest number of votes in the previous ballot, but not exceeding twice the numbers of places remaining to be filled. However, in the case of a tie between a greater number of unsuccessful candidates, a special ballot shall be held for the purpose of reducing the number of candidates to the required number; if a tie again results among more than the required number of candidates, the President shall reduce their number to that required by drawing lots.

3. If such a restricted ballot (not counting a special ballot held under the conditions specified in the last sentence of paragraph 2) is inconclusive, the President shall decide among the candidates by drawing lots.

### **VII. Committees**

#### **Main Committees and subsidiary bodies - Rule 34**

The Conference shall establish three Main Committees for the performance of its functions. Each such Committee may establish subsidiary bodies so as to provide for a focused consideration of specific issues relevant to the Treaty. As a general rule each State Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference may be represented in the subsidiary bodies unless otherwise decided by consensus.

#### **Representation on the Main Committees - Rule 35**

Each State Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference may be represented by one representative on each Main Committee. It may assign to these Committees such alternate representatives and advisers as may be required.

#### **Drafting Committee - Rule 36**

1. The Conference shall establish a Drafting Committee composed of representatives of the same States that are represented on the General Committee. It shall coordinate the drafting of and edit all texts referred to it by the Conference or by a Main Committee, without altering the substance of the texts, and report to the Conference or to the Main Committee as appropriate. It shall also,

without reopening the substantive discussion on any matter, formulate drafts and give advice on drafting as requested by the Conference or a Main Committee.

2. Representatives of other delegations may also attend the meetings of the Drafting Committee and may participate in its deliberations when matters of particular concern to them are under discussion.

#### **Officers and procedures - Rule 37**

The rules relating to officers, the Conference secretariat, conduct of business and voting of the Conference (contained in chaps. II (rules 5-7), IV (rules 10-11), V (rules 13-27) and VI (rules 28-33) above) shall be applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to the proceedings of committees and subsidiary bodies, except that:

- (a) Unless otherwise decided, any subsidiary body shall elect a chairman and such other officers as it may require;
- (b) The Chairmen of the General, the Drafting and the Credentials Committees and the Chairmen of subsidiary bodies may vote in their capacity as representatives of their States;
- (c) A majority of the representatives on the General, Drafting and Credentials Committees or on any subsidiary body shall constitute a quorum; the Chairman of a Main Committee may declare a meeting open and permit the debate to proceed when at least one quarter of the representatives of the States participating in the Conference are present.

### **VIII. Languages and records**

#### **Languages of the Conference -Rule 38**

Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish shall be the official languages of the Conference.

#### **Interpretation -Rule 39**

1. Speeches made in a language of the Conference shall be interpreted into the other languages.
2. A representative may make a speech in a language other than a language of the Conference if he provides for interpretation into one such language. Interpretation into the other languages of the Conference by interpreters of the Secretariat may be based on the interpretation given in the first such language.

#### **Language of official documents - Rule 40**

Official documents shall be made available in the languages of the Conference.

#### **Sound recordings of meetings - Rule 41**

Sound recordings of meetings of the Conference and of all committees shall be made and kept in accordance with the practice of the United Nations. Unless otherwise decided by the Main Committee concerned, no such recordings shall be made of the meetings of a subsidiary body thereof.

#### **Summary records - Rule 42**

1. Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Conference and of the meetings of the Main Committees shall be prepared by the Secretariat in the languages of the Conference. They shall be distributed in provisional form as soon as possible to all participants in the Conference. Participants in the debate may, within three working days of receipt of provisional summary records, submit to the Secretariat corrections on summaries of their own interventions, in special circumstances, the presiding officer may, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the Conference, extend the time for submitting corrections. Any disagreement concerning such corrections shall be decided by the presiding officer of the body to which the record relates, after consulting, where necessary, the sound recordings of the proceedings. Separate corrigenda to provisional records shall not normally be issued.
2. The summary records, with any corrections incorporated, shall be distributed promptly to participants in the Conference.

### **IX. Public and private meetings**

#### **Rule 43**

1. The plenary meetings of the Conference and the meetings of the Main Committees shall be held in public unless the body concerned decides otherwise.

2. Meetings of other organs of the Conference shall be held in private.

### **X. Participation and attendance**

#### **Rule 44**

##### **1. Observers**

(a) Any other State which, in accordance with article IX of the Treaty, has the right to become a Party thereto but which has neither acceded to it nor ratified it may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for observer status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. Such a State shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the plenary and of the Main Committees other than those designated closed meetings and to receive documents of the Conference. An observer State shall also be entitled to submit documents for the participants in the Conference.

(b) Any national liberation organization entitled by the General Assembly of the United Nations to participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly, all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly and all international conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for observer status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. Such a liberation organization shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the plenary and of the Main Committees other than those designated closed meetings and to receive documents of the Conference. An observer organization shall also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Conference.

##### **2. The United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency**

The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or their representatives, shall be entitled to attend meetings of the plenary and of the Main Committees and to receive the Conference documents. They shall also be entitled to submit material, both orally and in writing.

##### **3. Specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations**

The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific Forum, other international and regional intergovernmental organizations, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization and any specialized agency of the United Nations may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for observer agency status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. An observer agency shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the plenary and of the Main Committees, other than those designated closed meetings, and to receive the documents of the Conference. The Conference may also invite them to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as Conference documents.

##### **4. Non-governmental organizations**

Representatives of non-governmental organizations who attend meetings of the plenary or of the Main Committees will be entitled upon request to receive the documents of the Conference.

[*Editorial note:* Appendix to Rule 12 – Schedule for the division of costs, not included.]

### **Final Draft Version of Chair's Recommendations to the 2010 NPT Review Conference**

[Reproduced from NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/CRP.4/Rev.2., 15 May 2009 – proposed changes not incorporated]

The Preparatory Committee has considered principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality. The States parties reaffirm the need to maintain a balance between the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Preparatory Committee conveys to the 2010 Review Conference the following elements for its consideration in evaluating the implementation of undertakings

of the States parties under the Treaty. It has also identified areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. These elements build upon the three Decisions and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, and subsequent deliberations and discussion within the NPT review process. The Preparatory Committee believes that these elements, which were drawn from statements and working papers by States parties, identify a practical framework in which the Review Conference could achieve a consensus. These elements are conveyed without regard to their priority, without prejudice to other initiatives that States parties may wish to offer, and without any intention to represent a comprehensive summary of all initiatives proposed in Preparatory Committee sessions.

### **1. Universality of the treaty, and of principles of disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.**

a. Reaffirm the existence of fundamental principles of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy that are universal in scope. Reaffirm that the Treaty is an expression of these principles. Recognize the fundamental importance of full compliance with all the provisions of the Treaty and the relevant IAEA safeguards agreements, and of consequences for breaches of Treaty obligations. Emphasize that responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty should be pursued by diplomatic means.

b. Declare that the Treaty remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and that its full and effective implementation is vital to international peace and security. Reaffirm that the Treaty fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

c. Reaffirm the commitment shared by States parties to achieving universal membership. Call upon all states that are not parties to join the Treaty promptly as non-nuclear-weapon States and without conditions. Engage non-parties with a view to achieving this goal.

### **2. Action plan for the three pillars of the Treaty.**

#### **2.1 Nuclear disarmament, including specific practical measures.**

a. Reaffirm the obligations of States parties under Article VI relating to nuclear disarmament, and to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Indicate support for ongoing and future efforts in these fields. Recognize the importance of practical nuclear disarmament by all nuclear-weapon States.

b. Reaffirm and update commitments relating to disarmament made at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and at the 2000 Review Conference. Recommend, on the basis of the principles of promotion of international stability and undiminished security for all, several practical disarmament measures and goals contributing to the fulfilment of article VI, including, but not limited to: facilitation of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and, pending its achievement: maintaining the moratoria on nuclear test explosions; commencing negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a verifiable fissile materials [cutoff] treaty, building upon the positive momentum of efforts by its 2009 Presidents to adopt a programme of work; implementing an immediate moratorium on the further production of fissile material for weapons pending conclusion of the treaty; and pursuing deep reductions in nuclear arsenals.

c. Discuss related ways and means to ensure the irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency of disarmament activities. Recognize the benefits for disarmament of reducing the operational status of nuclear forces; reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons pending their elimination and reducing reliance on nuclear weapons in security policies.

Affirm the importance of effective assurances that nuclear-weapon States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties. Examine ways and means to achieve additional assurances that are legally binding.

d. Commence open-ended discussions to identify possibilities available to establish an international legal framework for the

achievement of global nuclear disarmament. Engage non-parties to the Treaty with the aim of attaining a world free of nuclear weapons.

### **2.2 Non-proliferation; promote and strengthen safeguards.**

a. Reaffirm that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat to international peace and security requiring a global response and underscore the urgent need for States parties to pursue strengthened ways and means to achieve the objectives of articles I, II, and III.

b. Affirm that export controls are best addressed and implemented in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner, and without hampering the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses, in conformity with the Treaty. Recommend that transparency in export controls should continue to be promoted within a framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States Party to the Treaty. Recognize that national rules and regulations of States parties are necessary to ensure that the States parties are able to give effect to their commitments with respect to the transfer of nuclear and nuclear dual-use items to all States taking into account articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and for States parties, also fully respecting article IV.

c. Underscore the importance of the verifiable de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Support diplomatic efforts to achieve this goal.

d. Affirm the need for full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency to resolve any outstanding verification issues.

e. Reaffirm that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, play an essential role in the implementation of the Treaty and contribute to create an environment conducive to achieving nuclear disarmament and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

f. Reaffirm that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority responsible for verifying compliance with its safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, and, in this context, reaffirm the importance of acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards. Identify specific measures that would serve to promote the universalisation of the IAEA safeguards system. Welcome the efforts of the Agency to strengthen safeguards and to increase the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, as well as the steps taken to assist states in their application.

d. Affirm the need for multilateral cooperation to prevent the establishment, perpetuation, or growth of clandestine nuclear supply networks, in accordance with international law.

### **2.3. Advance peaceful uses of nuclear energy.**

a. Reaffirm the inalienable right of States parties under article IV to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Note the contribution that growing applications of nuclear technology in health care, industry, agriculture, power generation, and environmental protection can make in advancing development worldwide.

b. Commend the important role of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme in facilitating the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in developing countries. Stress the need to support such cooperation with adequate financial and human resources in an assured and predictable manner.

c. Stress the importance of extensive and transparent consultations in the consideration of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and assurances of the supply. Indicate that such proposals should be addressed in a multilateral, economically viable and non-discriminatory manner under the auspices of IAEA, without infringement of the rights of States parties under article IV the Treaty. Confirm that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

d. Recognize the importance of bilateral and international cooperation programmes to assist countries considering the

development of nuclear energy for the first time. Stress the need to develop the adequate infrastructures, with appropriate assistance in the field of human resources training.

### 3. Ways and means to strengthen nuclear safety and security.

a. Highlight the importance of strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection, the safety of radioactive waste management, and the safe transport of nuclear and radioactive materials, including maritime transport. Underscore the need to maintain the highest standards of safety at civilian nuclear installations through national measures and international cooperation.

b. Emphasize that the acquisition of nuclear weapons or related materials by non-State actors would constitute a threat to international peace and security. Affirm the importance of the full implementation of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008), as well as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

c. Stress the importance of combating nuclear terrorism and support the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan. Welcome the contributions of the IAEA in the promotion of the physical protection of nuclear material and safety in all its aspects. Endorse the IAEA's work in assisting States' efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. Underscore the importance of regular contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

d. Call upon all states that have not yet done so, to accede to all relevant conventions on nuclear safety, on safety of spent fuel, on safety of radioactive waste management, and on physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. Also call upon all states to follow the guidelines in the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Stress the importance of maintaining dialogue on facilitating the safe maritime transport of radioactive material.

### 4. Ways and means to implement regional non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives and to explore future initiatives.

a. Reaffirm that nuclear-weapon-free zones have made and continue to make an important contribution to the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime in all its aspects, and to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Support increased cooperation among the parties to all the zones. Consider calling for the consideration of the establishment of new zones in regions with nuclear facilities or materials. Recognize the importance of the establishment of regional zones free of weapons of mass destruction.

b. Note the establishment of the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and also recognize and affirm the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. Endorse and reaffirm the goal of achieving the early entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty. Underline the importance of the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Encourage zonal parties and the nuclear-weapon States to engage in dialogue to enable their adherence to the Protocols of all treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

### 5. Ways and means to implement the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

a. Recall that the Resolution on the Middle East was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended. Underscore the need for increased efforts to implement the Resolution.

b. Consider the proposal to convene a conference of all states concerned to address ways and means to implement the Resolution and undertake consultations with a view to facilitating the convening of such a conference. Establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference to consider concrete practical steps to promote the earliest implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East. Consider the appointment of a special coordinator to hold consultations with the countries in the region and report on their outcome during the course of the review process. Call upon all States parties to issue periodic reports to each of the Preparatory Committees and the Review Conference on their efforts to implement the Resolution.

### 6. Measures to address the risks and implications of Treaty withdrawals.

a. Acknowledge the right to withdraw from the Treaty, in accordance with article X.

b. Consider the proposals presented in the Preparatory Committee that identified modalities under which States parties could collectively respond to notifications of withdrawal.

### 7. Initiatives to strengthen the review process, including possible institutional measures.

a. Affirm the essential role of the strengthened review process in ensuring the effectiveness of the Treaty in improving international security environments, in enhancing transparency, in strengthening accountability in the implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty, and in promoting its universality. View the decisions and the resolution adopted in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document adopted at the 2000 Review Conference as embodying principles, objectives, or means to serve this goal.

b. Affirm that the strengthened review process has become an indispensable, dynamic mechanism for evaluating the Treaty's operation and implementation. Recognize that several proposals advocating the need for certain institutional and procedural reforms have been submitted by States parties, including the need for securing the adequate financial support for and the cost-efficiency of the review process. Give due consideration and undertake a thorough evaluation of these proposals with a view to achieving a consensus on agreed measures to strengthen further the review process.

c. Stress that enhancing transparency and accountability among all States parties in regard to their obligations under the Treaty should remain a constant endeavour of the States parties.

### 8. Ways and means to promote engagement with civil society in strengthening NPT norms and in promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education.

a. Commend the contributions of the civil society and especially of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) to the strengthened review process of the Treaty and in the efforts to promote the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons by developing proposals on practical measures to achieve this vision. Note the proposals made during the Preparatory Committee sessions for the enhanced participation of NGOs in this process.

b. Underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the Treaty in addressing both current and emerging challenges. Consider the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the UN study on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

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## Draft Recommendations to the Review Conference – Revision 1

[NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/CRP.4/Rev.1  
13 May 2009]

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The Preparatory Committee has considered principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality. The States parties reaffirm the need to maintain a balance between the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Preparatory Committee conveys to the 2010 Review Conference the following elements for its consideration in evaluating the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty. It has also identified areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. These elements build upon the three Decisions and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the Final Document adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, and subsequent deliberations and discussion within the NPT review process. The Preparatory Committee believes that these elements, which were drawn from statements and working papers by States parties, identify a practical framework in which the Review Conference could achieve a consensus. These elements are conveyed without

regard to their priority, without prejudice to other initiatives that States parties may wish to offer, and without any intention to represent a comprehensive summary of all initiatives proposed in Preparatory Committee sessions.

### **I. Universality of the treaty, and of principles of disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.**

a. Reaffirm the existence of fundamental principles of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy that are universal in scope. Reaffirm that the Treaty is an expression of these principles. Recognize the fundamental importance of full compliance with all the provisions of the Treaty and the relevant IAEA safeguards agreements, and of consequences for breaches of Treaty obligations. Emphasize that responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty should be pursued by diplomatic means.

b. Declare that the Treaty remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and that its full and effective implementation is vital to international peace and security. Reaffirm that the Treaty fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

c. Reaffirm the commitment shared by States parties to achieving universal membership. Call upon all states that are not parties to join the Treaty promptly as non-nuclear-weapon States and without conditions. Engage non-parties with a view to achieving this goal.

### **2. Action plan for the three pillars of the Treaty.**

#### **2.1 Nuclear disarmament, including specific practical measures.**

a. Reaffirm the obligations of States parties under Article VI relating to nuclear disarmament, and to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Indicate support for ongoing and future efforts in these fields. Recognize the importance of practical nuclear disarmament by all nuclear-weapon States.

b. Reaffirm and update commitments relating to disarmament made at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and at the 2000 Review Conference. Recommend, on the basis of the principles of promotion of international stability and undiminished security for all, several practical disarmament measures and goals contributing to the fulfilment of article VI, including, but not limited to: facilitating the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and, pending its achievement; maintaining the moratoria on nuclear test explosions; commencing negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a verifiable fissile material [cutoff] treaty, building upon the positive momentum of efforts by its 2009 Presidents to adopt a programme of work; implementing an immediate moratorium on the further production of fissile material for weapons pending conclusion of the treaty; and pursuing deep reductions in nuclear arsenals.

c. Discuss related ways and means to ensure the irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency of disarmament activities. Recognize the benefits for disarmament of reducing the operational status of nuclear forces, reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons pending their elimination, and reducing reliance on nuclear weapons in security policies. Affirm the importance of effective assurances that nuclear-weapon States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties. Examine ways and means to achieve additional assurances that are legally binding.

d. Commence open-ended discussions to identify possibilities available to establish an international legal framework for the achievement of global nuclear disarmament. Engage non-parties to the Treaty with the aim of attaining a world free of nuclear weapons.

#### **2.2 Non-proliferation; promote and strengthen safeguards.**

a. Reaffirm that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat to international peace and security requiring a global response and underscore the urgent need for States parties to pursue strengthened ways and means to achieve the objectives of articles I, II, and III.

b. Affirm that export controls are best addressed and implemented

in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner, and without hampering the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses, in conformity with the Treaty. Recommend that transparency in export controls should continue to be promoted within a framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States Party to the Treaty. Recognize that national rules and regulations of States parties are necessary to ensure that the States parties are able to give effect to their commitments with respect to the transfer of nuclear and nuclear dual-use items to all States taking into account articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and for States parties, also fully respecting article IV.

c. Underscore the importance of the verifiable de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Support diplomatic efforts to achieve this goal.

d. Affirm the need for full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency to resolve any outstanding verification issues.

e. Reaffirm that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; play an essential role in the implementation of the Treaty and contribute to create an environment conducive to achieving nuclear disarmament and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

f. Reaffirm that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority responsible for verifying compliance with its safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, and, in this context, reaffirm the importance of acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards. Identify specific measures that would serve to promote the universalisation of the IAEA safeguards system. Welcome the efforts of the Agency to strengthen safeguards and to increase the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, as well as the steps taken to assist states in their application.

d. Affirm the need for multilateral cooperation to prevent the establishment, perpetuation, or growth of clandestine nuclear supply networks, in accordance with international law.

#### **2.3. Advance peaceful uses of nuclear energy.**

a. Reaffirm the inalienable right of States parties under article IV to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Note the contribution that growing applications of nuclear technology in health care, industry, agriculture, power generation, and environmental protection can make in advancing development worldwide.

b. Commend the important role of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme in facilitating the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in developing countries. Stress the need to support such cooperation with adequate financial and human resources in an assured and predictable manner.

c. Stress the importance of extensive and transparent consultations in the consideration of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and assurances of the supply. Indicate that such proposals should be addressed in a multilateral, economically viable and non-discriminatory manner under the auspices of IAEA, without infringement of the rights of States parties under article IV the Treaty. Confirm that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

d. Recognize the importance of bilateral and international cooperation programmes to assist countries considering the development of nuclear energy for the first time. Stress the need to develop the adequate infrastructures, with appropriate assistance in the field of human resources training.

### **3. Ways and means to strengthen nuclear safety and security.**

a. Highlight the importance of strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection, the safety of radioactive waste management, and the safe transport of nuclear and radioactive materials, including maritime transport. Underscore the need to maintain the highest standards of safety at civilian nuclear installations through national measures and international cooperation.

b. Emphasize that the acquisition of nuclear weapons or related materials by non-State actors would constitute a threat to international peace and security. Affirm the importance of the full implementation of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008), as well as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

c. Stress the importance of combating nuclear terrorism and support the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan. Welcome the contributions of the IAEA in the promotion of the physical protection of nuclear material and safety in all its aspects. Endorse the IAEA's work in assisting States' efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. Underscore the importance of regular contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

d. Call upon all states that have not yet done so, to accede to all relevant conventions on nuclear safety, on safety of spent fuel, on safety of radioactive waste management, and on physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. Also call upon all states to follow the guidelines in the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Stress the importance of maintaining dialogue on facilitating the safe maritime transport of radioactive material.

#### **4. Ways and means to implement regional non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives and to explore future initiatives.**

a. Reaffirm that nuclear-weapon-free zones have made and continue to make an important contribution to the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime in all its aspects, and to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Support increased cooperation among the parties to all the zones. Consider calling for the consideration of the establishment of new zones in regions with nuclear facilities or materials. Recognize the importance of the establishment of regional zones free of weapons of mass destruction.

b. Note the establishment of the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and also recognize and affirm the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. Endorse and reaffirm the goal of achieving the early entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty. Underline the importance of the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Encourage zonal parties and the nuclear-weapon States to engage in dialogue to enable their adherence to the Protocols of all treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

#### **5. Ways and means to implement the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.**

a. Recall that the Resolution on the Middle East was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended. Underscore the need for increased efforts to implement the Resolution.

b. Consider the proposal to convene a conference of all states concerned to address ways and means to implement the Resolution and undertake consultations with a view to facilitating the convening of such a conference. Establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference to consider concrete practical steps to promote the earliest implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East. Consider the appointment of a special coordinator to hold consultations with the countries in the region and report on their outcome during the course of the review process. Call upon all States parties to issue periodic reports to each of the Preparatory Committees and the Review Conference on their efforts to implement the Resolution.

#### **6. Measures to address the risks and implications of Treaty withdrawals.**

a. Acknowledge the right to withdraw from the Treaty, in accordance with article X.

b. Consider the proposals presented in the Preparatory Committee that identified modalities under which States parties could collectively respond to notifications of withdrawal.

#### **7. Initiatives to strengthen the review process, including possible institutional measures.**

a. Affirm the essential role of the strengthened review process in ensuring the effectiveness of the Treaty in improving international security environments, in enhancing transparency, in strengthening accountability in the implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty, and in promoting its universality. View the decisions and the resolution adopted in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document adopted at the 2000 Review Conference as embodying principles, objectives, or means to serve this goal.

b. Affirm that the strengthened review process has become an indispensable, dynamic mechanism for evaluating the Treaty's operation and implementation. Recognize that several proposals advocating the need for certain institutional and procedural reforms have been submitted by States parties, including the need for securing the adequate financial support for and the cost-efficiency of the review process. Give due consideration and undertake a thorough evaluation of these proposals with a view to achieving a consensus on agreed measures to strengthen further the review process.

c. Stress that enhancing transparency and accountability among all States parties in regard to their obligations under the Treaty should remain a constant endeavour of the States parties.

#### **8. Ways and means to promote engagement with civil society in strengthening NPT norms and in promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education.**

a. Commend the contributions of the civil society and especially of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) to the strengthened review process of the Treaty and in the efforts to promote the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons by developing proposals on practical measures to achieve this vision. Note the proposals made during the Preparatory Committee sessions for the enhanced participation of NGOs in this process.

b. Underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the Treaty in addressing both current and emerging challenges. Consider the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/571124) regarding the UN study on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

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### **Draft Recommendations to the Review Conference**

[Reproduced from NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/CRP.4  
New York, 7 May 2009]

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The Preparatory Committee conveys to the 2010 Review Conference the following recommendations concerning the implementation of the Treaty, which build upon the three Decisions as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and the Final Document adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. The Preparatory Committee believes that these recommendations, which were based on statements and working papers by States parties, identify practical initiatives that stand a reasonable prospect of producing a consensus. These recommendations are conveyed without regard to their priority, without prejudice to other initiatives that States parties may wish to offer, and without any intention to represent a comprehensive summary of all initiatives proposed in Preparatory Committee sessions.

#### **1. Declaration on the universality of disarmament and non-proliferation principles.**

a. Declare that the Treaty is an expression of fundamental principles of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation that are universal in scope. Affirm the legally binding nature of the obligations of the treaty. Recognize the fundamental importance of full compliance with all the provisions of the Treaty and the relevant IAEA safeguards agreements. Emphasize that responses to concerns over compliance with obligations under the Treaty should be pursued by peaceful diplomatic means.

b. Declare that the Treaty remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and that its full

implementation is vital to international peace and security. Further declare that the Treaty provides a legal foundation for the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and for the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

c. Reaffirm the commitment shared by States parties to achieving universal membership and call upon all states that are not parties to adhere to the Treaty promptly and without preconditions. Resolve to engage nonparties with a view to achieving this goal.

## **2. An action plan to achieve nuclear disarmament, including specific practical measures.**

a. Reaffirm the commitments of States parties under Article VI relating to nuclear disarmament, and to general and complete disarmament. Recognize growing expectations for progress to achieve nuclear disarmament, and indicate support for ongoing and future efforts in these fields.

b. Acknowledge that several commitments relating to disarmament made at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and at the 2000 Review Conference have not yet been fulfilled. Consider the adoption of an action plan, drawing inter alia upon commitments made at these earlier Conferences, setting practical, achievable and specified goals, and measures leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

c. Identify several practical disarmament initiatives, including: the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and, pending its achievement, maintaining the moratoria on nuclear testing; commencing negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a verifiable fissile material treaty and, pending the conclusion of negotiations, encouraging a moratorium on the further production of weapon-usable fissile material; achieving deep and verifiable reductions in the nuclear arsenals; expanding the transparency in implementing disarmament commitments; ensuring the irreversibility of disarmament activities; reducing the operational status of the nuclear forces; diminishing further the role of nuclear weapons in security policies; refraining from the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; reducing nonstrategic nuclear weapons pending their elimination; and placing fissile material recovered from dismantled nuclear weapons under IAEA monitoring and verification. Examine, inter alia, ways and means to commence negotiations, in accordance with article VI, on a convention or framework of agreements to achieve global nuclear disarmament, and to engage non-parties to the Treaty.

## **3. Ways and means to strengthen non-proliferation; promote and strengthen safeguards.**

a. Reaffirm that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a global challenge requiring a global response and underscore the urgent need for States parties to pursue strengthened ways and means to achieve the objectives of articles I, II, and III.

b. Reaffirm that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, play an essential role in the implementation of the Treaty and contribute to create an environment conducive to achieving nuclear disarmament and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

c. Reaffirm that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with its safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty. Welcome the efforts of the Agency to strengthen safeguards as well as the steps taken to assist states in their application. Identify specific measures that would serve to promote the universalization and strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system.

d. Affirm the need for additional multilateral cooperation to prevent the establishment, perpetuation, or growth of clandestine nuclear supply networks, in accordance with international law.

e. Affirm that export controls are best addressed and implemented in a transparent and non-discriminatory manner, and without hampering the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses, in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty.

f. Affirm the importance of effective assurances that nuclear-weapon States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties. Examine ways and means to achieve additional assurances that are legally binding.

## **4. Measures to advance peaceful uses of nuclear energy, safety, and security.**

a. Reaffirm the inalienable right of States parties under article IV to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Welcome growing applications of nuclear technology in health care, industry, agriculture, and environmental protection.

b. Reiterate that restrictions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be applied for political purposes.

c. Commend the importance of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme, underlining that such cooperation has played an important role in facilitating the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes especially in developing countries. Stress the need to support such cooperation with adequate financial and human resources in an assured and predictable manner.

d. Stress the need to intensify consideration of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and assurances of the supply of nuclear fuel and technology. Indicate that such proposals should be addressed in a multilateral, economically viable and non-discriminatory manner under the auspices of IAEA, without restrictions on access to nuclear material, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes as provided for in the Treaty. Confirm that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

e. Highlight the importance of strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection, the safety of radioactive waste management, and the safe transport of nuclear and radioactive materials, including maritime transport. Underscore the need to maintain the highest standards of safety at civilian nuclear installations through national measures and international cooperation.

f. Emphasize that the acquisition of nuclear weapons or related materials by non-State actors would constitute a threat to international peace and security that could potentially jeopardize the Treaty. Affirm the importance of the full implementation of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008), as well as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

g. Stress the importance of combating nuclear terrorism and endorse the IAEA action plan on protection against nuclear terrorism. Endorse the IAEA's work in support of States' efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material and underscore the importance of contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund of IAEA. Urge the careful consideration of measures of control and monitoring of global stocks of materials directly usable in nuclear weapons and the capacity to produce such materials.

h. Welcome the contributions of the IAEA in the promotion of the physical protection of nuclear material and safety in all its aspects. Call upon all states that had not yet done so to accede to all relevant conventions on nuclear safety, safe waste management and physical protection of nuclear material and the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Support efforts to enhance the security of stockpiles of weapon-usable fissile materials, while minimizing their use in the civilian nuclear sector. Stress the importance of maintaining dialogue on facilitating safe maritime transport of radioactive material.

## **5. Ways and means to implement regional non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives, including the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, and to explore future initiatives.**

a. Reaffirm that nuclear-weapon-free zones have made and continue to make an important contribution to the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime in all its aspects, and to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the ultimate

objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Support increased cooperation among the parties to all the zones. Consider calling for the consideration of the establishment of new zones in regions with nuclear facilities or materials. Recognize the importance of the establishment of regional zones free of weapons of mass destruction.

b. Welcome the establishment of the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and also recognize and affirm the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. Endorse and reaffirm the goal of achieving the early entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty. Encourage the nuclear-weapon States to adhere to the Protocols of all treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Note the existence of strong support for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Southern Hemisphere, consistent with international law and the law of the sea.

c. Recall that the Resolution on the Middle East was integrally linked to the Decision by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference to extend indefinitely the duration of the Treaty. Underscore the need for increased efforts to implement the Resolution. Consider the proposal to call upon the nuclear-weapon States to convene a conference of all states of the Middle East region to address ways and means to implement the Resolution. Invite all States parties to undertake consultations with a view to facilitating the convening of such a conference. Call upon all States parties to issue periodic reports to each of the Preparatory Committees and the Review Conference on their efforts implement the Resolution.

#### **6. Measures to address the risk of Treaty withdrawals.**

a. Acknowledge the right to withdraw from the Treaty, in accordance with article X.

b. Consider the proposals presented in the Preparatory Committee that identified modalities under which States parties could collectively respond to notifications of withdrawal.

#### **7. Initiatives to strengthen the review process, including possible institutional measures.**

a. Affirm the essential role of the strengthened review process in ensuring the effectiveness of the Treaty in changing international security environments, in enhancing transparency, in strengthening accountability in the implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty, and in promoting its universality. View the decisions and the resolution adopted in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document adopted at the 2000 Review Conference as embodying principles, objectives, or means to serve this goal.

b. Affirm that the strengthened review process has become an indispensable, dynamic mechanism for the interpretation of the Treaty and for evaluating its operation and implementation. Recognize that several proposals advocating the need for certain institutional and procedural reforms have been submitted by States parties, including the need for securing the adequate financial support for and the cost-efficiency of the review process. Give due consideration and undertake a thorough evaluation of these proposals with a view to achieving a consensus on agreed measures to strengthen further the review process.

c. Stress that enhancing transparency and accountability among all States parties in regard to their obligations under the Treaty should remain a constant endeavor of the States parties. Consider establishing a uniform, practical and cost-efficient reporting system for the implementation of the Treaty.

#### **8. Ways and means to promote engagement with civil society in strengthening NPT norms and in promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education.**

a. Commend the contributions of the civil society and especially of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) to the strengthened review process of the Treaty and in the efforts to promote the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons by developing proposals on practical measures to achieve this vision. Consider the substantive proposals made during the Preparatory Committee sessions for the enhanced participation of NGOs in this process.

b. Underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the Treaty in addressing both current and emerging challenges. Encourage States parties to implement the

recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the UN study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

### **Final Report of the 2009 Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

[Reproduced from NPT/CONF.2010/1, 20 May 2009]

[Editorial note: Footnote not included]

[Eds...]

#### **I. Terms of reference and organization of work**

1. At its sixty-first session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 61/70 of 6 December 2006, took note of the decision of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), following appropriate consultations, to hold the first session of the Preparatory Committee in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May 2007.

2. Accordingly, the Committee held its first session in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May 2007. Following the decisions taken at the first session, the Committee held its second session at Geneva from 28 April to 9 May 2008 and its third session in New York from 4 to 15 May 2009. Reports covering the first two sessions of the Committee were issued, respectively, as documents NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/22 and NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/13.

3. At the first session of the Preparatory Committee, an understanding had been reached among delegations, according to which a representative of the Western Group should be proposed to chair the first session, a representative of the Group of Eastern European States should be proposed to chair the second session, a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be proposed to chair the third session and a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty should be proposed for the presidency of the 2010 Review Conference.

4. Pursuant to that understanding, at its first session, the Preparatory Committee elected Yukiya Amano (Japan) to serve as Chairman of the first session. It also decided that Volodymyr Yelchenko (Ukraine) would be the Chairman of the second session. It was further decided that, when not serving as Chairmen, the Chairmen of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee would serve as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee.

5. At its second session, the Committee decided to elect Boniface Guwa Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe) as Chairman of the third session.

6. At the third session, the Committee authorized its Bureau and the President-elect to handle technical and other organizational matters, as well as to carry out consultations with States parties in the period before the Conference. It also decided that the Chairman of the third session should open the Conference.

7. At its first session, the Committee adopted its agenda as contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/15, as follows:

1. Opening of the session.
2. Election of the Chairman.
3. Adoption of the agenda.
4. General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee.
5. Statements by non-governmental organizations.
6. Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East, adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of the 1975, 1985, 2000, and 2005 Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty, and thereby considering approaches and measures to realize its purpose, reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Treaty.
7. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee:
  - (a) Election of officers;

- (b) Dates and venue for further sessions;
  - (c) Methods of work;
  - (i) Decision-making;
  - (ii) Participation;
  - (iii) Working languages;
  - (iv) Records and documents.
8. Report on the results of the session to the next session of the Preparatory Committee.
9. Organization of the 2010 Review Conference:
- (a) Dates and venue;
  - (b) Draft rules of procedure;
  - (c) Election of the President and other officers;
  - (d) Appointment of the Secretary-General of the Review Conference;
  - (e) Provisional agenda;
  - (f) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee;
  - (g) Background documentation;
  - (h) Final document(s).
10. Adoption of the final report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the Review Conference.
11. Any other matters.

8. In connection with the adoption of the agenda, the Committee adopted the following decision: "The Committee decides that it understands the reference in the agenda to 'reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Treaty' to mean that it will consider compliance with all the provisions of the Treaty". The Committee also decided that the text of the above decision would be included as the footnote to item 6 of the agenda.

9. Thomas Markram, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Office for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Preparatory Committee. Tariq Rauf, Head, Verification and Security Policy Coordination, Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination, International Atomic Energy Agency represented the Agency at all sessions.

10. Delegations of the following 135 States parties participated in one or more sessions of the Preparatory Committee: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

11. At its first session, the Committee decided that:
- (a) Representatives of States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their countries' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Committee. Palestine participated in the work of the meetings of the Committee as an observer;
  - (b) Representatives of specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of

the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their organizations' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as documents of the Committee. Furthermore, the Committee decided, based on the agreement at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, which would be applied *mutatis mutandis*, that specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations be invited to make oral presentations to the Committee upon the decision of the Committee, on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, the following specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations were represented as observers at the meetings of the Committee: Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, European Commission, League of Arab States, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization;

(c) Representatives of non-governmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed, to be seated in the designated area, to receive documents of the Committee and, at their own expense, to make written material available to the participants in the Committee. The Committee shall also allocate a meeting to non-governmental organizations to address each session of the Committee. Representatives of 114 non-governmental organizations attended one or more sessions of the Committee.

12. At its first session, the Committee decided to make every effort to adopt its decisions by consensus. In the event that consensus could not be reached, the Committee would then take decisions in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 2005 Review Conference, which would be applied *mutatis mutandis*.

13. Also at its first session, the Committee decided to use Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish as its working languages.

14. In accordance with the Committee's decision at its first session, summary records were provided, at each session, for the Committee's opening meetings, the general debate and the closing meetings. The summary records of the first session were issued as documents NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/SR.1-4, 6 and 19. The summary records of the second session were issued as documents NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/SR.1-3, 5 and 14. The summary records of the third session (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/SR.1-3, 5 and 16) are issued separately as annex I to the present report.

15. Also at each session, the Committee set aside one meeting for presentations by representatives of non-governmental organizations.

## II. Substantive work of the Committee

16. The Committee held 25 meetings devoted to substantive discussions under agenda item 6.

17. The discussion at each session of the Preparatory Committee was structured according to indicative timetables, which provided equal time for the consideration of three clusters of issues and three specific blocs of issues.

18. The Committee considered the following three clusters of issues based on the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the 2005 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2005/DEC.1):

- (a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security;
- (b) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II.

19. The Committee considered the following three specific blocs of issues:

- (a) Nuclear disarmament and security assurances;
- (b) Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East;
- (c) Other provisions of the Treaty, including article X.

20. The Committee had before it a number of documents submitted by delegations. The list of the documents submitted during the Committee's sessions is contained in annex II to the present report.

### III. Organization of work of the Review Conference

21. In the course of its sessions, the Committee considered the following questions relating to the organization and work of the 2010 Review Conference:

- (a) Dates and venue;
- (b) Draft rules of procedure;
- (c) Election of the President and other officers;
- (d) Appointment of the Secretary-General;
- (e) Provisional agenda;
- (f) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee;
- (g) Background documentation;
- (h) Final document(s).

#### Dates and venue of the Conference

22. At its first session, the Committee decided to hold the Review Conference in New York from 26 April to 21 May 2010.

23. At its third session, the Committee adopted the following decision: "Taking into account the developments resulting from the Capital Master Plan (CMP) regarding the availability of conference services and facilities, the Committee decides to hold the Review Conference in New York from 3 to 28 May 2010".

#### Draft rules of procedure

24. At its third session, the Committee considered the draft rules of procedure for the Conference and agreed to recommend to the Conference the draft rules of procedure as contained in annex III to the present report.

25. At the same session, the Committee agreed to recommend to the Conference that, notwithstanding rule 44.3 of the draft rules of procedure recommended to the Conference, specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations be invited to make oral presentations to the Conference upon the decision of the Conference, on a case-by-case basis.

26. Also at its third session, the Committee agreed to recommend to the Conference that, in accordance with the draft rules of procedure, representatives of non-governmental organizations be allowed to attend meetings, other than those designated as closed, and to receive documents of the Conference; that, in accordance with past practice, non-governmental organizations be allowed to make written material available, at their own expense, to the participants of the Conference; and that non-governmental organizations be allowed to address the Conference, consistent with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

#### Election of the President and other officers

27. At its third session, the Committee unanimously endorsed the candidacy of Libran N. Cabactulan of the Philippines for the presidency of the 2010 Review Conference.

28. At the same session, the Committee agreed to recommend that: Main Committee I should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States, namely, the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee (Zimbabwe); Main Committee II should be chaired by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States, namely, the Chairman of the second session of the Preparatory Committee (Ukraine); and that Main Committee III should be chaired by a representative of the Western Group, namely, the Chairman of the first session of the Preparatory Committee (Japan).

29. The Committee also agreed to recommend that the post of Chairman of the Drafting Committee be assumed by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States, and the post of Chairman of the Credentials Committee by a representative

of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States.

#### Appointment of the Secretary-General

30. At its second session, the Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a nomination to be confirmed by the Conference itself. At its third session, the Committee was informed of the decision of the Secretary-General, taken after consultations with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate Thomas Markram, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Office for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, to serve as provisional Secretary-General of the Conference. The Committee took note of that nomination.

#### Provisional agenda

31. At its third session, the Committee adopted the draft provisional agenda of the 2010 Review Conference as contained in annex IV to the present report.

32. At the same session, the Committee adopted the draft decision on the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the Conference as contained in annex V to the present report.

#### Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee

33. At its second session, the Committee took note of the estimated costs of the Conference, including its Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/1). In order to promote greater financial transparency and accountability and taking into account the practice of multilateral and other organizations, the Committee, at its second session, decided to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to provide a financial report to the Review Conference and each session of its Preparatory Committee to be circulated as an official document. Pursuant to this decision, the financial report was submitted to the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/1).

34. At its third session, the Committee agreed to the schedule for the division of costs. The schedule for the division of costs is contained in the appendix to the draft rules of procedure, as reflected in annex III to the present report.

#### Background documentation

35. At its third session, the Preparatory Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General to prepare documentation, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The decision on background documentation is contained in annex VI of the present report.

#### Final document(s)

36. At its third session, the Committee decided to defer the consideration of this matter to the 2010 Review Conference.

### IV. Participation at the Review Conference

37. At the third session, the Committee decided that invitations to States which, in accordance with the decision on participation, were entitled to participate in the Conference, as well as invitations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, should be issued by the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee.

### V. Adoption of the final report

38. The Preparatory Committee adopted its final report at its last meeting, on 15 May 2009.

#### Annex I

##### Summary records

The summary records of the meetings of the third session of the Preparatory Committee will be issued separately in documents NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/SR.1-3, 5 and 16

**Annex II****List of documents****First session**

NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/1 Provisional agenda  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/2 Note verbale dated 27 April 2007 from the Permanent Mission of Cuba, Chair of the Vienna Chapter of the Non-Aligned Movement  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/3 Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament": report submitted by Australia  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/4 Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East: report submitted by Australia  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/5 Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament": national report of Mexico  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/6 Steps taken to implement the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education: national report of Mexico  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/7 Multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle: Food-for-thought paper submitted by Austria  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/8 Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East: report submitted by Canada  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/9 Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by Canada  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/10 United Kingdom report on implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/11 Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament": report submitted by the Republic of Korea  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/12 Steps to advance the Middle East peace process and to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East: report submitted by China  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/13 Implementation of article VI: report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/14 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East: report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/15 Agenda  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/16 Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament": report submitted by Malaysia  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/17 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by New Zealand  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/18 Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament": report submitted by Norway  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/19 Note verbale dated 10 May 2007 from the Permanent Mission of Cuba, on behalf of the Group of States Parties to the NPT that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/20 Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament": report submitted by Ireland  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/21 Partnerships for peaceful nuclear cooperation: United States support for article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, submitted by the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/22 Report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.1 Working paper submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic on substantive questions to be considered at the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.2 Working paper submitted by Japan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.3 Japan's efforts in disarmament and non-proliferation education: working paper submitted by Japan

NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.4 Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: report submitted by Japan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.5 Verification: working paper presented by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.6 Procedural and other arrangements for the effective and successful outcome of the Preparatory Committee and 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper presented by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.7 Regional issues: Middle East: working paper presented by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.8 Nuclear disarmament: working paper presented by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.9 Nuclear testing: working paper presented by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.10 Security assurances: working paper presented by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.11 Nuclear-weapon-free zones: working paper presented by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.12 Safeguards: working paper presented by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.13 Implementation of the 1995 resolution and 2000 outcome on the Middle East: working paper submitted by Egypt  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.14 Some principal and substantive issues relating to the effectiveness of the Treaty and its review process: working paper submitted by Egypt  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.15 Working paper submitted by Ireland on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden as members of the New Agenda Coalition  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.16 Peaceful uses of nuclear energy: working paper submitted by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.17 Model Nuclear Weapons Convention: working paper submitted by Costa Rica  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.18 Challenges of non-proliferation non-compliance: working paper submitted by the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.19 Disarmament, the United States and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.20 Facilitating disarmament: working paper submitted by the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.21 Achieving and sustaining nuclear weapons elimination: working paper submitted by the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.22 Article X of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: deterring and responding to withdrawal by Treaty violators: working paper submitted by the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.23 Promoting expanded and responsible peaceful uses of nuclear energy: working paper submitted by the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.24 Safeguards and nuclear security: working paper submitted by the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.25 Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: European Union common approach: working paper submitted by the European Union  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.26 Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty as the next logical multilateral instrument to be negotiated for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the NPT: working paper submitted by the European Union  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.IWP.27 Security assurances: working paper

submitted by Italy  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.28 Implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by Oman on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.29 Cluster one: nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances: working paper submitted by Canada  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.30 Preparing for a successful Review Conference 2010: working paper submitted by the European Union  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.31 Perspectives on issues related to cluster 1: working paper submitted by Australia  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.32 Perspectives on issues related to cluster 2: working paper submitted by Australia  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.33 Perspectives on issues related to cluster three: working paper submitted by Australia  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.34 Perspectives on issues related to article X of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by Australia  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.35 Australia's commitment to article IV of the NPT: paper submitted by Australia  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.36 Perspectives on issues related to nuclear terrorism: working paper submitted by Australia  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.37 Nuclear security: working paper submitted by the European Union  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.38 Export controls: working paper submitted by the European Union  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.39 Verification and safeguards: Working paper submitted by the European Union  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.40 Cluster two: non-proliferation and safeguards: working paper submitted by Canada  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.41 Cluster three: peaceful uses of nuclear energy: working paper submitted by Canada  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.42 Other provisions: institutional reform, article X and withdrawal: working paper submitted by Canada  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.43 Security assurances: working paper submitted by China  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.44 Peaceful uses of nuclear energy: working paper submitted by China  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.45 Nuclear-weapon-free zone: working paper submitted by China  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.46 Nuclear disarmament and reduction of the danger of nuclear war: working paper submitted by China  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.47 Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by China  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.48 Nuclear issues in the Middle East: working paper submitted by China  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.49 International Atomic Energy Agency: Fiftieth anniversary and ongoing contribution to the NPT: working paper by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.50 Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7: compliance and verification: working paper by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.51 Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7: physical protection and illicit trafficking: working paper by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.52 Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7: export controls: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.53 Article III (3) and article IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5: nuclear safety: working paper by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.54 Article V and article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: working paper by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and

Sweden  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.55 Article III (3) and article IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5: approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle: working paper by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.56 Article III (3) and article IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5: cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy: working paper by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.57 Cluster one: article VII: working paper submitted by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.58 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.59 Working paper on disarmament submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.60 Working paper on cluster 2 issues submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.61 Multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle/guarantees of access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy: working paper submitted by the European Union  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.62 Environmental consequences of uranium mining: working paper submitted by Kyrgyzstan, on behalf of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.63 Cluster I: working paper submitted by Norway  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.64 Cluster II: working paper submitted by Norway  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.65 Cluster III: working paper submitted by Norway  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.66 Nuclear power development: meeting the world's energy needs and fulfilling article IV: working paper submitted by Canada, France and the Republic of Korea  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.67 The question of the agenda of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.68 Regional issues and security assurances: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.69 Working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.70 Nuclear disarmament: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.71 Nuclear-weapon-free zones: working paper submitted by Peru, as Chairman of the Latin American and Caribbean Group, on behalf of the States parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) represented at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.72 Nuclear disarmament and security assurances: working paper submitted by the Republic of Korea  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.73 Nuclear non-proliferation and non-compliance: working paper submitted by the Republic of Korea  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.74 Working paper submitted by Palestine  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.75 Peaceful uses of nuclear energy: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.76 New Zealand perspective on issues under cluster III  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.77 Non-proliferation and the Middle East: working paper submitted by the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.78 Chairman's working paper  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/CRP.1 Dates and venues for further sessions of the Preparatory Committee and for the 2010 Review Conference: draft proposal by the Chairman  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/CRP.2 Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee (draft decision)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/CRP.3 Draft report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session

NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/INF.1 Information note  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/INF.2\* List of non-governmental organizations  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/INF.3 and Rev.1, 2 and 3 Indicative timetable  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/INF.4 and Rev.1 Proposed indicative timetable  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/INF.5 List of officers and telephone numbers  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/INF.6 and Add.1 and Corr.1 List of participants  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/INF.7 Proposed indicative timetable (week 2)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/MISC.1 Provisional list of participants

#### Second session

NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/1 Estimated cost of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/2 Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by Canada  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/3 Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East: report submitted by Canada  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/4 Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament": report submitted by Japan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/5 Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East: report submitted by Japan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/6 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East: report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/7 Implementation of article VI: report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/8 Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament": report submitted by Australia  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/9 Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East: report submitted by Australia  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/10 Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: report submitted by Romania  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/11 and Corr.1 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by New Zealand  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/12 Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament": report submitted by Norway  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/13 Report of the Preparatory Committee on its second session  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.1 Nuclear-weapon-free zones: working paper submitted by Mongolia  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.2 Implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.3 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.4 The issue of non-compliance with articles I, III, IV and VI: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.5 Nuclear disarmament: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.6 Peaceful uses of nuclear energy: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.7 Cluster 2: Non-Proliferation and

Safeguards "towards the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and the universal application of the Additional Protocol": working paper submitted by Japan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.8 Cluster 3: peaceful uses of nuclear energy and Japan's experience: working paper submitted by Japan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.9 Disarmament and non-proliferation education: working paper submitted by Japan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.10 Cluster 1: nuclear disarmament: working paper submitted by Japan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.11 Perspectives on issues related to withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: bolstering the benefits of the Treaty regime to prevent withdrawal: working paper submitted by Japan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.12 Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7 (compliance and verification): working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (Vienna Group of 10)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.13 Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, physical protection and illicit trafficking: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (Vienna Group of 10)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.14 Article V, article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12: comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (Vienna Group of 10)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.15 Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, export controls: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (Vienna Group of 10)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.16 Article III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (Vienna Group of 10)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.17 Article III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, nuclear safety: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (Vienna Group of 10)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.18 Article III (3) and IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy: working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (Vienna Group of 10)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.19 Substantive issues on the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.20 Establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East: working paper submitted by Egypt  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.21 Creating a new momentum for a fissile material cut-off treaty: working paper submitted by Germany  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.22 Working towards a successful 2010 Review Conference: working paper submitted by Germany  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.23 Nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties: working paper submitted by Slovenia on behalf of the European Union  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.24 Other provisions of the Treaty, including article X: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.25 Negative security assurances: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.26 New Agenda Coalition paper: submitted by New Zealand on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden as members of the New Agenda Coalition  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.27 Compliance and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by

the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.28 Non-proliferation: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.29 Article X: withdrawal: working paper submitted by the Republic of Korea  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.30 Challenges to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by Egypt  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.31 Cluster I: Article VII: working paper submitted by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.32 “To ensure access to nuclear fuel supply and enrichment services” — Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project: working paper submitted by Germany  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.33 Non-proliferation and the Middle East: working paper submitted by the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.34 Compliance with the provisions of the Treaty: working paper submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.35 Commitment of the United States of America to the Treaty: international cooperation on nuclear power: working paper submitted by the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.36 Preparing for a successful Review Conference 2010: working paper submitted by Ukraine  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.37 Procedures in relation to exports of nuclear materials and certain categories of equipment and material in relation to article III (2) of the Treaty: working paper submitted by Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America as members of the Zangger Committee and Costa Rica, Cyprus, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and New Zealand as additional co-sponsors  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.38 Improving the effectiveness of the methods of work of the Treaty review process: working paper submitted by the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.39 Financing the Treaty review process: working paper submitted by the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.40 Nuclear power development: meeting the world’s energy needs and fulfilling article IV: working paper submitted by Canada, Estonia, France, the Republic of Korea, Poland, Romania, Ukraine and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.41 Expanding international civil nuclear cooperation: working paper presented by France, Thailand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.42 Deterring and responding to withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by Treaty violators: working paper presented by the Republic of Korea and the United States of America  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.43 Chairman’s working paper  
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 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/CRP.1 Draft decisions on the organization of work of the Preparatory Committee and the 2010 Review Conference (decisions 1 to 3)  
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 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/CRP.3 Revised draft decisions on the organization of work of the Preparatory Committee and the 2010 Review Conference (revised draft decisions 2 and 3)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/CRP.4 Draft report of the Preparatory Committee on its second session  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/INF.1 Dates and venue: Information note  
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 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/INF.4 and Rev.1 List of non-governmental organizations  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/INF.5 List of Secretariat officers and telephone numbers  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/INF.6 List of participants

NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/MISC.1 Provisional list of participants

### Third session

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 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/2 Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”: report submitted by Japan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/3 Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East: report submitted by Australia  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/4 Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by Canada  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/5 Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East: report submitted by Canada  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/6 Implementation of article VI: report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/7 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East: report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/8 Chairman’s statement at the conclusion of the meeting of focal points of nuclear-weapon-free zones and Mongolia  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/9 Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”: report submitted by Australia  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/10 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: report submitted by the Government of New Zealand  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.1 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.2 The issue of negative security assurances: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.3 The issue of non-compliance with articles I, III, IV and VI: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.4 Other provisions of the Treaty, including article X: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.5 Nuclear disarmament: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.6 Non-proliferation: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.7 Peaceful research, production and use of nuclear energy: working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.8 Strengthening the Review Process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by Canada  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.9 Working paper submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic to the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Substantive issues in the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.10 Working paper submitted by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.11 Working paper submitted by Sweden on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden as members of the New Agenda Coalition  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.12 Cluster two: Article VII: working paper submitted by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.13 Eleven benchmarks for global nuclear disarmament: working paper submitted by Japan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.14 Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7 (compliance and verification): working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark,

Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (“the Vienna Group of Ten”)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.15 Article V, article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: working paper by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (“the Vienna Group of Ten”)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.16 Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7 (export controls): working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (“the Vienna Group of Ten”)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.17 Article III (3) and article IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 (nuclear safety): working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (Vienna Group of 10)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.18 Article III, paragraph 3, article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III, paragraphs 1, 2 and 4, and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 (Cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy): working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (“the Vienna Group of Ten”)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.19 Article III and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7 (physical protection and illicit trafficking): working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (“the Vienna Group of Ten”)  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.20 Implementation of the 1995 resolution and 2000 outcome on the Middle East: the final outcome of the last session of the Preparatory Committee: working paper submitted by Egypt  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.21 Implementation of the 1995 resolution and 2000 outcome on the Middle East: working paper submitted by Palestine  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.22 Principles of fuel supply guarantees and the multilateralization of fuel cycle activities: working paper submitted by Germany and the Russian Federation  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.23 Arab working paper submitted by the United Arab Emirates on behalf of the Group of Arab States, which are States members of the League of Arab States to the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, New York, 4-15 May 2009: Implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.24 The future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: effectiveness and future challenges: working paper submitted by the United Arab Emirates on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.25 Development of the initiative of the Russian Federation to establish a reserve of low enriched uranium (LEU) for the supply of LEU to the International Atomic Energy Agency for its member States: working paper submitted by the Russian Federation  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.26 Working paper on forward-looking proposals of the European Union on all three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be part of an action plan adopted by the 2010 Review Conference  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.27 The European Union and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty working paper  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.28 Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle: working paper submitted by the Republic of Korea  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.29 Environmental consequences of uranium mining: working paper submitted by Kyrgyzstan on behalf of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.30 Substantive recommendations to the third session of the Preparatory Committee and the 2010 Review Conference: working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.31 Progress towards nuclear disarmament by the United States of America: working paper submitted by the United States of America

NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.32 Contributions of the Latin American and Caribbean States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco: working paper submitted by the States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.33 Working paper submitted by Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain and Turkey for consideration at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.34 Multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle: increasing transparency and sustainable security: working paper submitted by Austria  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.35 A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as the next logical multilateral instrument to be negotiated for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: working paper submitted by the European Union  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.36 Nuclear disarmament: France’s practical commitment: working paper submitted by France  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.37 Nuclear disarmament: a concrete step by France — Visit to France’s former fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons: working paper submitted by France  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.38 Japan’s activities in technical cooperation related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy: working paper submitted by Japan  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.39 Nuclear power development: meeting the world’s energy needs and fulfilling article IV: working paper submitted by Canada, Estonia, France, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Ukraine and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.40 Working paper on procedures in relation to exports of nuclear materials and certain categories of equipment and material in relation to article III (2) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/DEC.1 Record of decisions  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/CRP.1 Draft rules of procedure for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/CRP.2 Draft decision on adjustment to the dates of the Review Conference  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/CRP.3 Draft provisional agenda  
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 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/CRP.5 Draft decision on background documentation  
 NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/CRP.6 Draft decision on the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the Review Conference  
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## Report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on its Second Session

[Reproduced from NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/13  
9 May 2008]

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[Editorial note: Footnote not included]

### I. Introduction

[Eds...]

3. The following 106 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons participated in the work of the

Preparatory Committee at its second session: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[Eds...]

## II. Substantive and procedural issues

### A. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee

7. The Committee continued to conduct its work on the basis of the agenda adopted at its first session (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/15),

[Eds...]

8. At its 1st meeting, on 28 April 2008, the Committee took note of the indicative timetable for its second session (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/INF.2).

9. In the course of discussions on agenda item 7 on the organization of work of the Preparatory Committee, the following decisions were taken.

#### (a) Election of officers

10. At its 12th meeting, on 6 May 2008, the Committee decided to elect Boniface Guwa Chidyausiki of Zimbabwe as Chairman of its third session (see NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/DEC.1).

#### (b) Dates and venues for further sessions

11. At its 12th meeting, on 6 May 2008, the Committee decided to hold its third session in New York from 4 to 15 May 2009 (see NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/DEC.1).

#### (c) Methods of work

##### (ii) Participation

12. Pursuant to the relevant rules of procedure and the decision taken at its first session, the Committee, at its 1st meeting, on 28 April 2008, took note of requests from specialized agencies, international and regional intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations to attend its meetings as observers.

13. Accordingly, representatives of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the European Commission and the League of Arab States attended the meetings of the Committee as observers, other than those designated as closed meetings.

14. Furthermore, representatives of 64 non-governmental organizations (see NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/INF.4/Rev.1) attended the meetings of the Committee, other than those designated as closed meetings.

##### (iv) Records and documents

15. The Committee set aside four meetings for a general debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee, in the course of which 47 statements were made. Furthermore, in accordance with the decision adopted at its first session, the Committee invited the representatives of the League of Arab States and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials to make statements at the end of

the general debate. The statements are reflected in the summary records of those meetings (see NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/SR.1-3 and 5).

16. At its 4th meeting, on 29 April, the Committee heard the statements of representatives of 15 non-governmental organizations.

[Eds...]

19. The Committee considered the following three clusters of issues based on the allocation of items to the main committees of the 2005 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2005/DEC.1):

- Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security;
- Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II.

20. The Committee considered the following three specific blocs of issues:

- Nuclear disarmament and security assurances;
- Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East;
- Other provisions of the Treaty, including article X.

[Eds...]

### B. Organization of the 2010 Review Conference

22. The Preparatory Committee, in conformity with its task of preparing for the 2010 Review Conference, considered issues contained in agenda item 9. It took the following actions.

#### (a) Dates and venue

23. At its 12th meeting, on 6 May 2008, the Committee decided to hold the Review Conference in New York from 26 April to 21 May 2010 (see NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/DEC.1).

#### (d) Appointment of the Secretary-General

24. At its 12th meeting, on 6 May 2008, the Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General for the 2010 Review Conference, a nomination which would later be confirmed by the Conference itself (see NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/DEC.1).

#### (f) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee

25. In response to the request made by the Committee at its first session, the Secretariat provided the Committee with an estimate of the costs of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including its Preparatory Committee (see NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/1).

26. At its 12th meeting, on 6 May 2008, the Committee:

- Took note of the estimated costs of the 2010 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee (see NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/1) and expressed its understanding that the workload statistics of the second session of the Preparatory Committee would determine whether the cost estimates contained in either annex I or annex II would be used as the basis for requests for advance payments for both the third session of the Preparatory Committee and the 2010 Review Conference, and agreed that assessed and outstanding dues must be paid in proper time;
- In order to promote greater financial transparency and accountability, and taking into account the practice of multilateral and other organizations, requested the Secretary-General to provide a financial report to the Review Conference and each session of its Preparatory Committee to be circulated as an official document (see NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/DEC.1).

**C. Documentation**

27. During the session, the following documents were before the Committee:

[Eds...]

**Annex****Summary records of the second session of the Preparatory Committee**

[To be distributed individually as NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/SR.1-3, 5 and 14]

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**Second Session of the Preparatory Committee  
for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to  
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear  
Weapons. Chairman's Working Paper**

[Reproduced from NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.43,  
9 May 2008]

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[Editorial note: Footnotes not included]

1. States parties<sup>1</sup> reaffirmed that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty) was the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. In the face of grave challenges to the non-proliferation regime, preserving and strengthening the Treaty was vital to international peace and security.

2. States parties noted the positive outcome of the first session of the 2007 Preparatory Committee and expressed the need to lay a solid basis for a successful Review Conference in 2010. They also noted that the 2008 session of the Preparatory Committee had taken place in the year of the fortieth anniversary of the Treaty's opening for signature. Recent public and political momentum towards a world free of nuclear weapons was noted. The need for concrete and practical steps to achieve that goal was highlighted.

3. States parties reaffirmed that the Treaty rested on three pillars: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The importance of the balanced, full and non-selective application and implementation of the Treaty was stressed. Emphasis was placed on the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation, and due respect for the right of States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the Treaty.

4. States parties continued to attach great importance to achieving compliance with the Treaty. The importance of compliance by all States parties with all the provisions of the Treaty at all times was stressed. Non-compliance with the Treaty's provisions by States parties undermined non-proliferation, disarmament, universality and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

5. States parties reiterated their commitment to the effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty, the decisions and resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, adopted without a vote, and the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, adopted by consensus.

6. States parties reaffirmed the importance of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes in ways consistent with the non-proliferation goal of the Treaty. A number of proposals for establishing multilateral mechanisms that guaranteed the provision of nuclear fuel under strict international control were presented.

7. States parties stressed that continued support to achieve universality of the Treaty remained essential. They expressed concern about the lack of progress in the achievement of universality, which seriously undermined the Treaty. States parties called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without conditions. Those States were also called upon to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Protocols, for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development, testing or deployment, and to refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security

and the international community's efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. States parties called upon India and Pakistan to maintain moratoriums on nuclear testing, and called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to become parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

8. States parties expressed concern that non-State actors could gain access to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The gravity of the dangers of weapons of mass destruction being acquired by terrorists further reinforced the need to strengthen the Treaty and its implementation. In addition, States parties noted the need for adherence to existing legal instruments, especially the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and for full compliance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

9. States parties expressed the need for multilateralism and mutually agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as the only sustainable method for dealing with the multiplicity of disarmament, non-proliferation and international security issues. Multilateralism based on the concept of shared commitments and obligations provided the best way to maintain international order.

10. States parties remained committed to implementing article VI of the Treaty. The full implementation of the 13 practical steps, including the unequivocal undertaking contained in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, was called for. Recent moves towards nuclear disarmament by some nuclear-weapon States were recognized. Concern continued to be expressed, however, about the slow pace of progress made in implementing the practical steps. A forward-looking review of the 13 steps and of progress towards their implementation was urged.

11. States parties stated that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against their proliferation or use or threat of use. Despite achievements in bilateral and unilateral reductions by some nuclear-weapon States, concern was expressed that the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still amounted to thousands. It was stressed that the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear arsenals. There were calls for a time-bound framework for achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

12. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligations of nuclear-weapon States (96/23 of 8 July 1996) was recalled and support was voiced for the development of a nuclear weapons convention. A subsidiary body dealing with nuclear disarmament at the 2010 Review Conference was sought.

13. Concerns were also voiced about the increased role of nuclear weapons in some strategic and military doctrines, and the apparent lowering of the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Calls were made for the re-evaluation of the strategic utility of nuclear weapons and their role in national security policies in the post-Cold War context.

14. Concern and disappointment were voiced about plans of some nuclear-weapon States to replace or modernize nuclear weapons and their means of delivery or platforms, and about the development of new types of nuclear weapons. In response, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America provided clarifications and explanations on their efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. The need to foster an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament was underlined. Considerable concern was also expressed about nuclear cooperation of States parties with States not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

15. States parties also attached significance to reducing the deployed status of nuclear weapons through de-alerting and de-targeting, to reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and to securing greater information from nuclear-weapon States on the active and reserve status of nuclear arsenals with a view to increasing confidence among all States parties. They welcomed the efforts of some nuclear weapon States in that regard, noting such practical measures could raise the threshold for uses of nuclear weapons and help avoid the risk of accidents and miscalculation.

16. Nuclear-weapon States reiterated their commitment to nuclear

disarmament under article VI of the Treaty. The more forthcoming way in which some nuclear weapon States were treating their article VI commitments was recognized. A number of nuclear-weapon States outlined their respective measures taken in accordance with article VI, underscoring actual and projected reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals, an accelerated programme of dismantlement, reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and reductions in their status of alert. France referred to its concrete plan of action on disarmament, to which the nuclear-weapon States should commit by 2010. The importance of transparent verification for nuclear disarmament measures was stressed, and the initiatives of the United Kingdom to explore the technical aspects of verifying nuclear disarmament through greater cooperation among nuclear-weapons States and with non-nuclear-weapon States were welcomed. It was noted that strategic conditions could have an impact on the pace of nuclear disarmament. Concerns were also voiced about apparent re-interpretations of nuclear disarmament obligations.

17. States parties underlined the special responsibility of the two States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals and acknowledged the progress made under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty). While noting those achievements, States parties called for further reductions beyond those required by the Moscow Treaty and stressed that reductions in deployments and in operational status could not be a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. States parties noted that START I and the Moscow Treaty were due to expire in 2009 and 2012, respectively, and called for bilateral follow-up agreements. They welcomed the Russian Federation-United States declaration in Sochi regarding a legally binding post-START arrangement. It was stressed that the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency should guide all nuclear disarmament measures.

18. States parties welcomed the more detailed information provided by most nuclear-weapon States on the number of weapons in their arsenals and progress in reducing those numbers. All States parties were called upon to increase transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals, implementation of disarmament measures and security doctrines. The establishment of mechanisms for standardized reporting and progressive recording of reductions in nuclear arsenals was urged.

19. Reporting by all States parties on the implementation of article VI was urged. Reporting by non-nuclear-weapon States in regional alliances with nuclear-weapon States on their efforts to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in collective security arrangements was encouraged. It was noted that routine reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall Treaty regime by increasing transparency and at the same time would help address compliance concerns.

20. States parties welcomed the impetus that had developed in the Conference on Disarmament under the six Presidents for 2006 and 2007 and that had continued in 2008. The positive contribution of cooperation and coordination of the six-President mechanism was noted and calls were made for its continuation. With reference to proposal CD/1840, it was widely emphasized that the Conference should commence substantive work as a matter of urgency.

21. Strong support was expressed for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The importance and urgency of its early entry into force were underscored. In that regard, the recent ratifications by Bahamas, Barbados, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Malaysia and Palau were welcomed. States that had not ratified the Treaty, especially the remaining nine whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force, were urged to do so without delay. The Joint Declaration of the Article XIV Conference, held in Vienna in 2007, was welcomed.

22. The testing of a nuclear weapon by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had highlighted the need for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. States parties reaffirmed the importance of maintaining a moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. They commended the progress made by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in establishing the international monitoring system.

States parties were called upon to support the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization by providing adequate resources and expertise.

23. The abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the development of missile defence systems drew concern as adversely affecting strategic stability and having negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Concern was also expressed about the risk of a new arms race on Earth and in outer space. In the latter regard, States parties noted the tabling in the Conference on Disarmament of a proposal for a treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space.

24. States parties highlighted the need to address non-strategic nuclear weapons, including their withdrawal to the possessor's territory. The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 by the United States and the Russian Federation were welcomed and calls were made for the formalization of those initiatives. The importance of further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons in a transparent, accountable, verifiable and irreversible manner was stressed. The proposal by the Russian Federation to transform the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty into a multilateral instrument was noted, as was the importance of continuing to fulfil existing commitments. The need to deny terrorists access to non-strategic nuclear weapons was also noted. Moreover, concerns were expressed about the ongoing proliferation of ballistic missiles. The reference to the elimination of the means of delivery in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was noted, and States parties were invited to adhere to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

25. The importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty concerning fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices was stressed. Calls were made to address the verifiability of such an instrument and the need for coverage of existing stocks. The urgent conclusion of such a treaty would be beneficial to the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Several proposals for progress on that issue were put forward, including a phased approach perhaps beginning with a framework treaty that could be strengthened and elaborated in protocols, the establishment of a group of scientific experts within the Conference on Disarmament, joint declarations to stop production of such material, a fissile material control initiative and the convening of a high-level expert panel. States that had not yet done so were called upon to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

26. The importance was emphasized of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other relevant international verification, and on arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes. Some nuclear-weapon States reported on the actions they had taken in that regard. In that context, the Trilateral Initiative was regarded as an important measure. The ongoing efforts of nuclear weapon States to convert excess highly enriched uranium for civilian use was commended and encouraged.

27. States parties recognized the positive contribution of various initiatives towards cooperation in reducing threats from all weapons of mass destruction. They included the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the Proliferation Security Initiative.

28. States parties welcomed other new initiatives by Governments and within civil society aiming at achieving the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, including the 5 principles and 10 recommendations developed at an international disarmament conference held in Oslo in February 2008, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission and the call from four United States elder statesmen.

29. The importance was stressed of education on disarmament and non-proliferation to strengthen the disarmament and non-proliferation regime for future generations. In that regard, States parties were encouraged to undertake concrete activities to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation

education (see A/57/124) and to share information thereon. Steps and means as well as new initiatives to implement the recommendations were reiterated at the meeting.

30. States parties noted that, pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon States should provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. Security assurances could serve as incentives to forgo the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and to achieve universality of the Treaty. It was recalled that both the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference had underscored the importance of security assurances. It was further recalled that the final document of the 2000 Review Conference called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on security assurances. It was emphasized that negative security assurances, an element that contributed to the 1995 extension decision, remained essential and should be reaffirmed and implemented. The view was expressed that it was a legitimate right of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to receive such assurances. Reaffirmations were expressed of commitments under Security Council resolution 984 (1995). Some States parties emphasized the importance of a no-first-use policy as maintained by China.

31. States parties stressed that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority, without prejudice to security assurances already given bilaterally or under nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. In that regard, references were made to pursuing a protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the prospect of substantive discussions envisaged by the current draft decision put forward by the six Presidents of the Conference on Disarmament. Pending the conclusion of any new instrument, nuclear-weapon States were called upon to honour their respective commitments under Security Council resolution 984 (1995), nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and bilateral arrangements. The view was expressed that commitments under resolution 984 (1995) were not legally binding or unconditional, falling short of meeting non-nuclear-weapon States' security requirements. Concern was expressed that recent developments in respect of nuclear doctrines might, in any event, undermine the aforementioned commitments. An international conference under the auspices of the United Nations to discuss the issue of security assurances was proposed. There were calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances at the 2010 Review Conference.

32. It was stressed that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was a fundamental goal of the Treaty. Concern was expressed that grave proliferation challenges strained the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, eroding confidence in the compliance by States parties with their obligations under the Treaty. The need to effectively address proliferation issues within the Treaty was stressed. States parties were called upon to exert maximum effort to bring about diplomatic solutions to concerns about compliance and strengthen confidence among all States parties.

33. States parties reaffirmed that IAEA was the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States parties underlined the need for strengthening the role of IAEA and reaffirmed that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the Agency in verifying non-diversion. They noted the need for effectively addressing violations of safeguards obligations in order to uphold the integrity of the Treaty.

34. States parties welcomed the efforts of the Agency in strengthening safeguards and its completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards, as well as the steps taken towards their application. They stressed the importance of IAEA safeguards as a fundamental part of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and commended the important work of IAEA in implementing safeguards to verify compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty. The IAEA safeguards thereby promoted further confidence among States, helped to

strengthen their collective security and played a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

35. States parties expressed the need to strive towards the universalization and strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system. While welcoming the recent entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols with a number of States parties, concern was expressed that some 30 States parties had yet to bring into force safeguards agreements, as required by article III, and that only 87 had Additional Protocols in force. States that had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA were called upon to do so without further delay.

36. The importance of the Additional Protocol as an essential and indispensable tool for effective functioning of the IAEA safeguards system was underlined. It was stressed that States parties must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol in place for IAEA to be able to provide credible

assurance of both the non-diversion of declared material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the States concerned.

37. States parties reaffirmed the need for the Additional Protocol to be universalized, and noted that further efforts in promoting that goal were needed to increase confidence in the compliance by States parties with their non-proliferation obligations. States parties that had not yet concluded Additional Protocols were called upon to do so as soon as possible. Efforts to achieve universal application of the Additional Protocol should not hamper efforts towards achieving universality of comprehensive safeguards agreements.

38. Views were expressed that the strengthened safeguards system — a comprehensive safeguards agreement coupled with the Additional Protocol — constituted the Non-Proliferation Treaty's verification standard and that that standard should be used as a precondition for new supply arrangements. In that regard, views were also expressed that concluding an Additional Protocol should remain a voluntary confidence-building measure. New arrangements on the Small Quantities Protocols agreed in 2005 at IAEA were welcomed and considered an important step in the process of strengthening safeguards. All concerned States were called upon to adopt that new standard.

39. It was reiterated that export controls were a key element of the non-proliferation regime under the Treaty. In the light of revelations regarding clandestine proliferation networks, States parties underlined that effective export controls, together with IAEA safeguards, were an integral part of the regime. Their legitimate role in ensuring compliance with articles I, II and III, and in facilitating peaceful nuclear cooperation was emphasized, as was the need for all States to exercise vigilance in the transfer of sensitive equipment and technology. The important role played by the international export control framework for nuclear related materials and technologies, namely the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, was noted, in particular their utility in guiding States in setting up their national export control policies. States parties were urged, however, to implement export controls in a transparent, non-discriminatory and cooperative manner. It was further stressed that the inalienable rights under article IV should not be undermined.

40. Support was expressed for internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned and on the basis of established United Nations guidelines. The contribution of such zones to enhancing global and regional peace and security, including the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation, was emphasized. It was noted that the number of States covered by the nuclear-weapon-free zones exceeded 105. The establishment of such zones under the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk was considered a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. The importance of the entry into force of all the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties was stressed. In that regard, States parties welcomed the recent ratifications of the Pelindaba Treaty and the Plan of Action endorsed by the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Commission to strengthen the implementation of the Bangkok Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States' renewed efforts to resolve the pending issues on the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty

were seen as encouraging. Nuclear-weapon States were called upon to provide security assurances to members of nuclear-weapon-free zones by signing and ratifying protocols to those treaties.

41. Continuing and increased cooperation among the parties to the zones was encouraged, as was the development of a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere. States parties welcomed the conclusion and the recent ratifications of the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The need for further consultations among concerned countries in accordance with the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines to resolve outstanding issues regarding the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was expressed. Support for the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia was reiterated. Efforts to institutionalize that status were noted. States parties underlined the importance of establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in the Middle East and South Asia.

42. States parties reaffirmed the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and emphasized that the resolution remained valid until its goals and objectives were achieved. The resolution was both an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and an essential part of the basis on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties reiterated their support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Strong concern was voiced at the lack of measurable implementation of the resolution. Renewed, action-oriented determination to implement the resolution was strongly urged. States parties affirmed the importance of establishing practical mechanisms within the review process to promote the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in particular by reporting to the Secretary-General on the steps they had taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. A subsidiary body within Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference was sought, together with a specific period of time during the Preparatory Committee and the establishment of a standing committee of the members of the Bureau of that Conference to follow up intersessionally the implementation of recommendations concerning the Middle East. The convening of an international conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, with the participation of nuclear-weapon States and all States in the region, was sought.

43. States parties noted that all States of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, were States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Great concern was expressed regarding the nuclear capability of Israel. States parties called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible as a non-nuclear weapon State, conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement and place its nuclear facilities under full scope IAEA safeguards. Concern was also expressed about nuclear cooperation with States outside the IAEA safeguards system, especially Israel. The need for monitoring compliance by States parties with articles I, II and III, in particular obligations regarding transfer, was stressed.

44. The importance of creating an environment conducive to implementation of the Middle East resolution was emphasized. The presence of nuclear weapons in the region was seen as an impediment to aspirations for the Middle East to become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. States parties welcomed the voluntary decisions by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to abandon its programmes for developing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as its ratification of the Additional Protocol. All States in the region that had not yet done so were urged to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, conclude with IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols, and become parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. More generally, States parties also expressed full support for achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The view was expressed that the lack of progress in the Middle East peace process should not inhibit implementation of the 1995 resolution. It was also noted that the accession of all States in the region to the Non-Proliferation Treaty would contribute to the objective of establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear

weapons as well as of other weapons of mass destruction.

45. States parties reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement of the Islamic Republic of Iran and insisted that that country comply fully and without further delay with all the requirements in Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) as well as the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors. States parties noted that IAEA had reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran and that it remained unable to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in that country; and that certain questions and verification matters were resolved while yet others, including some of serious concern, were not. The completion of the workplan to resolve some outstanding issues between the Islamic Republic of Iran and IAEA was noted. States parties noted further that IAEA would continue, in accordance with its procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and to verify, as part of its verification, the completeness of that country's declaration. States parties believed the issue should be resolved peacefully through diplomatic efforts and negotiations. Questioning the need for the involvement of the Security Council, the Islamic Republic of Iran indicated its readiness to continue to resolve the outstanding issues within the framework of IAEA. It underscored its intention to cooperate with IAEA in accordance with its legal obligations envisaged in the IAEA statute and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It reiterated the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and declared its resolve not to suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities.

46. States parties recognized that the nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea presented a grave challenge to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and noted the progress achieved under the 13 February 2007 initial actions and the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. They welcomed the monitoring and verification arrangements implemented by IAEA with the agreement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They also welcomed the continuing verification by IAEA of the shutdown status of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. States parties noted that the disabling of some of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was currently under way. They were concerned that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had not yet submitted a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programmes and activities, and urged it to do so promptly. They urged that country to comply with Security Council resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006) and the joint statement of September 2005, to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes as well as associated ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and to return promptly to compliance with the obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement. States parties stressed the importance of achieving the goal of the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. They underlined the need for a peaceful solution to that issue and welcomed the diplomatic efforts undertaken in the framework of the six-party talks.

47. There was concern about reports of alleged clandestine nuclear activities by the Syrian Arab Republic, and calls were made for prompt clarifications regarding those activities in cooperation with IAEA. The unilateral actions taken in response to those alleged activities prompted some States parties to highlight the need for early involvement of IAEA in cases of suspected proliferation activities. The Syrian Arab Republic reiterated its commitment to compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and safeguards agreements with IAEA, rejecting the validity of any information suggesting otherwise.

48. States parties reaffirmed their inalienable right under article IV to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. It was noted that, as part of the fundamental bargain, nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be interpreted as affecting that right. It was stressed that participating in and facilitating the exchange of nuclear technology for peaceful uses must be consistent with the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations.

49. In view of climate change and the growing demand for nuclear energy and sustainable development, a call was also made to fully

ensure the free, unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The proliferation risks associated with the growing global energy demand were noted. The importance of assisting States parties to develop safeguards, safety and security was emphasized. The development of internationally agreed criteria for transfers of proliferation-sensitive nuclear equipment and technology was suggested. It was reiterated that additional restrictions should not be applied to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially in developing countries or for political purposes.

50. In that context, States parties emphasized the value and importance of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, underlining that technical cooperation played an important role in further developing the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. States parties acknowledged the wide application of nuclear technology for areas in health, industry, agriculture and environmental protection. Appreciation was expressed for the assistance rendered, in particular for developing countries, through the programme. It was stressed that States parties should take measures to ensure that the programme was adequately and predictably financed. There was some concern that the programme could be used as a political tool.

51. Attention was drawn to the significance of developing proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies, including through the international project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). In that regard, references were made to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.

52. The importance of strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection, the safety of radioactive waste management and the safe transport of nuclear and radioactive materials, including maritime transport, was highlighted. The need for maintaining the highest standards of safety at civilian nuclear installations through national measures and international cooperation was also emphasized. Concern was expressed about the environmental consequences of uranium mining and assistance was sought with radiological assessment and remedial measures in the affected areas in accordance with the appeal made in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

53. The role of IAEA in the promotion of safety in all its aspects was underlined and it was noted that further efforts were needed in that regard. States parties that had not yet done so were called upon to accede to all relevant conventions on nuclear safety, safe waste management and physical protection of nuclear material and the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. States parties supported efforts to enhance the security of existing stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, while minimizing its use in the civilian nuclear sector. They called for the acceleration of efforts to develop and implement a fully effective global nuclear security framework. Support was expressed for the work undertaken by the International Expert Group on Liability (INLEX). The importance of maintaining dialogue on facilitating safe maritime transport of radioactive material was stressed.

54. States parties noted the importance of combating nuclear terrorism and strongly supported existing IAEA initiatives in that regard. The IAEA action plan on protection against nuclear terrorism was widely noted and supported. States parties called for full implementation of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006) and 1810 (2008). In addition, the entry into force of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, in July 2007, was noted and States parties were called upon to accede thereto.

55. Other initiatives, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism were also noted. IAEA work in support of States' efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material was commended. In that context, States noted the new proliferation threat posed by clandestine activities and networks for the supply of nuclear goods and technologies. It was emphasized that only through proactive and full cooperation and assistance to the Agency could such proliferation threats be addressed. States parties were encouraged to enhance cooperation among themselves and with international organizations, in particular IAEA, to prevent, detect and respond to suspected proliferation activities and illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, equipment and technology. States parties stressed the importance of contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund of IAEA.

States expressed support for measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and related material and welcomed the principles of the Group of Eight in that regard.

56. States parties urged the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities as an element of the non-proliferation regime that should be emphasized, in particular in the light of the heightened risk of nuclear terrorism. They welcomed the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and urged States that had not yet done so to accede to the amended convention. All States were urged to implement the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

57. States parties emphasized the need to increase international cooperation in respect of the promotion of multilateralism in the nuclear fuel cycle and the supply of nuclear fuel. The numerous existing proposals, including the establishment of a fuel bank of low enriched uranium and multilateral enrichment centres, as well as the ongoing discussions in IAEA on fuel supply assurance mechanisms, were welcomed. States parties expressed their willingness to participate in and contribute to such discussions. It was stressed that such proposals should be addressed in a multilaterally negotiated, comprehensive, economically viable and non-discriminatory manner under the auspices of IAEA, without restrictions on access to nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. It was noted that a balanced multilateral mechanism could significantly contribute to confidence-building in the field of non-proliferation, to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to the overall strength of the non-proliferation regime. It was emphasized that the multilateralization of the fuel cycle should not deny States parties choices regarding the development of national fuel cycles and should be consistent with the Treaty.

58. States parties reaffirmed the sovereign right of each State party to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as provided for in article X (1). It was noted that article X envisaged that withdrawal would be exercised only in the face of extraordinary events. It was stated that the goal was not to deny the right to withdraw, but to make it more difficult for violators to use withdrawal to escape accountability for their violations. Importance was attached to the need for any withdrawal to be made in a manner consistent with the requirements, purposes and objectives of the Treaty. The view was expressed that because of its potential to undermine the Treaty, a withdrawal would warrant international scrutiny, as envisaged in article X. The elaboration of effective and prompt modalities under which States parties could collectively respond to notifications of withdrawal was urged.

59. Views were expressed that a State that withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty should not be able to benefit from nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired while party to the Treaty. States parties urged supplier countries to make arrangements to retrieve from the withdrawing State any nuclear material, facilities and equipment transferred prior to withdrawal or ensure an end to their use. It was emphasized that, under international law, a withdrawing party was liable for breaches of the Treaty that occurred prior to withdrawal. It was also stressed that nuclear material, equipment and technology acquired by States parties for peaceful purposes prior to withdrawal must remain subject to peaceful uses under IAEA safeguards. Concerns were expressed that some proposals on article X went beyond the provisions of the Treaty.

60. The need was noted for States parties to undertake consultations and conduct every diplomatic effort, including on a regional basis, to encourage a party to reconsider its sovereign position to withdraw. Given the particular circumstances envisaged in article X for the exercise of the right to withdraw, the role of the Security Council, as provided for in that article, was also underlined.

61. The need to strengthen the Treaty and its review process was expressed. A range of views was expressed on the need for institutional improvements, such as annual or extraordinary meetings of States parties, consideration of national reports, a small standing bureau or standing committee, streamlining of documentation and an enhanced secretariat.

62. Views were expressed on rotation among regional groupings of the chairpersonship of the preparatory committees and the review conferences for future cycles. The issues of financial assessments

and adequate financial support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle were also raised.

63. Noting the contributions from civil society in promoting the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and in developing proposals on practical measures to achieve this vision, States parties emphasized the value of the involvement and contribution of civil society in the process of reviewing the Treaty. Substantive proposals were made for the enhanced participation of non-governmental organizations.

### Report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on its First Session (Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007)

[Reproduced from NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/22, 11 May 2007]

#### I. Introduction

[Eds...]

4. The 106 following States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons participated in the work of the Preparatory Committee at its first session: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

[Eds...]

#### II. Substantive and procedural issues

##### A. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee

7. With regard to the chairmanship of the various sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the presidency of the 2010 Review Conference, an understanding had been reached among delegations, according to which a representative of the Western Group should be proposed to chair the first session, a representative of the Group of Eastern European States should be proposed to chair the second session, a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be proposed to chair the third session and a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty should be proposed for the presidency of the 2010 Review Conference.

All groups were encouraged to propose the representatives for the chairmanship of the various sessions of the Preparatory Committee and for the presidency of the 2010 Review Conference at their earliest possible convenience.

8. Pursuant to that understanding, Yukiya Amano (Japan), the representative of the Western Group, was proposed to chair the first session. At its 1st meeting, on 30 April, the Committee unanimously elected Mr. Amano to serve as Chairman of the first session. Also at the same meeting, the Committee decided that Volodymyr Yelchenko (Ukraine), the representative of the Group of Eastern European States, would be the Chairman of its second session. It was further decided that, when not serving as Chairman, the Chairmen of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee would serve as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee.

9. At its 12th meeting, on 8 May, the Committee adopted the following agenda (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/15):

1. Opening of the session.
2. Election of the Chairman.
3. Adoption of the agenda.
4. General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee.
5. Statements by non-governmental organizations.

6. Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East, adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of the 1975, 1985, 2000, and 2005 Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty, and thereby considering approaches and measures to realize its purpose, reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Treaty. (The Committee decides that it understands the reference in the agenda to "reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Treaty" to mean that it will consider compliance with all the provisions of the Treaty.)

7. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee:

[Eds...]

8. Report on the results of the session to the next session of the Preparatory Committee.

9. Organization of the 2010 Review Conference:

[Eds...]

10. Adoption of the final report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the Review Conference.

11. Any other matters.

10. In connection with the adoption of the agenda, the Committee adopted the following decision: "The Committee decides that it understands the reference in the agenda to 'reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Treaty' to mean that it will consider compliance with all the provisions of the Treaty". The Committee also decided that the text of the above decision would be included as the footnote to item 6 of the agenda. Furthermore, the Committee took note of the indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/INF.3/Rev.2), which was subsequently revised in accordance with the adopted agenda (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/INF.3/Rev.3).

11. In the course of the discussion on the organization of work of the Preparatory Committee, the following decisions were taken:

##### (a) Dates and venues of further sessions

At its 11th meeting, the Committee decided that it would hold its second session from 28 April to 9 May 2008 in Geneva.

##### (b) Methods of work

###### (i) Decision-making

[Eds...]

###### (ii) Participation

[Eds...]

###### (iii) Working languages

[Eds...]

###### (iv) Records and documents

[Eds...]

12. The Committee set aside five meetings for a general debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee, in the course of which 47 statements were made. The statements are reflected in the summary records of those meetings (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/SR.1-4 and 6).

13. At its 5th meeting, on 2 May, the Committee heard 7 statements by non-governmental organizations.

14. The Committee held a total of 6 meetings for a substantive discussion under agenda item 6.

15. The discussion was structured according to an indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/INF.3/Rev.3), which provided equal time for the consideration of three clusters of issues and three specific blocs of issues.

16. The Committee considered the following three clusters of issues based on the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the 2005 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2005/DEC.1):

(a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security;

(b) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones;

(c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II.

17. The Committee considered the following three specific blocs of issues:

- (a) Nuclear disarmament and security assurances;
- (b) Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution;
- (c) Other provisions of the Treaty, including article X.

18. During the session, the Committee had before it the following documents:

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**First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Chairman's Working Paper**

[Reproduced from NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.78,  
11 May 2007]

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[Editorial note: Footnote not included]

1. States parties reaffirmed that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. In the face of grave challenges to the non-proliferation regime, preserving and strengthening the Treaty was vital to international peace and security. States parties stressed the importance of the first session of the preparatory committee for laying a solid foundation for a successful new review cycle.

2. States parties reaffirmed that the Treaty rested on three pillars: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The importance of balanced, full and non-selective application and implementation of the Treaty was stressed. Emphasis was placed on the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation.

3. States parties reiterated their commitment to the effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty, the decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference adopted without a vote, and the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, adopted by consensus. It was also noted that the current situation should be borne in mind.

4. States parties expressed that multilateralism and mutually agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provided the only sustainable method of dealing with the multiplicity of disarmament and international security issues. States parties also expressed that multilateralism based on the concept of shared commitments and obligations provided the best way to maintain international order.

5. States parties expressed concern over the possibility that non-State actors could gain access to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The gravity of the dangers of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists further

reinforced the need to strengthen the Treaty and its implementation.

6. States parties further stressed that continued support to achieve universality of the Treaty remained essential. Concern was expressed about the lack of achievement in universality. States parties called upon States outside the Treaty to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without condition. They were also called upon to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, and to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development, testing or deployment, and to refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security and the international community's efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. States parties called upon India and Pakistan to maintain moratoriums on testing, and called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to become party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

7. States parties continued to attach great importance to achieving compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The importance of compliance by all States parties with all the provisions of the Treaty was stressed. The view was expressed that non-compliance with the Treaty's provisions by States parties to the Treaty could undermine non-proliferation, disarmament, universality and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

8. States parties remained committed to implementing article VI of the Treaty. The full implementation of the 13 practical steps including the unequivocal undertaking contained in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference was called for. While recent moves towards nuclear disarmament were recognized, concern continued to be expressed over the slow pace of progress made in implementing the steps.

9. States parties stated that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use. Concern was expressed that, despite the intentions of and past achievements in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still amounted to thousands. It was stressed that the indefinite extension of the NPT did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear arsenals.

10. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligations of nuclear-weapon States was recalled and support was voiced for the development of a nuclear weapons convention. A subsidiary body dealing with nuclear disarmament at the 2010 Review Conference was sought.

11. States parties also attached significance to reducing the deployed status of nuclear weapons through de-alerting, to reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and to securing greater information from nuclear-weapon States on the active and reserve status of nuclear arsenals.

12. Concern and disappointment were voiced about plans to replace or modernize nuclear weapons and their means of delivery or platforms, the increased role of nuclear weapons in strategic and military doctrines, and the possibility of lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. In response to concerns addressed to the United States and the United Kingdom, they provided their clarifications and explanations on their efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. Concern was also expressed about nuclear cooperation with States not party to the NPT, and calls were made for adherence to obligations under the Treaty.

13. Nuclear-weapon States reiterated their commitment to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty. A number of them delivered presentations, in particular with concrete figures, to other States parties of their respective measures taken in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, underscoring reductions of nuclear weapons arsenals, reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, reductions in their status of alert and an accelerated programme of dismantlement.

14. In that regard, the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty) was acknowledged as a positive trend towards nuclear disarmament. While noting those achievements and presentations, States parties called for further reductions

beyond those required by the Moscow Treaty and stressed that reductions in deployments and in operational status could not be a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. States parties noted that START I and the Moscow Treaty were due to expire in 2009 and 2012 respectively, and called for bilateral follow-up agreements. It was stressed that the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency should guide all nuclear disarmament measures. The need to create an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament was noted.

15. Increased transparency with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities as a voluntary confidence-building measure was strongly advocated. Nuclear-weapon States were called upon to increase transparency and accountability, such as through annual briefings, with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals, implementation of disarmament measures and security doctrines. An additional idea suggested was the compilation by the secretariat of a comparative table recording measures undertaken by nuclear-weapon States in complying with their obligations under article VI, for tabling at the 2010 Review Conference.

16. Reporting by all States parties on the implementation of article VI was encouraged. It was noted that this would promote increased confidence in the overall Treaty regime through increasing transparency, and at the same time would help address compliance concerns.

17. States parties welcomed the impetus that had developed in the Conference on Disarmament in 2006 under the six Presidents for that year and that had continued under their successors in 2007. It was emphasized that the Conference should agree on the proposal tabled on 23 March by the six Presidents for 2007.

18. Strong support was expressed for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The importance and urgency of its early entry into force was underscored. States that had not ratified the Treaty, especially the remaining 10 States whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force, were urged to do so without delay and without conditions. It was stressed that the testing of a nuclear weapon by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea highlighted the need for an early entry into force of the Treaty. States parties reaffirmed the importance of maintaining a moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. States parties noted the progress made by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in establishing the international monitoring system.

19. The termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the development of missile defence systems drew concern as adversely affecting strategic stability and having negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Concern was also expressed about the risk of a new arms race on Earth and in outer space.

20. States parties stressed the importance of further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons in a transparent, accountable, verifiable and irreversible manner, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process, for example through the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 by the United States and the Russian Federation. There were calls for the formalization of those initiatives. The need to deny terrorists access to non-strategic nuclear weapons was also noted.

21. The importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices was stressed as a logical step in the process of nuclear disarmament. Calls were made to address the verifiability of such an instrument and the need for coverage of existing stocks. The hope was expressed that such a treaty might be concluded prior to the 2010 Review Conference. States that had not yet done so were called upon to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

22. Stress was put on the importance of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other relevant international verification, and on arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes. Some nuclear-weapon States reported on the actions

they had taken in that regard. In that context, the Trilateral Initiative was regarded as an important measure. The ongoing efforts of nuclear-weapon States to convert excess highly enriched uranium for civilian use was commended and encouraged.

23. States parties recognized the importance of the Group of Eight Global Partnership as a positive contribution towards cooperation in reducing threats from all weapons of mass destruction through practical initiatives.

24. The importance of education on disarmament and non-proliferation to strengthen the disarmament and non-proliferation regime for future generations was stressed. In that regard, States parties were encouraged to make efforts based on the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education (A/57/124). Steps and means as well as new initiatives to implement the recommendations were introduced at the meeting.

25. States parties noted that, pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon States should provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that they would not use nuclear weapons against them. It was expressed that security assurances could play an important role in the NPT regime and serve as an incentive to forgo the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. It was also expressed that security assurances could serve as an incentive to achieve universality. It was recalled that both the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference had underscored the importance of security assurances. It was further recalled that the final document of the 2000 Review Conference called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on security assurances. It was emphasized that the need for negative security assurances, a key basis of the 1995 extension decision, remained essential should be reaffirmed. Reaffirmations were expressed of commitments under Security Council resolution 984 (1995). Some States parties, including one nuclear-weapon State, emphasized the importance of a no-first-use policy.

26. States parties stressed that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority, without prejudice to legally binding security assurances already given in respect of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In that regard, references were made to pursuing a protocol to the NPT and to the prospect of substantive discussions envisaged by the current draft decision put forward by the six Presidents of the Conference on Disarmament. Pending the conclusion of any new instrument, nuclear-weapon States were called upon to honour their respective commitments under Security Council resolution 984 (1995). Concern was expressed that recent developments in respect of nuclear doctrines might undermine those commitments. The eligibility of a State party to security assurances in circumstances where such a party was not in good standing under, or had withdrawn from, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was regarded as warranting discussion. The need for a subsidiary body on security assurances at the 2010 Review Conference was urged.

27. It was stressed that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was a fundamental goal of the Treaty. Concern was expressed that serious proliferation events strained the NPT regime by eroding confidence in the compliance of all States parties with their obligations under the Treaty. States parties reaffirmed that IAEA was the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States parties underlined the need for strengthening the role of IAEA and reaffirmed that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in verifying non-diversion. States parties noted the need for effectively addressing violations of safeguards obligations in order to uphold the integrity of the Treaty.

28. States parties congratulated IAEA on its fiftieth anniversary and welcomed the efforts of the Agency in strengthening safeguards and its completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards, as well as the steps taken towards their application.

States parties stressed the importance of IAEA safeguards as a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and commended the important work of IAEA in implementing safeguards to verify compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty. The IAEA safeguards thereby promoted further confidence among States, helped to strengthen their collective security and played a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. States parties expressed the need to strive towards the universalization and strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system. While welcoming the recent entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols with a number of States parties, concern was expressed that some 30 States parties had yet to bring into force safeguards agreements, as required by Article III, and that only 80 had additional protocols in force. States that had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA were called upon to do so without further delay.

29. The importance of the model additional protocol as an essential and indispensable tool for effective functioning of the IAEA safeguards system was underlined. It was stressed that States parties must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in place for IAEA to be able to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of declared material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the States concerned.

30. States parties reaffirmed the need for the model additional protocol to be universalized, and noted that further efforts in promoting that goal were needed to increase confidence in the compliance by States parties with their non-proliferation obligations. States parties that had not yet concluded additional protocols were called upon to do so as soon as possible. It was also stated that efforts to achieve universal application of the model additional protocol should not hamper efforts towards achieving universality of comprehensive safeguards agreements. Views were expressed that the strengthened safeguards system — a comprehensive safeguards agreement coupled with the Additional Protocol — constituted the Non-Proliferation Treaty's verification standard, and that this standard could be used as a precondition for new supply arrangements. In that regard, views were also expressed that concluding an additional protocol should remain voluntary. New arrangements on the Small Quantities Protocols agreed in 2005 at IAEA were welcomed and considered an important step in the process of strengthening safeguards; all concerned States were called upon to adopt that new standard.

31. It was reiterated that export controls were a key element of the non-proliferation regime under the Treaty. States parties underlined that effective export controls, together with comprehensive safeguards, were recognized as forming an integral part of the non-proliferation regime and would facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation. The important role played by the international export control framework for nuclear-related materials and technologies, namely the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, were noted, in particular their utility in guiding States in setting up their national export control policies.

32. Support was expressed for the concept of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned and on the basis of established United Nations guidelines. The contribution of such zones to enhancing global and regional peace and security, including the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation, was emphasized. It was noted that the number of States covered by the nuclear-weapon-free zones exceeded 105. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba was considered a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. The importance of the entry into force of all those nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties was stressed. Nuclear-weapon States were called upon to provide security assurances to nuclear-weapon-free zones by signing and ratifying protocols to those treaties.

33. Continuing and increased cooperation among the parties of the zones was encouraged, as was the development of a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere. The fortieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco was recognized. States parties welcomed the conclusion of the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaty. The need for further consultations among

concerned countries in accordance with the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines to resolve outstanding issues was expressed. Support for nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia was reiterated. States parties underlined the importance of establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in the Middle East and South Asia.

34. States parties reaffirmed the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and recognized that the resolution remained valid until its goals and objectives were achieved. The resolution was both an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and an essential part of the basis on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties reiterated their support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Strong concern was voiced at the lack of measurable implementation of the resolution. Renewed, action-oriented determination to implement the resolution was urged. States parties affirmed the importance of establishing practical mechanisms within the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process to promote the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, particularly through reporting to the Secretary-General on the steps that they had taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. A subsidiary body within Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference was sought, together with the establishment of a standing committee of the members of the bureau of that conference to report to the 2015 Review Conference. Support was also expressed for the arrangements to convene a forum requested at the forty-fourth IAEA General Conference with a view to facilitating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as well as the ongoing efforts under the 1995 Barcelona Declaration.

35. States parties noted that all States of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, were States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Great concern was expressed regarding the nuclear capability of Israel. States parties called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

36. The importance of the creation of an environment conducive for implementation of the resolution was underlined. The continued possession of nuclear weapons or ambitions to possess such weapons by States in the region was seen as an impediment to aspirations for the Middle East to become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. States parties welcomed the voluntary decisions by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to abandon its programmes for developing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as its ratification of the Additional Protocol. More generally, States parties also expressed full support for taking forward the Middle East peace process. It was also noted that a solution to the Iranian issue would contribute to the objective of establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

37. Serious concern was expressed over the nuclear programme of Iran (Islamic Republic of), which was strongly urged to comply with all the requirements in Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) and the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors without further delay. It was noted that these multiple unanimous Council resolutions on that country's nuclear programme demonstrated the resolve of the international community on that issue. States parties believed that the issue should be resolved peacefully through diplomatic efforts and negotiations. For its part, Iran (Islamic Republic of) indicated its readiness, provided the Security Council disengaged, to resolve issues in the framework of IAEA.

38. States parties expressed grave concern over the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its announcement of a nuclear test in October 2006, which represented not only a clear threat to international security but also a serious challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. They urged that country to comply with Security Council resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006) and the joint statement of September 2005, abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes as well as ballistic missiles programmes in a

complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, returning promptly to compliance with the obligations under the NPT and the IAEA safeguards agreement. States parties stressed the importance of achieving the goal of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. They underlined the need for a peaceful solution of this issue and welcomed the diplomatic efforts undertaken in the framework of the six-party talks. They welcomed the agreement reached on 13 February 2007 regarding initial actions towards the implementation of the joint statement, and called on the parties to faithfully and expeditiously implement the agreement.

39. States parties reaffirmed the inalienable right under article IV of all States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. It was noted that, as part of the fundamental bargain, nothing in the NPT should be interpreted as affecting that right. It was stressed that participating in and facilitating the exchange of nuclear technology for peaceful uses must be consistent with the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations.

40. In view of climate change and the growing demand for nuclear energy and sustainable development, a call was also made to fully ensure the free, unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Concern was expressed about the potential effect on the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly in the context of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. It was reiterated that additional restrictions should not be applied to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially in developing countries or for political purposes.

41. In that context, States parties emphasized the value and importance of the IAEA technical cooperation programme, underlining that technical cooperation played an important role in further developing the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Appreciation was expressed for the assistance rendered, particularly for developing countries through the programme. It was stressed that States parties ensured the programme remained firm and sustainable through adequate resources. It was also stressed that full compliance with articles I, II and III of the Treaty was the basic condition for benefiting from article IV. Concern was expressed that the programme could be used as a political tool. Attention was drawn to the significance of developing proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies. States parties acknowledged the wide application of nuclear technology for areas in health, industry, agriculture and environmental protection.

42. The importance of strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection, the safety of radioactive-waste management and the safe transport of nuclear and radioactive materials, including maritime transport, was stressed. The need for maintaining the highest standards of safety at civilian nuclear installations through national measures and international cooperation was also emphasized. The role of IAEA in the promotion of safety in all its aspects was underlined and it was noted that further efforts were needed in that regard. States parties that had not yet done so were called on to accede to all relevant conventions on nuclear safety, safe waste management and physical protection of nuclear material and the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. States parties supported efforts to enhance the security of existing stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, while minimizing its use in the civilian nuclear sector. The importance of maintaining dialogue on facilitating safe maritime transport of radioactive material was stressed.

43. States parties noted the importance of combating nuclear terrorism and strongly supported existing IAEA initiatives in that regard. The IAEA action plan on protection against nuclear terrorism was widely noted and supported. States parties called for full implementation of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) and noted the adoption of the convention against nuclear terrorism as well as other initiatives, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The Agency's work in support of States' efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material was also commended. In that context, States noted the new proliferation threat posed by clandestine networks for the supply of nuclear goods and technologies. It was emphasized that only through proactive and

full cooperation and assistance to IAEA could those threats be curbed. States parties stressed the importance of contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund of IAEA. States expressed support for measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and related material and welcomed the principles of the Group of Eight in that regard.

44. States parties urged the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities as an element of the non-proliferation regime that should be emphasized, particularly in the light of the heightened risk of nuclear terrorism. They welcomed the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and urged States that had not yet done so to accede to the amended convention. All States were urged to implement the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

45. States parties emphasized the need to increase international cooperation in respect of the promotion of multilateralism in the nuclear fuel cycle and the supply of nuclear fuel. The ongoing and forthcoming discussions at IAEA on fuel supply assurance mechanisms were noted, and some States parties made reference to the various proposals submitted on that subject, expressing their willingness to participate in and contribute to such discussions. It was stressed that such proposals should be addressed in a multilaterally negotiated, comprehensive and non-discriminatory manner under the auspices of IAEA, without restrictions on access to nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. The need to ensure participation by States in full compliance with their safeguards obligations was also stressed. Some States expressed the hope that the NPT review process would encourage further progress. It was noted that a balanced multilateral mechanism could significantly contribute to confidence-building in the field of non-proliferation and to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Some States noted that multilateralization of the fuel cycle should not deny States parties' choices regarding the development of national fuel cycles.

46. States parties were reminded about discussions held at the 2005 Review Conference on the need for disincentives on and response to withdrawal from the Treaty. While reaffirming the sovereign right of each State party to withdraw from the NPT as provided for in article X (1), it was noted that article X envisaged that withdrawal would be exercised only in the face of extraordinary events. Importance was attached to the need for any withdrawal to be made in a manner consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Treaty and that its consequences would be subject to international scrutiny.

47. Views were expressed that a State that withdraws from the NPT should not be able to benefit from nuclear materials, equipment and technology acquired while party to the Treaty. It was emphasized that, under international law, a withdrawing party was liable for breaches of the Treaty that occurred prior to withdrawal. It was also stressed that nuclear material, equipment and technology acquired by States for peaceful purposes prior to withdrawal must remain subject to peaceful uses under IAEA safeguards.

48. The need was noted for States parties to undertake consultations and conduct every diplomatic effort, including on a regional basis, to encourage a party to reconsider its sovereign position to withdraw. Given the particular circumstances envisaged in article X for the exercise of the right to withdraw, the role of the Security Council as provided for in that article was also underlined.

49. The need to strengthen the Treaty and its review process was expressed. Institutional improvements suggested included annual or extraordinary meetings of States parties, a small standing bureau or standing committee, and an enhanced secretariat.

50. There was an exchange of views on rotation among regional groupings of the chairpersonship of the preparatory committees and the review conferences for future cycles.

51. States parties emphasized the value of the involvement and contribution of civil society in the process of Treaty review. Substantive proposals were made for the enhanced participation of non-governmental organizations.