

U.S. Space Weapons

Big Intentions, Little Focus

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Bush National Space Policy

Bush National Space Policy

- Released Oct. 6, 5 pm, OSTP website
- More aggressively articulates space war-fighting strategy
- Rejects any “limits” on U.S. action in space
- Doesn't mandate, but doesn't rule out ASATs and/or space-based weapons
- Caps a number of other military space documents

Bush NSP, cont'd

- Claims freedom from attack and freedom to attack:

“The United States considers space capabilities – including ground and space segments and supporting links – vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; **dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.** (Emphasis added.)

Bush NSP, cont'd

- Space viewed through military prism:

“In this new century, those who effectively utilize space will enjoy added prosperity and security and will hold a substantial advantage over those who do not.

Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power.”

NSP and Space Weapons

- The NSP cannot be read in a vacuum, other key documents and statements must be weighed.
- Despite administration denials, the NSP should be read as blessing U.S. development of ASATs and space-based weapons.

UN Statements/Actions

- “[T]he high value of space systems -) for commerce and
- in support of military operations - long has led the United
- States to study the potential of space-related weapons to
- protect our satellites from potential future attacks,
- whether from the surface or from other spacecraft. As
- long as the potential for such attacks remains, our
- Government will continue to consider the possible role
- that space-related weapons may play in protecting our
- assets.”

**John Mohanco, Deputy Director
Office of Multilateral Nuclear Security Affairs,
U.S. State Department
June 13, 2006
Conference on Disarmament, Geneva**

UN cont'd

- PAROS Resolution Oct. 2005
 - 160 nations for
 - Israel abstained
 - U.S. “no”
- U.S. killed ad hoc committees
- CBM Resolution Oct. 2005
 - 160 nations for
 - Israel abstained
 - U.S. “no”

Joint Doctrine for Space Ops

- **Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, JP-314**
August 2002
Joint Chiefs of Staff
- “The United States must be able to protect its space assets (and when practical and appropriate, those of its allies) and deny the use of space assets by its adversaries.”
- “Within the domain of space operations, there are four primary mission areas: space control, force enhancement, space support and force application. Space control operations provide freedom of action in space for friendly forces while, when directed, denying it to an adversary, and include the broad aspect of protection of US and US allied space systems and negation of enemy adversary space systems. **Space control operations encompass all elements of the space defense mission and include offensive and defensive operations....Space control may involve activities conducted by land, sea, air, space and/or special operations forces. ...** “

Joint Doctrine, cont'd

Further, space control operations include:

“Negation – Measures to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy an adversary’s space capabilities. Negation can include action against the ground, link, or space segments of an adversary’s space system.”

Counterspace Operations Doctrine


U.S. Air Force Counterspace Operations Doctrine, AFDD 2-2.1 August 2004

- “US Air Force counterspace operations are the ways and means by which the Air Force achieves and maintains space superiority. Space superiority provides freedom to attack as well as freedom from attack.
- “OCS [Offensive Counterspace Operations] preclude an adversary from exploiting space to their advantage. **OCS operations may target an adversary’s space capability (space systems, terrestrial systems, links or third party space capability) using a variety of permanent and/or reversible means.** The “Five D’s” – deception, disruption, denial, degradation and destruction – describe the range of desired effects when targeting an adversary’s space systems.”

Space-based Interceptors

- The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), in its FY 07 budget documentation, cited plans to ask for \$45 million in FY 08 to begin research on a testbed for space-based interceptors (SBI).
- Lt. Gen. Trey Obering, MDA chief, in an Oct. 16, 2006, interview with *Space News* reiterated his interest in SBI.
- CBO (Oct. 2006) said MDA plans for operational SBI network by 2017.
- SBIs would have both defensive (vs. missiles) and offensive capabilities (vs. space launch or satellites)

Yelling Loudly

- U.S. Declaratory Posture Sends Signals:
 - All satellites are fair targets
 - U.S. intends to hold others' satellites at risk in peacetime and war
 - U.S. intends to pursue ASATs and space-based weaponry
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No Stick

- Actual Posture and Investment Strategy is at Odds with Declaratory Policy
 - Political and budgetary viability of a space-control strategy remains in question
 - Lack of capability
 - It takes decades to develop new military systems
 - Lack of significant investment, either in hardware or in people

Security Dilemma

- U.S. Declaratory Policy on Space Is Dangerous
 - Furthers perception of U.S. as unilateralist/aggressive
 - U.S. seen as further distancing itself from international law, norms and institutions
 - U.S. viewed as uncooperative in civil space
 - Alienates allies/isolates U.S. in space
 - Provides political cover for those adversaries who would target U.S. space assets
 - Cannot be implemented for at least a decade (if then)
 - Busts the status quo (which favors U.S.) with no realistic plan for U.S. reaction